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Creating
Territorial Boundaries to Design the Political Order of
Self-
rule and Shared-rule of Federal Units: A Review
Desta,
Aayehgn, Professor of Sustainable Economic Development, Barowsky School of
Business, Dominican University of California
Introduction
Trends
in the formation of ethnic-national and regional federalism have recently
spurred literature on political economy. Since these legitimate bases,
contents, and divisions are the central themes of federalism, a number of
researchers have addressed the dilemmas and opportunities faced by a
number of federalist states. More
specifically, researchers are attempting to articulate important exogenous
and endogenous factors and then to examine them critically for their
viability for federalism. The
most profound issue that surrounds federalism is that unitary sovereign
states are breaking into autonomous ethnic or cultural cleavages. Regions
are seeking a combination of self-rule and shared rule without facing
constrained control from the central government. Given
the relationship between the doctrine of federalism and the diffusion of
central governmental power to impose its norms upon the autonomous
regions, the central focus of this study is to examine the modalities of
federalism.
Federation
involves a territorial division of power between constituent units –
sometimes called provinces, cantons, possibly cities and states, and the
central government (Watts, 1998). In
other words, federalism may be defined as a form of governmental and
institutional structure designed by the will of the stakeholders to
maintain unity while also preserving diversity (Odion, 2011). The main
characteristics of federalism include: 1) political power that is
structurally dispersed among centers of authority to encourage both self
and shared rule; 2) subordinate units prescribed by areas of jurisdiction
that cannot be invaded by the central authority; 3) leaders of subordinate
units who draw their power heavily from local sources independent of the
central authority; 4) governmental institutions of the sub-units that have
democratic rights to choose their own officials and develop (by
forming their own constitution, symbols, anthems, etc)
their own policies within their areas of jurisdiction; 5) leaders
and representatives of each sub-unit who possess a legally protected base
from which they can voice their opposition to the central authority; and
6) governors of each unit chosen not by the ruling political party but are
elected by local residents (
Feeley,1994).
Among
other things, the political order of federalism requires: a) the
definition of boundaries and the composition of the member units (i.e.
along geographical, ethnic, and/or cultural lines); b) the distribution of
power between the member units and the central institutions; c)
the allocation of power-sharing or a form of influence by member units in
central decision-making bodies within the interlocking political systems;
and d) maintaining sufficient
democratic control over the central bodies (Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2003).
A review of the
literature indicates that there at least three theoretical frameworks that
have been forwarded by researchers to examine the advantages and
disadvantages of federalism. Proponents of federalism argue that instead
of pursuing the goals of a national integration and political legitimacy
that could exacerbate ethnic conflict, federalism accommodates the
interests of different ethnic groups, enhances liberty, and promotes
active citizenship. Since the structures are democratically interlocked,
federalism alleviates cleavage tension (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006).
According to proponents, ethnic or national federalism depends on: 1)
allowing the self-rule of each ethnic-nation group and the sharing of
political power with the central government; 2) the representation of
various ethnic-nation groups to have a say in the various institutions of
the state, and 3) the affirmation and preservation of the particular
cultures (religion, language, etc.) of each ethnic-national group (Magnareila,
1993).
Opponents
on the other hand, argue that the formation of ethnic federalism by
dismembering an existing sovereign state is troubling. Rather
than being a panacea for ethnically and nationally diverse states, when a
centralized nation is divided by drawing borders and naming of regions, it
Balkanizes the nation into ethnic states in the name of federalism that
would most certainly contribute to the formation of endless unstable
states. More fundamentally,
if the issue of self-determination up to and including secession is
warranted in the federal constitution, the viability and existence of
federal states becomes highly questionable. Furthermore, opponents feel
that fiscal decentralization contributes to the increase of
inequality because resource strained regions would remain behind
the most endowed regions in terms of generating funds necessary for the
enhancement of their developmental stage. Thus, instead of Balkanizing the
central unit into separate ethnic or cultural regions in the name of
federalism, opponents strongly suggest that decentralization (i.e., the
delegation of centralized authority to subordinate units) of authority may
serve as a necessary step to restrain Balkanization and maintain a viable
and a strong centralized sovereign nation.
In
the light of the experience of the Soviet Union (which classified its
ethnic groups into nations, national groups and peoples), another group of
analysts are lukewarm about creating federal states that may emerge as a
result of emotional demands rather than rational decisions. They state
that the demarcation of border lines of various ethnic groups of a
centralized state is difficult because they believe that ethnicity is a
politically sensitive matter. Therefore, they suggest that to avoid this
likely path to turmoil and ethnic ruptures in the future, policy makers
need to create manageable regional, federal systems that have a common
history and common culture. In addition, they claim that the viability of
a regional type of federal state in order to effect the management of a
unified sovereign state is an unattainable venture if the inhabitants are
not willing to subscribe to democratic principles.
Stated differently, the adherents of this school of thought are of
the opinion that a federal system is only viable and manageable if the
existing emotionally charged ethnic group feelings are
further sub-divided into manageable geographic regions. The Swiss
model that consists of 26 cantons could serve as a useful starting point.
While preserving the overall territorial integrity of its country, each
canton in Switzerland enjoys dynamic workable levels of autonomy from the
central government.
Despite
the political and ideological stalemate apparent among the above mentioned
three schools of thought, starting in the early 1990s a number of states
have been governed under a federal system fully convinced that unitary
sovereign states would become more efficient and could sustain stability
if broken down into autonomous regions. That is, a number of unified
sovereign nations have created their own autonomous ethnic or region-based
federal states (provinces). Currently, the multi-national people of
Ethiopia are predominantly administered under an ethno-federalist
structure. Moreover, all the autonomous regions or subunits with the
consent of their representatives are, on paper, democratically committed
to belong to and build a unified Ethiopia.
The
central questions of the study therefore are: 1) is the ethnic federalism
process that was introduced to Ethiopia in 1991 designed with a coherent
historical, geographical and cultural context? If so, 2) has the ethnic
federal structure established in Ethiopia contributed to a government of
self-rule, economic growth, stability, democracy and accountability that
will prevail in the sub-states or regions?
To answer these questions, section II of the study reviews existing
secondary resources, such as reports and articles. Section III briefly
narrates the formation of Ethno-federalism in Ethiopia. The last section
of the study summarizes the main findings of the study and draws possible
policy implications for the future.
Literature
review
In
view of the argument that federalism of a multination state is a reliable
method of safeguarding stability in ethnically diverse countries provided
it is established voluntarily, not imposed by interest groups or the
government, proponents argue that the dismemberment of an existing unitary
sovereignty into the formation of autonomous national or ethnic or
regional federal states could empower all the inhabitants of a nation in
its development process. As
summarized by Bakke and Wibbels (2006), “the theoretical justification
for federalism, is based on the combination of shared and self-rule:
federalism offers the potential to retain the territorial integrity of the
state while providing some of self-governance for disaffected groups.” In
addition, supporters of federalism predict that federal states will tend
to do better than unitary states to manages ethnic conflicts and stimulate
social trust among the different forces in society, limiting
discriminatory practices against other groups (Bermeo, 2002). Nonetheless,
the proponents of federalism suggest that to be authentic, federalism
needs to be grounded on the rule of law so that the constitutional
division of powers and the rights of minorities are fully honored and
respected. Prolonging their argument they say that the federal arrangement
of multination states will be necessitated by considerations of equity and
the right to self-determination with a constitutionally entrenched right
to secede under specific conditions and in accordance with a strictly
defined process (McGarry, 2005).
Therefore, a “…republic that is
too vast cannot save itself from despotism except by subdividing itself
and uniting itself into so many federative republics,” (Beccaria in
Spolaore, 2008). From
an economic perspective, proponents argue that federal subunits provide a
necessary foundation for fostering economic competition and enhancing
competitive efficiency for the nation as a whole.
Politically, an ethno-national federation as a unit of
self-government encourages local units to have a say in selecting their
own rulers to bring about political stability, and also to select rulers
of their counties who can be held accountable for their decisions. In
short, supporters claim that federalism provides a system of checks and
balances between ethnic, regional and national levels, and reduces the
fears of minorities (Bergman, 2011). They also argue forcefully that
creating an authentic, democratic federation allows the representatives of
its national communities to engage in dialogue and effectively bargain for
their interests, grievances, and aspirations. Such a dialogue mechanism is
a prerequisite for the development of co-operative practices.
Federalism
was practiced in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
However, in the early 1990s the Soviet Union split into fifteen
independent nations. Yugoslavia gave way to seven sovereign states, and
Czechoslovakia was broken into two separate states. These federated
countries were managed tightly under centralized governments that had no
representation (Spolaore, 2008). On the other hand, in Canada, India,
Switzerland, and South Africa, federalism has flourished because these
countries have heavily depended on democracy as means of managing their
various groups. That is, each state has effectively been given self-rule
to practice the principal linguistic and cultural values of its national
communities. Following the examples of these federated nations; Spain is
in the process of entertaining the formation of multi-ethnic federal
states for its inhabitants. Belgium is now relying on voluntary agreements
to reorganize itself based on ethnic federation. It believes that the
formation of ethnic community contributes to the formation of a shared
space that could provide individuals with a cultural context in which to
establish relationships. As a membership in a community flourishes, so
does the member’s well-being and life chances.
To
summarize, supporters of multi-ethnic federalism not only defend it as an
effective operational device for granting autonomy to distinct peoples,
but also will swear that federalism is indispensable for self-rule,
encouraging shared governance, and giving each region the opportunity to
enjoy a proportional share of economic investment to support development (McGarry,
2005). In short,
ethno-national federation not only fosters deliberation and political
participation but it also enhances the citizens’ capacity to empathize
with one another more readily than in a heterogeneous setting (quoted in
Simoeon (1982).
Critics
on the other hand argue that rather than being a panacea for ethnically
and nationally diverse states, the dismemberment of a centralized state
into a so-called multi-ethnic federalism would contribute not only to
centrifugal, destabilizing effects but would also create a safe haven for
guerrilla activities, eventually contributing to the formation of endless
unstable states. Stated differently, the opponents of federalism as a
stabilizing force are of the opinion that ethno-national federalism is
neither workable nor suitable. Unlike living in a unitary state where
diversity could bring about economies of scale and benefits stemming from
learning and the exchange of ideas and innovation, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization or federalism encourages each ethnic group or region or
indigenous peoples to have the rights to self-determination. This is a
fundamental vehicle for launching a secessionist movement (McGarry, 2005).
For example, though ethno-nationalism asserts that a distinct
ethnic group needs the rights to self- and shared rule, if its desire is
to pursue an illegitimate end, it may contribute to genocide and ethnic
cleansing. Thus, to the extent that claims of self-determination including
ethnic federalism and secession are animated by nationalism, the moral
legitimacy of those claims is “dubious” (Selassie, 2003).
In terms of self-sufficiency, ethno- federalism impedes economic
progress because it has the potential to restrict the mobility of labor,
capital and goods. More specifically, ethno-federalism contributes to
driving away other ethnic groups and also bars other non-natives
(outsiders) from participating in the local economy. From a human rights
perspective, the principles of a federal system are at odds with the
fundamental and universal human rights norm of nondiscrimination. For
example, the restructuring of a nation into ethnic-national origins
nullifies or impairs other non-natives from participating on an equal
footing with the natives and freely move or reside wherever they choose
with the country (See Selassie, 2003).
Alluding
to ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, Selassie (2003, p. 95) states that
Ethno-national federalism is not only a threat to national unity, but its
economic and political performance is marginal. Furthermore,
selssaie argues that by deliberately and openly highlighting ethnic
differences that would have otherwise faded in time, such a system corrals
citizens into ethnic enclaves, encourages aggressive ethnic identification
and separatism, and exacerbates ethnic distrust and social discord. While
describing federalism in Nigeria, some scholars argue that the federal
structure of 36 sub-state groups currently existing has exacerbated
conflict and corruption and should be abolished rather than tinkering with
the three regions that were purposely established by
the British to fulfill the
plurality of their colonial administration (Suberu, 2001). On
the other hand, others are trying to justify the territorially delineated
cleavages and historical legacy of division among various ethnic groups
and regions in Nigeria that have been so imperative that even the
centralist, hierarchical military regimes attached importance to
Nigeria’s system of federal government (Odion, 2011).
Thus,
conservatives highly prefer a unitary state with a dominant
decision-making mode. Though slightly different, some conservatives would
prefer the decentralization of the centralized authority in favor of
subordinate units of a geographical area, believing that administrators of
the geographic unit are likely to have more knowledge and be more
responsive than authorities located at some distant central office (Rubin,
1994).
In
light of the experience of Switzerland (26 cantons), India (states), and
South Africa (provinces), some analysts take a middle of the road
perspective, a position between the two extremes – an ethnic-national
federation at one extreme and a unitary form of government regardless of
ethnic differences at the other extreme.
They argue that while ethnic-federalism in theory is in and of
itself a positive force for enhancement of peace and stability they are
lukewarm about creation of a federal state that inadequately takes into
account demands based on ethnic identity. As argued by Selassie
(2003) “...it does not make sense to combine two or more regions
into the same federal unit when the regions are otherwise separated by
natural barriers such as harsh deserts, non-navigable rivers or high
mountains, merely because those regions are inhabited by the same ethnic
group.” Thus, this school of thought strongly advocates that a better
method of forming units needs to be based on a coherent historical and
geographical basis to provide stability rather than decentralizing the
various groups based on ethnicity.
First,
decentralization of federalism does not mean self-rule as all groups are
represented within the federal government and the power of any unit is not
relegated by the central government.
Second, the demarcation of border lines according to various ethnic
groups in a centralized state is difficult because ethnicity is by and
large a politically sensitive matter that can avoid the likely path to
turmoil and forgo ethnic ruptures. Third, in the absence of effective
political mechanisms to integrate populations with diverse preferences,
“…self-determination and voting outcomes tend to bring about excessive
fragmentation and costly breakup. Such political costs tend to depend not
only on the degree of heterogeneity of preferences but also the quality of
institutions though individual preferences are turned into collective
action,” Spolaore, 2008). Thus, to those whose opinions reflect the
middle of the road, the federation of sub-national units is manageable and
appropriate for the 21st century if the homogenous groups are
mainly demarcated based on geographical units taking population into
consideration. In addition to
maintaining equality between resource-endowed units with other
resource-poor units, the federal government needs to play a major role in
bringing about fair allocation of resources.
Thus to implement federalism effectively, a fiscal redistribution
policy is necessary to allow for equal development of the nation a whole.
Ensuing and instituting mechanisms
of economic and financial adjustment will be important in ensuring more
equal living standards among the subunits of the federal system.
To summarize, the literature seems to be clear that those who support
federalism based on regional, ethnic, and national attributes equate
federalism with stability and economic growth. In addition, federalism is
seen as an appendage of democracy (see Duchacek, 1977).
Critiques present counter examples and state that unlike a unitary
state, federalism is a destabilizing force. Those in between the
proponents and opponents are strongly skeptical about the viability of
both unitary and federal states without the existence of genuine
democracy. They argue that ethnic federalism is a good starting point for
accommodating the emotional (affective) sentiments of some disaffected
groups. To them economic
growth with stability is possible provided that there is a harmonious
interplay between centripetal (centralized)) and centrifugal (outward
flying) forces. They
forcefully argue that initially, ethnic federalism could act as a starting
point for accommodating the demands of emotionally charged
ethno-nationalist movements. To be viable for the future, however, it is
strongly stressed that federalism needs to be based not only on
unmanageable ethnic criteria but it
has to be designed on a well-thought out historical, cultural, and
geographical structures to demarcate the various sub-sets of
centralized nation. In short, these federal subunits need to be located at
a check point where the various units could exercise self and shared rule.
Retrospectively, what does Ethiopia’s Federalism look like? Empirical
contribution of Federalism will be briefly discussed using Ethiopia as a
case study. (To
be continued)
References:
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