Sovereignty
and Democracy in Ethiopia: A Reflection on Gebru Asrat’s Book
Reviewed by Desta,
Asayehgn, Ph.D. Professor of Sustainable Economic Development, Barowsky
School of Business, Dominican University of California
Over the past forty years, we
have been hearing and reading a lot about the Tigrai People’s Liberation
Front (TPLF) which dismantled the inhuman and atrocious Military
dictatorship that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991. It was not only highly
skilled in military operations but was visionary. The
impression that was widely circulated was that when the TPLF came to power
it would protect Ethiopia’s sovereignty, adhere to the rules of law and
ensure that equity and social justice would prevail , and above
all democracy would be the
norm of Ethiopian society.
Contrary
to these assertions, Gebru Asrat (hereafter referred to as Gebru), in his
book entitled “Sovereignty and
Democracy,” published by the Signature Book Printing Press in 2014, gives us a u-turn with his depiction of the history of the TPLF.
Using his first-hand account and other primary sources, Gebru argues
that TPLF’s culture was based on secrecy. Because of naiveté and
misguided propaganda, most members of the TPLF became indoctrinated with
the Stalinist concept of self-determination. Thus,
in the earlier times, TPLF did not reflect on the socio-cultural history
of Ethiopia during its armed struggle. As
stated by Gebru, the goal of TPLF was to achieve the rights of
self-determination for the people of Tigrai. In the case of Eritrea, Gebru
states that the TPLF had a crystal clear belief that Eritrea was a colony
of Ethiopia and believed that the independence of Eritrea was possible not
by deliberating with the ruling fascist military regime but through the
barrels of the gun.
Gebru
was a Central Committee Member of the TPLF during the period of armed
struggle. After the overthrow of the military dictatorship in 1991, Gebru
became the President of Tigrai Region, and a member of the Politburo of
the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
After carefully studying and reflecting on the history of Ethiopia, the
author, Gebru, has come to the point of discarding what he was socialized
to master by the ideologies of the TPLF.
For example, on Eritrea, he has come to asserting that Eritrea was
part of Ethiopia, except that it was occupied by Italy during the colonial
days. To justify his point, Gebru argues that in 1989 Emperor Menelik of
Ethiopia had an agreement with Italy that Italy would return Eritrea to
Ethiopia when it left. Therefore, according to Gebru’s argument, in
1952, the United Nations purposely made Eritrea a protectorate of Ethiopia
so that Ethiopia would be entitled to full access to the Red Sea.
Furthermore,
Gebru challenges the 1991 to 1998 strategies that the TPLF/EPRDF ruling
party had intended not to make Ethiopia sovereign but to legitimatize the
dependency of Ethiopia on Eritrea. To validate his point, Gebru asserts
that the TPLF/EPRDF which is the current ruling party of Ethiopia
unnecessarily asked the United Nations to use its good office to arrange
for a referendum on Eritrea (i.e., though Eritrea unilaterally ruled
itself for two years) so that the Eritrean people could decide to be part
of Ethiopia, or claim their independence. Interestingly enough, Ethiopia
was the first nation to respond and recognize Eritrea’s independence in
1993.
Contrary
to the Meles Regime’s argument to the United Nations that Eritrea
deserved to acquire its independence, Gebru now tells us that Ethiopia’s
sovereignty could have been better served
if Ethiopia in 1993 argued that it has to have unconstrained access
to the Port of Assab along the Red Sea. More precisely, Gebru argues that
this was not possible at that time because the TPLF/EPRDF believed Esaias
Afewoki, the current President of Eritrea, when he repeatedly, but
verbally, promised to Ethiopian officials that Ethiopia would have full
access to the Port of Assab. Gebru’s
argument is that since now Ethiopia is deprived of having unconditional
access to the Port of Assab, he emphatically asserts that Ethiopia needs
to reverse its position through diplomacy. Therefore,
the question we need to ask Gebru at this juncture is: is it possible for
Ethiopia to have ownership on the Red Sea frontier while Eritrea is still
regarded by the United Nations as having the sovereign legal rights? Given
the reality as it exists now, can Gebru systematically
explain how Ethiopia could have sovereignty over the Red Sea?
Furthermore,
Gebru argues in retrospect that the slogan created in 2001-2002 by the
then Prime Minister Meles that the economy of Ethiopia would rebound if a
renaissance of Ethiopia was declared, was nothing but a window dressing
slogan. Gebru
emphatically argues that the slogan was purposely designed to legitimize
the EPRDF’s rule in Ethiopia. In addition, Gebru believes that the
“renaissance slogan” was designed by the regime to help the then Prime
Minister Meles and his group to consolidate power and curtail the then
flourishing of democracy throughout Ethiopia. At
a personal level, Gebru claims that the Meles’ regime sponsored a number
of writers to write pro-government books and articles to discredit and
purposely to distort the author’s political group called the Arena
for Ethiopia’s Sovereignty and Democracy.
In
justifying the purpose of his book, “Sovereignty
and Democracy in Ethiopia,” Gebru
states that the book was written to give a different version of the
existing history and that he foresees the readers of his book will be able
to review and desensitize the pro-Meles propaganda messages that they have
been getting which discredit Gebru and the “Arena
for Ethiopia’s Sovereignty and
Democracy” Party. In addition,
Gebru’s book was to rewrite and straighten the distorted view of the
historical development of the TPLF and also to get across his own
reflections on the effects of the Algiers Agreement on the sovereignty of
Ethiopia in 2000.
The Algiers Agreement was
a peace agreement between the
governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia signed
on December 12, 2000, at Algiers. As
argued by Gebru, the Algiers Agreement was deliberately designed by Meles
and his group to give additional land to Eritrea that it never asked for.
(Eritrea was completely devastated during the 1998-2000 war
period.) Finally, the book argues that the slogan of having
“revolutionary democracy” in Ethiopia was solely propagated by the
TPLF/EPRDF regime which amounts to nothing but an empty slogan, purposely
created by Meles’ regime to prolong its stay in power.
The author was kind enough to entertain constructive criticisms on
the six chapters of his book. Actually, Gebru makes it clear that had he
finished his book before the death of Prime Minister Meles, he would have
been very happy and thrilled to entertain a debate with the then Prime
Minister Meles on the various allegations that the author had depicted
about the TPLF/EPRDF ruling party. The
author also strongly feels that he would be more than happy to see the
ideas portrayed in his book invite other concerned Ethiopians to enter
into constructive dialogues so that the book could be used as a framework
to marshal the energy of various collaborations to design new trajectories
for Ethiopia’s viability.
In
Chapter 1, Gebru’s book gives a historical narrative starting from the
Axumite Kingdom period up to the formation of the TPLF in February 18,
1975. More specifically, the chapter narrates a historical account of
democracy and the sovereignty of
the Ethiopian kingdom before the emergency of the TPLF/EPRDF. In this
chapter Gebru attempts to correct some of major ahistorical accounts about
Eritrean Colonialism that the TPLF has portrayed over the years.
Chapter 2 narrates the armed struggle between the Military Junta and
the TPLF for about seventeen years. Furthermore, the chapter highlights
the controversial issues that started within the TPLF and the rocky
relationship that existed between the TPLF and other armed organizations
that were struggling in Ethiopia. Finally, this chapter gives some of the
cardinal factors that contributed to the complete annihilation of the
Military Junta in Ethiopia and the emergence of the TPLF/EPRDF at the apex
of Ethiopian political power.
Chapter
3 of the book gives a description of the relationship between Ethiopia and
Eritrea from 1991 to 1998. That is, the chapter gives a bird’s eye view
of the unequal relationship that existed between Eritrea (Shaebia) and Ethiopia’s (TPLF/EPRDF) during these years. In
short, as depicted by the author, the 1991 to 1998 period manifests the
very challenges that the TPLF/EPRDF regime in Ethiopia faced when it was
attempting to consolidate its power and restructure its economy. The Shaebia/Eritrea
regime on the other hand, was trying to act as a regional superpower in
Eastern Africa by amassing the many war gadgets that were left by the
military government in Ethiopia in order to destabilize or even subjugate
its neighbors.
Chapter 4 of the book discusses the war between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. This
chapter reveals how the then Prime Minister Meles and his group had
skillfully manipulated the division that existed between the two groups
and stopped the advancing Ethiopian military that could have made the Shaebia
/Eritrean group bend its knees and pray to almighty God to use his power
to arrest the highly galvanized Ethiopian forces that were marching to
occupy the entire Eritrean State. As stated by Gebru, when the Ethiopian
counter-offensive forces heard from the field that Prime Minister Meles
had declared that the war would be ended once Zalambesa was liberated, we
had a clear understanding that Prime Minister Meles had the intention
(though some say that Meles was instructed by the United States not to
advance) of saving the
humiliated Shaebia /Eritrean forces from
being completely annihilated by the Ethiopian mighty forces.
However, as stated by Gebru, later when the most vocal TPLF Party
officials confronted Prime Minister Meles, given that he controlled the
law and police force, Prime
Minister Meles counter-charged that the splintered opposing TPLF groups
were involved not only in anti-democratic activities but were deeply
immersed in other forms of corrupt activities.
In Chapter 5 the writer gives his account how the post
Ethio-Eritrean war gave the upper hand to then Prime Minister Meles and
his group, giving full control of the apparatus of the Ethiopian state.
The author also discusses some conspicuous problems that arose in
Ethiopia, because the entire Ethiopian nation was under the control of
EPRDF Polit Bureau that was subjugated to the will of Prime Minister Meles.
In Chapter 6 the author describes that until 2005 Prime Minister
Meles opened wide the door to allow different political parties to fully
participate in the existing Ethiopian political scene. However, the author
contends that as the Prime Minister saw that his Party had been losing
ground and the Addis Ababa parliamentarian seats within the Federal
Government were on the verge of being controlled by the opposing parties,
he reversed his position and as a dictator he restricted all the opposing
parties from open access to political activities throughout the country
then and in the future. What
is more disturbing, the author describes that Prime Minister Meles was
determined to the extent of deliberately infringing upon the rights that
had been accorded to the many ethnic groups and nationalities in Ethiopia.
In
conclusion, the author gives to policy makers six possible suggestions so
that they might mend the situation in Ethiopia. These are: 1) Ethiopia’s
position along the Red Sea must be conspicuous; 2) Peaceful reconciliation
needs to exist between Ethiopia and Eritrea; 3) Assure that various
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia remain united; 4) Implement
the right type of Federalism
in Ethiopia; 5) Practice true democracy in Ethiopia; and 6)
Attempt to maintain socio-economic equity in Ethiopia.
Reflection
The author is of the opinion
that his book has a different perspective than those books that have been
published thus far. Given
the experience of the author, the book is based on a U-shaped analysis of
the TPLF history. The author’s stand is based on rewriting and
correcting the distorted version of Ethiopia’s history by the TPLF. For
someone who doesn’t know Gebru, the book appears to be therapeutic and
one might think that writing this book may have helped Gebru to find peace
rather than what he experienced with the TPLF on the battleground and then
at the apex of power from 1991 to 2000. To those who had a different
understanding about TPLF, reading the book can give them a different
perspective of the TPLF and the ability to examine the management system
that it followed after it come to power. Mainly, as Gebru had been with
Meles for more than twenty years, it is possible to say that as a student
of history and politics Gebru might have given us an accurate description
of the thinking and the political calibers of the late Prime Minister
Meles.
As clearly given in the bibliography, Gebru has systematically used
both primary and secondary sources. However, as mentioned above, Gebru’s
book seems to be unique because one of the purposes of the book was to
instruct its readers that there is a different version of the TPLF’s
history. After all, who is to tell us the history of the TPLF expect Gebru
who has been one of the most ardent supporters of the TPLF. That
is why the book has become very popular with those who knew very little
about TPLF and especially with those who are opposed to TPLF/EPRDF’s
rule of Ethiopia. Gebru has given the needed ammunition that the
opposition group has been searching for during the last twenty years.
Also, the fact that the book is written in Amharic is a clever marketing
strategy.
As mentioned before, the purpose of the book is to
demonstrate to its readers that Ethiopia’s sovereignty is at stake
because it has been embezzled by the current TPLF/EPRDF regime.
Regrettably, as an academician I could say that the author has failed to
give us a theoretical framework and pinpoint the underlying factors that
contribute to the idea of sovereignty as a concept. In addition, the flaw
of the book is that it does not operationalize the different dimensions of
sovereignty. His suggestion that the United states of America, France,
Britain, etc. could help Ethiopia have sovereignty over the Red Sea
doesn’t seem to me a sound argument. I think the author needs further
reading on the literature that relates to international relations. Given
his radical thinking, I cannot imagine that Gebru would think that those
nations that contributed to the balkanization of Africa or who are
restlessly involved in destabilizing the African continent are going to
indulge in good conscience by helping Ethiopia to have sovereignty over
the Red Sea?
Similarly,
if it is practiced in Ethiopia, the author fails to give us the factors
that explain democracy. By the way, is Ethiopia an emerging democracy or
is it still struggling to apply the centralized political or the planned
centered system that the fighters were socialized to exercise?
Instead of concentrating
on Meles, which the writer has mostly focused on, a number of readers
would have appreciated his
book if the writer explained more on EPRDF’s administration
and management style. For example, the writer should have drawn some case
studies from the Tigrai Region to illustrate some of the things he did in
that region where he was President for more than six years. In
short, case studies from his region would have supported his scholarly
claims and would have helped the readers to appreciate some of the
empirical works he did while he was the governor of Tigrai, then the book
could have contributed to the knowledge in his field.
Gebru’s book seems credible and some of its ideas actually
coincide with his rival, Argawi
Berhe’s writing. For example
in describing the Tigrai Liberation Front (TLF), who were the pioneer
fighters for the independence of Tigrai, Gebru tells his readers that the
TLF fighters, who were having a sort of reconciliation meeting with the
TPLF were instead mercilessly massacred
by the TPLF while they were asleep. Similarly, Aragawi ( 2009, p.
82) states that “ in the early morning of 11 November 1975, a secret
signal, which was only given to the TPLF fighters, would alert them to pin
down the TLF fighters and
snatch their weapons. As the ratio of TPF-TPLF fighters was one to three
or four, it was believed this tactic was the most efficient and likely to
cause the least or no bloodshed. It was carried out as planned, but two of
the TLF fighters were killed in a skirmish that got out of hand. …Sadly,
one of the fighters who lost his life unexpectedly was Yemane Gebre-Meskel.”
Gebru not only admires the
heroism of one of my very bright students, Yemane Gebre-Meskel, but also
strongly condemns the massacre that was carried out by the TPLF.
If
Gebru agrees with Argawi, why did Gebru fail to discuss in detail how much
of the foreign aid that the TPLF was getting from abroad was distributed
to the hungry masses and how much of it was used to finance his Party, the
Marxist –Leninist League of Tigrai (MLLT.) The
distribution of foreign aid to the starving masses in Tigrai during the
war is still a burning issue and it is at the heart of mass media
critiques.
As
discussed above, Gebru has forwarded a number of suggestions for policy
makers. His first suggestion is that Ethiopia should have a conspicuous
position at the Red Sea because the Red Sea is Ethiopia’s natural
frontier. This suggestion
might rekindle the heart of an Ethiopian nationalist but given the reality
we have at this juncture, I think it looks like wishful thinking. Also, as
I said before, the western nations look at any situation in term of their
interest. For example, investors from western nations and for that matter
other countries as well are likely to come to Ethiopia for only one
purpose and that is to exploit its natural resources or for land grabbing
purposes. I don’t think it
is in Ethiopia’s interest to have its environment degraded for the sake
of earning foreign exchange. Most of the accumulated foreign exchange from
exports has been used to subsidize the rich and ruling class in Ethiopia.
Instead of pushing the local people to marginal lands as is the case of
foreign agricultural investment in Gambella and other regions, I suggest
that it is our responsibility to learn from and then train the local
peoples how to use their resources wisely.
I
agree with Gebru that federating Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 was a
miscalculation by the United Nations. Ethiopia had a feudal type of
government, whereas Eritrea experienced Italian colonialism (actually
Eritrea’s name is derived from the Red Sea and was given to it by Italy)
and the British trusteeship. Since they had irreconcilable differences,
federating Eritrea with Ethiopia was like mixing apples with oranges. In
retrospect, had the United Nations, as planned, allocated the Port of
Assab to Ethiopia and allowed Eritreans to choose whether to be part of
Ethiopia or be autonomous for at least ten years and then decide to be
part of Ethiopia or to be independent, then we would not have had the
current mess that exists in that region now.
I am sure, during the ten years, Ethiopia would have reformed its
archaic system in order to entice Eritrea to be part it. Similarly, the
Eritreans would have experienced what it means to live harmoniously with
their neighbors, because unlike now Eritrea would have not earned foreign
remittance from its citizens. The
problem that I see in Ethiopia and Eritrea is that the two countries have
never had the chance to undergo thorough, effective learning and
reflective processes to appreciate what they have in common.
Otherwise, they would not have continued with their parochial views
nor live in destitution in the era of globalization.
Now
Gebru is suggesting that there should a peaceful reconciliation between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. This might be possible, provided the present policy
makers in Ethiopia and Eritrea are willing to settle their cases amicably.
However, the question I have is, how can the author reconcile his
suggestion with the comment he gave in Sweden that a peace initiative such
as the “normalization campaign” is “another term for Eritrea’s
return to an economic invasion of Ethiopia. Normalization would have no
other meaning than legalizing the Eritrean regimes right for the unbridled
plunder of Ethiopian resources pre-98 style” (facebook.com, May 13,
2012).
Gebru’s
third suggestion that Ethiopia should design ways and means of having
harmonious relationships among Ethiopian nationalities is a reasonable
advice. Though I agree with Gebru and as I have written widely on the
subject, the present form of federal government in Ethiopia was designed
in 1991 to accommodate different ethnic-based groups. The question I have
for Gebru is then, why was Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution copied
from somewhere else and pasted in to be a part of the Ethiopian
Constitution when he was in power? Has
Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution been encouraging the different
nationalities in Ethiopia to agitate instead of settling peacefully as
part of Ethiopia?
Reverting back to a unitary state in Ethiopia is passé. Now
Ethiopians don’t seem to have the appetite for either a centralized or
decentralized system of government. All they want is to have a federal
government that encourages and promotes self-rule, a self-rule that would
help them to participate in the nomination and election of their own
representatives. As stated in his book, Gebru would agree with me that the
existing federal structure that we have in Ethiopia has to be altered and
amended to cope with the challenges that are arising. (See Desta,
2014)
The
cornerstone of a democratic federal polity is based on diversity. In the
name of democracy, what exist in Ethiopia are political cadres chosen by
the central government’s officials who administer the various
localities. Among other
things, the most viable and necessary condition for an Ethiopian federal
government is to encourage and require each community to choose its own
representatives in government. So as Gebru has suggested, the practice of
a sound democratic system in Ethiopia needs to be based on transparency,
power sharing, and an allowance for effective checks and balances. (See
also, Desta, 2014)
To
illustrate the current economic system in Ethiopia, Gebru has identified
numerous reliable sources of information. For example, Gebru has given us
that 39 percent of the Ethiopian population earns below the poverty line
($1.25 per day). In addition when the Multi-dimensional Poverty rate is
taken into consideration, in 2011 alone about 87 percent of the Ethiopian
people lived below the poverty line. The rate of unemployment among
Ethiopian youths is close to 30 percent. In addition, Gebru argues that
though the Ethiopian economy is supposedly growing at the rate of 7.0 to
7.5 percent per year, a large part of the economy is based on government
expenditure and not on consumption, investment, or net export expenditure.
In addition, Gebru gives us a clear picture of the glaring inequity that
has existed in Ethiopia. Also,
Gebru highlights how the rate of inflation and conspicuous rent-seeking
activities are devastating Ethiopia’s
economy.
As
a caveat, I would like to add that that the government in Ethiopia
promotes that it is universalizing primary education while the dynamics on
the ground reveal that primary public schools in Ethiopia are inadequate
furnished. In addition, as
Gebru said in his book, the helpless school children are socialized to
master the ideology of the ruling class. The school administrators of the
various government schools are not based on professional qualification but
on political cadres. The current dual schooling system in Ethiopia is
challenging and highly disturbing. As Gebru sees it, the present system in
Ethiopia encourages cronyism and corruption.
Conclusion
Gebru’s book “Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia” is a u-turn historical
account of the Tigrai People’s Liberation Front. In reviewing this book,
the principal criteria included purpose, content, organization, and
reference sources. To give credit to the author, Gebru Asrat’s book is
well documented and is an excellent resource for students, educators,
policy-makers, and others who follow the history of Ethiopia.
Starting with the Axumite kingdom, the author, as a former student
of history, has shown the detailed progression of Ethiopian history. The
tone of the book reflects a learned appreciation for historical
documentation. As a reader, I was taken on a journey through Ethiopian
history and received first-hand accounts of the formation of the TPLF, the
armed-struggle, and the author’s assessment of the effectiveness of the
EPRDF as he was a member of the ruling class. Gebru’s
multi-faceted background and the fact that he has played a strategic role
during the armed struggle and having been the President of the Tigrai
Region, and a member of the currently ruling politburo of the Ethiopian
Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front or (TPLF/EPRDF as he prefers to
name it) has helped him to assemble key pieces of data that span Ethiopian
history. To reiterate, the book is well documented and is worthy to read.
References:
Asrat, G. (2014). Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia: Washington, D.C.: Signature
Book Publishing.
Berhe, A. ((2009). A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation front
(1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology, and Mobilization in Ethiopia:
California: Teshai, publishers.
Desta, A. (2014). From Economic Dependency and Stagnation to Democratic developmental
State. New jersey, Trenton: the Red Sea Press, p. 96.
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