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The Federalist and Unitary
Systems in Comparative Perspective and in the
Ethiopian Context
Ghelawdewos Araia, PhD
June 7, 2019
“The 21st century
might be destined to be federalism’s secolo
d’oro, its gilded age, the finest hour.”
Michael A. Pagano
Ever
since humans made a transition from hunting bands
and pastoral communities to the first rudimentary
sedentary cultures and the beginning of agrarian
societies, from around 10,000 BCE to 2000 BCE, the
first organized communities appeared
simultaneously. This phenomenon, known in history
as ‘farming revolution’, also brought along
with it the incipient order vehicle known as the
state and it is the latter that will ultimately
evolve into a unitary state, mostly acquired by
force and violence. Following this long, arduous,
and painstakingly slow human performance, there
appeared the first nation-state known as Kemet
(black land or land of black people) or Egypt,
first with the Badarian Era (4400 BCE) and then
with the advent of Aha Mena (Narmer), the first
king of the first dynasty, who united Upper and
Lower Egypt circa 3400 BCE.
The
unitary Egyptian state, though encountered several
intermediaries engendered by intermittent foreign
invasions, was basically an inexorable human and
material force that ?major civilizations like the
Ethiopian (Aksumite), Persian, Roman, Indian,
Greek, Maya & Aztec, and Inca followed the
example of Kemet and established relatively
formidable unitary states and empires.
As
I have tried to show in the above introductory
note, the first states were unitary by their very
nature (evolving from city-state to an all
encompassing empires), and, in fact, even today,
the majority of nation-states are still unitary
compared to the federalist states. However, as we
shall see below, it is the federalist state, and
not the unitary state, that attempted to redress
the grievances of members of society, and as we
delve more into the nature and characteristics of
the two systems, we shall witness that some
unitary modern nations, influenced by federalist
states, will either adopt elements of federalism
or incorporate justice-related welfare and equity
systems that federalist systems promoted as their
primary policy spectrum.
My
interest in this essay is to compare and contrast
the federalist and unitary systems and in the
concluding part to propose the significance of the
continuation and preservation of the federalist
structure in Ethiopia. This task requires an in
depth analysis and interpretation not only of
federalism in its generic sense but it would also
be imperative to discuss and dissect the
typologies of federalism. What is federalism? What
is the nature and characteristics of the
federalist state?
As
Thomas O. Hueglin and Alan Fenna argue,
“Federalism is almost always the result of
careful deliberation, agreement and choice and
compromise among constituent members. It differs
from other forms of plural and multilevel
governance in that it contains a strong commitment
to balanced equality.”1 And in its
philosophical sense, the authors further argue
that “federalism can be understood as a way of
approaching politics that acknowledges group
identity alongside individual identity. However,
it is a particular form of group identity that
federalism acknowledges – a spatial, locational,
or territorial one.”2 Above all, the
federal system “rests principally on the degree
of autonomy that the constituent units enjoy
within the political system.”3
In
order to have a good grasp of the essence of
federalism, I like to add one more definitional
statement: “Federalisms have been marked by the
existence of at least two orders of government,
one for the whole federation and the other for the
constituent regional units, each acting directly
on its citizens; a formal constitutional
distribution of legislative and executive
authority and allocation of revenue resources
between the two (or more) orders of government
ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each
government.”4
Now
that we understand what a federal system is all
about, we must critically examine what the mission
and objectives of the federalist state is. The
most obvious objective or purpose of the modern
federal state is the principle of divided and
shared rule in order to meet the challenges of
diversity, and in due course of its mission, the
federalist state is characterized by what Heuglin
and Fenna call “coming together” and
“holding together” federalisms.
Beyond
holding together, however, the federalist state
main mission and objective, or as Michael Burgess
aptly put it is “its raison
d’etre is to furnish the basis for order and
stability but in a framework that formally
acknowledges protests, and promotes human dignity,
difference and diversity.”6
The
above definitions of the purpose and mission of
the federalist state can now comfortably enable us
toward analyzing comparative perspectives in
relation to the federalist system and also vis-à-vis
the unitary system. Federalism, by its very nature
brings people together for a common agenda and
purpose; it is essentially a people-to-people or
community-to-community relationship, but this kind
of relationship is neither novice nor invented by
the modern federalist system. In fact,
“…without much exaggeration, we might say that
federalism is as old as human civilization. People
have always organized social life in small
communities, groups, clans, neighborhoods, towns,
and regions, and have always engaged with such
communities for the purpose of mutual benefit.”7
We
have now many federal systems in the world, some
of which are the USA, Switzerland, Belgium, India,
Brazil, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Russia,
Argentina, Malaysia, Pakistan, Venezuela etc. it
is beyond the scope of this paper to compare and
contrast all of the above federalist states, but
by way of sampling, I will make a comparative
analysis of some of them. Before I begin the
comparison, however, I like to underscore that
federalist states around the world, by and large,
seriously consider identities associated with
political history, life style, language,
ethnicity, religion etc.
The
basis for Ethiopia’s federal structure, for
instance, are language and ethnicity, and as a
result it created nine autonomous regional states
composed of predominantly one linguistic
nationality in each state in spite of the fact
that these regions are not neatly and completely
homogenous states. By contrast, Nigeria
established thirty-six multiethnic autonomous
states. While both countries’ federal systems
are designed to devolve power to the regional
states, the essential difference is that the
Nigerian states are autonomous geographical
provinces and those of Ethiopia are basically
autonomous regional states with sub-national
sameness (ethnic identities).
The
Ethiopian federal structure is meant to redress
the plight of the oppressed and forgotten
nationalities, which was quite an achievement and
to which I will come back later. The Nigerian
federal system was first induced by the British
colonizers in 1946 with the formation of three
regions, but that of Ethiopia was entirely
initiated by Ethiopians themselves. However, after
independence in 1960, Nigerians took matters into
their own hands and designed and redesigned their
federation many times (1966, 1976, 1987/1989, and
1991/1996) until the present 36 constituent parts
of the Nigerian federal structure were established
by mergers and/or splits.
Similar
to the Nigerian initial experiment in federalism,
India also encountered the brunt of British
colonial influence in designing its federal
system. “The Indian federation was forged from
14 British colonial provinces as well as hundreds
of semi-sovereign princely states comprising
hundreds of languages as well as multitude of
virtually all of the world’s major religions.”8
As already discussed above, it looks that
India has considered a number of factors,
including politics, history, language and
religions to solidify its federal system.
Compared
to the Indian subcontinent, little Belgium also
attempted to bring together the French-speaking
Wallonia and the Dutch-speaking Flanders, and even
included a tiny German-speaking group to
constitute an administrative region; the capital
city Brussels is also defined as a region in the
Belgian federal system.
Since
its independence in 1830, Belgium was a
centralized unitary state, but after 1970 it
adopted the federal system that was constructed
based on language, culture, and economic
interests; the country’s units that comprise
regions and communities are entirely autonomous
communicating with three official languages,
namely Dutch, French, and German; and despite the
fact that Belgian regions are powerful, however,
the federal government has an upper hand in the
decision making process in regards to foreign
affairs and national defense.
The
German federation is similar to other federations
in terms of decentralization and sharing power
that is divided amongst the sixteen regional
states (Lảnder) and Berlin, the capital,
also empowered as the 17th Lảnder,
but what makes Germany different is that there are
institutions that play a pivotal role in German
politics, and these include coalition parties,
powerful state governments, the autonomous central
bank, a powerful constitution court,
self-determination bodies in local government, and
social insurance
and higher education. These institutions act as
formidable checks and balances in the overall
political performance of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
As
we have seen above, each country experimenting
and/or adopting the federal system, in the final
analysis, followed its instinct of basing its
history and unique circumstances in the
construction of federal structures as viable and
better political systems. In this case, Russia is
a good example in which the country “looked
toward a decentralized political system to both
keep the remaining constituent parts of the nation
together and maintain its reputation as an
important international player.”10
The
US federal system is the oldest and biggest
political system in the world, from which a lot of
nations across the globe have learnt a lesson,
although the US itself ironically made no
deliberate efforts to introduce its type of
federalism to other nations. Like other federal
systems that we have discussed above, that of the
US “was adopted in the Constitution…the
framers established a government that recognized
two distinct levels or units of official
authority: a national government and several state
governments. Both derive their authority from the
United States Constitution. Neither can be
destroyed by the other. Neither is beholden to the
other for its existence.”11
The
strength of the US federal system is that it
incorporates a strong mechanism of checks and
balances that effectively impedes dictatorial
and/or authoritarian propensities and practices;
it also won’t allow concentration of power in
either branch of government, more so in the
central government. “The US constitution along
with the fifty states’ constitutions defines the
basic structure of... intergovernmental relations.
The constitution identifies the general
relationship between the national and state
governments, provides the basic guidelines within
which interstate relations occur, and establishes
the fundamental liberties of all American
citizens. The state constitutions determine the
relationship between state and local units of
government, and augment the rights, privileges,
and obligations of those who live under their
jurisdiction.”12
All
federal political systems, including the ones that
we have discussed above, out of necessity and
expediency have integrated or subsumed political,
economic, ideological & philosophical, social,
cultural, and legal factors that jointly serve as
fulcrum to the system; on top of these factors,
there is also the moral dimension of federalism.
Michael Burgess captures the moral aspect of
federalism and he argues, “Federalism deals
simultaneously with fundamental moral questions as
well as with amoral matter-of-fact issues. The
former, like social diversity and individual and
collective identities are highly charged emotional
questions for many people, while the latter
involve the routine pursuit of economic profit and
security and reflect for the most part calculated
and dispassionate self-interest. The moral basis
to federalism derives from inherent virtues such
as respect, tolerance, dignity and mutual
recognition, which lead to a particular form of
human association, namely, the federal state or
federation. The amoral foundation suggests that no
such qualities inhere in federalism at all and
that it is nothing more than a particular and/or
political technique for achieving certain
overarching goals such as territorial expansion or
economic benefits and security.”13
After
considering all elements that make up the federal
system, it is important to see the distinction
between federalism and unitary systems and their
concomitant advantages and disadvantages. In terms
of efficiency, for instance, it is the unitary
system that is more efficient compared to the
federal system; the former is efficient due to the
fact that the central government has a heavy hand
in decision making and policy formulating, while
the latter is designed to operate slowly in order
to safeguard justice-related issues. However, in
some cases, unitary states like Sweden promote a
more just society than some federal systems; and
in some cases, some federal states like Austria
are more centralized than other unitary states. In
fact, “calls for greater local autonomy in
centralized polities, such as Italy, the United
Kingdom, Mexico, Spain, are clear signals that
decentralized power, local autonomy and control,
and fear of pernicious effects of centralizing
ambitions are on ascendancy throughout the
world.”14
Despite
the general trend of unitary states following suit
federalist states, however, the ultimate
authority, as has been discussed already,
including administrative, legislative, and
financial, lies within the orbit of the national
government in the unitary states, and it is not as
such ‘divided’ and ‘shared’ as in
federalist states. Overall, federalist systems and
nations have been more successful in national
reconciliations, in the resolution of conflicts,
in harmonizing the larger society, and in
rectifying inequalities with respect to
nationality, gender, and religion. Will Kymlicka
convincingly argued that no other system came
close to federalism in solving the grievances of
minority or oppressed nationalities: “On any
reasonable criteria,” Kymlicka contends,
“democratic federations have been surprisingly
successful in accommodating minority
nationalisms…democratic multinational
federations have succeeded in taming the force of
nationalism….It is difficult to imagine any
other political system that can make the same
claim…[W]e are currently witnessing yet another
burst of interest in federalism in multination
countries.”14
The
last part of this article deals with the Ethiopian
federal system and the current politics of
seemingly reformist policies and measures and yet
circumvented by contradictions, chaos,
instability, and internal displacements. The
objective of this section of the article is to
critically examine the Ethiopian experience in
light of all other federalist states and also to
initiate a debate amongst policymakers,
intellectuals, and other stakeholders of the
larger Ethiopian society in regards to preserving
and continuing the present federal structure with
some reform for a better system.
In
modern Ethiopian history three types of federal
systems were attempted from the late 19th
century to the late 20th century. The
first attempt was made by Emperor Yohannes
(1872-1889) who presided over as king of kings and
delegated power to regional kings such as King
Menelik of Shewa, King Teklehaimanot of Gojjam,
Abba Jiffar of Jimma, and Ras Michael of Wollo.
The latter region apparently was divided into two
spheres, one administered by Ras Michael and the
second governed by the Emperor’s son, Araya
Selassie. The objective of the Emperor’s
federalism, however, was aimed to overcome the
fragility of Ethiopia and create further unity
with expansion and acquiring territorial
possessions and establishing a unitary state. But,
it should be clear that only Emperor Yohannes IV
initiated devolution of power and founded a
political system that comes very close to
federalism. Neither his predecessor, Emperor
Tewodros II, nor his successor kings Emperors
Menelik II and Haile Selassie I considered a
federal type governance; on the contrary they were
very centralist and in favor of a unitary state.
The
second attempt of devolution of power (or
“federalism”) was attempted by the military
government or the Derg (1974-1991), and Ethiopia
under the rule of this regime was divided into
twenty-four administrative regions, i.e. Adding
ten more provinces to the already existing 14
provinces under the reign of Emperor Haile
Selassie. I have critically examined the Derg’s
devolution of power in my book Ethiopia:
Democracy, Devolution of Power and the
Developmental State: “Although the Derg
officially declared devolution of power and had
conducted secret negotiations with the Eritrean
and Tigrayan guerrillas, it was rather conducting
wars against the nationalist armed combatants and
seriously engaged in maintaining the unitary
Ethiopian state. The Derg was no different from
the centralization policy of Emperor Haile
Selassie in terms of administering the respective
regions from Addis Ababa. To be sure mere
compartmentalization of Ethiopia into autonomous
and regional administrative units without the
formation of an actual local government that could
ran their own affairs could hardly be called
devolution of power. The fact that the Derg curved
out Aseb from Eritrea and put it on the Ethiopian
map as a separate region is quite obvious that its
intention was to guarantee Ethiopia an outlet to
the sea if Eritrea successfully divorced itself
from Ethiopia.”15
The
real devolution of power and a federal system came
into being by the initiative of the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
and the proclamation of Ethiopia as a Federal
Democratic Republic (FDRE).
The
opening statement of the Preamble of the Ethiopian
constitution states: “We , the Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia”, and
this declaration is a testament of the Ethiopian
grand design of coming together and holding
together of the various Ethiopian nationalities,
and on whose behalf a federalist system will be
established; and according to Article 47 of the
constitution, thus, “member states of the
federal democratic republic” were proclaimed and
formed in right order as follows:
1.
The State of Tigray
2.
The State of Afar
3.
The State of Amhara
4.
The State of Oromia
5.
The State of Somalia
6.
The State of Benishangul/Gumuz
7.
The State of the Southern
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
8.
The State of the Gambella
Peoples
9.
The State of the Harari People
The
above nine autonomous regional states, known as Kilil in Amharic “shall have equal rights and powers” according
to sub-article 4 of the Constitution.
Additionally, Article 39 of the Ethiopian
constitution grants to the regional states
“unconditional right to self-determination,
including the right to secession.”
In
many of my previous writings I have endorsed the
present federal structure of Ethiopia and hailed
the right of the nationalities but I was not at
ease with the secession clause of Article 39,
which by the way a similar clause is not to be
found in any of the federalist states except the
old Soviet Union, as we have comparatively
examined in this essay. My main concern was that
the idea of secession could altogether dismantle
historic Ethiopia. In regards to this concern, I
have in fact made a cautionary note in my debut
book Ethiopia:
The Political Economy of Transition (1995) and
this is how I put it then:
The TGE’s [Transitional
Government of Ethiopia] policy of Kilil and
self-determination is commendable, but the
consequence of fragmentation as a result of new
wave of ethnic political consciousness, and the
inability of some minority nationalities to become
economically and politically viable , would
ultimately preoccupy Ethiopians to otherwise
unforeseen problem.16
However,
although Article 39 is troublesome at face value,
it should also be known that the same Article has
embodied a safety net, because it could only be
translated into action or shall come into effect
when some criteria enumerated below are met:
·
When
a demand for secession has been approved by
two-thirds majority of the members of the
Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality, or
people concerned.
·
When
the Federal government has organized a referendum
which must take place within three years from the
time it received the concerned council’s
decision for secession.
·
When
the demand for secession is supported by majority
vote in the referendum.
·
When
the Federal government will have transferred its
powers to the council of the Nation, Nationality
or People who has voted to secede.
·
When
the division of assets is affected in a manner
prescribed by law.
The
safety net against dismemberment of historic
Ethiopia is remarkable indeed, but my fear and
concern some two and half decades ago have now
come to haunt Ethiopia as a specter of
lawlessness, disorder, chaos, civil strife, ethnic
animosity, violent conflict, and internal
displacement, unheard of in Ethiopian history.
Despite
the current frightening political mess, however,
an important and significant historical phenomenon
took shape in Ethiopia, which I believe is a
result and legacy of the federal system, and the
majority of the Ethiopian people and the regional
states are in favor of the now existing federal
structure. There are some nascent political
groupings, mostly from ex-Diaspora opposition
movements, that now managed to converge in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia and are advocating on behalf of
the unitary state; and some of these groupings
even endorse the idea of going back to the old
imperial provincial governance based on geography
alone and completely abandon the cause of the
nationalities and the prize won by the regional
states. They are detached from the reality on the
ground in Ethiopia and their agenda of replacing
the federal system by a unitary state would not be
accepted to the regional states; in a recent
Mekelle conference of the legally registered
opposition parties and the TPLF leaders, almost
all of the conferees reaffirmed that the federal
system is the only political structure that met
their needs in self-determination and in terms of
honoring their identities, flourishing their
culture and languages as well. A gentleman from
the Afar Regional State bluntly asserted in the
conference that the Afar people had no national
identity before the federal structure was
installed; they were known as Afar from Tigray,
Wollo, and Shewa; now, thanks to the federal
system, they have their own regional state and one
and undivided identity. This sentiment of the Afar
people is shared by the Somali, Gambella,
BeniShangul-Gumuz, Oromo, Harari, Tigray, and the
Southern Ethiopian Peoples; the only exception in
this general consensus of endorsing the present
federal structure and the constitution, including
the national Ethiopian flag that represents the
regional states and nationalities, is the Amhara
State. Given this reality, thus, it would be
extremely difficult to overturn the Ethiopian
federal republic and put instead a unitary state
that would not represent the Ethiopian people
interests.
In
light of the success stories championed and
implemented by the many federal systems around the
world, and also in relation to Ethiopia’s
relative advancement in a span of two and half
decades, it is imperative that Ethiopian
politicians, elites, intellectuals, and civic
leaders (including religious and business leaders)
strive for the continuation of the federal system,
and reform it if necessary, via dialogue and
all-Ethiopia conference. Ethiopians must
understand that it is much easier to build on what
already exists than demolish present institutions
and start from scratch. As Michael Burgess
convincingly argues, “In the making of
federations political elites must work with the
grain. They have to work with materials that they
have at hand. Federation is appropriate only at
certain times and in certain circumstances. It is
a theory of circumstantial causation. Indeed, the
contingents of these circumstances in respect of
nationality, was recognized as far back as 1946;
Kenneth Weare first observed that the desire to
unite to form the federations of Canada and
Switzerland ‘arose in spite of differences of
language and race…religion…and nationality.”17
The
unique Ethiopian experience was also influenced by
history and circumstances and the country managed
to device and design a federal system that suits
the Ethiopian people in general and the
nationalities in particular; it has successfully
registered in the annals of history its secolo d’oro, its gilded age, and its finest hour and as such it
must jealously guard its federation.
Notes
1.
Thomas O. Hueglin and Allan
Fenna, Comparative
Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry, 2nd
Edition, P. XIV
2.
Heuglin and Fenna, Ibid, P. 16
3.
Michael A. Pagano (author) and
R. Leonardi (editor), The
Dynamics of Federalism in National and
Supranational Political Systems, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007, P. 4
4.
Alan-G. Gagnon and Soeran Keil,
Understanding
Federalism and Federation, Routledge, 2015,
5.
Hueglin and Fena, op cit, P. 2
6.
Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice, Routledge, P. 3
7.
Hueglin and Fenna, op cit, P.
2
8.
Hueglin and Fenna, Ibid, P. 11
9.
Manfred G. Schmidt, Political
Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany,
oxford University Press, 2007, P. 3
10.
Michael A. Pagano, “In the
Eye of the Beholder: The Dynamics of Federalism in
National and Supranational Systems”
in Michael A. Pagano and R. Leonardi
11.
Charles V. Hamilton, American
Government, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982,
P. 57
12.
Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob,
and Robert B. Albritton, Politics
in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, Scott,
Foresman/Little, Brown Higher Education, 1990, P.
39
13.
Michael Burgess, op cit, P. 3
14.
Quoted in Michael Burgess
15.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Democracy, Devolution of Power, and the Developmental State,
Institute of Development and Education for Africa
(IDEA), 2013, pp. 75-76
16.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopia: The Political Economy of Transition, University Press of
America, 1995, P. 166
17.
Michael
Burgess, op cit, P. 109
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