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Ethiopia
Should Manage Internal Political Crisis and
Deflect External Threats
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
January 18, 2016
This
article is intended to address the current
political crisis surrounding Oromo outbursts in
Ethiopia by providing a general pattern of
political science theory in regards to crisis
management.
The
present Oromo protestation is instigated by the
so-called “Addis Ababa-Oromia Integrated Master
Plan” because protestors perceived the Master
Plan as ‘land grab’ from the Oromia region. To
the best of my knowledge, there is no such thing
as ‘land grab’ unless there is a hidden agenda
of the Addis Ababa City Administration to
systematically expand the Addis Ababa Zone by
incorporating Oromia adjacent lands.
Instead
of ‘land grab’, however, the protestors or the
opposition forces and even the disgruntled
elements could have made sense had they argued
that the Master Plan could have a far reaching
impact on Oromo farmers who leave in the adjacent
areas. In other words, one could easily surmise or
conjecture (and this could make sense in the
context of logic) that the Master Plan could
displace Oromo residents and destabilize their
livelihood.
Irrespective
of the perception of Oromo protestors, however,
the EPRDF Government has exhibited two major
weaknesses: 1) lack of transparency: the
Government should have clearly and openly
explained the nature and characteristics of the
Integrated Master Plan; 2) lack of peaceful
resolution to the crisis: Once the people (mostly
youth) in the Oromia region began protesting, the
Government should have immediately taken the
necessary measures toward dialogue with the
protestors instead of resorting to the use of
force to quell the demonstrations.
No
one could verify with certainty the number of
people killed in the Oromo protests, but external
media outlets, including the BBC, have reported
that a 140 people were killed by police. The
Ethiopian Government, on the other hand claims
that only 22 people were killed. The victims, of
course, are not just statistics; they are
Ethiopian citizens who are entitled to all rights,
including the sanctity of life.
As
I will discuss and extrapolate the management of
political crisis below, the Ethiopian Government
should seriously consider the peaceful resolution
of the problems and contradictions long before
they go out of hand, and it would not be too late
for the Government to initiate mini-conferences
dialogue in the Oromia region even after the
demonstrations have subsided and some isolated
disturbances have tapered off. The January 13,
2016 initiative by the Oromo People’s Democratic
Organization (OPDO), one of the four constituents
parts of the ruling EPRDF party, and its decision
to discontinue the Master Plan, for instance, is a
good gesture of crisis management, although it is
a little too late.
How
Ethiopia Can Manage Political Crisis:
1)
First and foremost, in an effort to maintain
peace, stability, and order, Ethiopia should adopt
a proactive policy of crisis prevention and/or
mitigation, that is, long before the crisis erupts
or trying to minimizing its effects after it
bursts. This policy applies to political and
social crises as well as to natural calamities.
2)
Ethiopia should establish conflict and
conflict-resolution institutions, not only as
government organizations or academic institutes
but also at grassroots levels in all Ethiopian
communities. This initiative can be supplemented
by traditional conflict resolution institutions.
3)
Ethiopia should utilize the democratic process as
a tool for conflict resolutions. Only democratic
societies have been successful in either
preventing or mitigating crises, but in the event
of an outburst or people’s uprising, democratic
nations can handle political crisis effectively
and efficiently. However, the main problem is that
democracy has not taken root in Ethiopia yet!
4)
Ethiopia, thus, should allow a broad range of
democratic rights to its citizens not only for
minimizing political crisis, but also for
nurturing participatory democratic culture in
which citizens, without the assistance of the
Government, will promote and foster the tools of
conflict resolution as mediation, negotiation,
dialogue, and reconciliation.1
On
top of what I have suggested above, the public
generally expects the Government to maintain peace
and order (and this is the quintessential task of
all governments) and as we say in political
science, a normative-analytical approach is
generally applied by policymakers in managing
political crises. In other words, “the ability
of governments to discern and solve different
types of crisis situation is a topic of
long-standing interests.”2
Moreover,
as many research studies and journals have
published on the management of crisis, “current
horizons in disaster and related studies need to
be broadened to incorporate a
political-administrative perspective on crises and
crisis management,”3 and as I have
pointed out earlier, “in times of crisis,
citizens look at their leaders, presidents and
mayors, local politicians and elected
administrators, public managers, and top civil
servants. We expect these policy makers to avert
or at least minimize the damage of the crisis at
hand. They should lead us of the crisis; they must
explain what went wrong and convince us that it
will not happen again.”4
Also,
as I have stated above, the Ethiopian Government
needs to be proactive and prevent political crisis
before the country plunges into a quagmire of
political crisis because there is a huge
difference between alertness and devotion on the
one hand and unpreparedness and negligence on the
other. “When emerging vulnerabilities are
adequately assessed and addressed some potentially
devastating contingencies simply do not happen.
Misperception and negligence, however, allow
crisis to occur. When policy makers respond well
to a crisis, the damage is limited. When you
[they] fail, the crisis impact increases. In
extreme cases, crisis management makes the
difference between life and death.”5
Ethiopia
under the EPRDF may have not been a complete
failure in dealing with internal political crises,
but it definitely demonstrated lethargy toward the
crisis and took a snail-type action in dealing
with Oromo protestors. This is quite astounding,
because a country that devoted itself in the
Somali and South Sudan civil wars for mediation
and peaceful resolution to the conflicts was
unable to mitigate its own political crisis.
The
more delayed actions by the seating government
could mean a dangerous encounter for Ethiopia in
which the country can slide into a nation-wide
crisis. Moreover, the internal or domestic
political crisis cannot be analyzed without
external threats, although these intriguing
endogamous and exogamous phenomena may not
intersect in a given situation or exhibit
inter-linkage in one form or another. In
some instances, however, both internal political
crisis and external threats could reinforce each
other and agents of the latter could deliberately
exacerbate the manifestations (for our present
discussion, the Oromo protestations) of the
former.
Historically,
Ethiopia has always been threatened by outside
forces. It was the historian Diodorus Siculus (90
BCE-30 BCE), who, long time ago, said, ‘Ethiopia
have had many enemies who wanted to conquer her,
but none of them was successful’.
Diodorus’ prophetic assertion could be
mesmerizing and give some solace and pride to
patriotic Ethiopians, but it is imperative that
Ethiopians never lose sight of their deadly
enemies and lay back and relax; on the contrary,
they should remain vigilant and alert at all
times.
What
Ethiopia should do to deflect external threats:
Some
Ethiopians are of the opinion that Ethiopia can
easily deflect or thwart external threats and this
assumption is mostly predicated on Ethiopia’s
relative military might and robust security
apparatus. One observer, for instance, says,
“For many experts following events in the Horn
of Africa and the fight against terrorism,
Ethiopia stands out as having been exceptionally
successful.”6
Ethiopia
may have been doing well in averting the threat of
terrorism, but this could not permanently
guarantee the country from the perils engendered
by external forces. For one thing, the Horn of
Africa is prone to conflicts and major wars; and
for another, Ethiopia was the only country in
Africa that was not colonized but it nonetheless
shared the brunt of European colonial domination
and imperialist hegemony, and as a result
Ethiopia’s modern history was determined by the
geopolitical policies of the colonial regimes. The
country was thus surrounded by French Djibouti,
British Sudan and Kenya, and Italian Eritrea; and
of all the encirclements, it was Eritrea’s
artificial demarcation that effectively blocked
the country and made it landlocked (see map
below).
Following
the martyrdom of Emperor Yohannes in 1889, the
Italian occupying forces that were kept at bay on
the Red Sea by the Ras Alula Ethiopian forces
moved from Massawa to Asmara and established their
incipient primogeniture colony. At this stage, the
Italian colonial territory in Eritrea was a mere
triangle that linked Masawa, Asmara, and Segenieti
(56 km from Asmara) and they officially proclaimed
their colony in 1890. However, in light of
Ethiopian patriotism and the determination of
Ethiopians to fight and vanquish colonial forces,
the Italians came up with a new strategy of
expanding and encapsulating Ethiopia. In 1994,
thus, they expanded and incorporated huge tracts
of lands in the Barka/Tessenai area while at the
same time they effectively controlled the Red Sea
maritime territory between Ras Kassar and Ras
Dumera, in which the important ports of Massawa
and Assab are located.
Now,
a similar blockage of Ethiopia is taking place,
but the political actors are different and among
the new political actors, the chief actors are
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) is also very much part of the grand
Arab geostrategic plan to monitor and if possible
to control the Middle East between the Gulf of
Persia and the Red Sea. They may be able to
control the South Eastern Red Sea bordering Yemen
but they could find a platform haven in the South
Western Red Sea, thanks in large measure to the
cooperation of Eritrea and for letting the mini-hegemon
Arabs to use the Port of Assab. Saudi Arabia and
Qatar are heavily involved in the Yemeni civil war
and for logistical and strategic reasons, Assab is
an ideal location to conduct their military
operations, because it is a mere 12 miles between
the southern end tip of Eritrea and Yemen and they
could easily have a military upper-hand especially
in the Taize area of Yemen (see map above).
Back
in November, 2015, Andrew Korybko, writing for
Global Research, observes the expansion of Saudi
Arabia and the GCC to Eritrea and discusses the
geopolitical implications for Ethiopia in some
detail. The writer, while recognizing Ethiopia as
“Africa’s next and upcoming power” discusses
‘Bab el Mandeb and the War in Yemen’ in which
he makes the following interesting analysis:
The
Saudi’s and their lackeys have succeed in
blockading the Yemeni coast and conquering Aden,
thus returning most of the unipolar world’s
control over their lost ‘real estate’ in this
ultra-strategic region but capitalizing on their
unofficial casus belli to make sure that they can
indefinitely retain control there, the GCC decided
to ‘jump the pond’ to the Horn of Africa,
hence its interactions with Eritrea and the
contracting of Amara’s [sic Asmara’s]
‘services’. In a sense, Eritrea is envisioned
as being the Gulf’s “back-up Yemen”, a
friendly territory under the proxy influence from
which punitive measures can be launched against
the people of Yemen if they ever to succeed in
once more nearly liberating the entirety of their
country.7
Now,
going back to our theme, ‘what Ethiopia can do
to deflect external threats’, I propose and
underscore in this paper that foreign Ethiopian
enemies could be kept at bay insofar Ethiopian
patriotism (which at present is challenged) is
regenerated; and in order to revive Ethiopian
patriotism, the history of modern Ethiopia is sine
qua for Ethiopians to reminisce the experience of
their forefathers and look back and learn from
that great tradition of selflessness. In this
regard, Ethiopians have a rich history and could
simply recap the exemplary roles played by their
former leaders. For instance, Emperor Tewodros
confronted the British at Mekdela and committed
altruistic suicide; The Italians were kept at bay
in 1885 and 1887 by the Ras Alula-led Ethiopian
forces, or confronted and destroyed by Emperor
Yohannes; and more so annihilated by Emperor
Meneilk at Adwa in 1896.
The
present generation of Ethiopians should re-visit
the proud history of patriotism of their country
and the sense of Ethiopian identity that their
forefathers upheld as a banner to unite their
country and mobilize the people against foreign
enemies. It is insofar Ethiopians foster
patriotism (which is now challenged and
compromised) by practically engaging a
pan-Ethiopian agenda that transcends
ethno-nationalism and ethnocentric values that,
the external threats could be diffused because a
pan-Ethiopian united front, in turn, enables
Ethiopians to defend their country and deflect
external threats.
It
logically follows, thus, that Ethiopia should
revise the parameters and section of the
constitution that encourages separatism (e.g.
Article 39 of the Constitution). The EPRDF’s
agenda of self-determination of nationalities
including up to secession may have been
well-intentioned, but the policymakers of the
EPRDF leaders were unable to foresee the negative
implications of the policies of
‘self-determination and its attendant
‘divorce’ from the Ethiopian body politic. The
above argument had already been entertained in my
debut book, Ethiopia:
The Political Economy of Transition (1995)
when the transitional government of Ethiopia (TGE),
a precursor to the present regime, was formed, and
this is how I put it then:
The
TGE’s policy of Kilil and self-determination is
commendable, but the consequence of fragmentation
as a result of new wave of ethnic political
consciousness, and the inability of some minority
nationalities to become economically and
politically viable, would ultimately preoccupy
Ethiopians to otherwise unforeseen problem 8
The
‘new wave of ethnic political consciousness’
amongst Ethiopian communities that I foresaw two
decades ago has now engulfed Ethiopians as
nightmarish divisive politics, and it is
especially Diaspora Ethiopians that have become
the victims of ethno-nationalism by their own
volition, so to speak.
Furthermore,
in my new book, Ethiopia:
Democracy, Devolution of Power, and the
Developmental State, I have critically
examined the nuances surrounding ethnic politics
and ethnic-based demarcation of regional states by
creating three scenarios:
·
However
dogmatic and flawed the EPRDF program of
self-determination could be, it was meant to
genuinely redress the minority rights of Ethiopia.
·
The
EPRDF policy of ethnically demarcated regions for
Ethiopia could inadvertently undermine the unity
of the Ethiopian people and result in the
disintegration of Ethiopia.
·
In
due course of the formation of the regional
states, the EPRDF would reconsider its previous
policy and would opt for a strong center instead
in order to facilitate the political and economic
interests of the ‘new class’ and administer
the regions by remote control or, in order to
promote development via the developmental state
while at the same time create opportunities for
the regional states… The EPRDF would like to
preside over the affairs of Ethiopia via scenarios
one and two, but also wants to hang on to power by
solidifying its foundations at the center.9
It
is pretty much clear that elements of the three
scenarios strongly illustrate the current
political affairs and the Oromo protestations in
Ethiopia. Ethnic affiliation, though quite organic
and natural in cementing the values and traditions
as well as sentiments of ethnic groups around the
world, it is nonetheless too backward and becomes
a major hurdle to unity and development especially
in the era of globalization where the existence of
the state that represent a whole unified nation
has become questionable, let alone tribal
affiliations that don’t fit into the general
international trend of global political economy
that demands world-wide or regional trade
integration.
Out
of the current political mess, hopefully, an
all-Ethiopia unifying political group could emerge
and if the latter is realized, its first task
should be to carefully assess and diagnose the
internal and external threats that could very well
undermine the unity of Ethiopia. This hypothetical
organization or pan-Ethiopian organizations that
apparently would emerge out of the ashes, should
investigate the suspicious “terrorist” acts
like the bombing of Dilla University, followed by
Harar and Jimma. They should also investigate the
case of Qimant in Gondar; why it is necessary for
the Qimant to divorce from the Amhara Regional
State, when in fact the Qimant are
indistinguishable from other Amharas, and who is
behind the “Qimant initiative” to attack and
destroy Tigrayan-owned businesses? The patriotic
pan-Ethiopian leaders should also investigate some
writings by some Diaspora Ethiopian intellectuals
(and pseudo-intellectuals) that deliberately
foster ethnic politics and call for the unity of
Oromo and Amhara against Woyane (or Tigrayans);
investigate further the fabrication of a story
that “Tigrayan troops are attacking Oromo
protestors.” The Regional States have their own
police and Ethiopia has a federal police and a
national army and there is no such thing as
‘Tigrayan troops’. The patriotic pan-Ethiopian
leadership should also investigate the video clip
on Wolkait, in which a sizable population of the
area were gathered and in which two speakers
repeatedly emphasized that “the people of
Wolkait are Amhara and not Tigrayan”, and
paradoxically, just behind the stage on which the
speakers stood are displayed the current Ethiopian
flag and the flag of the Regional State of Tigray.
Finally,
I believe the EPRDF Government has an historical
responsibility to effectively manage the internal
political crisis and deflect external threats. If
the Government could not shoulder such
responsibility, however, the Ethiopian people as a
whole and the pan-Ethiopian patriots in particular
must shoulder the historic task of saving Ethiopia
from the twin challenges of internal and external
threats.
What are the attributes of a
pan-Ethiopian patriotism? ‘Pan’
literally means “all” and a pan-Ethiopian
organization should necessarily embrace all
Ethiopians irrespective of their ethnicity,
language, traditions, and religious affiliations.
Pan-Ethiopian patriotism transcends all narrow
ethnic affiliations and interests and promotes an
all-inclusive Ethiopian agenda first while at the
same time respects the self-determination (short
of secession) of all Ethiopian nationalities. A
group that fosters ethnic politics and
divisiveness among Ethiopians but carries the name
of ‘Ethiopian’ is neither pan-Ethiopian nor
patriotic.
Notes:
1.
For
further discussion on democracy and political
culture, see Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopia: Democracy, Devolution of Power, and the Developmental State,
Institute of Development and Education for Africa
(IDEA), 2013. All first five chapters are
important for this discussion, but Chapter 6
especially is relevant to the central thesis of
this article.
2.
Alexander
Kouzmin, Alan M. G. Jarman, “Policy Advice as
Crisis: A Political Redefinition of Crisis,”
Oxford International Studies Review
3.
Journal
of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.
7, Issue 2 (Oxford)
4.
Arjen
Boin et al, The
Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership
Under Pressure, Cambridge University Press
5.
Arjen
Boin et all, Ibid
6.
Mehari
Tadelle Maru, Horn
of Africa Affairs, August 1, 2015
7.
Andrew
Korybko, “Saudi Arabia and the GCC are Expanding
to Eritrea. Geopolitical Implications for
Ethiopia,” Global
Research, November 18, 2015
8.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, Ethiopia:
The Political Economy of Transition,
University Press of America, 1995, p. 166
9.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, Ethiopia:
Devolution of Power, and the Developmental State,
p. 82
All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©
Institute of Development and Education for Africa
(IDEA), 2016. Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia can be
contacted for educational and constructive
feedback via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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