Beyond
the Usual: Re-thinking Ethiopia’s Ethnic
Federalism for the 21st Century
By
Professor Asayehgn Desta
Beyond
the Usual: Re-thinking Ethiopia’s Ethnic
Federalism for the Century. The implementation of
Ethnic-federalism for the last twenty years in
Ethiopia has produced polarizing debates
Abstract
A
review of the political and ideological stalemate
demonstrates that the concept of federalism has
produced a polarizing debate among scholars. That
is, federalist regimes have been rigorously
challenged from theoretical and from practical
points of view.
Supporters of multi-ethnic federalism
defend it as an effective operational device for
granting autonomy to distinct peoples. They
forcefully swear that federalism is indispensable
for self-rule, encouraging shared governance, and
giving each region the opportunity to enjoy a
proportional share of economic investment to
support development. On the other hand, the
scholars that espouse a democratic autonomous
self-ruling type of federalism are skeptical and
also question the viability of a centralized
Federal state. They argue that initially ethnic
federalism could act as a starting point for
accommodating the demands of emotionally charged
ethno-nationalist movements. To be viable for the
future, however, scholars of an autonomous
self-ruling democratic form of federalism advocate
that in order to practice effectively the
principal linguistic and cultural values of its
national communities and foster a democratically
induced self-ruling form of government, the
designated federal sub-units need to be demarcated
and allowed to exercise dynamic workable levels of
autonomy.
Despite
continued achievements of economic growth for the
last decade and the attempts undertaken to lift
rural poor out of poverty, the implementation of
ethnic-federalism in Ethiopia for the last twenty
years has produced these polarizing debates.
Advocates have argued that implementing ethnic
federalism in Ethiopia has rendered stability and
has provided the opportunity for each region to
develop, promote, and preserve its language and
culture. In addition, ethno-national federation
fosters deliberation and political participation
and also enhances the citizens’ capacity to
empathize with one another more readily than in
the heterogeneous setting prevalent in the past.
Opponents
on the other hand argue that in Ethiopia disparity
still exists between the doctrine of federalism
and the diffusion of central governmental power to
impose its norms upon the autonomous regions. In
addition, they argue the demarcation of regions
according to ethnicity is static and cannot
adequately drive the transition for the future.
Given this, they propose that the scale of
transformation in the era of globalization demands
new ways of engaging citizens in the search for
solutions rather than being the prisoners of
political cadres that have been socialized to blow
vague slogans. Extending their argument, they
claim that Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism has
denied economic and political rights to its
inhabitants because it denies its stakeholders
involvement in designing and implementing the
nation’s federal development process. Therefore,
their constructive suggestion is that Ethiopia’s
ethnic federalism needs to be constantly altered
into manageable democratic and autonomous federal
units so that the country will be able to cope
with the challenges that are likely to arise in
the 21st century era of globalization.
Introduction
The
root base of Africa’s intra-state federalism is
attributable to the divide and rule policy that
was designed by the British colonialists. Against
the formation of a unitary system that was
supposed to have ushered in and escalated
instability, the
British colonialists purposely formulated a
federal policy
that would divide and rule, balkanize and
disintegrate the then existing cohesive
and powerful principalities or
administrative units(
B., W., Záhoík, J.,2008; Assefa2007: 101;
M. Burgess (2012).
The most recent example of this is, during
the dark years of apartheid in South Africa,
multi-national federalism was purposely
perpetuated to facilitate political
disintegration.
In recent years,
however,
in order
to achieve
some type of
political integration based
on a
combination of
shared
rule and /or self-rule in South Africa,
the existing regime of the South African
government is attempting to set up a decentralized
ethnic type of
federalism.
(Elazar,1987 and Studlar, 2006).
Ethnic
groups are composed of people sharing a
distinctive and enduring collective identity based
on common cultural traits such as language,
religion, and the perpetuation of a common
heritage, linked with a specific territory, shared
experiences, and often a common destiny (Obydenkova,
2014). In some cases, ethnic federalism has been
tailored as a stepping stone for launching
separatist movements.
In addition, the formation of ethnic
federalism has given rise to the belief that
ethno-nationalist groups have the superiority to
claim their rights to self-determination. In the
final stage, through a well-engineered referendum
process, some alienated ethnic groups could make
demands up to and including secession (See S.
Huntington, 1993b:13-14 and Burgess 2012, 11).
Because
of their bitter experience with the colonial
divide and rule policy, most African countries do
not have a positive image of federalism.
Instead of
federalism, a number of African nations
have been showing a vested interest in the
formation of unitary states whereby the polarity
of power could give latitude to the central
governments to design national sovereignty with
the twin processes of achieving
nation building and strengthening national
integration. Even those countries that have
established a nominal form of federalism have been
reluctant to sustain a liberal form of democratic
rights that could foster local autonomy and
encourage self-government. For example, the
Congolese Federation implemented federalism in
1960. It was abrogated in 1965. The Ugandan
government that designed a federal system regime
to accommodate the Kingdom of Buganda in 1960, but
it too was gradually abolished in 1966. The
Anglo-French project of the Cameroonian federation
that started in 1962 was dismantled in 1972.
Given
such negative experiences, a number of African
countries have been reluctant to form intra-state
and multiparty democratic federalism.
For example, among the 54 nations in
Africa, Ethiopia (1995), South Africa (1996), and
Nigeria (1999), are the only three African
countries that are endeavoring to experiment with
establishing multinational, or multiethnic, or
regional, or city-state, or provincial types of a
federal system. However, as stressed by Burgess
(2012), the formation of federalism in this
handful of African countries doesn’t seem to
amount to the formation of federal democratic
nations. Rather,
the type of federalism that has been experimented
with in the above mentioned three African states
seems be construed as favorable ways to
accommodate ethnic and linguistic diversity within
a single centralized political party. The
constellation of haphazard regional states (mostly
ethnic) has also induced the feeling that like
unitary states, some authorities of the central
governments have been propagating and using vague
and irrelevant jargons such as “revolutionary
democracy” coined by Marx and Lenin to enforce
some forms of federal mandates or provisions in
order to undermine the power of local units and
constituents.
As
mentioned above, starting in1995, the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has been
predominantly administered by an ethno-federalist
structure marked by some distribution of
responsibilities among ethnic, national, state,
and regional components with the objective of
maintaining the overall territorial integrity of
the country. As stated in the Africa Report (4
September, 2009) the intent of the Ethiopian
ethnic federalism was “…to create a more
prosperous, just and representative state for its
entire people.”
At
the outset, it needs to be made clear that
compared to the most oppressive form of unitary
Dergist government that Ethiopia had, the
federalism type of government that Ethiopia is now
practicing is an improvement. The majority of
Ethiopians have no desire to go back to a type of
unitary form of government that abhors diversity.
Actually, when initiated in 1995, a number of the
oppressed people in Ethiopia highly valued
federalism because it ideally cherishes all forms
of human rights. But its current organizational
type is outdated and needs to be overhauled.
Realizing that there occurs a significant gap
between the viewpoint of the theory of federalism
as it is practiced, a number of political economy
researchers are attempting to address the
opportunities and dilemmas faced by a number of
federalist regional states, and are critically
examining whether the existing centralized form of
federalism in Ethiopia is viable for maintaining
unity while at the same time preserving diversity.
Given
this concern, the central purpose of the study is
to reassess the structure of and learn lessons
from Ethiopia’s type of federalism that has
existed for more than two decades. In addition,
the study is expected to provide additional
insights for policy makers to reexamine in order
to modify the country into autonomous democratic
entities with self-rule that would contribute to
Ethiopia’s stability, and unity, and empower the
local people to navigate forward, engaged in
dialogue that would effectively bargain for their
interests, grievances, and aspirations. More
specifically, the central questions of the study
include:
1.
Is the political power in federal Ethiopia
structurally dispersed among centers of authority
so that it encourages shared rule and self-rule?
2.
Are the subordinate units of the federal structure
prescribed by areas of jurisdiction so that they
couldn’t be subjugated by the central authority?
3.
Do the governmental institutions of the sub-units
have democratic rights to choose their own
officials and develop their own policies within
their areas of jurisdiction? and
4.
Do the leaders and representatives of each
sub-unit of the federal structure possess a
legally protected base from which they are able to
voice their opposition to central authority?
Literature
Review
Federalism
involves a territorial division of power between
constituent units – sometimes called provinces,
cantons, regions, possibly cities and states, and
the central government (Watts, 1998).
Stated differently, federalism is defined
as a form of governmental and institutional
structure designed by the will of the stakeholders
to maintain unity while also preserving diversity
through shared rule (Odion, 2011). According to
Elazar (1987), Federalism is a mode of political
organization which unites separate polities within
an overarching political system so that it induces
each polity to maintain its political integrity.
The political order of federalism also requires:
a) the definition of boundaries and the
composition of the member units (i.e. along
geographical, ethnic, and/or cultural lines); b)
the distribution of power between the member units
and the central institutions;
c) the allocation of power-sharing or a
form of influence by member units in central
decision-making bodies within the interlocking
political systems; and
d) maintaining sufficient democratic
control over the central bodies (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003).
The
main characteristics of federalism include: 1)
political power that is structurally dispersed
among centers of authority to encourage both self
and shared rule; 2) subordinate units prescribed
by areas of jurisdiction that cannot be invaded by
the central authority; 3) leaders of subordinate
units who draw their power heavily from local
sources independent of the central authority; 4)
governmental institutions of the sub-units that
have democratic rights to choose their own
officials and their own policies within their
areas of jurisdiction; 5) leaders and
representatives of each sub-unit who possess a
legally protected base from which they can voice
their opposition to the central authority; and 6)
governors of each unit chosen not by the ruling
political party but who are elected by local
residents ( Feeley,1994).
To
examine the advantages and disadvantages of
federalism, at least two polarizing debates have
been forwarded. These are, 1) State-centered or
centralized federalism and 2) Democratic
Autonomous self-ruling federalism or
Consociationalism.
State-centered
or Centralized Federalism
Starting
in the early 1990s a number of states have been
governed under different types of federal systems
because they were convinced that unitary sovereign
states are static and would become more efficient
and could sustain stability if broken down into
federal autonomous regions. According to the
proponents, ethnic or national federalism depends
on: 1) allowing regulated self-rule of each
ethnic-nation group and the sharing of political
power with the central government; 2) the
representation of various ethnic-nation groups to
have a say in the various institutions of the
state, and 3) the affirmation and preservation of
the particular cultures (religion, language, etc.)
of each ethnic-national group (Magnareila, 1993).
Advocates
of state-centered or regulated or democratically
centralized federalism argue that the
state-centralized form of federalism alleviates
tensions of division because the structures are
somewhat democratically interlocked (Bakke and
Wibbels, 2006). In other words, instead of
pursuing the goals of national integration and
political legitimacy that could exacerbate ethnic
conflict, multinational types of states tend to
adopt a federal system of government to empower
different nationalities and ethnic groups and
avoid political instability. In short, federalism
accommodates the interests of different ethnic
groups, enhances liberty, and promotes active
citizenship.
In
view of the argument that federalism of a multi-
ethno-national federalism is a reliable method of
safeguarding stability in ethnically diverse
countries, provided it is established voluntarily
and is not imposed by interest groups or the
government, a number of unified sovereign nations
have created their own autonomous ethnic or
region-based federal states (provinces). Stated
differently, advocates of regulated federalism
argue that the dismemberment of an existing
unitary sovereignty into the formation of
autonomous national or ethnic or regional federal
states could empower all the inhabitants of a
nation in its developmental process. As summarized
by Bakke and Wibbels (2006), “the theoretical
justification for federalism, is based on the
combination of shared and self-rule federalism,
offering the potential to retain the territorial
integrity of the state while providing some
self-governance for disaffected groups.”
In addition, supporters of federalism
predict that federal states will tend to do better
than unitary states to manages ethnic conflicts
and stimulate social trust among the different
forces in society, limiting discriminatory
practices against other groups (Bermeo, 2002).
The
proponents of regulated federalism suggest that to
be authentic, federalism needs to be grounded on
the rule of law and based on the “British”
model of Parliamentary Democracy. In simple terms,
Parliamentary Democracy applies to a democratic
form of government in which the party (or
coalition of parties) with the greatest
representation in the parliament (legislature)
forms the government.
Parliamentary democracy promotes simplicity
in administration and efficiency in
decision-making, and also provides voters and
representatives the right to monitor. The
constitutional division of powers and the rights
of citizens are fully honored and respected.
Similarly, cabinets are bestowed with the
courage not to shirk their duty but to act in the
public interest (Strom, 2000).
Parliamentary
Democracy could be operationally defined to entail
a simple form of delegation and accountability.
In terms of the chain of flow of
delegation, Parliamentary Democracy reflects at
least four discrete steps: 1) the voters
elect their legislative representatives to
parliament who are the holders of original
authority; 2) the majority of the legislators then
choose the head of the government or prime
minister to run the country and oversee the
executive branch of ministers; 3) the head of
government or prime minster in turn
chooses heads of cabinet and presents them
to the legislators for approval, (that is, the
prime minister and his or her cabinet are
correspondingly
the legislature’s agent or are the subset
of the parliament); and 4) the head of departments
appoints or hires civil servants
to run
the day to day operations of
their institutions.
When analyzed in reverse direction, the
chain of accountability scrutinizes or monitors
the effective implementation of the chain of
delegation that runs from ultimate policy makers
to voters. Though cumbersome in implementation, on
paper, adherents of a centralized federal system
stress that under specific conditions
and in accordance with a strictly defined
process, the federal arrangement of multination
states could have the rights to self-determination
with a constitutionally entrenched right to
secession (McGarry, 2005).
Democratic
Autonomous self-rule Federalism or
Consociationalism
Sometimes
federalism can be a nominal principle of
government dominated by a one political party
which is able to override formal distinctions with
a centralized agenda. Opposed to this type of
federal formation, the democratic autonomous
self-rule or consociational federalism school of
thought is lukewarm about the creation of
mono-party federal states that may emerge as a
result of emotional demands rather than rational
decisions. Also they argue that the demarcation of
border lines of various ethnic groups of a
centralized state is basically controversial and
is a politically sensitive matter that could
thwart the realization of genuine federalism. As
discussed above, federalism provides the best
possible form of government for a nation
characterized by ethic and regional disparities. A
centralized federated state however may not
encourage local participation. Its viability to
become an effectively managed and unified
sovereign state may not be possible because it
could limit the ability of the ethnic majority of
the region to impose its will on ethnic minorities
(Obydenkova, 2004).
By not subdividing itself into so many
equally sharing units, a vast centralized
federated state may be too vast to save itself
from despotism (Beccaria in Spolaore, 2008).
In
view of the fact that a federal system cannot
provide the whole answer to existing or potential
conflicts, adherents of democratic or
consociational federalism argue that without a
genuine robust democracy, the republic form of
federalism is not
sustainable ( Kefale ( 2013).
Thus, the nature and possible challenges of
centralized federalism may be better appreciated
using Lijphart’s paradigm of liberal democratic
or consociational federalism. To avoid the
likelihood of turmoil and ethnic ruptures in the
future, Lijphart suggests that nations need to
emphasize and practice a democratization process
that creates manageable self-rule of communal
constituents in order that they may fully enjoy
equal partnership in the system ( Howe, Philp J;
Clark. P and Foweraker, J (2001). In short, as
suggested by Lijphart (1977), to be called
democratic or consociational federalism, a nation
must be governed by the existence of: 1) Grand
coalition (the ruling elites of each unit rule in
the interest of their constituency); 2) Mutual
veto (consensus is required rather than majority
rule); 3) Proportionality (representation based on
the population of each unit), and 4) Segmental
autonomy (each federal units is autonomous).
Given
the above argument, the only option that we have
is a democratic system of autonomous self-rule
federalism or consociationalism (i.e., a plural
society with overlapping ethnic/cultural
/linguistic groups, democracy). It is the only
genuine option for a democratic and stable form of
management because it promises harmonious
relationships among ethnic, religious, or
linguistic factions.
Democratic self-rule federalism or
consociational democracy divides the federated
state into equally autonomous units. The
autonomous federal units are managed with
recognition and accommodation among the elites of
each of its major social groups so that the
created federal state remains stable rather than
being fragmented on the basis of ethnicity and
religious factors. In short, the goals of
democratic self-rule federalism or democratic
consociationalism, brings about governmental
stability, the survival of the power-sharing
provisions, and the avoidance of violence (Wikipedia,
2015).
More
specifically, the operational attributes of
democratic self-rule federalism or consociational
democracy are strongly associated with the
following nine constellations. These being, 1)
small population size, 2) no majority segment, 3)
segments of equal size, 4) overarching loyalties,
5) small number of segments, 6) geographic
concentration of segments , 7) socioeconomic
equality, 8) traditions of accommodation, and the
9) lack of external threats ( Lijphart, 1977,
53-103 and see also Taylor, 1992).
In addition, the attributes of autonomous
self-rule federalism include the existence of
reciprocal relationships between central and local
governments and between local governments and
citizens. Through the transfer of authority,
responsibility, and accountability from the
central to local governments, democratic political
decentralization incorporates both devolution and
the power to develop, implement policy, and the
extension of democratic processes to lower levels
of government (Barnett , C. et al., December
1997and Araia, 2013).
That
is, the process of democratic political devolution
is the transfer of responsibilities and services
from the central government to municipalities that
elect their own mayors and councils, raise their
own revenues, and have independent authority to
make investment decisions.
In a devolved system, local governments
have clear and legally recognized geographic
boundaries over which they exercise authority and
within which they perform public functions.
Therefore, political devolution inevitably changes
the allocation of power and jobs (The World Bank
Group, 2001).
The
advocates of Democratic Political Devolution or
democratic self-rule federalism don’t completely
discount that ethnic-federalism may act as a
positive force for the enhancement of peace and
stability. Instead, they go one step further and
strongly advocate that a better method of forming
constituent units needs to be based on a coherent
historical and geographical basis to provide
stability rather than decentralizing various
groups based on ethnicity. In other words, to this
group of thinkers, first, administrative
decentralization of federalism based on ethnicity
does not necessarily mean that each ethnic
constituent unit is represented by democratically
voted representatives within the federal
government. Second,
the demarcation of borders according to various
ethnic groups in a centralized state is difficult
because ethnicity is by and large a politically
sensitive matter. Third, in the absence of
effective political mechanisms to integrate
populations with diverse preferences,
“…self-determination and voting outcomes tend
to bring about excessive fragmentation and costly
breakup. Such political costs tend to depend not
only on the degree of heterogeneity of preferences
but also the quality of institutions though
individual preferences are turned into collective
action,” Spolaore, 2008). As aptly put by
Selassie (2003) it does not make sense to combine
two or more regions into the same federal unit
based on ethnicity
“…when the regions are otherwise
separated by natural barriers such as harsh
deserts, non-navigable rivers or high mountains,
merely because those regions are inhabited by the
same ethnic group.”
As
argued by Fleiner (November, 2006), the formation
of autonomous units of federalism may weaken
national unity or create loyalty conflicts leading
to a decline of loyalty toward the national state
and potentially encourage separatist tendencies.
However, politically, democratic autonomous
self-rule federalism as a unit of local
self-governance encourages local units to have a
say in selecting their own rulers to bring about
political stability and also to select rulers of
their counties who can be held accountable for
their decisions. In short, the supporters of the
democratic autonomous self-rule type of federalism
claim that this regime provides a system of checks
and balances between ethnic, regional and national
levels, and reduces the fears of minorities
(Bergman, 2011). Since it is believed that a
mechanism for dialogueis a prerequisite for the
development of co-operative practices, the
democratic self-rule school of thought argues
forcefully that creating an authentic, democratic
federation allows the representatives of its
national communities to engage in dialogue and
effectively bargain for their interests,
grievances, and aspirations.
To
thrive economically, advocates of a democratic
system of local self- governance suggest that the
local government needs to be endowed with adequate
resources, collecting taxes and administering
fiscal policy to maintain the necessary foundation
for fostering economic competition and enhancing
competitive efficiency.
But, if the ability of the local government
is constrained, the state federal government needs
to play cooperatively in order to bring about fair
allocation of resources among the federal
subunits. Ensuing and instituting financial
adjustments will be important for the federal
state to ensure more equal living standards among
the subunits of the federal system. To maintain
equality between resource-endowed units with other
resource-poor units, democracy and local
governance should be strengthened with fiscal
decentralization without diminishing the benefits
that can arise from coordinated action at the
center (See Desta, 2015).
To
repeat, the sequential stages of progress in
achieving the governance objectives of
decentralization needs to slide from
centralization to: 1) administrative
decentralization, 2) financial decentralization,
3) democratic decentralization or the empowerment
of autonomous local government, and 4)
legitimization of the process at the local level
through which diverse interests can be heard, and
negotiated for resource allocation decisions (
Barnett et al (1977).
In
short, in light of the experience of Switzerland
(cantons) and India (states), the advocates of
democratic decentralization or democratic
self-rule argue that a federal system is only
viable and manageable if the existing emotionally
charged ethnic group feelings are further
sub-divided into manageable geographic regions.
Following the viable concrete examples from
the well managed federated nations, believing that
the formation of an ethnic community contributes
to the formation of a shared space that could
provide individuals with a cultural context in
which to establish relationships, Spain, for
example, is in the process of entertaining the
formation of multi-ethnic federal states for its
inhabitants. Belgium on the other hand is now
relying on voluntary agreements to reorganize
itself into a manageable ethnic federation because
it is convinced that as membership in a community
flourishes, so does the member’s well-being and
life chances.
To
those whose opinions reflect democratic self-rule
within the constituent units or adhere to “new
federalism,” the federation of sub-national
units is appropriate for the 21st century because
it presumes the formation of homogenous groups
within geographical units. For example, by
breaking themselves into manageable autonomous
states and espousing the cardinal principles of
democracy, Canada, India, Switzerland, and South
Africa are effectively managing their various
constituent units.
Ethnic
Federalism in Ethiopia
In
1991, as
the EPRDF ousted the Derge’s authoritarian rule,
it embarked on a radical transformation of
Ethiopia’s political system by inviting all
ethnic-based and other opposition parties to a
transitional national conference held in Addis
Ababa in July 1991. About thirty different groups
attended and adopted a provisional national
charter, created an 87-member Council of
Representatives, and formed the Transitional
Government of Ethiopia (TGE, led by the EPRDF that
controlled 32 of the 87 seats in the Council of
Representatives (Africa Review, 2009, and Vaughan,
S. 1994).
As
mentioned above, the EPRDF vigorously redefined
the political landscape and restructured the state
into the contemporary Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia. In
December 1994, a constitutional assembly ratified
a new constitution, which was fully implemented in
1995. Using Tigrai as the model (see Desta, 2015),
the EPRDF spearheaded the formation of nine
asymmetrical, ethnic-based regional states. These
encompassed five single ethnic states (i.e.,
Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Orimiya, and Somali) and
four multi-ethnic regions (i.e., Benishangul-Gumuz,
Southern Nations, nationalities, and peoples,
Gambella, and Hara). The Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa
cities were designated as federally administered
city-states.
On
August 21, 1995, the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia created a federal structure of
government. In
accordance with Article 39 of the constitution,
each region was assured the unconditional right to
self-determination, including the right to
secession. As stated by Alem Habtu, “the
ideological antecedents of the EPRDF’ ethnic
federalism project can be traced to
Marxist-Leninist ideology and its conception of
the national question.
The project followed the example of the
USSR and Yugoslavia. The Ethiopian Student
Movement (ESM) at home and abroad had introduced
Marxism-Leninism to Ethiopia in the mid1960s” (Habtu,
2003). Though controversial, the integration of
political with secessionism makes Ethiopia’s
federalism unique because it is the only federal
nation that has integrated political pluralism
with the right of secession for its constituents,
after the dissolution of the USSR in 1985 (Habtu,
2003).
The
implementation of Ethnic-federalism for the last
twenty years in Ethiopia has produced polarizing
debates. Advocates have argued that implementing
ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has rendered
stability and has provided each region the
opportunity to develop, promote, and preserve its
language and culture.
As pervasively argued by Simoeon (1982),
ethno-national federation not only fosters
deliberation and political participation but it
also enhances the citizens’ capacity to
empathize with one another more readily than in a
heterogeneous setting.
Comparing
ethnic federalism to the centralized form of
feudal monarchy and unitary military dictatorship
that previously ruled Ethiopia, critics have
countered that administering the Ethiopian state
under ethnic federalism is deepening with little
or no recognition of self-rule for each
constituent. Extending
their argument they claim that Ethiopia’s
structure upon ethnic federalism has denied
economic and political rights to its inhabitants
because it has hardly involved the stakeholders in
designing and implementing the nation’s federal
development process. To mitigate these problems,
they propose that the Ethiopia’s ethnic
federalism needs to be altered constantly in order
to cope with the challenges that are likely to
arise in an age of globalization. More
specifically, they suggest that some of the
existing regions need to be subdivided into more
manageable units.
In the upcoming book, the status of
Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism will be
systematically and rigorously reviewed to answer
the pertinent questions posed above.
References:
Africa
Report #153 (4 September 2009). Ethiopia: Ethnic
Federalism and its Discontents”
International/Crisis Group Working to
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G. (2013). Ethiopia: Democracy, Devolution of
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Assefa
Fiseha (2007): Federalism and the Accommodation of
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Bahru,
Z. (2002). Ethiopia: The Challenge of Democracy
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Kristin M. and
and Erik Wibbels (October 2006).
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