|
Political
Leadership and Political Economy in Contemporary
Ethiopian Politics
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
August 16, 2018
In
this article, I will discuss the basic tenets of
political leadership and political economy in the
context of the current crisis in Ethiopia and in
light of the ethnic-based disturbances that are
quite enigmatic to explain, but for all intents
and purposes it looks that ethno-nationalist
tendencies and practices targeting certain ethnic
groups, are artificially inseminated by some
forces who wish to see Ethiopia torn apart by
civil wars. I am of the opinion that these
disturbances will eventually subside and the
ulterior motives of the obscure forces will fail,
but at this juncture of their history Ethiopians
are required to stand in unison and cannot afford
to stand by and watch when a nation-wide crisis
hovers over Ethiopia.
Introductory
Remarks on Political Leadership
Ancient
Egypt or Kemet was the first nation-state and
ancient civilization that heralded the innovation
of governance; and political leaders, namely the
pharaohs of the respective dynasties were expected
to govern according to the principle of Maat
(order, stability, and righteousness). The
ancient Greeks borrowed the idea and practice of
governance from the ancient Egyptians; Plato’s The
Republic, in fact, was inspired by the
Egyptian master-teacher priests. However, Plato
refined the concept of the state (and by extension
‘governance’) as the embodiment of reason, and
he argued that political leadership was the
preserve of the statesmen that he calls
‘philosopher kings’, individual rulers who
would govern for the common good.
Ancient
Ethiopian art of governance was, in many ways,
similar, to that of ancient Egyptians; however,
what makes Ethiopian political leadership unique
was the prevalence of Kwame
Hig (fixed legislation or constitution) and
the Ba’ale
Hig (public advocates) during the heyday of
the Aksumite Kingdom. Ancient Ethiopia’s Aksum
kings and queens ruled with the consultation and
consent of the twelve council of elders
(collective leadership as in most African
traditional societies); in lieu of Maat
and ‘common good’, thus, Fithi/Fith
was incorporated in the corpus of the
Ethiopian legislature, that later became the basis
for Fitha
Biher (Justice of the Nation); the Fitha
Biher , antecedent to modern constitution,
served broad public interests.
In
contradistinction to the above ideas and practice
of political leadership and governance, Niccolo
Machiavelli argued that states and rulers are
driven not by reason but by passion. Furthermore,
in a nutshell, effective leadership for
Machiavelli was “the end justifies the means”,
even if the ruler employs ruthless
and despotic
style of governance. His advice to the prince (and
the title of his book is The Prince) was to embody the characteristics of the cunning fox and
the strength of a lion. This Machiavellian
doctrine, of course, must be seen in the context
of the unruly and war-torn Italy of the 16th
century and we must not perceive Machiavelli as
the architect
of negative
attributes of politics, for he also advocated the welfare of the people in his
contrasting analysis of the Palace (the ruling
elite) and the Piazza (the public square of the
ordinary people).
One
other important political theorist that I like to
include in this essay for the sake of
enlightenment in political leadership is Max
Weber, who makes a fine departure from the
normative and traditional leadership styles.
Weber’s analysis of political leadership
underscores the legitimacy of authority vis-à-vis
the government; hence, the source of legitimacy
for Weber are: 1) the rational-legal; 2)
traditional authority; and 3) the charismatic
authority. The latter authority attributes
superhuman and/or extraordinary qualities to the
leader.
Long
after Machiavelli was gone, that is, in the last
quarter of the 19th century and the
first half of the 20th century and
beyond, other theorists like Gaetano Mosca and
Vilfredo Pareto wrote about elite power; scholars
like C. Wright Mills and Robert Dahl also debated
the primacy of elite power and pluralism in the
United States in the 1960s. All of them wrote
volumes on elite power and brushed aside
grassroots power, and in the same vein a
significant number of Ethiopians, obsessed with Shumet
(legitimate power) conventionally advanced the
role of political elites and not the role of
people.
As
far as I am concerned, politics is not just about
power although the latter is, without doubt, the
unit currency in leadership and governance.
Politics is the administration of the state and
the people, and the sources for the legitimacy of
power are the people. On top of my definition of
politics, a political leader for me is one who is
farsighted, visionary, creative, innovative,
change agent, and one who (s/he) is really
committed to the people. On top of these
qualities, the individual and/or collective
leadership ought to revive the glory of Ethiopia
(its ancient and medieval civilizations), not only
for the sake of pride and psychological
satisfaction, but also to use it as a fulcrum to
mobilize Ethiopians toward forging their country
into an industrial hub and economic success.
The
above introductory note can help us understand the
subtle nuances of politics and also the nature and
characteristics of political leadership. However,
most of the
political theorists, I have brought forth are
circumvented by what we call real politic in
political science. There is no doubt that real
politic can be used as an explanatory tool for
human behavior (or the political animal) and
respective political systems, but I am afraid,
this paradigm is devoid of the humane dimension of
politics that ancient Ethiopians purposely adopted
as their modus operandi, and it is in the latter
spirit that
I write this article.
Therefore,
in order to realize a stable, peaceful, united,
and prosperous Ethiopia, we must at all costs
humanize the current Ethiopian politics with all
its manifestations of ethno-national skirmishes
and clashes, here and there. It is for this
apparent reason that I produced one article
entitled “National Reconciliation and National
Development in Ethiopia” in 2010; this is what I
said then:
This essay intends to reach out the Ethiopian Government and the
opposition by way of suggesting to both parties so
that they can and should make efforts to iron out
their differences and create a political climate
conducive enough to enable the two blocs to sit in
a round table for dialogue and for the peaceful
and smooth development and transformation of
Ethiopia…Above all, reconciliation ,
negotiation, and dialogue to bring together
opposing or opposite forces and not birds of the
same feather that flock together….Political
fragmentation in contradistinction to national
development emasculates the latter’s objectives,
and the EPRDF ought to transcend the current Kilil
(regional) politics and foster a pan-Ethiopian
development without undermining the relative
autonomy of the regional states.1
I
made the above argument when the ruling party, the
EPRDF, was relatively strong but not ready to
reconcile the larger Ethiopian society; now, when
I began scribbling this article, the EPRDF,
despite its efforts to overcome confrontational
politics in the last three years, is in pretty bad
shape and has literally squandered its clout on
the various political actors that played a role in
the making of the new regime. However, the EPRDF
still gets credit for boldly criticizing itself
and for asking forgiveness from the Ethiopian
people, and for leading a smooth transition from
the former government of PM Hailemariaim Desalegn
to the new government of Abyie Ahmed.
Nevertheless,
despite the smooth transition, the Ethiopian
political landscape, at present, is bedeviled by
ethnic clashes and disturbances especially in
Benishangul Gumuz, Debub Kilil, Oromia, and the
Somali Regional State. What went wrong? When Abiye
Ahmed emerged as head of the nation, all
Ethiopians, including myself, saw a promising hope
and a shining future for Ethiopia, but whether prima
facie (first impression) encounters are
deceiving or not is one major conundrum that we
Ethiopians have now encountered and shouldered –
a more complex problem that Ethiopians
countenanced and perhaps compelled to overcome
this major problem on their own. But, at a time
when they are so divided, can Ethiopians really
unite and combat the ethnic divide that has
afflicted much of Ethiopia?
I
personally do not like to judge a book by its
cover, nor make a hasty generalization about the
current government, which is only five months old,
but out of concern for Ethiopia’s peace and
stability, I wrote an article entitled “The
Ascendance of a New Regime and Contradictory
Polices and Measures in Ethiopian Politics”, and
the following, in part, is what I stated then:
There is no doubt that the new prime minster, Abiye Ahmed, has
distinctly and single-handedly mobilized the
Ethiopian people by his intellectual prowess and
his
communication skills, but his deeds have been
performed by too much too soon actions.
Accomplishing political agendas in
a short time is highly appreciated,
although translating policies into action via slow
and steady “track and field” is sometimes
preferable in order to avoid (or prevent in
advance) mistakes that could have negative impact
on the overall politics of the country.2
Contrary
to the above critical appraisal, the Abiye
government moved at a fast pace; granted freedom
to political prisoners and convicted criminals,
and even invited Diaspora Ethiopians, including
former Derg members who masterminded and
translated into action the Red Terror that
consumed thousands upon thousands of Ethiopians,
especially the youth. Dr. Abiye also made a swift
move in responding to the deadlock of ‘no peace,
no war’ state between Eritrea and Ethiopia and
in no time the new prime minister of Ethiopia went
to Asmara and the President of Eritrea came to
Ethiopia. Now, we know why this hurriedly
conducted air-to-air diplomacy was supported by
the two governments; as Reuters reported,
“…the rapprochement was, in fact, the
culmination of a year of back-channel talks,
sources with knowledge of the matter told Reuters.
One of the drivers behind that process was the
United States, which has been a major player in
the Horn of Africa for decades. More surprising
was the role played by a much smaller nation: the
United Arab Emirates.”3
The
peace diplomacy between Eritrea and Ethiopia was
supported by a significant number of Ethiopians
and Eritreans, but it was opposed by a sizable
Eritrean Diaspora groupings. The Tigray Regional
State, headed by Dr. Debretsion Gebremichael,
fully endorsed the peace agreement between the two
countries, but this most northern Ethiopian state
is requesting for a land-to-land and
people-to-people diplomacy instead. Debretsion has
suggested that Isaias of Eritrea and Abiye of
Ethiopia come by car to the people, but this
metaphoric car has yet to be a material force!
We
will have
to wait and see what the implications of the
rapprochement is going to be on Ethiopian
politics; if, on its positive side, it is going to
bring real and sustainable peace between the two
countries, a great historic achievement will be
witnessed; if on the other hand the peace
initiative, on its negative dimension, is meant to
disrupt Ethiopia by first going against Tigray (as
the present low-level politics indicates), it will
create havoc to the larger Ethiopian society but
it will also destroy the very actors who
engineered the
entire schema of
negative energy.
Now,
is Dr. Abiye with his unique style of leadership,
taking these initiatives all by himself (a
soliloquy leadership enterprise) or there are
obscure other actors behind him? In all
probability, Abiye seems to be acting without the
EPRDF, a party that is now almost greatly weakened
but not defunct yet. If Abiye is acting alone,
notwithstanding the shadowy elements, he would be
transgressing the principle of collective
leadership, which, in turn, could result in
further damage to the democratic process in
Ethiopia and even play as a stumbling block to
national integration.
It
is not too late for Abiye to operate in
consultation with his own party, the parliament,
and the competing political parties. As we
understand it in political science and as Putnam
proposes six integrative factors are identified to
help a leader create his/her own road map: social
homogeneity, recruitment patterns, personal
interaction, value consensus, group solidarity,
and institutional context.4
of these six integrative
factors, only one, that is, ‘personal
interaction’ is being employed by Dr. Abiye, and
he would have to go a long way in order to
effectively consolidate
political power and lead Ethiopia for the better,
and he can’t do it by mere populist drama and
mass sentimental support.
Abiye
Ahmed has yet to learn to become a political
savvy, and I would not mind extending my two-penny
worth advice to him, especially with respect to
rethinking his organizational base. If he
completely abandons his party, the hyenas of Arat
Kilo, who still maintain office and who pledged
loyalty to Abiye, could ultimately betray him, and
this is not going to be surprising
because
these hyenas suffer from opportunistic pathogens;
they are pretentious and hypocritical and they are
clever at deception; and in relation to this
Mafia-type politics (“Trust Nobody”) I like to
use my first advice by employing the old Tigrigna
adage or proverb that goes as follows: ዝብኢ ከሳዕ
ዝደለዮ
ዝረክብ
ይሕንክስ
when roughly
translated it means, ‘the hyena limps until it
gets what it wants’. The second advice comes
from a fellow scholar by the name Joel DeLuca:
“Inspirational leadership without a firm
grounding in organizational politics risks
becoming hollow rhetoric.”5
It
is optional for Dr. Abiye to either accept or
ignore the above advices; he could follow his own
instinct and attempt to form a new coalition
government that constitute
himself, Team Lemma, the various opposition
groups who recently returned to Ethiopia, and some
of the homegrown parties, but he should at least
seriously consider the digital revolution in
information technology that he is familiar with,
and read between lines what Rhodes and Hurt say:
“In the media age, leaders are presented and
stage-managed – spun – DDL [Database
Definition Language] as the solution to almost
every social problem. Through the mass media and
the internet, citizens and professional observers
follow the rise, impact, and fall of senior
political office holders at closer quarters than
ever before.”6
Finally,
in this section of the paper and before I delve
into political economy, I like to urge to the
Government of Ethiopia that it should take an
urgent action to thwart the current disturbances
in almost all Ethiopia. The Abiye regime must
understand that it cannot govern a country unless
there is peace and stability on the ground and the
first task of any government is to ensure security
for its citizens, without which there could not be
any meaningful development agenda. On top of this
peace and security concerns, the Government and
other actors (Ethiopian and non-Ethiopian alike)
must refrain from trying to isolate Tigray, which
by the way is going to be a futile attempt to
curtail a part of the whole and wish to maintain
the whole; the latter cannot stand without the
part. I had advanced a similar argument in my
previous article entitled “21st
Century Ethiopian Politics should be Reoriented
toward National Reconciliation and a Home Grown
Ideology”, and this is what I said in part:
As far as I am concerned, any movement leveled against the people of
Tigray will fail ignominiously not because Tigray
is quintessential core of the Ethiopian nation but
also because ethnic hatred in all its forms is
anti-Ethiopian. Any grouping that foments hatred
against any nationality in Ethiopia, including the
Amahara, Oromo, and other nationalities is
anti-Ethiopian.7
Unfortunately,
however, it looks that present-day Ethiopian
politics is tainted with domestic and external
alliances against Tigray, or more specifically
against the TPLF, and one wonders why this kind of
weird politics is being enhanced in the Horn of
Africa now, and
Abiye Ahmed may
have altogether dismissed the wisdom of the Afar
Ethiopian people who told him “that he should be
careful not isolate Tigray” from current
Ethiopian politics; and quite ironically, one
external observer by the name Bronwyn Bruton seems
to have justified and verified the position of
Abiye and Isaias on Tigray. She said that “Abiye
Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki are racing toward peace
because they both face the same threat:
hard-liners in the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation
Front…Although it might seem shocking to outside
observers there is a very clear reason why both
leaders are suddenly so eager to cooperate. They
are united by the presence of a still-potent
mutual enemy: the Tigrayan People’s Liberation
Front (TPLF)”8
Furthermore,
Bronwyn argues that “Abiye has proved more of
firebrand than expected and has been moving
quickly to generate a political following and
dismantle the TPLF’s grip on power”, but she
also contends that Abiye might confront
limitations in his capacity to accomplish his
mention of brushing aside the TPLF completely. She
says, “The bad news for Abiye is that his
maneuvers will probably have minimal effects…
Abiye can’t possibly afford to fire 95 percent
of Ethiopia’s generals. To consolidate his power
he needs to fire the worst but co-opt the rest,
and that process could take years.”9
With
respect to Bronwyn’s argument, and at times her
biased opinion, we can conclude that the current
government, after all, might fall under ‘state
of exception regime’ rather than the many
typologies of political leadership that we have
discussed above, and if this is true, as we shall
see below, the policies of such regime could have
a major impact on the development strategies and
projects that the previous government has promoted
and attained.
The Political Economy of Ethiopia: What is it and what should it be?
A
significant number of people think that political
economy is the simple admixture of politics and
economics, but that is not the case. As many
economists, political scientists, sociologists,
and philosophers agree, political economy is a
complex broad discipline that deals with
production, trade, and the relations of politics
and economics in the relations among
nation-states. I don’t mind this definition, but
the essence of political economy cannot be
understood unless there is a general consensus
among scholars and statesmen that political economy is
a constant
interplay between politics and economics.
The
first people who propounded political economy were
Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and
Karl Marx, and out of their theories and extensive
writings, there evolved the theory of the liberal
market economy. Among these theoreticians, it was
Adam Smith who came up with the idea of the
‘invisible hand’ or the market governs itself
thesis but he was proven wrong due to the fact
that the market economy suffered recession and/or
depression several times in history and was unable
to govern itself until respective governments
intervened and rescued it. Karl Marx was also
wrong in assuming that capitalism would be
replaced and
eliminated by socialism under the leadership of
revolutionary proletarian regimes; he
underestimated the potential of the market economy
and the
resilience of capitalism. Quite the contrary,
capitalism became the most successful mode of
production in
human
history, but
as we shall see below, its shortcomings and
negative attributes on the welfare of the working
people need to be reformed and adjusted; that is
to say, a more humane capitalist system should be
adopted and implemented.
The
political economy of Ethiopia under the Derg
(1974-1991) was socialist; mixed economy (public and
private enterprises supervised by the
developmental state) under the EPRDF; and it could
be a neo-liberal capitalist system under the new
regime of Abiye Ahmed. The latter regime might
attempt to transfer control of economic factors to
the private sector from the public sector, thereby
reviving economic liberalism and that is the
nature and characteristics of a neo-liberal
policy.
In
the post-WWII period and with the advent of the
Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank, IMF
etc), the neo-liberal economic policy was
inaugurated as the guiding blue print for
governments. The emphasis of this policy was the
privatization of the economy, especially the
industrial, agricultural, and service sectors. In
brief, the capitalist system (or the market
economy as they prefer to call it) without
government interference or without state
(public)-owned enterprises is preferable.
As
stated above, the EPRDF adopted a mixed economy
guided by the DS, and Ethiopia did very well in
terms of economic progress in the last two
decades. EPRDF’s DS success was manifested in
the great surge forward in the foundational
economy: nationwide all-weather roads, railways,
electric power and dams, irrigation in
agriculture, industrial parks, the expansion of
elementary and secondary schools, the
proliferation of vocational and technical schools,
the expansion of universities (now fifty of them),
and the establishment of nation-wide primary
health care centers. On top of these achievements,
Ethiopia’s double-digit growth was confirmed and
celebrated even by the neo-liberal institutions
like the World Bank and IMF and European
observers. One American TV company, the CNBC
(headquartered in New York City) reported that
“…Ethiopia continues its emergence as a
regional manufacturing hub. The landlocked country
in the Horn of Africa has seen double-digit
economic growth as recently as 2017 thanks to its
state-led development model which has espoused the
mass opening of industrial parks.”10
What
is referred to as ‘state-led development
model’ is what I called developmental state (DS)
in my book published in 2013 and this is how I
defined it:
The developmental state in simple and plain language is a state that is
involved in and has control and guidance of the
parameters of development projects of a given
country. …A developmental state is heavily
involved in comprehensive development (ranging
from foundational development projects such as
education and infrastructure to agro-industrial
development) not simply in macroeconomic planning
as some development theorists would like to argue.
Furthermore, a developmental state enjoys autonomy
and intervenes in the making of the economy, but
unlike a regulatory state like the United States
that is not interested in the type of industries,
it is interested not only in the type of
industries but also decides what kind of industry
a country should have. Therefore, industrial
policy becomes central to a developmental state.
Some developmental states not only do [they]
intervene aggressively in the economy, but they
also own industries. However, other developmental
states like Japan hardly own industries, but in
the end both types of developmental states are
capitalist and as such allow private ownership to
flourish and permit corporate elites to play a
crucial role in the development process.11
If
a DS renders sound transformation and prosperity
as it did for the Asian Tigers (South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong), China, and
Japan etc why then resort to a neo-liberal
development agenda, when in fact the latter failed
in most Third World countries? I pose this
question on purpose so that the Ethiopian policy
makers have clarity on this issue before they
venture into debunking the Ethiopian DS that has
really made a difference in the Ethiopian economy.
While
addressing the Ethiopian parliament, Dr. Abiye
told us that he is in favor of capitalism, which
by the way is acceptable to me, and as I have
indicated above, this economic system was most
successful and has demonstrated universal
applicability. However, I have not heard of the
details of the Prime Minister’s policy in
regards to the capitalist system. Similar to Dr.
Abiye and his Government, Ginbot 7 and Arena Tigray
are also in favor of the neo-liberal market
economy, but I am not sure whether they have
incorporated in their respective policies and/or
political programs the distinction between the
Liberal Market Economy (LME) and the Coordinated
Market Economy (CME), both of which are capitalist
systems. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss in detail the policies of the two systems,
but it is important to note which countries belong
to which. The US, Canada, the UK, and Australia
belong to the LME group, and Germany, Japan,
Scandinavian nations, Netherlands, Austria, and
Switzerland belong to the CME bloc. While the
former group still promotes unfettered capitalism,
the latter bloc of nations humanized capitalism.
If
Ethiopia adopts the LME policy of economic
development, slowly but surely it could reverse
the gains of the DS and the many major projects
such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
could be stalled or delayed indefinitely; if, on
the other hand, Ethiopia pursues the CME strategy,
it will have a chance to make reforms in the
economy without completely obliterating the DS and
without hindering the current pace of development.
In
conclusion, I like to bring to the attention of
the neo-liberal Ethiopians at government level, in
the academia, and in the competing political
parties, the irony of American capitalists who
have recently shown reservation, if not
resentment, to the capitalist system. This was
discussed by Rick Newman, a columnist to
Yahoo/Finance, and here is what he stated in his
column entitled “Both Political Parties are
Rejecting Capitalism”:
Why are both parties supporting more government intervention? Which
would you prefer: Economic authoritarianism? Or
domineering socialism? If you thought that
Republicans and Democrats mainly differed on the
matter of how best to distribute the spoils of
free market capitalism, you are stuck in the
1990s. Each of these parties is now lurching
toward anti-capitalism statism, with the main
difference being how, exactly, the government
should control the economy.” 12
Let
me pose another question before I end this
article: why are some Ethiopians excited about
neo-liberal capitalism when, in fact, it is being
rejected even in its own turf? Let me know what
you think!
Note:
1.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “National Reconciliation and National
Development in Ethiopia”, www.africanidea.org/national_reconciliation.html
October 22,
2010
2.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “The Ascendance of a New Regime and
Contradictory Policies and Measures in Ethiopian
Politics”
www.africanidea.org/Ascendance_contradictory_measures_Ethiopia.html
3.
Reuters,
August 8, 2018
4.
R. D.
Putnam, The
Comparative Study of Political Elites,
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1976
5.
Joel
R. DeLuca, Political
Savvy: Systematic Approach to Leadership Behind
the Scenes, September 2002
6.
R. A.
W. Rhodes and Paul Hurt (editors), The
Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership, July
26, 2016
7.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “21st Century Ethiopian
Politics Should be Reoriented Toward National
Reconciliation and a Home Grown Ideology”
www.africanidea.org/reorient_ethiopian_politics.html
8.
Bronwyn
Bruton, “Ethiopia and Eritrea have a Common
Enemy” July 12, 2018 https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/ethiopia-and-eritrea-have-a-common-enemy-abiye-ahmed-isaias-afwerki-badme-peace-tplf-eprdf
9.
Bronwyn
Bruton, Ibid
10.
CNBC
World Politics: Ethiopia and Eritrea declare an
end to war – and this could mean a lot for their
economies, Monday, 9 July, 2018
11.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, Ethiopia:
Democracy, Devolution of Power and the
Developmental State, Institute of Development
and Education for Africa (IDEA), 2013, p. 127
12.
Rick
Newman, Yahoo/Finance, August 14, 2018
All Rights Reserved © Copyright: Institute of Development and Education
for Africa (IDEA) 2018. For educational and
constructive feedback, contact Dr. Ghelawdewos
Araia via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
|
