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Critique
on and Supplement to Bank Sector Reform in
Ethiopia
Ghelawdewos Araia, PhD
February 24,
2014
This
essay, as its title suggests, intends to critique
and supplement Bank Sector Reform in Ethiopia
by Drs. Desta Asayehgn and Admassu Bezabeh that
was published by (IDEA) Inc. (www.africanidea.org/Banking_sector_in_Ethiopia.html).
I found their abstract interesting, especially in
some parts where the authors present sound
arguments and are leveled against government
policies as constructive criticism, and I will
endorse the ideas that I agree with. On some of
their ideas, however, I have different views,
reservations and disagreements; hence I will
critique those ideas in an effort to make input
and insight for future considerations.
Therefore,
when I critique and supplement the Banking
Sector Reform in Ethiopia, it is in
anticipation of embracing a larger perspective
that links the context of the Ethiopian economy in
general and the financial institutions in
particular. Broader perspectives, in turn, enable
us reflect on the scope and magnitude on domestic
Ethiopian banks’ overall
performance and how they are impacted by
the entry of foreign banks.
This
paper, thus, goes beyond critiquing and
supplementing to suggesting and solving a major
problem that encounters (at times bewitches) the
Ethiopian economy. Problems are solved when we
devote a great deal of attention in a creative way
and in this context, I found Drs. Desta and
Admassu’s Abstract not simply as incidental
contribution but as an essential component of the
creative process in solving Ethiopia’s problems.
It is in the latter spirit that I like to present
this essay to readers, but the central thesis of
my paper underscores Ethiopia’s priorities in
accordance with a set of criteria that ought to be
established by the Ethiopian Government. But, the
Ethiopian Government should also open up in terms
of embracing external inputs put forth by
Ethiopian intellectuals that could have a
far-reaching implication in policy making.
Desta
and Admassu argue, “Global experience suggests
that greater competition among domestic and
foreign banks can bring greater benefits in the
form of improving efficiency. Fundamental
market-oriented measures are therefore needed to
further strengthen the financial sector in order
to accelerate Ethiopia’s economic growth.”1
Moreover,
in order for Ethiopia to make a meaningful
economic growth, the authors enumerate the
following suggestions2
- The
privatization of the dominant state-owned
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
- Permitting
entry of foreign banks
- Allowing
market forces to determine interest rates and
exchange rates of the ETB
- Upgrade
the regulatory and supervisory ability of the
National Bank of Ethiopia to restore the
public’s trust in the banking sector.
I
disagree with items 1 through 3 and endorse item
number 4. Let me begin my analysis with number 4
and return to the other three in right order
later. I agree with the authors that the National
Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) must undertake periodical
structural reform within itself and upgrade its
regulatory and supervisory ability not only “to
restore the public trust” but also to guarantee
the smooth functioning of the financial
institutions in Ethiopia. However, it is important
to acknowledge that the NBE has indeed wrought
some upgrading by introducing a new technology in
order to integrate the banking system in Ethiopia.
Yoseph
Mekonnen, writing for Addis Fortune, for instance,
reports how NBE launched new CORE banking system:
“The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) launched
its new centralized, on-line, real-time,
electronic (CORE) banking system, called Quantum
Intellect, on Monday 18, 2013. This will replace
the previous Bank Master System. …The Intellect
solution, which was developed specifically for
central banks, is expected to resolve these issues
by allowing the integration of currency
management, securities, payments and settlement
and the enterprise general ledger. In addition, it
should speed the Bank’s operations and allow it
to keep accurate management and regulatory
reports, according to Polaris press release at the
time of the contract signing. …The NBE has
brought and deployed new services and software to
support its CORE banking system. Afcor plc was
awarded a one million-dollar contract in April
2013 for the supply of IBM 3650-M3 servers and
Oracle software for data storage”3
I
happen to be an employee of Chase Manhattan Bank
(now ‘Chase’) in the early 1980s in the Wall
Street area and served as research assistant in
the Cancelled Securities Department of the Bank
and I very well know how efficient these private
banks are. In New York City, where I have lived
for a long time, there are also public
institutions and state owned enterprises that are
equally efficient, and examples of these are the
New York City Metropolitan Transit (subway and
city buses) that run by the minute on the clock,
operate 24 hours, and that are the envy of the
world. Likewise, as I have discussed in my debut
book in 1995, the World Trade Center, the Holland
and Lincoln Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge,
the John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark
Airports are all managed by the Port Authority and
owned by New York State and State of New Jersey.
Similarly, New York State and the State of
Connecticut own the Metro North that runs from
Grand Central station. The more developed OECD
countries in Europe also own and manage mass
transit throughout Europe.
Therefore,
it is not mere privatization of a firm, company,
or bank that makes it efficient. It is the
professional management and up-to-date technology
in these respective enterprises that would play a
decisive role in transformation, development, and
the making of wealth. Privatization alone also
cannot be an effective panacea especially during
recession and/or depression. We know how
governments from time to time intervened to either
resuscitate an economy in crisis or revive a
collapsing economy.
During
the last major depression in the 20th
century, John Maynard Keynes inspired Franklin D.
Roosevelt in recovering the US economy. In his
celebrated book, The General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money, Keynes
reasoned that the state could stimulate economic
growth and improve stability in the private sector
through interest rates, taxation, and public
projects.
It
is the state intervention and not the “invisible
hand” (the market corrects itself) of Adam Smith
that breath life into the dying American economy.
In 2011 too when it became Dé jávu (“already
seen” or “here we go again”) and the US as
well as the global economy were gripped by a deep
recession, the US Government under Barrack Obama
declared “too big to fail” in order to salvage
the big banks and automobile industries, except
for Ford. What happen to these banks and other
private institutions that are supposedly
“superior” to public enterprises? In New York
and elsewhere it was the efficient financial
institutions and banks like Lehman Brothers that
vanished like morning dew, and not the public
enterprises like the New York subway. And without
timely injection of capital from the Federal
Government, the major US industries perhaps would
have crumbled and would have become part of the
dustbin of history.
Given
the above experience and the wrong libertarian
classical political economy analysis of Adam
Smith, thus, I would not suggest the privatization
of the state-owned CBE. Moreover, the CBE have
been operating for over fifty years and it is one
of the most successful banks in Africa. The Bank
has now 780 branches throughout Ethiopia and
during the 2011/12 fiscal years it garnered an
impressive profit of Ethiopian Birr (EB)
7,600,000,000. When it started its operations in
1963, the Chase Manhattan Bank sponsored The CBE
and I remember CBE employees coming to New York in
the early 1980s for further training, when I used
to work there.
The
CBE operated very much like its Western
counterparts and most of the CEOs of the new
private banks in Ethiopia have come out from the
CBE and NBE and there is no doubt that the
knowledge and expertise of managers of the private
banks emanated from those old banks of Ethiopia.
For instance, according to Bulcha Demeksa, among
Ethiopian experts in banking who made feasibility
study for the establishment of the Awash
International Bank are, “Kebede Kumsa, who
mainly led the study and who, as the General
Manager of the Development Bank of Ethiopia, had
gained years of experience in banking. Others were
Tikkiher Hailu, Amerga Kassa, Bekele Nedi, who was
legal advisor to the Development Bank of Ethiopia
in the early 60s and Belete Menkir of the
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. As Tikkiher Hailu was
former Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia,
and Amerga Kassa, former Director of International
Banking in the National Bank of Ethiopia, they
were particularly knowledgeable about central and
commercial banking.”4
To
his credit, Bulcha also acknowledged the
professional ability of some Ethiopian bankers and
tells us that the Awash International Bank (AIB)
was fortunate enough to have Leikun Berhanu, who
later became President of AIB, because he “was a
professional banker and knew his job thoroughly
and gave the government sound advice.” Bulcha
also says, “ I was in constant contact with the
Chief Legal Officer of the National Bank (Eshetu
Irrena) who was strictly professional in all his
dealings with us.”5
The
second proposal of Desta and Admassu,
“permitting entry of foreign banks” into
Ethiopia also could stir controversy because
questions such as 1) why do we need them in
Ethiopia and 2) what could Ethiopia benefit out of
these banks, could arise. The authors underscore
the significance of efficiency and competition due
to entry of foreign banks, and there is no doubt
that the latter could bring innovation, new
technology, professionalism, enormous assets, and
above all linkage with the global economy because
these foreign banks are part and parcel of
transnational corporations (TNCs). However, their
entry into Ethiopia could not materialize because,
“only Ethiopians could operate and own financial
institutions,” according to the law of the
country. The latter is interpreted by Desta and
Admassu, and justifiably so, as “prohibiting
foreign banks entry based on infant industry
policy,” or mercantile market economy.
For
the sake of further understanding the controversy
surrounding entry of foreign banks into Ethiopia,
I now like to turn to the pros and cons propagated
by some scholars and financial experts. Stijin
Classens, Professor of International Finance
Policy at the University of Amsterdam, along with
his colleagues, has studied 7,800 banks in 80
countries in relation to how foreign banks affect
domestic banking markets, and here below is their
finding and their rationale.
Stijin
Classens, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Harry Huzinga
state, “We investigate how net interest margins,
overhead, taxes paid, and profitability differ
between foreign and domestic banks. We find that
foreign banks have higher profits than domestic
banks in developing countries, but the opposite is
the case for developed countries. Estimation
results suggest that an increased presence of
foreign banks is associated with a reduction in
profitability and margins for domestic banks.”6
Unlike
Classsens et al, Hyun E. Kim and Byung-Yoon Lee
studying the effects of foreign banks on domestic
banks in Korea, seem to question the viability and
validity of the role of foreign banks in Korea but
they also seem to share aspects of the findings of
Classens et al. Their position in foreign-domestic
banks nexus looks ambivalent but it is important
to examine their finding. “Has increased foreign
participation actually contributed in any
substantial degree,” say Kim and Lee, “to
improvement in the efficiency and stability of the
domestic banking system in Korea?” After posing
the above question, Kim and Lee provide us with
the following answer: “Despite the sharp rise in
the level of foreign participation in local
financial institutions in many emerging markets
and particularly in the second half of the 1990s,
an increasing body of empirical evidence indicates
that it is not wholly clear as to whether foreign
entry has improved either the efficiency or
stability of domestic banking system.”7
However,
other experts like Dan Luo, Yizhe Dong, Seth
Armitage, Wenxuan Hou who have studied foreign
bank penetration into China, more or less
reinforce Desta and Admassu’s reasoning in the
whole gamut of foreign banks-domestic banks nexus.
“Based on a sample of three types of Chinese
banks from 2002 to 2011,” say Dan Luo et al,
“we find that the expanded branch networks of
foreign banks help stimulate the improved
profitability of domestic banks, as a result of
higher achieved efficiency and the increased of
non-interest income of domestic banks, as a result
of knowledge transformation from foreign banks.
These positive relationships are more pronounced
among joint-stock banks (JCBs). Finally, foreign
bank penetration has been found to play a
significant role in stimulating the
risk-management improvement of domestic banks,
especially those with foreign strategic
investors.”8
On
the other hand, Yingkai Yin, Xiaotian Tina Zhang,
and Yahua Zhang have entertained diametrically
opposite ideas to that of Dan Luo et al positive
analysis of the import of foreign banks. On the
contrary, they argue that foreign bank entry, in
fact, weakened domestic Chinese banks while at the
same time they acknowledge the foreign banks
contribution in new technologies, products and
management skills, and increasing capital adequacy
ratios. Despite these advantages of entry of
foreign banks “however, there are potential
problems associated with the influx of foreign
capital. For example, foreign financial
institutions tend to under value the value of
Chinese banks and want to bargain a low
acquisition price, sometimes even much lower than
the market price. In addition, the introduction of
foreign equity may increase the possibility of
contagion and susceptibility to any financial
crisis (Chen et al 2009)”9
In
light of the above views and comparative analyses
of foreign banks entry into given developing
countries or even middle income status nations,
and also given Ethiopia’s fresh ascent on the
regional as well as global economy, I strongly
propose that the Ethiopian Government should
upheld the current existing bank and financial
policy, especially in forestalling the coming of
foreign banks into Ethiopia. This policy must
remain in effect until the new private banks reach
a certain threshold of strength and
competitiveness and until the Ethiopian industrial
base exhibits a remarkable stage of development.
Inviting
foreign banks into Ethiopia at this stage, that
is, when Ethiopia is still a staggering toddler
nation in development, could mean allowing a great
white shark into a pool of seals where the latter
are eaten one by one by the sea beast. The White
shark-seal analogy could also be attributed to the
so-called Transitional Economies of Eastern
Europe, in which the domestic banks are overrun by
foreign Western European banks. American banks
have not yet ventured into East Europe except for
Citibank. Foreign
banks now own a significant number of former East
European banks; Italian banks have now a
predominant role in Croatia; other East European
banks are owned by Sweden.
In
order to have a clear picture of how foreign banks
diminish the financial legal personality of East
European banks, it is important to rely on the
findings of Sophie Clays and Christa Hainz: “In
Hungry foreign banks already outnumbered domestic
banks in 1993. Due to the Hungarian liberalization
strategy that started in [the] early 1980s, the
share of foreign banks now represents more than 70
percent of the market… In 1999 the Polish
Government started to sell majority shares of
domestic banks to foreign investors. This led the
number of foreign banks in Poland to exceed the
number of domestic banks in 1999 and dominate the
market in terms of market share since 2000.”10
Banking in tiny Estonia and other former
Soviet allies in East Europe are now managed and
owned by Western European banks.
In
light of all the findings and indicators of the
effect of foreign banks entry, I would not
recommend the Ethiopian Government to permit
international banks into Ethiopia and wittingly or
unwittingly witness the East European scenario and
fate in the country. On the other hand, I fully
agree with Drs. Desta and Admassu that “the
Ethiopian economy is characterized by low growth
and high inflation.” However, this major
Ethiopian problem could not be solved by inviting
foreign banks or by Ethiopia’s domestic banks
alone. It is understandable that developing
countries like Ethiopia suffer from inflation and
low growth during the transition period from
small-scale phase to major industrial phase. Even
highly developed nations encounter intermittent
inflation during the overall growth cycles.
One
assertion that I was unable to fathom is the fact
that the authors of the Abstract seem to have
taken it for granted when they stated, “Despite
heavy pressure from the United States Government,
as evidenced by Wikileaks messages, the Ethiopian
Government continues by law to prohibit the entry
of foreign banks to the country.” This argument
is not palatable to me and it is for the following
reasons: 1) Ethiopia is a sovereign nation-state
and it must formulate and implement its policies
without being instructed by foreign powers; 2) I
am not opposed to any American vested interest in
Ethiopia. After all, I am Ethiopian-American and I
would favor American interests being promoted in
Ethiopia and elsewhere but I would not like to see
US hegemony over Ethiopia.
One
other reason why I am not in favor of foreign bank
entry into Ethiopia is because the Ethiopian
banks, both state-owned and private, are doing
very well in terms of profitability and some of
them are also cooperative banks and
people-oriented financial institutions and they
render a distinct advantage to Ethiopian citizens
that foreign banks would not even consider as part
of their financial ethos. Some examples of
cooperative banks are Addis International Bank (AdIB),
the Cooperative Bank of Oromia, and Enat Bank.
According
to Addis Fortune, “the AdIB stands out from most
other competitors in the industry for its strong
cooperative base. Out of the total paid-up
capital, 64.3 pc is owned by corporate
shareholders (cooperatives 48 pc, share companies
11.1 pc, idirs [traditional Ethiopian credit
union] 3.3 pc) and the remaining 35.7 pc by
individual shareholders. Four unions (two coffee
farmers, two saving and credit cooperative unions)
are among the major shareholders of the bank.”11
Similarly,
“The Cooperative Bank of Oromia shows a
considerable expansion in its assets, registering
6.54 billion Birr – an increase of 82 pc during
the year that ended on June 30, 2013. The CBO’s
profit after tax showed a remarkable increase,
reaching 189.6 million Br. The profit after tax
has been constantly on the up over the past few
years.”12
Enat
Bank (literally “Mothers” Bank) prioritize
Ethiopian women’s interests and the majority of
the shareholders, hence the benefactors, are
women; and on top of these cooperative banks, 131
shareholders of the Bank of Abyssinia that was
established in 1996 are all Ethiopians.
To
date, there are at least 18 private banks in
Ethiopia and four of the top, successful, and
competent banks are shown with their profit below.13
Name
of bank
Profit in EB 2011/12
Awash
Int. Bank
550,000,000
NIB
389,000,000
Dashen
896,000,000
Wegagen
458,000,000
With
the advent of the new private banks that have not
supplanted the state owned banks, and also with
the promising of an ongoing development surge in
Ethiopia, it is highly probable that a sizable
middle class will be created in the country. It is
this middle class that would ultimately contribute
to the economic transformation of Ethiopia and its
historic leadership role should not be curtailed
by foreign incursions. The middle class, that is
essentially an entrepreneurship class, should not
be confused with the very few rich Ethiopians that
have popped out in the last two decades, at a time
when we still have millions of impoverished
Ethiopians. The real middle class will emerge (its
incipient embryonic stage have already shown) when
a sizable entrepreneur class leads the industrial,
agricultural, and financial sectors of the economy
and when at least ten to twenty million Ethiopians
are uplifted from poverty. This goal, however,
could be attained only when Ethiopian
professionals have the upper hand in the business
sector and when Ethiopia, as a whole, determines
its fate itself.
My
answer to the third point, that is, “allowing
market forces to determine interest rates and the
exchange rate of the ETB” is unequivocally no,
and it is for the following reasons: 1) the
so-called market forces are mystified and as I
have indicated above in relation to Adam Smith and
his maxim of ‘invisible hand’, the market, as
such, does not have an organic, built-in, and
universally applicable laws that govern all
societies. Moreover, as I have already
extrapolated earlier the market does not correct
itself during crisis and for this apparent reason
the state intervenes to correct the failure of the
market and thereby ameliorate the dire condition
of the economy; 2) central banks (also known as
national banks), including the Federal Reserve (US
central bank), all over the world determine
interest rates and I don’t see any reason why
Ethiopia should be an exception and the market
forces determine its interest rate and exchange
rate of its currency.
Financial
crisis and/or recession are inherent
characteristics of capitalism and every time the
market plummets and signs of recession are on the
horizon, in the American case, the Federal Reserve
steps in (other central banks take similar
actions) and lowers the interest rate. Lowering
interest rate in plain English means encouraging
buyers (the consumer multitude) to buy more stuff,
ranging from grocery to cars, and to real estate
etc. and as a result the economy is stimulated.
If
all central banks all over, including the US
Federal Reserve, determine interest rates, why
couldn’t the NBE do the same? The NBE, like
other central banks, in fact, would play a
positive role in the market economy by providing
‘close inspection and guidance’ to the
financial sector of Ethiopia. But, beyond
inspection and guidance, Ethiopia’s monetary
policy is also clearly stated in the NBE
Governor’s Note. In his annual report of
2011/2012 fiscal years, the Governor of NBE,
Teklewold Atnafu, had the following to say:
“Regarding the monetary sector, monetary policy
continued to focus on maintaining price and
exchange rate stability, ensuring financial system
soundness and creating conducive environment for
sustainable economic growth. To achieve these
strategic objectives, the National Bank of
Ethiopia (NBE) uses reserve money as monetary
anchor to closely monitor monetary
developments.”14
One
important point that Desta and Admassu raised and
that I agree with is the problem of brain drain.
Time and again, I have suggested in my other
writings that Ethiopia device a strategy to
attract Ethiopian Diaspora professionals but to no
avail. The Government sponsored Diaspora
conferences but they were not effective enough
because the conferences were not an all
encompassing and inclusive symposia.
The
brain drain problem, however, is a little tricky
and complicated; the problem is engendered not
only by the weakness of the Government but also by
the reluctance of Ethiopian professionals to stay
and work in their home country due to low wages,
benefits, and overall compensations. Nevertheless,
despite the brain drain and dearth of
professionals, the Ethiopian banks – both public
and private – are managed by professional,
experienced, and learned Ethiopians.
Binyam
Alemayehu of Addis Fortune, reporting on the
Bankers Association of Ethiopia has the following
to say: “The 12-year-old Ethiopian Bankers
Association (EBA) has installed a new face on its
highest position, with the Board of Directors
overwhelmingly electing Addisu Habba, the current
President of Bank of Abyssinia (BOA) to lead
them…At the Association, Berhanu [Berhanu
Getaneh, former leader of United Bank and
President of EBA] is replaced by Addisu, MA in
banking and finance from Italy…Bekele Zeleke,
President of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE);
Haileyesus Bekele, President of the CBB and Esayas
Berhe, President of the Development Bank of
Ethiopia (DBE), are the three members from the
state-owned institutions. Members include
presidents of long established private banks, such
as Araya Gebreegziabher from Weggagen Bank;
Berhanu Woldeselassie of Dashen Bank; Kibru
Fendija of Nib International Bank (NIB); Taye
Dibekulu of United Bank and Tsehay Shiferaw,
President of Awash International Bank (AIB).”15
By
and large, it looks the Ethiopian banks are in
good hands although they may further need
professional cushioning in order to be more
successful and productive. By way of concluding,
thus, I like to mention four points, which I think
are important: 1) Despite my opposition to foreign
bank entry into Ethiopia, I am in favor of foreign
investment, including foreign direct investment (FDI)
and due to the overall favorable condition and
stability in the country, hundreds of foreign
investors have converged in Ethiopia and as a
result, “the Ethiopian Investment Agency and the
Regional Investment Offices licensed 62,068
investment projects with an aggregate capital of
Birr 1.2 trillion in the period between
1992/93-2011/12. Of these projects, 52,462 (84.5
percent) were domestic, 9,498 (15.3 percent)
foreign and 108 (0.2 percent) public;”16
2) I like to extend my gratitude to Drs. Desta and
Admassu for their initiative and scholarly
abstract, which has inspired me to write this
critique, and we Ethiopians must evolve dialogue
amongst ourselves in order to benefit the larger
Ethiopian society; 3) the current Ethiopian
Government and future regimes should open up, as
indicated above, and encourage policy dialogue and
proposals irrespective of who initiates
policy-related issues and debates; 4) bank sector
reform, for that matter restructuring and
overhauling the Ethiopian economy in light of
governing domestic, regional, and global realities
must be a prerequisite
(sometimes precondition or necessary evil) to
Ethiopia’s transformation and development.
References
- Desta
Asayehgn and Admassu Bezabeh, Banking
Sector Reform in Ethiopia, www.africanidea.org/Banking_sector_in_Ethiopia.html
- Desta
Asayehgn and Admassu Bezabeh, Ibid
- Yoseph
Mekonnen, “National Bank Launches New Core
Banking System”, Addis Fortune,
November 24, 2013
- Bulcha
Demeksa, My Life: My Vision for the Oromo
and the Other Peoples of Ethiopia, Red Sea
Press, 2013, P. 208
- Bulcha
Demekesa, Ibid, P. 213
- Stijin
Classens, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Harry
Huzinga, “How Does Foreign Entry Affect
Domestic Banking Markets?” Journal of
Banking and Finance, 25, 2001 891-911
- Hyun
E. Kim and Byung-Yoon Lee, “The Effects of
Foreign Bank Entry on the Performance of
Private Domestic Banks in Korea,” March 2004
- Dan
Luo, Yizhe Dong, Seth Armitage, and Wenxuan
Hou, “The Impact of Foreign Banks
Penetration on Domestic Banking Sector: New
Evidence From China”, January 20, 2014
(originally posted on August 7, 2013)
- Yingkai
Yin, Xiaotian Tina Zhang, Yahua Zhang,
“Foreign Bank Entry and Domestic Bank
Performance in China”
- Sophie
Clays and Christa Hainz, “Foreign Banks in
Eastern Europe: Mode of Entry and Effects on
Bank Interest Rates”, Discussion Paper No.
95, Governance and the Efficiency of
Economic Systems (GESU), February 2006
- Binyam
Alemayehu, “Addis International Bank
Benefits From Strong Cooperative Base with
Impressive Growth”, Addis Fortune,
December 8, 2013
- Binyam
Alemayehu, “Cooperative Bank of Oromia Shows
Remarkable Increase in Profits”, Addis
Fortune, December 15, 2013
- National
Bank of Ethiopia Annual Report of Fiscal Years
2011/12, November 18, 2013
- National
Bank of Ethiopia Annual Report, Ibid
- Binyam
Alemayehu, “New Face at the Helm of Bankers
Association Board”, Addis Fortune,
December 8, 2013
- National
Bank of Ethiopia Annual Report, op cit, P. 98
All
Rights Reserved. Copyright © IDEA, Inc. 2014. Dr.
Ghelawdewos Araia can be contacted for educational
and constructive feedback via g.araia@africanidea.org
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