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Analyzing the Tragic Conflict in
Ethiopia and the War on Tigray
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
December 28, 2020
This
article intends to critically examine the current
conflict in Ethiopia, with particular focus on the
war in Tigray, but most importantly it will
systematically analyze the complicated and complex
factors that contributed to the war in Tigray.
Many observers, notwithstanding few and far in
between freelancers who correctly monitored the
situation on the ground, have superficially
reported about the war and this article, thus,
will shoulder responsibility by way of presenting
the main and core factors and forces that have
played a major role in the conflict. Furthermore,
this essay will expose the many non-Ethiopian
actors who are directly or indirectly engaged in
the conflict.
In
order to successfully analyze the Ethiopian
conflict and the war in Tigray, it is important to
begin with some background account to the present
crisis and doing so view the conflict in-depth
from many dimensions and angles, and this is the
only way we can really grasp the essence of the
war that was unleashed on Tigray, a unique
historical phenomenon of the 21st
century. I say ‘unique’ because there has
never been in the annals of history where a
government attacks its own regional state by
inviting other states (ex. Eritrea, United Arab
Emirates, and Somalia); ancient and modern
nation-states have sought help from other friendly
states in order to defend their land from an
aggressor nation, but they never invited such
forces in order to quell their internal rebellion
or crush a domestic people’s resistance.
First
let me begin with some ideas that explore the
psychological and cultural dimension
that contributes to skirmish and major conflicts
and that I have attempted to elaborate in my
article entitled “The Ascendance of a New Regime
and Contradictory Measures in Ethiopian
Politics” (2018), and this is what I said then:
“As always, the Ethiopian phenomenon is
complicated, complex, and shrouded in mystery to
say the least. Given the admixture of a lingering
feudal mode of thinking (the mode of production
was done away with in the wake of the 1974
revolution) with unpolished and haphazard
modernity (considering the exposure of Ethiopians
to Western values and technology), obscurantism in
the Ethiopian political culture is not surprising.
Hybrid politics, however, is dangerous because it
tears apart Ethiopians between the archaic
framework of thinking and the relatively
science-based orientation. Ethiopians, thus, are
suspended between two irreconcilable poles, and
adding fuel to the fire, the present generation of
Ethiopians are even in a much worse condition for
the following reasons: 1) they have no knowledge
of the rich and proud history of Ethiopia; 2) they
lack political consciousness; 3) they are unable
to make linkage with the legacy of the patriotic
pan-Ethiopian movements (ex. the Ethiopian Student
Movement); and 4) they have lost the common
Ethiopian identity and embraced rather a much
narrower ethnic identity.”1
In
the final analysis, Ethiopians who are now engaged
in series of conflicts and the war in Tigray are
victims of their psychological makeup, a mode of
thinking that negates objective reality and
positive contributions made by powers that be;
when the Derg (military government) assumed state
power following the Ethiopian revolution and the
fall of Emperor Haile Selassie, it immediately
tarnished the image of the Emperor and portrayed
him as a diabolical autocrat without giving him
any credit during his entire reign. Similarly,
when the EPRDF defeated the Derg, it presented the
Derg rule as one of fascistic rule without
attributing anything positive to the
seventeen-year military government of Ethiopia;
and in very similar fashion, following the
2016-2018 uprisings and subsequent downfall of the
EPRDF, the new Abiy-led regime began campaigning
against the EPRDF itself, but more so against the
TPLF, which was the dominant party within the
EPRDF coalition. The newly established Prosperity
Party (PP) led by Abiy Ahmed fiercely attacked the
TPLF and associated its stay in power of
twenty-seven years with “dark ages” without
even giving credit to the TPLF/EPRDF for its
foundational economy that are visible in Addis
Ababa and in the rest of Ethiopia. I personally
have criticized the TPLF/EPRDF for not introducing
the democratic political culture into the corpus
of the larger Ethiopian society and for
incarcerating media personalities, but I have
given it credit for its initiatives in development
projects and the expansion of higher institutions
of learning; for major industrial plants such as
industrial parks; infrastructures such as roads
and railways, and for establishing four dozens of
universities, in my book, Ethiopia: Democracy,
Devolution of Power, and the Developmental State.
By the same token, I have given credit to Emperor
Haile Selassie for his attempts in modernizing
Ethiopia and the expansion of elementary and high
schools, but I criticized him for failing to
uplift Ethiopians from poverty in his long reign.
I also have given credit to the Derg regime for
its contribution in meager development projects
such as the National Literacy Campaign, the Beles
agricultural project and the Melka Wekena
hydroelectric power, although the Derg conducted
huge atrocities against the Ethiopian people via
its so-called Red Terror, and it is documented in
my debut book, Ethiopia: The Political Economy
of Transition (1995). This is what a scholar
must do, but unfortunately, the present Ethiopian
intellectuals are not bold enough to tell the
truth and to objectively analyze reality, and they
seem to relish rather in lies, innuendo, and
propaganda.
The
other dimension that can help us understand the
conflict in Ethiopia and the war in Tigray is the
nature and characteristics of
the new regime led by Abiy
Ahmed. Who is Abiy and what kind of government
does he preside over? If we examine Abiy and his
mission and objectives superficially, it is
apparent that he is the byproduct of the EPRDF who
ascended to power via smooth transition when he
was sworn in the Ethiopian parliament in April
2018; soon after he became prime minister, he
unequivocally told the Ethiopian audience and the
world that he is committed to a neoliberal policy
agenda and that he would establish a capitalist
economic system as opposed to a mixed economy of
its predecessor regime. There is nothing wrong in
promoting the market economy in Ethiopia and
fostering private enterprises, but it could be
detrimental to the overall economy of the country
if the major companies and corporations like
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Electric
and Power Authority (EEPA), Ethiopian Shipping
Lines, Ethiopian Airlines etc. are sold to foreign
investors.
On
top of the above attempt to explore the nature of
Abiy and his government, it is also important to
have a look at contradictory verbiage
and policy measures. For
instance, in many instances, Abiy said his motto
in uniting Ethiopia is Medemer (inclusiveness
in order to augment unity) and this in turn
entails ‘love’, ‘unity’,
‘forgiveness’, wonderful expressions that made
a significant number of Ethiopians rally around
Abiy’s orbit, but soon the Medemer mobilizing
power diminished considerably and it proved to the
people that it was indeed evanescent; in fact, it
really disappeared in the mist of thin air because
Abiy and his cohorts began contradicting their own
“love-ridden” policies; they began
incarcerating journalists like Eskinder Nega and
political leaders like Bekele Gerba, Jawar
Mohammed, and Lidetu Ayalew (now discharged from
prison); Abiy himself in one conference said that
he is “very close to becoming a dictator”; in
another instance, he said “Ethiopia is not
sovereign” and on the contrary, the country
‘is aid-dependent’ and he further said, “I
am good at begging” and implied that Ethiopia is
a beggar nation; the latter parlance has some
truth; Ethiopia is indeed a poor nation and
dependent on foreign aid like many Third World
countries, but discarding ‘Ethiopian
sovereignty’ is a dangerous premise, and perhaps
tantamount to
treason.
Consistent
with the above contradictory measures of the
regime, one thing that was abundantly clear to
most Ethiopians is the absence of rule of law and
security and consequently the internal
displacement of thousands of Ethiopians throughout
the country; violent attack on ethnic groups by
“unknown armed group” and the burning of
public property and Ethiopian Orthodox Churches;
interestingly the patterns of the latter heinous
crimes were same in all Ethiopia; on top of these
disturbances, left unchecked by the government,
all roads to Tigray were closed by local bandits
but with the tacit approval of the government.
As
a result of the multifaceted contradictory padding
and measures by the government, the Abiy reform
policy also began to disappear like a
phantasmagoria. I have argued once that “the
so-called reform is now derailed and the
reemergence of open political debate and civil
dialogue could altogether vanish…The government,
it looks, is more interested in populist agendas
of gathering people and promising all the good
wishes… But the populist narrative is
contradicted by the “day-time hyenas” rhetoric
and the attempt to isolate the Tigray Regional
State from the Ethiopian body politic. It may not
be clear whether this is, a reflection of paradox
of mental vision, or involuntarily releasing the
hidden true self like a deflating balloon, but
what is quite astounding is the regime’s
immersion in self-perpetuating cycle of
dysfunction, which is manifested sometimes with
some shocking revelations. At any rate, whatever
interpretation we give to the promises made in a
public square, the lofty statements are mechanisms
of distraction from the more pressing problems
that Ethiopia has encountered now.”2
With
the above analyses of the nature and
characteristics of the Abiy regime, we may not be
able to certainly affirm what Abiy and his cohorts
are up to. What is their real motive? May be, we
can find the answer in Finian Cunningham, the
brilliant Irish journalist, assessment of Abiy’s
regime. “The new prime minister” says
Cunningham “has embraced Washington’s Arab
allies in the region, in particular Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and United Arab Emirates…The nation
[Ethiopia], which was seen up to now as an African
role model for independent development, is being
shifted from its erstwhile independence and
partnership with China to become a client of
Western capital and Washington’s regional allies
among the Arab states.”3
What
makes Cunningham’s thesis credible is Abiy’s
newly forged alliance with Eritrea and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) by making “state visits”
to these countries several times and signing
so-called peace treaties and diplomatic relations
with the head of states, namely Isaias Afeworki
and Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, but the Ethiopian
people have no clue whatsoever of Abiy’s
diplomatic ventures with Eritrea and UAE. But, a
significant number of Ethiopian intellectuals and
professionals have now learned that Abiy’s peace
accord with Isaias in fact was a window dressing
conspiracy against Tigray; their agenda was to
encircle Tigray and ultimately wage against the
regional state, the last bastion of peace compared
to regional states that were wrecked by incessant
skirmish and ethnic violent confrontations, now in
Somalia, now in Benishangul Gumuz, and now in
Konso, not to mention Wolita and Sidama that were
hit hard by similar aggressions under the watchful
eyes of the regional police; the Ethiopian Defense
Forces (EDF), as part of the command post, were
engaged in constant wars with the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF) forces in the Wellega Zone of Western
Ethiopia. The EDF, by serving as command post
fighting forces in the Southern regional state and
Oromia, have already lost its national duty as a
territorial and defense army and became rather a
police-type military that is engaged in subduing
its own people, and now when they are mobilized in
war in Tigray, they have completely betrayed the
Ethiopian constitution, and one fine day they may
be charged with treason.
The
generals of the EDF may have lost their memories
of the magnanimity and charisma of Chief-of-Staff
General Seare Mekonnen, but some them, I suspect,
that they know very well that Seare geared the
psychology of the army toward respecting the
constitution and defending the Ethiopian
nation-state, but none of the army members
probably know why Seare was assassinated,
including the present chief of staff General
Birhanu Jula, who wept during funeral service of
Seare. But, as of recent, new revelations testify
that General Seare was assassinated because he
fiercely opposed to the idea of a United Arab
Emirate intelligence experts involvement in the
Ethiopian national security agencies; he is
believed to have said, “involving foreign
intelligence specialist in the Ethiopian national
security system could derail and undermine
Ethiopian national interest”; soon after, he was
assassinated; he paid a price for just defending
his country, but it is now glaringly obvious that
he had to be eliminated long before the war on
Tigray was declared, and in which the United Arab
Emirate came into the battle zone of Tigray with
its drones.
After
two and half years of preparation on the Abiy side
and more than two decades discreet drawing up on
the part of Isaias’s Eritrea, the Ethiopian
government declared war on Tigray on November 4,
2020. The war mongers have strategized to come on
all directions to first fight the TPLF forces, and
then occupy, destroy and plunder Tigray and that
is what exactly happened; the Eritrean troops,
brigades after brigades, have overrun northern
Tigray from Humera and Shire area in the north
west to Aksum and Adwa in the central zone, and
Agame on the eastern frontier; the EDF came from
the south on the Alamata front; and the Amhara
Militia and Amhara Regional States special force,
accompanied by the EDF came on the western front,
in particular the Dansha, Tesegede area. The
objective clearly was to destroy Tigray and
perpetrate genocide as well.
With
the war in Tigray, now in its 55th
days, and a surprisingly protracted war given all
these enemies against one small regional state,
the brunt the Tigrayans have paid, however, is
enormously huge; it ranges from death of entire
families to the destruction of public properties,
factories, institutions, universities, and farm
areas. The barbaric Eritrean troops have not only
shelled major cities like Adigrat, Adwa, Shire
etc. but they also have plundered virtually
everything possessed by the Tigray Regional State
and some Tigrayan businessmen; they looted the
Addis Pharmaceutical Industry of Adigrat and
destroyed it; they plundered computers and
laboratory equipment and other essential materials
from Adigrat University and then destroyed the
physical buildings, halls, and classrooms of the
university. Few kilometers away from Adigrat, in a
church called Mariam Dinglat, the congregation
were attacked by Eritrean troops and more than
hundred of them were slaughtered in the church. By
the same token, they looted and destroyed the
textile industry of Adwa and the edible oil
factory and hotels in Shire; they have done the
same thing in Mekelle with the approval and
collaboration of the EDF.
The
bombardment of Tigray, however, is not an isolated
incident; all Ethiopia is now in shambles; all
Ethiopian people, in one form or another, have
been attacked by “unknown gunmen” as mentioned
above; when members of the Somali Democratic Party
(SDP) opposed the integration of their party with
the PP party of Abiy Ahmed, they were violently
attacked; earlier, the president for eight years
of the Somali Regional State, Abdi Mohamoud Omar,
an ardent supporter of the Ethiopian constitution,
the federal system, and an open friend of the
TPLF, was taken from his home in Addis Ababa, and
was thrown into prison. His successor, Mustafa
Muhmmed Omer, serving as member of PP is one of
the top Abiy advisors who justify the war against
Tigray.
Abiy
will not have a problem with the Amhara Regional
State leaders because they are his best allies;
the Amhara militia and Amhara Regional State
current President Agegnehu Teshager are working
hand-in-glove with him and they have a vested
interest in emasculating Tigray and recapture
Wolqait and Raya that they have been claiming for
a long time. Although Agegnehu, in his recent
speech, said, “we are not interested in land,
but in the revival of our identity” (whatever
that means), he contradicts the mission and
objectives of the ‘Land Reclaiming Committee’
established by Amhara irredentists a decade ago,
and I strongly believe that their irredentist
ambition would be realized given the current
crisis and the fragility that they have caused in
Tigray.
We
must also address the political economy factor
that has contributed to the current conflict and
the war in Tigray. While the whole Ethiopia was in
dire economic crisis due to sudden interruptions
of many projects, the drastic reduction of
productivity of factories and industries, and most
importantly the slow economic growth (from 10-11%
in 2010-2016 to 7.7% in 2018 and now to 1.9% at
the end of 2020) coupled by the absence of foreign
direct investment (FDI), Tigray was doing well in
relative terms and was on the right track in
economic development. But Abiy and his government,
directed blockages; first the main highway to
Tigray was blocked; then the other route via the
Afar Regional State was blocked, and Tigray was
left with only one outlet or corridor on the
Sudan-Western Tigray border. Following the
blockages, the Abiy regime entered in what I call
local cold war with the TPLF leadership; the TPLF
challenged him on many issues including elections
that were postponed, the rule of law, the
continuation of the federal system and the current
constitution; Abiy, it seems to me was frightened
by the TPLF, which also was organizing an
all-Ethiopia federalist forces conferences in
Mekelle, which in the long run could undermine his
stay in power. The TPLF was a real headache to
Abiy Ahmed, but in my opinion this TPLF
frustrating tactic was not something that I
condone; the TPLF should have lessened its
superfluous criticism of Abiy and give him some
space for comfort so that he could come to a
negotiating table; I also believe, the TPLF missed
a golden opportunity when the Ethiopian
faith-based institute led by the Patriarch Abuna
Matias went to Mekelle and asked Dr. Debretsion to
reconcile with the PP and sit in a round table for
negotiation. By way of responding to the proposal
of the religious leaders, the TPLF said, “the
reconciliation should not be between the TPLF and
the PP; it should include other opposition parties
as well” and this was where the TPLF erred in
policy and in principle; it should have seized the
moment and used the opportunity to sit in a round
table with its opponent, instead of bothering with
the inclusion of other opposition political
parties.
However,
the political economy of sabotage increasingly
undermined the development agenda and initiatives
of the Tigrayan leadership; and it was impossible
for the latter to reconcile its differences with
the Abiy government. The budget that was allocated
to all regional states was not given to Tigray;
the federally owned industrial park of Mekelle was
also denied funds when the federal government
distributed funds to all other industrial parks,
including that of Hawassa Industrial Park; and
when there was a challenge of the second invasion
locusts in northern Wollo and southern Tigray,
federal government drones were spraying
insecticides on the Wollo area but not on the
Tigray zone.
It
seems to me the war on Tigray was craftly designed
by Abiy and Isaias and their Arab mentors so that
they could have control and upper hand on the
geopolitics of the Red Sea zone and the Horn of
Africa. Moreover, while Eritrea is interested in
looting and destruction of Tigray, Abiy and his
government are interested in claiming victory,
perhaps a vainglorious one, over the TPLF, and
then conduct other wars in Benishangul, Oromia,
and mobilizing his forces against other mini
states that are perceived as recalcitrant and
rebellious; wars, thus, will continue in Ethiopia
for a relatively long time. If the wars with
Benishangul, Oromia, and Sudan continues unabated,
the TPLF might get some respite and gather
momentum and the Abiy government could reach a
vanishing point. History is full of surprises and
anything can happen in Ethiopia during the
post-war period, and we will have to wait and see.
One more factor I
like to add and which I think is relevant to
analyzing the Ethiopian conflict and the war on
Tigray, has to do with two important insights on
the hidden agendas pertaining to Ethiopian
resources and aid to authoritarian regimes. In
relation to these two themes, I recently came
across two interesting titles: 1) “US
Businessmen are close to exploiting Ethiopia’s
oil plans in a multibillion scheme” by Zekarias
Zelalem; and 2) “The Conflict in Ethiopia Calls
in to Question Authoritarian Aid” by Nic
Cheeseman.
Zekarias
explores the hidden agenda to exploit Ethiopian
oil reserve, which, apparently was handled and
operated by the Ethiopian Mineral, Petroleum and
Biofuel Corporation (EMPB) founded in 2016.
Zekarias is interested in investigating and
exposing one fake corporation by the name
Greencomm Technologies, a company located in
Virginia, and according to the writer,
“Greencomm referred to itself as “a global
leader in renewable energy and sustainability on
its LinkedIn profile despite there not being any
evidence of a single completed project anywhere in
the world”. Greencomm may have now signed a
contract of $3.6 billion with EMPB, and it is all
a secret deal. “Whether or not the Ethiopian
government officials are complicit,” says
Zekarias, “in ensuring the Greencomm scheme
would be a success that cannot be established thus
far.4
The
war on Tigray would effectively hide the Greencomm
scheme and other similar plots that international
media outlets would attempt to cover and report,
but beyond the grand secret designs, however, it
is highly probable that the crude oil in the
Ethiopian Somali Regional State could be exploited
by Isaias’ Eritrea and other interested parties
who participated in the war against Tigray.
The
article of Professor Nic Cheeseman is focused on
‘aid on development to authoritarian
governments’ who made a difference in
transforming their respective societies; he
mentions Ethiopia and Rwanda as examples, but
there are many other nations that did very well in
development under autocratic regimes; the Asian
Tigers and China are a very good example of this
aid-development-autocratic-regime nexus. In an
attempt to extrapolate his thesis, Cheeseman
argues, “…Ethiopia and Rwanda achieved
impressive success, attracting international
praise for reducing poverty and unemployment while
consistently securing high economic growth…The
gains achieved from 1995 to 2012 under then
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi have proved
more resistant to caricature but have been no less
influential …Ethiopia’s fall from grace is
especially important because it has the potential
to radically change this situation, making it much
harder for international donors to justify
sacrificing human rights on the altar of
development.”
With
respect to ethnic identity in Ethiopia, Cheeseman
furthermore argues; “Rather than seeking to
enforce one ethnic identity over the others, the
EPRDF committed to giving the country’s
different communities the freedom and self-respect
they had always desired. The government enshrined
a right to self-determination in the Ethiopian
constitution…The system was sustainable during
Meles, whose personal authority and astute
political management papered over the cracks. But
after his death in 2012, the EPRDF began to come
apart at the seams. The rise to power of the
current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, was a direct
product of these tensions”5
Unlike
Cheeseman, other many scholars, and myself who see
the Ethiopian constitution and federal structure
as contributing factors to the self-determination
of the Ethiopian nationalities, the present
government led by Abiy and his associates in the
PP, the miniscule parties that support PP, and the
chauvinist elements of the former Derg remnants,
who are now serving as advisors to Abiy, view the
federal system and the constitution as major
impediments to their agenda of dismantling the
current systems that guaranteed
self-determination. In order to realize their
agenda of deliberate reversal of the twenty-seven
years gains in self-determination, and that is why
they have been working hard in dismantling the
Ethiopian social fabric; hence, the internal
displacement of millions of Ethiopians in the last
two and half years; and now, in order to
facilitate the grand agenda of dismantling
Ethiopia and its “fall from grace” as
Cheeseman aptly put it, they have conducted a
major war against Tigray, an Ethiopian Regional
State that was relatively peaceful and viable.
Notes:
1.
Ghelawdewos Araia, “The
Ascendance of a New Regime and Contradictory
Policies and Measures in Ethiopian Politics”
July 4, 2018
www.africanidea.org/Ascendance_Contradictory_measures_Ethiopia.html
2.
Ghelawdewos Araia, “Is
Ethiopia Heading Toward a One Man Show or
One-Party Dictatorship?”, www.africanidea.org/Is_Ethiopia_heading.html
September 22, 2019
3.
Finian Cunningham,
“Ethiopia, Breaking the Dam of Western Debt
Slavery”, in ‘Strategic Culture’ www.africanidea.org/Is_Ethiopia_heading.html
4.
Zekarias Zelalem, “US
Businessmen are close to exploiting Ethiopia’s
oil plans in a multi-billion-dollar scheme”, Quartz
Africa, December 22, 2020
5.
Nic Cheeseman, “The Conflict
in Ethiopia Calls to Question Authoritarian
Aid”,
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/12/22/conflict-in-ethiopia-calls-into-question-authoritarian-aid-pub-83515
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