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The
Contradiction between Good Governance and the
Developmental State in Ethiopia
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
March 21, 2016
Good governance has now become the
vogue, if not the primary policy agenda of
developing countries around the world that seek
aid from international financial institutions (IFIs)
like the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The concept was launched during the
United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
a major UN agenda initiated at the turn of the 21st
century, a program of action to be achieved
between 2000 and 2015, but most of the developing
nations were unable to realize the MDG.
The concept of good governance,
however, has no clear-cut definition or proximate
explanation, and as a result various UN agencies
and IFIs have come up with their distinct criteria
as a precondition to good governance and to
monitor their funding to the recipient countries.
Hence, the definition-cum-criteria of good
governance ranges from sufficient provision of
goods and services to the conduct of public
institutions; to decision-making process to
democracy in general, and to fundamental rights of
citizens and their unfettered and undeterred
participation in political affairs.
Nevertheless, irrespective of the
lack of general consensus in the definition of
good governance, some observers welcomed the world
institutions criteria and preconditions while
others view them as sinister motives of the IFIs.
William Easterly, for instance, argues that “the
World Bank can hardly avoid some discussion of the
nature of government in development, and they have
been preparing reports on this topic – what they
have vaguely called governance for years now”
and he believes that concepts like liberty,
freedom, equality, rights, and democracy are
omitted in the World Bank report. Moreover, he
says, “they play little or no role” in what
the Bank calls “strengthened approach to
governance.” Furthermore, Easterly tells us what
the Bank told him as follows: “the World Bank
Press Office explained to this author that the
World Bank is legally not allowed by its own
charter to use the word democracy.”1
Based on Easterly’s rationale and
empirical findings, thus, one can safely assume
that the preconditions for good governance laid
out by the World Bank and other global
institutions are not sincerely designed to help
promote democracy in the developing countries. In
other words, democracy is irrelevant to good
governance and from this premise we can infer the
hollowness of good governance that we have been
observing over the years in the so-called Third
World countries. Out of this inference, in turn,
arises a fundamental question: How can governance
be good without democracy, unless we are
hoodwinked by the impressive development agendas
and the provision of goods and services by
autocratic regimes.
Ultimately, we might come up with a
model that could help us dispel some
misconceptions with respect to good governance and
thereby detect the flawed pieces of puzzle
associated with superficial and technical approach
to a refined policy on development. The model also
can help us polish strategies for development by
first avoiding glib definitions of good
governance. Before we can resolve the intricacies
of good governance, however, I like to make it
crystal clear that democracy is central to
effective and viable good governance.
In my book, ETHIOPIA:
Democracy, Devolution of Power, & the
Developmental State, I have dedicated the
first seven chapters and the last chapter of the
book to democracy. I have also critically examined
the contradiction between good governance and the
developmental state (DS). In most instances, and
in the context of the Ethiopian society, I viewed
good governance (with a substantial corpus of
democracy) and the DS as polar opposites.
To begin with, the Ethiopian DS is
bedeviled not only by lack of democracy but it is
also bewitched by incessant and engrained
corruption. “Thus, the primary task of the
Ethiopian state should be to cleanse itself from
the current endemic corruption, and this would
require a reform to restructure the state
apparatus by appointing talented professionals
free of corruption, or a revolution that can
completely unseat the status quo and lay the
groundwork for the developmental state.”2
Additionally, “in order to have a genuine
developmental state, the Ethiopian state must
either operate democratically or found democratic
institutions that could serve as catalysts in the
development march.”3
Unless the Ethiopian state
undertakes purgatory measures, bad governance
could effectively derail or reverse the DS agenda
of transformation; and the self-fulfilling
prophecy of the DS may not be realized if bad
governance, infested with corruption, serves as
stumbling block. A DS enmeshed in a pool of bad
governance is fraught with drawbacks and neither
institutional pretensions nor brilliant paper
policies or promises could deter the corrupt
Ethiopian bureaucrats.
Corruption and bad governance could
actually have a negative impact on the larger
society in general and a disempowering function to
respective government departments. Emasculated
government bodies are unforeseen bonus to corrupt
officials and in order to promote their selfish
interests, the authorities presiding over
ministries and other government agencies
deliberately slow down or sabotage the democratic
process. Why are these officials terrified by
democracy? The answer is simple: Democracy entails
rule of law, transparency, and accountability and
this kind of system exposes the corrupt officials
to the public. On the contrary, in the absence of
democracy, the self-promoting bureaucrats can
override rules and regulations that could
potentially deter their “mafia-type”
operation; and the government could either be
paralyzed or exhibit a shadowy existence.
I very well understand that it is
not easy to completely eradicate corruption, a
social disease that is universal and not unique to
Ethiopia. During the pre-election debates of 2015,
Abay Tsehaye, one of the EPRDF top leaders, who
was a member of the panel at Addis Ababa
University, candidly told the audience that it is
very difficult to control and not easy to deal
with corruption. I may not be in full accord with
Ato Abay but I kind agree with his contention, but
I also believe that corruption can be contained
and minimized if the EPRDF leaders take bold
measures.
I believe Prime Minister Hailemariam
Desalegn was trying to delineate the contradiction
between good governance and the DS in a recent
EPRDF leaders meeting, when he forcefully asserted
that there is so much talk about good governance,
but ‘after such kind of meeting’ says the PM,
‘all we do is go our own ways and promote our
individual networking.’ By that, he means, I
gather, the officials are interested in promoting
their interests rather than the interests of the
people and the mission and objectives of the
Ethiopian DS.
In point of fact, in a televised
broadcast (Friday, March 18, 2016), Prime Minister
Hailemariam acknowledged that good governance has
now become the agenda of the people and the people
themselves are talking about it. Furthermore, he
said, “Although the government has conducted its
own research pertaining to good governance, its
research is based on the peoples demand and
aspirations” (translation modified by me).
Town meetings on good governance
have been taking place in the last three to four
years in all major Ethiopian cities and towns, and
now it is intensified at the level of the regional
states; it is a very encouraging political
scenario, but as stated earlier, unless structural
change takes place, the public discourse could end
up in ordinary chattering platforms where people
vent their anger only.
The stalemate between good
governance and the DS ultimately could result in
what I like to call ‘creative stagnation’; the
latter could sound contradiction in terms and it
is true, because what we will witness in the end
is sweet talks about good governance while the DS,
tainted with innovation in development programs,
encounters a snail progress, if not faces
deferment of its variegated agendas. On the other
hand, if the Government implements the requisite
elements of good governance, then the DS would
quickly meet its goals and transform the Ethiopian
society for the better.
In the final analysis, what we need
to do is come up with a political economy analysis
of good governance in the context of ‘who
governs’? If the government is democratic (or at
least exhibits propensity toward democratic
practices), and the country has democratic
institutions (or some modicum democratic political
culture), good governance could nestle on
relatively conducive platform. If, on the other
hand, the country is devoid of democracy, and has
no robust constitution, open political debates,
and an independent judiciary, good governance
simply becomes out of question. It is for this
apparent reason that I like to argue that we must
evaluate the nature and characteristics of a given
political system before we venture analyzing and
critiquing good governance. For instance, we
should recognize that corruption is a
manifestation of bad governance and the latter, in
turn, is a reflection of either a weak political
system or a relatively backward political culture
coupled by low-level economic development. In this
essay, however, we are interested in examining
elements that, in one form or another, affect good
governance.
Professor Naveed Ahmed discusses
good governance in the context of rule of law and
argues that “the menace of corruption and
absence of rule of law exacerbate
impoverishment” and he essentially examines the
attributes of good governance that many scholars
have entertained thus far, but what makes his
approach unique is that he identifies the media as
the fourth branch of government in his native
Pakistan. “The media exposes,” says Naveed,
“the corrupt practices and inappropriate conduct
of officials…the media plays important role in
enlightening the public and holding government
accountable.”4
The media in Pakistan could probably
expose corrupt practices and enlighten the people;
after all, according to Professor Ahmed’s
findings, there are over 70 TV channels in
Pakistan, and it is possible that some of these
media outlets are independent and could play a
positive role in the fight against corruption, but
this reality does not exist in Ethiopia. To begin
with, Ethiopia is not blessed with multitude of TV
and radio channels like Pakistan (it is quite
impressive that this poor nation has over 70 TV
channels), and the only one of its kind is the
government-owned Ethiopian Broadcast Corporation (EBC).
In the last two decades, of course, some media
outlets like Ethiopian Broadcasting System (EBS),
Ethiopian Reporter, and some FM radio channels
have mushroomed in Ethiopia, but they are far from
engaging in politics and exposing corrupt
officials, let alone hold the government
accountable.
One other issue that we must be
clear on is that some DS countries (e.g. The
Tigers and China) have transformed their
respective societies without democracy. But in the
end, even these countries were compelled by
historical circumstances and global reality to
gravitate toward democracy. The Republic of Korea
and China, thus, adopted democracy and market
economy respectively without relinquishing the
mission and diminishing the role of the DS, and by
doing so they have gradually and steadily moved
from a dictatorial political system to relative
good governance with relative transparency and
accountability. These countries, however, have yet
to overcome corruption; in fact, President Xi Jin
Ping of China has recently launched massive anti
corruption campaign directed first against
high-level government officials, and now spread to
the countryside to crackdown low-ranking
authorities.
If we focus on good governance vis-à-vis
international assistance, it would be advisable to
follow Professor Asayhengn Desta’s proposal:
“If Ethiopia is to accept Western assistance, it
needs to examine critically the Western capitalist
economic theories, because they were developed for
a different social order. Ethiopian policymakers
need to modify the ‘one size fits all’ in
order to adapt and use only the most relevant
aspects for Ethiopian culture and its way of
living.”5
My proposal, as already indicated
above, goes beyond good governance-aid nexus and
focuses rather on structural change within the
Ethiopian state and overall reconciliation between
democracy and the DS. By way of conclusion and in
an effort to formulate a sound and viable good
governance policy, I will reiterate the
significance of reconciliation that I have
analyzed in one of my works:
Reconciliation
within the larger Ethiopian society is predicated
on democratic governance, and in this regard the
DS must first democratize itself, and that is the
only way it could strengthen democracy within the
larger Ethiopian society. In the final analysis,
thus, the Ethiopian state would shoulder two
significant roles, among many others: 1)
state-driven economy and 2) participatory
democracy. The state plays a central role in
realizing the two criteria mentioned above,
although the state must encourage the private
sector in playing a role especially in fostering
resources and augmenting economic growth. The
reason I want the DS to play a major role is
reasonably justified because as Steven Friedman
convincingly argues, ‘[the] civil society has no
meaning unless it is conceived of in relation to
the state; to talk of a viable and effective civil
society in the absence of an equivalent state is a
contradiction, for it is the state that provides
and enforces the legal framework from which the
association of civil society derive their freedom
to associate and that arbitrates the competing
claims within civil society and it is from
engagement with the state that civil
society derives its rationale.6
The engagement of the Ethiopian
civil society with the government is now channeled
via the ongoing town meetings on good governance,
but we have to wait and see how far this
grassroots movement is going to go. Again, if the
government seizes the moment and exhibits a
forward moving mission, and most importantly
priority is given to democratic governance, then
Ethiopia will witness full-fledged good
governance. The latter is not a gift to be
delivered to the people; the Ethiopian people
should earn it via democracy, a system that can
altogether empower them and give them assurance of
a sane political order that governs with justice,
freedom, liberty, and equality; reduces poverty
and eliminates famine once and for all. In its
very broad context, that is what good governance
should be.
Notes
1.
William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights
of the Poor, Basic Books, New York, 2013, p. 7
2.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Democracy, Devolution f Power, & the Developmental State,
Institute of Development and Education for Africa
(IDEA), 2013, p. 137
3.
G. Araia, Ibid, p. 138
4.
Naveed Ahemd, “Rule of
Law and Good Governance: A Critical Examination of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”, pp. 10-11; p.
20
5.
Asayhegn Desta,
“Modifying the ‘One Fits All Size’ Good
Governance Agenda of Ethiopia”, www.africanidea.org/Modifying_good_goverance_fits.html
6.
G. Araia, op cit, p. 226
All
Rights Reserved. Copyright © Institute of
Development and Education for Africa (IDEA), 2016.
For educational and constructive feedback, please
contact Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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