The old EPRDF is dead, can its system be saved?
Five steps to save the federation
October 3, 2018
by Dr. Mehari
Taddele Maru
Drawing on years of experience analyzing the
EPRDF’s federal system, Mehari Taddele Maru
explains why it is in grave danger, and outlines
how to avoid a drift towards majoritarian rule and
worsening instability.
After a long wait,
the highly anticipated 11th Congress of the
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
Front opened today in Hawassa, the capital of the
multi-ethnic Southern Nations state. This Congress
cannot be dismissed as routine. It is deadly
serious, as its outcome may well determine the
future of Ethiopian politics and economic and
foreign policy.There are many possible
trajectories for the ruling front after the
three-day meeting, but signs of a dark future are
prominent. The configuration of forces within the
EPRDF may well change, but more importantly the
constitution and its consensus-based federative
and parliamentary democracy are at risk. Arguably
of even greater import, the Congress may toll the
death knell for the EPRDF’s Democratic
Developmental State.
The Congress may toll the death knell for
the EPRDF’s Democratic Developmental State
The Congress’
theme is “Let’s ensure the Ethiopian
Renaissance by upholding changes within the
Developmental Democracy Framework.” Until
recently, the Democratic Developmental’ State
had been the EPRDF’s ideological anchor. The
change in emphasis from ‘Democratic
Developmental’ to ‘Developmental Democracy’
suggests the EPRDF could mutate from a
development-centric to a democratic-centric
ideology. Ostensibly superficial, these semantic
could be the wind in the sails of change, as can
also been seen in the ‘democratic’ name
changes of the Amhara and Oromia parties.
Such alterations could mean an extended,
increasingly volatile political transition and a
loss of economic momentum at a crucial stage of
development.
A
powerful front or hollow shell?
In 2007 at the
Forum for all Political Parties I argued that in
the eyes of many the EPRDF would no longer be the
EPRDF if it reversed its support for some of the
founding principles of the federation, such as
Article 9, the sovereignty of ethno-cultural
communities; Article 39, the right to
self-determination up to secession; and Article
40, the collective ownership of land. Deviation
from these constitutional principles would mean
that Ethiopia had moved into a post-EPRDF era.
Now the key questions are: Are these
constitutional provisions still the core
principles EPRDF and are they fully supported by
powerful members? Is EPRDF now a federalist or a
majoritarian force? Procedurally, is EPRDF still
guided by the principle of Democratic Centralism?
My answers to all
are in the negative. The powerful ideological and
organizational adhesive of EPRDF is no longer
shared, even superficially. Like galaxies in the
cosmos, the EPRDF’s four building blocks are
drifting apart.
EPRDF’s emergence
EPRDF was an
offshoot of the Student Movement of the 1970s that
played a key role in the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution
that toppled Emperor Haile Selassie. Though highly
contested by its peers in the opposition, the
EPRDF founders considered itself a continuity of
the 1970s Ethiopian Student Movement. Five vital
characteristics of the Student Movement were 1)
the ‘question of nationalities’ (a popular
term for the 1960s struggle against
ethno-linguistic domination, famously referred to
as ‘Ye
BiherBiheresebTiyaque’ in Amharic), 2) the
‘land question’ (‘Ye
MeriyetTiyaque’ or ‘Land to the Tiller’,
‘Meret La
Rashu’), 3) unquestioning support for
Marxist-Leninist ideology, 4) extreme intolerance
of any form of dissent and 5) high commitment to
public service.
After EPRDF seized
power in Ethiopia in 1991, the federal
constitution stipulated state ownership of the
land. Federalism became an institutional form for
the protection, expression and promotion of
nationalities. The drafters of the constitution
favored a model of consociation democracy, where
ethno-linguistic communities would be meaningfully
represented in all government institutions and
hold sovereign constitutional power over federal
and regional states. Such communities are entitled
by the constitution to establish regional states
or even claim full independence. The Ethiopian
federal system was intended to contain
disintegrative forces and to create a balance
between centripetal and centrifugal drifts.
Critics of this system claim that it may encourage
disintegration, whilst others portray it as
detrimental to the self-determination of
ethno-linguistic communities, with the intention
of continuing the domination from the center that
prevailed for a long time in Ethiopia.
EPRDF in paralysis
Since taking state
power in 1991, EPRDF has faced several crises
including the major split in 2001, and mass
protests in 2005 and 2015. The crisis that begun
in the protests of 2015 in Oromia regional state
has inflicted grave blows and left EPRDF
paralyzed. Internal divisions have been so great
within EPRDF’s leadership that it denied former
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, also
Chairperson of the front, the command and control
the position once enjoyed.
The paralysis was
attributable to the internal weakness of the
EPRDF, namely corruption, power struggles, and a
lack of shared vision for the future. The external
forces with strategic interests hostile to
Ethiopia, competition among great powers due to
shift of focus from war on terror to strategic
competition between USA, on one hand and China and
Russia on the other, accelerated this change.
Foreign-based Ethiopian activists also played a
critical role. The rise of populism from corrupt
elements within EPRDF accelerated these changes.
The rise of populism from corrupt elements
within EPRDF accelerated these changes
Eventually,
Hailemariam resigned and Abiy Ahmed was elected
chairperson. Since then, significant changes have
come to Ethiopia. But new and outstanding
questions remain unanswered. Key among them are
whether the front transforms into one party and
the fate of affiliated parties ruling Somali,
Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harar. The
issues of equity in voting within EPRDF, and the
fate of the Southern Ethiopian People’s
Democratic Movement, along with other thorny
questions.
But meanwhile, the
EPRDF’s internal power struggles persist.
Failure of the EPRDF leadership to mend its
division at this Congress may lead to imminent
fragmentation. The coalition is still there for
the sole reason that the party is in power. It
lacks a shared ideological doctrine worth standing
and fighting for. Once its power base is eroded,
the remaining institutional unity of EPRDF will
wither away. But what may bring about such
self-destruction?
Reconstituted front
Consensus
democracy is the core of the federal constitution.
Lijphart Arend, a leading scholar on democracies,
asserts that the two primary characteristics of
consociational democracy are: sharing of executive
power under grand coalition and two, group
autonomy with mutual veto power and
proportionality in power sharing. The Ethiopian
constitution confers veto powers to the regional
states. It also grants fundamental rights to each
cultural community including the freedom to enjoy
autonomy, establish own regional state and even
seek an independent sovereign state if they so
wish and fulfil the preconditions. This is
reflective of the consensus principle that
promotes the idea that democracy should be
designed to represent all interests and provide
numerous checks and balance on the majority. Thus,
the federal constitution redefined Ethiopianism
and reconceptualized it as egalitarian, inclusive
and multicultural identity drawn from a federation
of diverse cultures.
A groundswell of populism has caused a
drift to majoritarianism even within the EPRDF
This redefinition
is now under severe attack from both old
absolutist Ethiopianism, and extreme
ethno-nationalism. A groundswell of populism has
caused a drift to majoritarianism even within the
EPRDF. The surge of populism of absolutist
Ethiopianist, extreme ethnonatinalist, and hyper
Pan-Ethiopianists is in total control of some
regional states, particularly Amhara and Oromia,
and to a limited extent in other regions, such as
parts of Southern Nations (Wolayta, Sidama),
Tigray, Somali and Afar. Political forces in these
regions supported by Diaspora-based activists are
pushing the politics of hate, fear and resentment.
This has led to clashes between regional states on
the pretext of internal boundary disputes (Oromia
and Somali), or between a regional state (Somali)
and the federal government.
In addition to the
mob attacks and vigilante incidents, this could
lead to intensifying conflict between states or
between a state and the central government. These
confrontational trends, if left unabated, may set
Amhara in a collision course with Tigray over the
Wolkait area boundary dispute, and, even worse,
between the federal government and Tigray, as it
exercises its constitutional rights.
Majoritarian drift
The father of the
consensus-based federal system, EPRDF, is
increasingly finding it difficult to be the
champion of inclusive Ethiopian identity. Though
it is the author of the anti-majoritarian federal
constitution, EPRDF has found itself in a
majoritarian drift that is antagonistic to
consensus constitutional democracy envisaged by
the constitution. Academics such as Lahra Smith
found the current constitution does not enjoy
equal degree of support in all regional states by
all communities. For instance, in Amhara, most of
the political parties reject the constitution,
while others including in Oromia may demand
critical amendments to introduce a new form of
majoritarian rule including presidential system.
But, in the rest of the states, particularly in
Afar, Tigray, Somali, Gambella, support for the
constitution seems strong.
In contrast to
consensus democracy, the majoritarian principle
emphasizes concentration of power in the hands of
majority. Peter Emerson, in his book From Majority
Rule to Inclusive Politics, stresses
“unfortunately, one of the worst democratic
structures is the most ubiquitous: majority rule
based on majority voting. It must be emphasized,
furthermore, that these two practices are often
the catalysts of division and bitterness, if not
indeed violence and war.”
Majoritarianism
contradicts consensus constitutional democracy.
Such majoritarianism will destroy not only EPRDF
but also the equilibrium on which progressive and
inclusive Pan-Ethiopianism was built. To make
radical change to the current constitutional
order, the majoritarian drift may introduce a
presidential system (replacing parliamentary
system), and even employ public referendum (in
place of amendments). This drift to
majoritarianism may end up in a constitutional
crisis and protracted instability.
Developmental dead end
Convinced that the
constitution had helped to address long-standing
political questions of the 1970s Student Movement,
the EPRDF chose to focus on poverty eradication as
a priority. For the EPRDF, state ownership of land
and an emphasis on group rights were the logical
culmination of the ‘national questions’ of the
Student Movement and the armed struggle that
followed.
As I discussed in
a co-authored 2015 research paper, through
enabling state ownership of the land and adopting
a federal system, the EPRDF believes that it has
fulfilled the core demands of the Movement. It
believes that peace and economic development in
Ethiopia can only be achieved through federal
arrangements and protection of the overwhelmingly
agrarian population from displacement due to
dispossession of its land. For the opposition
parties, the EPRDF’s land and federal policies
are a means to maintain power by controlling
land—the vital means of economic activity for
the great majority of Ethiopians.
Rejecting the
neoliberal economic path, EPRDF also looked to the
east for inspiration on developmental state.
China, Singapore, and South Korea provided good
examples on which the EPRDF decided to base its
economic model, albeit with some adjustments to
reflect Ethiopia’s historical, cultural and
other national peculiarities. With authoritarian
or Marxist-dominant parties at some time in their
history, these countries have a highly dominant
ethnic community and are less heterogeneous than
Ethiopia.
As a coalition, EPRDF looks now set to
abandon its economic focus on the Developmental
State
In general,
Developmental States emphasize the delivery of
public services over democratic governance. At the
center of the Developmental State (DS) is monopoly
of power. The DS not only provides the
legislative, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms
within which the market operates, but also defines
the direction of the political economy, providing
a lead for all public and private actors engaged
in economic activities. Accordingly, the state
monopolizes not only the means and use of
violence, norm-setting mandates, and regulatory
and enforcement powers, but also the economic
space of the country.
Thus, the
EPRDF’s idea of the DS reverses the traditional
capitalist conception of the respective roles of
the public and private sector in the economy. In a
market economy, the state intervenes to correct
market failure. In the Ethiopian DS, while the
state invests, the private sector intervenes to
complement the public investment and economic
actions of the state. In a nutshell, the private
sector fills the ‘state gaps’ in the economy.
The state dominates, whereas the private sector
plays a supportive role.
Once termed by the
World Bank as “The Ethiopian Way”, the DS
brought transformations that the free market would
not have been able to bring by its own.
As a coalition,
EPRDF looks now set to abandon its economic focus
on the DS. Three factors may play essential roles:
ideological differences; continued instability’
and geopolitical competition between great powers
for economic domination. It is unlikely to
continue to implement its pro-poor developmental
policies with the same dedication due to divisions
within itself, and the advent of coalition
politics. Monopoly of power uninterrupted by
election cycles is a vital element for a DS.
Without such stability, economic delivery will be
slow-paced at best, or cause an economic crisis at
worst.
Coalition politics is in sight, but
without the requisite institutions
The recent
instability in Ethiopia may overshadow the
economic progress Ethiopia has already made under
EPRDF in recent decades. In the past three decades
or so, Ethiopia’s stability had three pillars:
the ruling party EPRDF, the security sector
including the Ethiopian National Defense Forces,
Federal and Regional Police, and the intelligence
services; and the collective social psychology of
Ethiopians emanating from the history of
uninterrupted statehood.
Ethiopia seems now
to be in a post-EPRDF-dominated era, but without
strong institutions. The security sector,
including the military, is timorous, more reticent
to act than ever. They remain apprehensive and
prone to fragmentation if not insulated from the
political schisms of the ruling party and
ethnicity based political mobilizations. Coalition
politics is in sight, but without the requisite
institutions, and without the necessary mentality
required in the population at large. The likely
ensuing protracted instability may curtail the
chances for continued rapid development.
EPRDF abroad: Neutrality neutered?
In a detailed
study on Ethiopia’s foreign relations published
in 2017, I argued that the “emerging
geopolitical and geo-economic issues that may
impair the diplomatic achievements of Ethiopia if
the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy
and Strategy (FANSPS) is not urgently
reappraised…Otherwise, internal political
crises, the conflicts in Yemen and the Middle
East, migration into the EU, rivalry around Nile
River hydro-politics and transnational threats
such as terrorism and violent extremism may well
serve to impair the impressive economic and
diplomatic progress Ethiopia has made thus far.”
I also argued that
Ethiopia’s successful policy of military
containment and diplomatic isolation of the
Eritrea since the border war 1998 cannot be
maintained without the full support of regional
and global allies. “In the ‘no war, no
peace’ stalemate that followed the end of the
border war with Eritrea in 2000, and against the
background of Ethiopia’s successful policy of
military containment and diplomatic isolation, the
Eritrean army had been weakened to the point where
it was barely able to defend the country. The
congruence of recent developments in the Middle
East, EU and Horn of Africa has, however,
substantially eroded the effectiveness of
Ethiopia’s policy, requiring significant
revision of [FANSPS].”
For a long time, EPRDF has been able to
maintain some degree of policy sovereignty
Thus, it was only
natural for Ethiopia to revise its policy on
Eritrea, and try to mend relations, as diplomatic
isolation does not work without allies. Within
Ethiopia too, this has led to the euphoria of
peace, love, reconciliation, and democracy. This
has provided strong positive optics that should be
built on.
For a long time,
EPRDF has been able to maintain some degree of
policy sovereignty. For this reason, EPRDF battled
against IMF, World Bank, and other influences, and
successfully managed to curve out economic policy
sovereignty. As increasingly upsetting to the
Western countries, Ethiopia’s voting behavior in
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
especially related to Crimea/Ukraine and Syria
were indicative of the sovereign strength of the
Ethiopian government.
At the same time,
EPRDF was able to enjoy significant level of
cooperation with the USA and Europe on peace and
security and other issues such as climate change.
Maintaining the success of the new regional
diplomacy in relation to peaceful resolution of
disputes also requires care to ensure that
Ethiopia maintains its policy sovereignty.
The EPRDF
leadership under former Prime Minister Hailemariam
failed to read the signals of the imminent US
policy shifts. As early as 2010, the ‘Asia
pivot’ signaled the shift in US policy towards
China with indirect consequences to those
considered allies. Embroiled in its internal small
squabbles, EPRDF, and particularly TPLF, failed to
pick-up these signals and accordingly deliberate
and prepare itself for the implications of the
shift in US policy. EPRDF has become the
unintended target of US policy shift from war on
terror to economic confrontation with China.
Within EPRDF, the hardcore ideology of the
Developmental State and sovereignty comes from
TPLF and hence, TPLF became the target of this
unforgiving pivot from the USA.
EPRDF’s current
approach stands against the longstanding Ethiopian
stance of neutrality in its diplomatic relations
with Middle Eastern crises and competition between
great powers. Now, Ethiopia is increasingly
getting closer to the Saudi-led bloc. Eritrea is
out of the diplomatic isolation, Egypt and Gulf
countries have overrun, if not conclusively, the
last obstacles in their effort to put the Horn of
Africa under their sphere of influence. On the
Nile River and GERD, the high moral and legal
ground has been lost both internationally and
regionally. Uganda, South Sudan, DRC, Burundi may
backpedal on their pledge to sign the
Comprehensive Framework Agreement for managing the
Nile basin.
A looming crisis
Highly pragmatic
in retaining and maintaining political power,
EPRDF may survive the current internal ideological
and organizational tremors. It may go through a
metamorphosis of survival like before. Discovering
a united vision among its coalition members will
be critical in finding a new equilibrium. In the
short-term, and as a tactical measure, coalition
members of EPRDF may prefer to stick together.
This way, EPRDF would probably fail to reinvent
itself and remain as a nominal coalition,
therefore unlikely to stand together at the next
election. In the final analysis, lacking
ideological dynamism and support from key Western
allies, EPRDF will fail to revitalize to regain
the dominance of the political and economic space
it once enjoyed at national and regional level.
However, there are
more compelling reasons to believe that lacking
adequate dynamism and ideological cohesion to
resuscitate it, EPRDF may fragment, with each
coalition member seeking new coalitions on
ideological basis.
The EPRDF parties are in a race to
populism within their regional states
The EPRDF parties
are in a race to populism within their regional
states. The centripetal equilibrium of EPRDF is no
more, as the principle of democratic centralism is
debilitated. For instance, with strong democratic
centralism, there was no open campaigning for
positions. Aspirants always said they are soldiers
that are ready to work wherever the party deploys
them. This was part reality, part fiction, and now
it has turned to a total fiction. To be sure there
was always a whispering campaign for candidates,
but EPRDF has now moved from whispering campaign
to open social media campaign in its elections
since the resignation of Prime Minister
Hailemariam. This decline of EPRDF’s command and
control helps in exercising genuine federalism,
and actually the functioning of some regional
states look more like a confederal system.
For now, the only
element holding EPRDF together is power and the
responsibility associated with ruling a country.
Further attempts to renew EPRDF may lead to
referendums to change the constitution. Such
popular votes may focus on the key constitutional
provisions like Article 9, Article 39, and Article
40 with implications for the federal state
structure, regional state boundaries, the
parliamentary system, and procedures for
constitutional amendments. However, a change of
position on these provisions will mean entering a
substantively post-EPRDF era.
The only element holding EPRDF together is
power and the responsibility associated with
ruling a country
More importantly,
the introduction of the referendum to amend the
constitution will be unconstitutional, unless the
constitution is first amended as per Article 104.
Amendment of such kind at this time may also face
significant resistances from regional states and
political actors.
This Congress is
also held at a time where competitive politics of
coalition is setting in without the necessary
democratic institutional framework and public
mindset. The ruling parties in these regional
states, particularly ANDM (now ADP), OPDO (now ODP)
and Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement
will face stiff competition from contending with
perhaps more popular parties.
Tigray strongly
supports the current constitution. In relative
terms, the ruling party, TPLF, also enjoys popular
legitimacy. Nonetheless, the region faces a
serious democratic deficit, and its development is
not on a par with other regional states. But in
Tigray, the opposition parties are yet to garner
sufficient popular support to challenge TPLF.
Politics in
Ethiopia will soon become a dogfight between
federalist and assimilationist, and between the
Pan-Ethiopianist and absolutists. The change will
occur without the necessary preparations for
transforming the existing institutions to neutral
and independent democratic ones capable of
entertaining coalition politics. This risks the
state’s stability.
EPRDF leaders are
trying to ride three waves of populism: absolutist
Ethiopianist, extreme ethnonationalist, and hyper
Pan-Ethiopianists that have clashing end-states.
Populism has now spread beyond the control of its
creators. Rather, the waves are in control of the
riders. EPRDF will fail to satisfy either of them,
and in the process undermine the progress made so
far, making the transition even more precarious.
With regional
states driven by populism, the implications of
such forces on security sector actors will be far
reaching. Uncertainty and volatility may bring
more instability and violence that might increase
the current atrocities and frighten the private
sector and foreign investment.
A long drawn-out
internal struggle within EPRDF and with other
political parties may undermine the single-minded
focus that governments require in order to achieve
the fast-paced delivery that is necessary to
escape permanent poverty. With higher instability,
delivery of public goods, EPRDF’s longstanding
source of legitimacy, will deteriorate. Unless
EPRDF is able to substitute performance legitimacy
through popular legitimacy soon, then EPRDF faces
defeat in electoral politics. EPRDF, as a
coalition of forces of equality, will have a hard
time adjusting to popular politics.
With regional states driven by populism,
the implications of such forces on security sector
actors will be far reaching
U.S. economist
Paul Romer once said “a crisis is a terrible
thing to waste.” Depending on the collective
wisdom of the EPRDF leadership, this crisis, like
before, could offer EPRDF another chance for
revitalization. No one will benefit from defending
the old EPRDF. In addition to external forces with
hostile interest with Ethiopia, the old EPRDF was
the source of much of the trouble the country
faced and faces.
The status quo is
not the nirvana some EPRDF leaders try to portray
it as, and it will not last long. No useful
purpose will be served by dwelling the mistakes of
the past. Defending the historical and the status
quo are not only losing fights, but also deflect
the energy we need to search for new common ground
for a consensus-based federal system.
Closure for many
hurt by past violations is paramount so that they
can play an active role in the future of Ethiopia.
EPRDF leaders and supporters need to reject both
defeatist siege mentality, prevent any
isolationist tendencies, and above all avoid
infantile Panglossian ideas. Sober analysis,
strategic foresight, and a forward-looking stance
could at least save the country, if not also
EPRDF.
Five steps to save the federation
EPRDF has to
communicate a clear blueprint for the changes it
is introducing, and on how to handle the new
political dispensation. To avert the negative
implications of the new politics, the federal
government and all regional states, and
particularly the Houses of Peoples’
Representatives and Federation should urgently
consider the following.
- Consensus-based
constitutional federal system
The current
constitution confers veto power to all regional
state when it comes to substantive amendments of
the constitution. Any amendment to the
constitution should be initiated and ratified as
prescribed under Article 104 and 105. Only the
House of Peoples’ Representatives, the House of
Federation or the Councils of Regional States
could trigger constitutional amendments.
The constitution was not ratified by popular
referendum, neither does it stipulate amendment
through popular referendum. While a popular
referendum may look democratic, in a constitutive
process of diverse countries, referenda could
degenerate to majoritarian rule, the very reason
why Ethiopia and many other countries failed to
effectively govern diversity, and opted for
consensus democracy over majoritarian democracy.
While amendments to the constitution are
constitutionally permitted, amendment during such
transitional period only festers political
differences and could lead to constitutional
crisis and even worse violent conflict.
2. Establish, by
an act of parliament, an inclusive National
Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission
This must be
created as a transitional pathway towards
peaceful, democratic and prosperous Ethiopia. The
first act of all participants in this process will
be to officially declare cessation of all physical
and verbal hostilities and to pledge to the
peoples of Ethiopia to remain peaceful.
The success of the dialogue will be determined by
the institutionalization of such a process, its
impact on bringing necessary reforms in our
political culture and all public institutions; the
inclusiveness and political will of all actors,
design and structure of process, and mechanisms
for the implementation of the outcomes of the
dialogue. Such institutionalized National Dialogue
could serve as a big tent where all strands of
opinion are represented under one roof to
deliberate on major challenges of the country,
forge a national consensus, and advance concrete
actionable recommendation for institutional
transformation in the country.
3. Develop a
nationwide pact on common interests
The National
Dialogue needs to enhance tolerance, and respect
for each other, and foster shared vision and unity
of purpose around a constitutional democratic
Ethiopia. In order to have an agreement on minimum
common ground focusing on national agenda, the
National Dialogue should come up with a pact on
the vital interests of Ethiopia that foster the
equality of cultures and territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the country. This requires
enlightened elite that thinks beyond ‘vanity of
petty differences’ and political forces that are
ready to compromise.
4. Overhaul all
democratic institutions to make them fit for
transformation and competitive coalition-based
political process
The urgent
priority for now is a meritocracy-based vetting
process for the officials leading and running the
democratic institutions. These institutions play a
critical role as shock absorbers in times of
crisis. Theoretically autonomous entities such as
the judiciary, parliament, electoral board, Human
Rights Commission, military and Federal Police can
all soften the blows on the bumpy road of the
transition.
Constitutionalism rests on institutions that erect
procedural safeguards, provide checks and
balances, and create the separation of powers
between the law-maker, law-adjudicator, and
law-enforcer. They place constraints on the will
of the people, taming the behavior of the
government with regards to minority rights.
5. Promote
democratic citizenship and forge a unity of
purpose
An empowered
democratic citizenry is key to increasing the
accountability of officials through constitutional
democratic institutions. Ultimately building human
rights-protective federalism would depend on
empowered citizenship rather than sectarianism.
Striking the
balance between the forces of unity and diversity,
Ethiopia should spend its resources on building
progressive federalism with an integrative and
human-rights-protective agenda. In this regard the
federal government has to make sure that Chapter
Three of the constitution on human and democratic
rights, both individual and group rights, is
observed by all state and non-state actors.
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