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The
Necessity of Circumspection in Ethiopia’s
Foreign Policy with respect to the future
Ethiopia-Eritrea Relations
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
April 14, 2017
This
article intends to critically examine the future
relations of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the context
of the prevailing complicated political scenario
that has impacted on the respective foreign
policies of the two countries following the
Algiers Agreement and subsequent delimitation of
the Ethiopian-Eritrean border by the Boundary
Commission (April 13, 2002).
I
personally was not in favor of the Algiers
Agreement, although in principle I condone the
latter’s package of peace initiative. The reason
why I opposed the Algiers Agreement and the
subsequent Decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission (EEBC) is because I have then
anticipated Ethiopia’s disadvantages at Algiers
in spite of its military victory at the battle of
Badme and also the negative consequence on its
national interest and territorial integrity as a
result of the Decision that compromised its
territorial integrity.
Once
Ethiopia accepted the Algiers arbitration and the
decision of the EEBC, I realized (like many of my
colleagues) that Ethiopia would encounter complex
foreign policy parameters while it attempted to
redeem its relations with Eritrea. And facing the
Border Commission, at the outset, Ethiopia was
dealing with colonial treaties of 1900 (for the
central sector), 1902 (for the western sector),
and 1908 (for the eastern sector), all treaties
that were long dead and also made null and void by
Italy when it temporarily occupied Ethiopia from
1936 to 1941. On top of this, in due course of
deliberations by the Border Commission, there were
so many confusing names of places and rivers that
were presented by the two parties as part of their
documentary evidences or exhibits. I recall that
Ethiopia maintained that there was no such river
named Muna in the 1900 Treaty; Ethiopia’s
position was right because Muna was just part of
the Endeli River stream. However, contrary to
Ethiopia’s correct position, the EEBC upheld the
name ‘Muna’ tout court.
Moreover,
Ethiopia’s contrary position on the 1908 Treaty
regarding Eritrea’s contention that the boundary
was already delimited was also correct, simply
because the boundary was not delimited and the
EEBC arguably endorsed Ethiopia’s position.
Nevertheless, Ethiopia missed a golden opportunity
not only from exploiting its correct stances on
the Treaties but also for not accepting the
EEBC’s findings and approval that Forto Cardona
and Tsorona historically belonged to Ethiopia.
Ethiopia
again missed an opportunity when Eritrea first
restricted fuel supply to the UN Peacekeeping
forces of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
in January 2008 and ultimately the Government of
Isaias Afewerki ordered the troops to leave border
on February of the same year. Ethiopia could have
invoked the comprehensive peace agreement and
binding arbitration, including the establishment
of a 25-kilometer wide temporary security zone (TSZ)
that the two parties agreed upon on June 18, 2000;
and based on this agreement and Eritrea’s
behavior in expelling UNMEE troops, Ethiopia could
have argued that Eritrea has violated the Algiers
Agreement and rendered it null and void. But,
there was no such stance on the part of Ethiopia
and I have then wondered why the EPRDF-led
Ethiopia was unable to maximize such kind of
unforeseen bonus in the midst of a tangled up
politics surrounding delimitation and demarcation
of the common border. Had Ethiopia avoided
propitiating propensities during the overall
EEBC’s decision making process, it could have
employed alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and
extend an effective preemptive strike to
forthcoming entanglements.
Ever
since the UNMEE troops pulled out from Eritrea,
major wars did not erupt between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, but there were many intermittent and
sporadic skirmishes on the border; and one
relatively major battle that was conducted at
Tsorona and that was underreported at
international level took place on June 2016; there
were heavy casualties on either side and it
further complicated the Ethiopian-Eritrean
relations and rendered the EEBC decision
ineffective and unrealizable. By then, many Horn
of Africa observers have concluded that the EEBC
delimitation decision was destined to become a
paper work of conflict resolution mechanism but
short of implementation.
Back
in 2014, Herman Cohen and David Shinn commented on
Ethiopian and Eritrean relations, and according to
the VOA Tigrigna report of January 2014, both
statesmen tried to prove that Eritrea was not
involved in arming the Al Shabab in Somalia; and
Ambassador Shinn, in particular, came up with the
idea of “Bringing Eritrea from the Cold: We Need
to Un-break the US-Ethiopia-Eritrea Triangle”.
The intentions of these statesmen was not clear to
me then; I was not sure whether they were trying
to influence the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea
to come to a round table and peacefully resolve
their differences, or they were interested in face
lifting the image of Isaias Afewerki, who for the
most part adopted an isolationist policy (if that
is what ‘bringing out of the cold’ means) as
opposed to the global diplomatic engagement of
Ethiopia. At any rate, I had responded at the time
as follows:
What Ethiopia ought to do is promoting its national interest vis-ŕ-vis
its good relations with its neighbors… However,
in order for Ethiopia to carry out a meaningful
foreign policy the political leadership should
first and foremost safeguard Ethiopian sovereignty
that, in turn, enables the country to exercise
independence in matters of foreign relations.1
In
the above quick response of mine, the key words
are ‘national interest’ and ‘sovereignty’,
but I had already presented the same themes
elaborately some fourteen years ago and again in
the article mentioned above (2008) and since the
argument I advanced then is still relevant, I am
compelled to reiterate it for the purpose of this
essay:
If at all relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are normalized via
dialogue, I am of the opinion that Badme would not
make a huge difference in the life of Eritreans,
although Eritreans repeatedly argued in favor of
the Algiers Decision, the stark reality in Eritrea
clearly demonstrates a bread and butter issue; the
bottom line is the Eritrean economy and not a
piece of land that would miraculously transform
the current dire situation in Eritrea. By the same
token, the use of Assab as a port of Ethiopia in
lieu of huge payment would benefit Eritrea and not
Ethiopia, and Ethiopia is already paying millions
of dollars to Djibouti for using the port, and it
would be a great mistake to indulge in the
Cohen-Shinn conundrum unless it is going to use
Assab gratis or “own” it as its de facto, if
not de jure port… Same logic applies to Badme.
It is sovereign Ethiopian territory and if
Ethiopia blindly agrees to the handing over of the
land to Eritrea, a huge backlash will ensue on the
part of Ethiopians, and the Ethiopian people will
feel betrayed by their own government. The
Ethiopian government, thus, should make a
calculated move in the context of Djibouti and
Assab. In terms of geographical proximity, Assab
is close to Kombelcha and Djibouti to Dire Dawa
and there is no point in negotiating Assab unless
there is some mystery behind the Cohen-Shinn
agenda that would grossly reward Ethiopia.2
As
of recent, it looks there is a new wave of
diplomatic venture to resolve the stalemate
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Prime Minster of
Ethiopia, Mr. Haile-Mariam Desalegn, in his visit
of Tigray Regional State told his audience that he
has a new solution to the problem with Eritrea,
but he did not specifically mentioned the contents
of the new Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea. In the
same vein, Ato Abay Woldu, in his visit to Shiraro
told the residents of the area that the government
of Tigray Regional State would not complete the
construction of the road from Shiraro to Badme.
In
the absence of tangible evidence and/or valid and
verifiable information in regards to political
issues, people tend to come up with their own
interpretation and a significant number of
Ethiopians have surmised that the Ethiopian
government is ready to hand over Badme to Eritrea,
and this conjecture of the Ethiopian observers is
based on PM Haile-Mariam and Ato Abay’s
assertions. And by default or by design, President
Omar al- Bashir of Sudan made an official visit to
Ethiopia on April 2, 2017, and among the many
important issues that he discussed and exchanged
with PM Haile-Mariam, he suggested that Eritrea be
returned to the Horn of Africa regional
organization, IGAD or Inter-Governmental Agency
for Development; at the same time, Egyptian envoys
have gone to Eritrea and had a stay with the
Eritrean naval forces.
Based
on the above diplomatic ventures and Ethiopia’s
new Eritrean policy, one could safely assume a new
peace initiative will be brokered between Ethiopia
and Eritrea, and I for one would salute the
initiative if indeed peace will prevail at long
last and the Ethiopians and Eritreans will once
again enjoy the dividends of peace. However, I am
still of the opinion that Ethiopia should be extra
vigilant and exhibit prudence and discretion in
formulating its new policy and in dealing with the
opposite party in the negotiating table.
As
I have done in the past and underscored in my
previous writings, I like to share with my fellow
Ethiopians and the government officials
(especially those who would represent Ethiopia in
the peace negotiation) in Ethiopia what I have
argued all along since 2000. My
main concern is transparency and accountability in
the policy making matrix and the peoples’ role
and say in the decision making process. It is
understandable that governments represent people
especially in relatively democratic societies, but
the government ought to inform the people and seek
feedback from them long before any policy is
implemented. In the context of this essay, thus, I
want to stress that the Ethiopian government
should not take any political measure in regards
to the Ethiopian-Eritrean relations without the
knowledge and endorsement of the people, and this
rationale reminds me of a paper entitled A New Paradigm in Ethiopian Politics: A Discussion on what Ethiopians
can do at this historical juncture to bring about
change in Ethiopia that I contributed in 2008.
Below is an excerpt of the article:
Whether we are engaged in a general common cause or poised to dissect a
specific problem, we must first understand that
politics is a gregarious business. There is no
such thing as individual politics unless a certain
psychopath or tyrant lives in a dream of soliloquy
governance in a remote isolated, romantic, and
ideal island with no inhabitants. Therefore, the
basis for the effective execution of all politics
is the collective effort of all members of
society…Incidentally, a government that operates
without involving the people, or a political party
that operates clandestinely for the most part is
likely to make huge mistakes, and again, they will
be checked and counter-checked by the people who
are genuinely empowered.3
By
‘the people counterchecking the authorities’,
I don’t mean to imply that we have a
checks-and-balances structure within the political
system of Ethiopia; but since public forums have
been conducted at local and regional levels and
the people have been using such forums to
criticize officials and also get answers to their
demands and questions, relative empowerment zones
have mushroomed in all Ethiopia although we are
not yet on a full-fledged democratic threshold.
The government should now bring the
Ethiopian-Eritrean issue before these forums and
get feedback from the people. Let the people speak
this time and let history witness that Ethiopians,
at grassroots level, have spoken and made an input
to the Government’s peace proposal.
The
reason why I am emphatic on the significance of
the empowerment of the people is not simply to
imply the democratic rights of the people in the
broader sense, but also to convey a message to the
government officials that the people at the
periphery are more knowledgeable about their
condition, their history, and their land than any
government bureaucrat at the center. While this
logical argument is applicable to all Ethiopians,
it is more so palpable when it comes to the people
of Tigray, who in the distant past and now at
present have shouldered the brunt of the
destructive effects of foreign incursions and
major wars.
Among
the Tigray people too (apart from the sacrifices
made by all Ethiopians during the war), it is the
people in the Shire area (north-western district
near Badme) and the Agame area (north-eastern
districts of Gulo-Mekeda and Irob) that have made
huge sacrifices, including the devastation of
their villages and the risk of some of their lands
being allocated to Eritrea. Most Ethiopians are
aware of the extent of devastation that took place
in the embattled zones, but it is the people who
live there that have really witnessed the effects
of the destruction. For instance the people of
Gulo-Mekeda have now a sad recollection of the
once thriving town of Zalambessa that has now
turned into a ghost ruined landscape; similarly
the people of Irob have concerns that the destiny
of
Alitena is hanging in the balance.
Following
my proposal above, if the government of Ethiopia
conducts a public forum with the people of Irob,
the sojourning officials will learn the following
facts: The Irob wereda is geographically located
in the Eastern District of the Tigray Regional
State and it borders Eritrea at the Endeli River
to the north; Saésié-TsaedaEmba
to the south; Afar to the east; and Gulo-Mekeda to
the west. The Irob will also tell the officials
that the historic capital city of Irob is Alitena
and not Dawhan (the current administrative
center); they have also concerns that they might
lose Alitena that was once occupied by Eritrean
forces during the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea
due to the wrong decision of the EEBC. Apparently,
I for one have once lived in Irob and witnessed
Alitena as the capital of Irob Wereda.
I suggest that Ato Abay Woldu descends down
to Irob and have a talk with the people as he has
done with the people of Chercher, EmbaSeneiti,
Shiraro, Zana, and Aider.
The
concern of people of Shire and Irob is the concern
of all Ethiopians, and the Ethiopian government
has an obligation to listen to the people and
honor their demands and aspirations, and it is in
light of the peoples’ concerns and overall
Ethiopia’s national interest that the Ethiopian
Government must enter peace negotiations with
Eritrea.
References
1.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopian
Foreign Policy and How the Delicate Balance of
Diplomacy and Negotiation should be Maintained,
July 25, 2014 www.africanidea.org/Ethiopian_foreign_policy.html
2.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ibid
3.
Ghelawdewos Araia, A
New Paradigm in Ethiopian Politics: A Discussion
on what Ethiopians can do at this Historical
Juncture to bring about Change in Ethiopia,
January 14, 2008
www.africanidea.org/paradigm_ethiopian_politics.html
All Rights Reserved, copyright © Institute of Development and Education
for Africa (IDEA); Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia can be
contacted for educational and constructive
feedback via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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