The
Kenya Political Crisis: Diagnosis and Prognosis
Ghelawdewos
Araia
March
20, 2008
Ever
since the Kenya political crisis erupted following
the December 27, 2007 electoral debacle, the major
media outlets around the world have been
portraying Kenya as ‘island of stability.’
There is no doubt that Kenya, relative to its
neighbors, have enjoyed peace and stability but
the latter have been exaggerated and mythologized.
It is therefore imperative to first demystify the
‘island of stability’ analogy in order to
better fathom the current crisis.
The current Kenya
crisis is neither a sudden and spontaneous
eruption nor has its beginnings with the Kibaki-Odinga
power conflict. The original sin for the current
crisis was actually impregnated during Daniel arap
Moi presidency (1978-2002). Moi, a Kalenjin, who
served as vice president under Jomo Kenyatta,
assumed power when Kenyatta died. Moi held power
for 24 long years and unfortunately his regime was
one of the most corrupt regimes in Africa. In an
effort to cling to power continuously, Moi
employed divide-and-rule tactics and unleashed an
attack on the Gikuyu by arming the Kalenjin tugs
and other unemployed Kenyans and in due course
tens of thousands of Gikuyu lost their lands to
the marauding armed criminals and were forced out
from their homelands simly to become homeless and
jobless.
The Moi attack
perpetrated against the Gikuyu was repeated in the
1992 and 1997 elections, but the world ignored the
crisis and, wittingly or unwittingly, overlooked
the regime’s ill-engineered policies and none of
the criminal elements were brought before justice.
In 1992, hundreds upon hundreds (the exact figure
is unknown) of Gikuyu were killed and close to
half a million were internally displaced and
became refugees in their own country.
In 2002, Mwai
Kibaki defeated Daniel arap Moi, but unlike the
latter, Kibaki, a Gikuyu, did not seek revenge
although he was determined to end the mono-party
system and the predominance of the Kenya Africa
National Union (KANU), the unchallenged sole party
since independence in 1963. Kibaki himself was a
member of KANU but in 1991 he left the party and
formed his own democratic party and ultimately he
founded the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC).
True to his party, unlike his predecessor, once
Kibaki formed his government in 2002 he
implemented a policy of inclusiveness in the
government. Also under Kibaki, Kenya enjoyed a
6.1% GDP growth of the economy, which was a
stagnant 0.6% growth under arap Moi.
Kibaki and his
rival Raila Odinga are neither rookies in
government nor novice to politics. In the early
1960s, Mwai Kibaki had been at the forefront for
Kenyan independence and was one of the first
members of parliament when Kenya became
independent in 1963. In the 1970s and 1980s he
served as Finance Minister and as Vice President.
Similarly, Raila Odinga was born to one of the
most influential and powerful Kenyan leaders,
Oginga Odinga who was the first vice president of
Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta. Oginga Odinga, a Luo,
was an author known for his celebrated book, Not
Yet Uhuru. Raila Odinga was a member of parliament
since 1992 and he served as Minister of Energy in
2001-2002 and as Minister of Roads, Public Works,
and Housing from 2003 to 2005; his brother, Oburu
Odinga is also currently a member of parliament.
Both Odingas are prominent leaders of their party,
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).
The current
post-election crisis, therefore, is not only a
manifestation of two contending parties, namely
NARC of Kibaki and ODM of Odinga, but also between
two very influential people who have been in power
circles for too long. Moreover, the bloodletting
conflict, the burning of Gikuyus alive in a
church, and other random killings and clashes, are
not necessarily spontaneous undertakings. They may
have been prompted and precipitated and perhaps
even incited by shadowy elements in the power
circles, both from within and outside the
government.
However, though the
Kenyan conflict manifested ethnic strife, it is
not a Rwanda-type ethnic cleansing genocidal
politics. Contrary to what we have witnessed in
Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda, Kenyan politics for
the most part was oriented by national unity
beyond ethnic particularities. For instance, the
Jomo Kenyatta-led Gikuyu Central Association was
quickly transformed into the Kenya Africa National
Union (KANU) and two decades before the emergence
of KANU, in 1921 one prominent Kenyan leader by
the name Harry Thuku presided over a political
organization named East African Association.
To be sure, in the
mid-1940s and early 1950s a Gikuyu group called
Anake a Forty (The 1940 Warriors) in an attempt to
reclaim their lost lands, declared war on the
colonial regime. In 1947, however, the
rank-and-file of the Anake was joined by other
ethnic groups such as Embu, Meru, and Kamba, and
once KANU consolidated in the late 1940s and early
1950s, major ethnic groups like the Gikuyu, Luo,
Luya, Kalenjin, and Kisu were rallied around the
nationalist party and in unison they played a role
in the Mau Mau movement.
The Mau Mau
guerrilla-type operations took place around Mt.
Kenya, Nakuru, Aberdares (Nyandura), and the
Central Province districts. The English colonial
forces (Royal Army and Air Force) that had
initially underestimated the Mau Mau had begun to
reckon with the African fighters especially in
1952 when the British sympathizer and supporter
Chief Waruhiu was assassinated. In retaliation,
the colonial government banned KANU and arrested
prominent Mau Mau leaders including Jomo Kenyatta,
Paul Ngei, Fred Kubai, Kungú Karumba, Bildad
Kaggia, and Achieng Aneko.
The above-mentioned
leaders and others who later joined the struggle
for independence had shared a vision of all-Kenya
and pan-African agenda. Kenya at independence,
therefore, far from ethnic politics had enjoyed a
more comprehensive and inclusive politics,
although as indicated above the arap Moi regime
betrayed the unifying Kenyan politics and resorted
rather to a more divisive agenda and with a
propensity to ethnic hatred politics. It is this
latter Machiavellian and sinister motive that
ultimately gave rise to the present Kenyan crisis.
When I say ‘all-Kenya’
and/or ‘pan-African’, I am not implying that
the Kenya national union has forged unity that has
completely transcended ethnic differences. After
all, Kenya like other African and Third World
countries is a multi-national mosaic and there is
no doubt that antagonism could prevail among the
various ethnic groups (at least 40 of them) that
make up Kenya but their differences or interests
are not irreconcilable. The logic is obvious: we
Africans must respect and tolerate our differences
and emphasize our unity and commonality.
So much for
diagnosis! What is to be done know? What should
the Kenyan prognosis entail? The Kenyan prognosis,
for that matter any political prognosis, must at
least reflect a plausible scenario and an
effective balancing act that can satisfy the two
contending rivalries (Kibaki and Odinga) in power
sharing.
Following the Kofi
Anan brokerage, Kibaki and Odinga finally came to
an agreement of quasi-coalition government in
which Kibaki will continue his presidency and
Odinga assumes the post of Prime Minister.
Superficially, the agreement could signal a sound
national reconciliation agenda, but deep down
there could be some important questions, which may
not get satisfactory answers at all.
The Raila Odinga
political party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)
has demanded the formation of a powerful office of
the prime minister and two additional posts of the
deputy prime ministers. The ODM, at least
initially, implied a Prime Minister-led government
and a nominal or ceremonial post of the
presidency, in which case Kibaki would become a
figurehead of state only. This proposal, however,
is not feasible given the Kibaki claim of
legitimate power and also the present Kenyan
government structure as stipulated in the
constitution.
Unless otherwise
the Kenyan constitution is completely revised and
re-written, the people of Kenya cannot simply
accept a sudden departure from the politics that
they are familiar with. According to the present
Kenyan constitution, the President [Kibaki] is
head of state and government and is elected
directly by the people for a five-year term
limited to two terms. The president selects
members of the cabinet from the National Assembly
and he also appoints the governors of the
respective districts (69 autonomous provincial
districts) and members of the judiciary including
the Chief Justice and High Court judges.
There is no doubt
that that the president of Kenya is a powerful
political figure and if at all the Odinga/ODM
demands are going to be realized, political
reforms must be undertaken as necessary
prerequisites. I personally am of the opinion that
Raila Odinga must be satisfied with the present
deal and accept his prime minister office as
stipulated in the constitution and then come up
with a reform package and present it to the
National Assembly. If the latter does not satisfy
the demand of the ODM, another option and yet a
peaceful political performance would be to demand
a referendum or plebiscite conducted by the
administrative regions or districts. This kind of
peaceful transition will prevent ethnic strife and
political instability and will enable Kenyans to
master a more civil and constructive national
political agenda.
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