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Foreign
Intervention, the Politics of Burning Public
Property, and State of Emergency Declaration in
Ethiopia
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
November 4, 2016
Foreign
intervention in Ethiopian affairs was critically
examined in many of my previous essays, and by and
large most of those essays were written in
anticipation to the current political crisis in
Ethiopia; and this article is going to
systematically analyze the Ethiopian situation in
the context of the three themes incorporated in
the title and the corpus of this article.
I have
always maintained that circumstance and objective
conditions, as opposed to subjective wishes,
govern us for the most part, and for this apparent
reason, I would be compelled to revisit some old
ideas, remarks, and recommendations, that I
believe are still reflective of the complex and
complicated political scenario in Ethiopia.
At the
outset, I like to remind the reader that this
article will address serious issues pertaining to
contemporary politics in Ethiopia, but I will also
be critical of the main actors directly involved
in Ethiopian affairs. As always, I will present a
balanced view and analysis of the three themes of
this article while at the same time candidly
exposing the weaknesses and/or negative energies
of the actors involved in Ethiopian politics.
Let’s begin with one profound question that
could enable us better fathom the Ethiopian
situation: What gave rise to the turmoil and
disturbances beginning November 2015 to the
declaration of state of emergency on October 2,
2016?
In
order to meaningfully and successfully answer the
question, we must first begin with the nature and
characteristics of the ruling party, the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
EPRDF’s
Unintelligible Style of Governance and the Current
Crisis
The
EPRDF captured state power after crushing the last
forces of the Derg (military government) in 1991.
This kind of power transition is not new to
Ethiopians. If we stretch back to the reign of
Emperor Tewodros (1855-1868) and analyze the modes
of power transfers, we will conclude that all
regimes, without exception, assumed state power by
employing force against their foes or opponents
competing for power. In brief, Ethiopians never
witnessed any democratic transition of power, nor
have they had any democratic political culture.
The
EPRDF, though a catalyst in transformative change,
is a byproduct of the larger Ethiopian society in
which democracy is virtually absent. The ruling
party, therefore, could hardly operate
democratically. However, it does not logically
follow that the seeds of democracy cannot be sown
in the barren land of democracy-deprived Ethiopia.
As the ubiquitous maxim goes, ‘if there is a
will there is a way’ and if the EPRDF have had
the will to sow the seeds of democracy and build
incipient democratic institutions in Ethiopia, at
the minimum, it could have realized political
tolerance, fair and free elections, and freedom of
speech and press as enshrined in the Ethiopian
constitution.
While
the EPRDF brought about significant material
culture transformation for Ethiopia, it was unable
to make gains in the realization of a democratic
culture. Some of the EPRDF leaders that I know in
person envision a democratic Ethiopia and
underscore the significance of democratic
practices, but the collective EPRDF leadership is
stuck in patron-client relations as manifested in
the various gradations of government apparatuses,
from local to state, and to federal levels. The
rationale behind the patron-client relations is
that loyal cadres and elites rather than opposing
and challenging groups are accommodated and
favored by the ruling party. This kind of policy
consequently affects the seemingly forward moving
Ethiopian transformation negatively. Hence, loyal
cadres (some of them incompetent) rather than
intellectuals with a great potential have
dominated Ethiopian government offices, including
the key positions in important ministries.
It is
understandable that the EPRDF could enter into a
major dilemma of prioritizing privileges to its
own rank-and-file comrades who paid a heavy toll
in the struggle against the Derg, while at the
same time seeking allegiance or support from the
Ethiopian people. However, governing a nation
altogether is a different matter. A government
that promotes patron-client relations and
alienates professionals and intellectuals that are
not affiliated to the ruling party ultimately
risks massive opposition and a rebellious
populace.
In a
political system in which patron-client relations
thrives, secret dealings and networking are apt to
develop; government officials (e.g. regional head
of states, ministers, bureaucrats etc) gain their
respective positions not via meritocracy but via
ascription. In other words, the bureaucrats are
appointed not by their educational background and
experience, but by their connection and loyalty to
the ruling party. It all boils down to ‘it is
not what you know but who you know’ that matters
in Ethiopian politics. Furthermore, all
appointments are done secretly and the appointed
officials are reticent in their dealings with
their subordinates and the public at large.
A
government that is too secretive could hardly
become transparent, and officials that are not
transparent could hardly become accountable. In
this kind of system, thus, democratic policies and
practices are trampled over; and as a result, the
public are systematically alienated from the
public discourse that the Government or opposition
parties ought to have promoted.
Ultimately,
the overall lack of democratic governance compels
the people to oppose the government and the latter
would resort to employing coercion to quell and/or
silence the opposition movement. That is bad
governance, and after observing the Ethiopian
reality on the ground for over two decades I have
come to conclude that the EPRDF leadership is not
aware of the Machiavellian ‘cunning fox’, a
metaphor for a governing elite that is clever
enough to use calculating and crafty strategies as
opposed to the employment of coercion in handling
contradictions between the people and the
government.
The
other important ingredient of a democratic culture
the EPRDF was unable (or unwilling) to implement
and foster platforms in which some degree of
tolerance to rivals is extended while embracing
divergent perspectives becomes the norm rather
than the exception was the fact that the ruling
party hosted transient aspects of dialogue as we
have witnessed in the pre-election debates; and it
is this kind of political behavior that led to the
alienation of the legally operating parties like
Medrek, EDP, Semyawi Party, Andinet etc And
because the EPRDF did not realize the significance
of divergent perspectives that enriches a society
in transition and brings about meaningful and
enduring transformation, some people rose against
its rule as witnessed in the Oromia and Amhara
regions. Later, with respect to the latter
protestations and disturbances, a detailed
analysis will be presented under a different
subtitle. On top of lack of good governance (which
was addressed by the respective regional states)
EPRDF’s overall operations is intriguing and
unintelligible. Instead of consulting and seeking
advice from Ethiopian professionals and
intellectuals, the EPRDF leadership seems to have
reveled secret dealings with some Diaspora
Ethiopian “intellectuals”, some of whom have
false credentials. This kind of unnecessary
clandestine performance may have established the
Ethiopian Diaspora Association, but it also have
alienated a significant number of Ethiopian
Diaspora intellectuals who could have made a major
input and a marked difference in the
transformation of Ethiopia. Similar to the above
mentioned Association, I was told by a confidant
that there was a meeting of Ethiopian
“intellectuals” at the Ethiopian Embassy in
Washington DC on February 2016. These secret
meetings are beyond me and I don’t understand
why the Ethiopian Government wants to enter into
this kind of unnecessary machinations when it is
capable enough of holding an open forum for all
Ethiopians who are willing to contribute for the
development of Ethiopia.
As has
been discussed above, one of the factors that gave
rise to the present crisis is the nature and
characteristics of the ruling party, but two other
factors that have also contributed to the crisis
are foreign intervention and domestic Ethiopian
protests and disturbances.
Foreign
Intervention in Ethiopian Affairs
Throughout
its modern history, Ethiopia has witnessed
plethora of foreign interventions that threatened
its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but the
country has successfully thwarted those
interventions and threats. Ethiopians have the
capacity to retool their resilience, and this
unique Ethiopian ethos was for the most part
misunderstood by foreign interlopers.
One of
these interlopers is Egypt. In an effort to
control the Nile and have predominance in the
regional geopolitical theater, the Egyptians have
intervened many times in Ethiopian affairs. In the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, i.e. in
1875 and 1876, Egyptian forces fought Ethiopians
on their turf but the Ethiopians repulsed them
with a resounding victory. Also between the late
1950s and early to late 1960s, Egypt was seriously
engaged in supporting Eritrean Liberation Fronts
in an effort to destabilize Ethiopia and reassure
itself that Ethiopia would not make any attempt to
control the flow of the Nile. Every regime that
assumed power in Egypt, i.e. from Gamal Abdel
Nasser to Anwar Sadat; from Hosni Mubarak to
Mohammed Morsi and now to Abdel Fatah el-Sisi
adopted the same uncompromising foreign policy
with respect to the Nile and employed intrigue and
coercion rather than diplomacy and cooperation.
The only regime that initiated rapprochement with
Ethiopia was that of el-Sisi, although soon it
betrayed the agreements reached upon on the Nile
between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt.
Most
Ethiopian observers, including the Government of
Ethiopia, believe that Egypt is behind the crisis
in Ethiopia because it provided financial support
to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ginbot 7,
both operating from Asmara, Eritrea. Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi denied the charge, but given some strong
and solid evidences (including video clips of
telephone conversation between OLF and Egyptian
officials) it is highly probable that Egypt is
actively engaged in the provision of material
support to the armed opposition Ethiopian
groupings.
At any
rate, long before Egypt and Ethiopia initiated a
certain level of civil discourse and an agreement
to peacefully resolve the Nile question, I wrote
an article entitled Egypt
has no Choice but to Cooperate with Ethiopia.
In that article, I pleaded to the Egyptian leaders
to open dialogue with Ethiopia and also extended
advice to the Ethiopian leaders to reassure fellow
Egyptians of their sustainable water needs. An
excerpt from the article suffices to explain the
central message of the Article: “…In order to
continue enjoy the ‘gift of the Nile’, the
Egyptian government must pursue a new policy of
cooperation in the context of the Riparian States
interests and the Ethiopian initiative to
construct the dam on the Nile. If, on the
contrary, Egypt pursues a psychological warfare,
however, it would be the ultimate loser. …for
all intents and purposes, the atmosphere
surrounding the new dam on the Nile favors
Ethiopia and Egypt has no choice but to cooperate
with the land of the source of the Blue Nile.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, must reciprocate
Egyptian [anticipated] cooperation by first and
foremost guaranteeing the water needs of the
Egyptian people.”1
To my
gratification, Egypt followed the footsteps of
Sudan and decided to sign the Agreement in an
effort to peacefully resolve the politics of the
Nile. Then I wrote another article entitled The
Historic Ethiopian-Egyptian Renewed Diplomacy and
Cooperation, and this is what I stated in part
in that article: “I am grateful to witness the
renewed Ethiopian-Egyptian diplomacy and
cooperation after much turbulence, mistrust, and
bellicose political climate that have gripped the
two African nations for decades. To be sure, it
was Egypt that had promoted animus
belligerendi (near war attitude) against
Ethiopia since the days of Haile Selassie. Now,
thanks to the wise leadership of President Field
Marshall Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the pragmatic
vision of the Egyptian people, Egypt has
completely reversed its old policy and enhanced a
friendly foreign policy toward Ethiopia. Ethiopia,
on the other hand, had advanced a more
conciliatory and compromise
d’arbitrage (resolving disputes peacefully)
policy toward Egypt, but finally, so it looks, the
Ethiopian patience paid off.”2
Now, in
retrospect, when I witness Egyptian devious and
deceitful motives, I realized my remark of
positive attribute to el-Sisi was a gross
miscalculation indeed. However, I am still hopeful
that one fine day the Egyptian leadership will
come to terms with its own self-negating and
contradictory Nile agenda and revamp its present
inimical foreign policy toward Ethiopia. If the
Egyptian leaders come to their senses, it is they
who will be the ultimate benefactors, but if they
continue to promote anti-Ethiopian policy, they
will be the biggest losers in history.
Incidentally,
Egypt is not the only one that is intervening in
Ethiopian affairs; some die-hard Arab nations, in
one form or another, have been conducting
operations that would undermine Ethiopian national
interest. These nations may not be directly
involved in Ethiopian affairs but they have been
super busy supporting anti-Ethiopian groupings of
Ethiopian origin by either facilitating venues for
the mercenaries or financing their operations. Who
are these Ethiopians at the service of foreign
enemies of Ethiopia? The betrayal of the Ethiopian
nation by its own sons and daughters is not new;
when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935/36, some
Ethiopian aristocrats sided with the invaders
while other patriots, of course, fought the
Graziani-led forces till the last-ditch effort to
avert Ethiopian colonization by Italy.
Ethiopian
Diaspora Opposition Political Groupings
The
Ethiopian Diaspora opposition is highly diverse
and amorphous. It is difficult to make an
empirical sociological and political science
analysis of these groups; in the broader context
they could be classified as foolhardy clamoring
swindlers and relatively well-meaning and
politically matured groups. In the first group,
that is the swindlers, one can safely assume that
they are a bunch of ex-Derg members, ESAT, OLF,
and hundreds of cyber politicians and social media
heroes. The second group, by contrast, includes
advocacy groups, academic forums, scattered former
EPRP members, including EPRP-D, and professional
and intellectual circles that are not affiliated
to any political organization.
The
second group is more sensible in its opposition to
the present regime in Ethiopia, but individuals
affiliated to this group are also stuck in the
“Woyane” characterization of the EPRDF and the
Ethiopian Government, and as a result, they have
missed one important methodological rigor in
political science and political economy: class
analysis and stratification of the governing elite
in Ethiopia. Unfortunately, these days the
yardstick that replaced class analysis is ethnic
depiction of Ethiopian political groupings and
Ethiopian affairs in general. Consequently,
members of the second group exhibit excesses and
lose a balanced overview of the Ethiopian reality,
but they have high regard for the Ethiopian
identity and nationhood. In a similar vein, the
legally registered opposition parties in Ethiopia,
despite their shortcomings in political acumen,
are genuine in their concerns for Ethiopia.
By
contrast, the first group of the so-called
Diaspora opposition is engaged in toxic activity
and outright lies; and the epitome of these groups
is the Ethiopian Satellite TV or ESAT, and I have
no clue whatsoever why the latter opposition media
outlet depends on innuendo rather than on verified
facts. I personally have no problem with ESAT; if
it wants to oppose the Ethiopian Government, it is
entitled to do so, but it ought to shoulder
responsibility by providing truth about events to
its audience. On top of the fabricated reports and
video clips with respect to the Oromo and Gondar
outbursts that it presented on some of its
programs, I am aware that the Ethiopian Satellite
TV (ESAT) has allowed interviews to attack my own
person and I am using this opportunity to expose
its devious propaganda. Examples of its lies and
fiction-like news are many but suffice to mention
just two incidents: 1) this was aired in 2013
(can’t recall the exact date) and two people
were interviewed by ESAT anchor; one of the
interviewee said, “Dr. Ghelawdewos came to
Columbus, Ohio and said that Wolkait is part of
Tigray.” That is a white lie and I never uttered
those words. I have been to Columbus many times,
mostly to pay visit to family members, but I have
also participated in one mini-conference of
Ethiopian intellectuals and professionals in which
many themes and topics pertaining to contemporary
Ethiopia were discussed. However, not a single
panel, including myself, mentioned Wolkait. 2) The
second attack came from a certain self-appointed
neighborhood politician by the name Yared Tibebu (Getachew
Jebesa). This person knows me very well and he
knows too well that I have been promoting
pan-Ethiopian agendas all my adult life, but he
chose to testify against his conscience and
portrayed me as a Woyane intellectual. This kind
of unfounded allegation does not bother me at all,
because thousands of Ethiopians are aware of my
writings, commitments, and for what I stand for,
but I like to remind my readers that pathological
liars are skillful at deception and they should be
carefully evaluated. This kind of deception,
promoted by the Ethiopian opposition of the first
category may have contributed, at least partially,
to the recent uprisings in the Oromia and Gondar
areas; and it is now important to have a look at
the dynamics of the protestations.
Oromia-Amhara
Sporadic Protestations & the Politics of
Burning Public Property
Throughout
recorded history, it is testified that people rise
against the status quo by expressing their
grievances and by subsequently demanding regime
and social changes. The peoples uprising could
either be spontaneous without leadership or a
classic social revolution led by organized elites.
The recent protestations in Ethiopia do not
exhibit any of the above characterization of the
uprisings. By all measure, the recent
protestations and violent disturbances lack
organized leadership and a meaningful political
agenda, not to mention a pan-Ethiopian vision that
was once promoted by the 1970s Ethiopian
generation. The latter were the harbingers of
social change for the welfare of the Ethiopian
people and the transformation of Ethiopia for the
better. That generation yearned for a united and
prosperous Ethiopia that the current generation
seems to undermine and dismantle.
Since
the beginning of the protestations in the Oromia
and Amhara regions, the Institute of Development
and Education for Africa (IDEA) has been
diligently following the activities on the ground,
and it now looks that the protestations were not
entirely home grown operations; they were in fact
inspired by Diaspora Ethiopian groups. According
to Dawud Ibssa, current chairman of the OLF, the
Oromo protestation in Ethiopia were engineered by
the OLF. He claims that his organization has
infiltrated government offices in Ethiopia, and he
boasts that the Oromo uprisings are at their apex
and their victory is just around the corner. Based
on this bizarre and fantastic rhetoric, Dawud
reprimands the Oromo police currently serving the
Ethiopian government and tells them to join the
Oromo rebellion or face punishment. He even
admonished the cadres of the Oromo People’s
Democratic Organization (OPDO), a part of the
ruling party EPRDF, that this is their last
chance. Finally he addresses the various
nationalities of Ethiopia, whom he calls ‘our
neighbors’, and tells them “to refrain from
killing our people [the Oromo]”. Dawud
insinuated in his incessant talk that Oromia will
be liberated, but he may have not realized the
Oromia that he claims was hypothetical for the
Oromo before 1991 and was made real only by the
EPRDF.3
At any
rate, although Dawud Ibssa is bizarre by all
measure, his rhetoric should never be underplayed
and OLF’s operations never underestimated,
because they are connected with the foreign
interlopers that I have discussed above, and quite
frankly they could always foment inflammatory
provocations via their seditious members on the
ground in Ethiopia.
I wish
the Oromo protestations could have been peaceful
and inclusive rather than destructive and
divisive. Their behavior is clearly demonstrated
in their attack of fellow Ethiopians (non-Oromo
nationalities) and burning public property of
foreign investors and of Ethiopians, including
properties owned by Oromo entrepreneurs and
business men and women.
The
young Oromo protestors that disrupted the Irrecha
festival are worthless progeny of the respected,
graceful, and wise Abba Geda. I doubt it very much
that the these protestors have completely detached
themselves from their culture and religious
rituals and have forgotten the significance of
Irrecha, a Thanksgiving giving major holiday of
the Oromo conducted annually following the heavy
rains of winter. What is not clear is why they
chose to disrupt their most revered festival.
The
young Oromo protestors may have thought that it
was a golden opportunity to promote their cause
(whatever their cause is) by roiling the Irrecha
and by assuming center-stage for the consumption
of media outlets. What they did not realize,
however, is their actions disrespected the Abba
Geda and denigrated their own culture. I think
they could care less about their culture that
actually gives them their identity and they
decided to disrupt the Irrecha despite the appeal
and supplication of the Abba Geda. The Irrecha
festival went well for the first 24 minutes; in
due course of the festival, that is, after 35
minutes, the disruptive forces made their way in
with crossed fists and at about 40 minutes after
the festival began some of the Abba Geda tried to
address the agitated crowd; in less than two
minutes, the protestors took over the stage and
the microphone from the Abba Geda and began to
chant by saying “down down Woyane” and soon
they clashed with the police.
Beyond
the Irrecha incident at Bishoftu, the young Oromo
protestors went berserk and frenziedly violent and
began burning public property in many parts of the
Oromo regional state. Their actions became more
lethal, ominous, and indiscriminate. Forty six
cars and buses were burned down at Sebeta and
vicinity and similar attacks were undertaken in
Eastern Shewa and in Meqi and Digda districts. A
sugarcane farm owned by Feissa Kelecha was
completely burned and raised to the ground.
Factories were also set ablaze in the Oromia
region, not far from Addis Ababa. Some of these
protestors even went to the extent of attempting
to attack Amhara and Gurage residents at Gedeo, in
the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples
Regional state, but their actions were foiled by
the Federal Police.
What
the destructive Oromo forces have not realized is
that their actions were counterproductive, because
as the 14th Dalai Lama once said,
“destroying your neighbor is destroying
yourself.” I hope the young Oromo and the likes
of Dawud Ibssa understand the essence of the Dalai
Lama adage. The majority of the Oromo people, like
other Ethiopians, are wise people and they have
condemned the actions of the destructive elements.
Some of them have told us in no uncertain terms
that ‘the Oromo people don’t burn public
property’, and local government leaders like
Arersa Merdesa, mayor of Sendafa, were embarrassed
and angry at the young disillusioned Oromo who
were engaged in destruction. One brave Oromo woman
said, “We the people of Asella are one and
united; the youth, the old, and the army are
united and we will not be divided.” Asella is a
city in the Arsi Zone of the Oromia region and its
inhabitants, like the majority of the Oromo and
other Ethiopians symbolize a united microcosm
Ethiopia.
The
Declaration of State of Emergency and the Role of
the Ethiopian People
In
times of crisis, it is understandable that
governments take necessary action in order to
mitigate violent disturbances and guarantee peace,
security, and stability to their respective
societies. That is the number one obligation of
governments. In the context of international law,
states are justified to declare and implement
state of emergencies and these kinds of actions
goes back to ancient civilizations. Following
civil unrest, armed insurrections, or threat of an
invasion, many nations have declared state of
emergencies at one point or another. The ancient
Romans, for instance, were compelled to declare
state of emergency when Hannibal invaded Italy in
218 BCE. Ever since, the Romans enacted a law
known as Justitium
put forth by Senatus
Consultum Ultimum (or Senate decree). By the
same token, modern nations adopted laws equivalent
to deterrence or a quick response to a crisis.
France, for instance, has its state of emergency
known as e’tat
d’urgence and other nations could give it a
different name but the purpose is the same. Some
countries use state of emergency for a relatively
short period of time (e.g. President Good Luck
Jonathan’s declaration of state of emergency on
May 2013 following the Boko Haram attacks in North
Eastern Nigeria) ; others employ it indefinitely,
and yet others can put emergencies in place
intermittently but for relatively long period of
time. A good example of the latter is Egypt, a
country that enforced state of emergency following
the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 and
continued to be effectively implemented until
2012.
Whether
state of emergencies and their attendant sanctions
are subject to controversies or not is a matter of
academic debate, but governments at least will
view it as a necessary evil to quell disturbances,
mitigate civil unrest, or deter foreign attacks.
Even in the latter context, in which state of
emergencies are justified, however, it would be
prudent to anticipate social unrest and take
necessary measures by dialogue, peaceful
resolution of conflicts, and national
reconciliation, long before uprisings begin; and
as I have alluded in the first part of this
article, had the Ethiopian government listened to
what some Ethiopians (including myself) proposed
in regards to national reconciliation and peaceful
resolutions to the many gradations of
contradictions (EPRDF vs. opposition parties,
EPRDF within itself, EPRDF and the people etc)
there won’t have been political crisis of the
magnitude that we have witnessed from November of
2015 to October of 2016. Moreover, the government
would have not been compelled to declare state of
emergency.
Now,
that the state of emergency has been declared and
implemented, I can perhaps lament by saying ‘it
is water under the bridge’. However, in order to
overcome the current crisis the EPRDF Government
must first and foremost acknowledge its faults and
weaknesses. The state of emergency might briefly
reassure Ethiopians of peace, security, and
stability but it may not guarantee a relatively
permanent peace and stability as I have proposed
in my latest article.4
To be
sure, some open political debates have taken place
and peoples’ initiatives for open dialogue have
also been conducted. The latter is best
exemplified by the Amhara people delegation to
Tigray. The delegation included wonderful people
like Sema Tiruneh, Zerai Tsadiq Hailu, Bekuru
Tiguhan, Gebre Ayenaw, Chekol Atnafu, and
Alebachew Taye of Gondar City Council. In due
course of their dialogue with the representatives
of Tigray Regional State and the Tigrayans who
flee from Gondar and who went via Sudan to
Mekelle, the Amhara delegation members spoke one
by one, and they all came up with constructive
ideas akin to the Ethiopian tradition of sympathy
and solidarity. But, of all the delegate members
that impressed me most is Gebre Ayenaw, who
uttered a very profound precept: ‘One Flag, One
Cemetery’. Ato Gebre’s message is quite
obvious even to the uninitiated; the Ethiopian
people are united under one flag and their final
destiny is the same!
In a
similar vein to the Amhara delegation to Tigray,
Ethiopian religious leaders, in view of their
solemn duty, have expressed concerns on the civil
unrest and violence. The Ethiopian Orthodox
Church, under the leadership of the Holiness
Patriarch Abuna Mathias, called for a seven-day
nation-wide mass prayer; the other religious
leaders that belong to the Ethiopian
Inter-Religious Council have also endorsed the
mass prayer for peace and stability. Other
prominent preachers like Kesis Memhir Zebene
Lemma, Megabe Haddis Eshetu, and Pastor Tolossa
Gudina strongly appealed to the Ethiopian people
in general and to the youth in particular and
stressed the prevention and avoidance of violence.
Pastor Tolossa told his congregation, and by
extension the Ethiopian people, “God knows our
country as Ethiopia, and not as Amhara, Oromo, or
Tigray,” and members of his church gave him a
standing ovation; all those Ethiopians who stood
on their feet were trying to extend their
endorsement to the Pastor’s injunction, but they
were also exhibiting their love for their country,
Ethiopia.
In an
effort to explain the meaning of peaceful
coexistence, Megabe Haddis Eshetu made reference
to the Prophet Isaiah’s prophecy of antagonistic
opposites living side by side: opposites like a
lion and a cow; a tiger and a goat; and a wolf and
a sheep. He, in effect, was saying we can live in
harmony in spite of our antagonistic differences.
Similarly, in one of his teachings, Memhir Zebene
mentioned Moses’ exemplary role on the sense of
sacrifice: “God, you rather destroy me and
redeem the people.” Kesis Zebene told his
audience that blood should not be spilled in
Ethiopia, and Ethiopia should be redeemed as in
Moses’ commitment of self-sacrifice.
Following
the state of emergency delegation, two important
panel discussions on the current crisis took
place; one in Addis Ababa and the other in Bahir
Dar. The first panel was focused on the
establishment of democracy and federalism in
Ethiopia, and by and large, this panel discussion
was an open debate on the current situation in
Ethiopia and it was by far constructive and
educational. In terms of the topic of the
conference and the themes discussed, it reminds me
of ‘Covadis Ethiopia’, a conference of
Ethiopians held in New York three decades ago;
covadis in Latin literally means ‘where are you
going?’ and the New York conference tried to
assess Ethiopia’s future direction (where is
Ethiopia heading?), and the Addis Ababa recent
conference was trying to grapple with Ethiopia’s
sojourn in democracy and federalism.
Dr.
Kassahun Berhanu, the first speaker in the Addis
Ababa conference, hammered the differences between
the EPRDF Government and the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and clarified the
problem of mixing up the government and the state.
He also critically examined what he calls ‘state
capture’, a political science term that explains
the authoritative allocation of power without
legal mandate; or the abuse of power by private
interests in the decision-making process. Rent
seeking, that is now widespread in Ethiopia and
that has become the epitome of corruption, could
be defined as one type of state capture.
The
second speaker was Engineer Tsedeqe Yehune and he
underscored the lack of dialogue and tolerance and
the disproportionate wealth and power relations.
The third speaker, Lidetu Ayelew of the Ethiopian
Democratic Party (EDP), was by far balanced in his
critique of the ruling party and the opposition
parties, and most importantly he candidly
addressed the wisdom that Ethiopians must employ
in resolving the current crisis in Ethiopia. He
said, “We must use this opportunity associated
with the crisis for the betterment of our
country.”
The
fourth speaker, Bereket Simon, representing the
ruling party and the Government, seemed to have
acquiesced to Lidetu’s criticism of the
Government while at the same time defending his
party. Bereket’s presentation was modest, and
more or less reflected the Government’s
readiness to work with the Ethiopian people in
order to mitigate the crisis and overcome major
political and social problems. However, Bereket
could have been in a much better position had he
simply enumerated the strengths and weaknesses of
his party. For instance, it is abundantly clear
that there is no democracy in Ethiopia, but it is
also conspicuous and unmistakable reality that the
EPRDF wrought major developmental transformation
in Ethiopia.
Now
that the EPRDF Government has moved from
declaration of state of emergency to open debates
and to restructuring the state apparatus, one can
safely assume that the Government will initiate
major reform and Ethiopia will recover from the
recent upheavals. However, whether the reforms
will keep future peoples’ uprisings and social
revolutions at bay remains to be seen. Moreover,
the Government’s action at reform is best
exemplified by the reshuffle in the Ministries and
the new appointments that PM Hailemariam Desalegn
presented to the Ethiopian Parliament for approval
on November 1, 2016.
Beyond
maintaining peace and stability as well as taking
initiative in political reform, the Ethiopian
Government should also take immediate action to
include the legally registered parties in the
parliament, a legislative body that is so far the
exclusive domain of the EPRDF. If indeed the
parliament is going to be democratic, as Presdient
Mulatu Teshome alluded to in his address to the
members of the parliament, opposition parties must
obtain some seats in the parliament.
One
other important issue that was never discussed by
the panels in the conferences nor raised by the
opposition parties is the skyrocketing market
prices in Ethiopia and the high cost of living
that the Ethiopian people are unable to bear
anymore. If one of the major agendas of the
developmental state is to cut poverty by half in
the short haul and eliminate it in the long run,
then the immediate task of the Government should
be to regulate market prices and monitor the cost
of living and give poor and middle class
Ethiopians some relief. If the Ethiopian
Government does not take immediate action to
alleviate the conditions of Ethiopians due to high
cost of living, we might revisit Yekatit 1966 EC
or the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 and we might
witness nation-wide social unrest.
Notes:
1.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “Egypt has no choice but to cooperate
with Ethiopia”, July 12, 2013, www.africanidea.org/Egypt_has_no_choice.html
2.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “The Historic Ethiopian Egyptian Renewed
Diplomacy and Cooperation” January 12, 2015
www.africanidea.org/Historic_Ethiopian_Egyptian_diplomacy.html
3.
Dawud
Ibssa interview by Seifenebelbal Radio, October 9,
2016
4.
Gheawdewos
Araia, ተኝቻለሁ እንጂ አልሞትኩም
The policy recommendations are enumerated at the
end of the article
www.africanidea.org/Sleepy_but_not_dead.pdf
All
Rights Reserved Copyright © Institute of
Development and Education for Africa (IDEA), 2016;
Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia can be contacted for
educational and constructive feedback via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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