A
Road Map to Resolving Contemporary Ethiopia’s Political Crises: A
Comment on Lt.
General Tsedaikan GebreTensae’sArticle
Desta
Asayehgn, Sarlo Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Economic
Development
Recently,
Ethiopia has been facing many kinds of surprising political activities.
Though over the years, the regime in power turned deaf ears to genuine
constructive criticisms from a number of Ethiopian scholars, the regime
may now be turning its attention
to them because uprisings
have emerged not
only in
numerous parts of the country, but also in an interesting article was
being posted on a number of websites. It was written by Lt. General
Tsadakan Gebre
Tensae, the
former Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Armed Forces (hereafter referred to
as the author), who has dramatized the political crisis in Ethiopia.
However, it should be made clear to the readers that the Amharic version
in the Reporter (Hamli, 24, 2008) is slightly different from the
English version posted in the Horn Affairs in English
(August 4, 2016).Thus, it should be known that I have used both the
Amharic and English versions, along
with General Tsadkan’s response to Prof. Messay Kebede’s in order to
review and assess the author’s position.
As
stated in the English version, the author persuasively argues that,
Ethiopia’s
current political conditions are unstable. Government’s own
pronouncements indicate this: (the) presence of pervasive
mal-administration, rent seeking, extensive mis-management of public
resources, and the failure of mega projects. On top of this, different
people from different corners of the country –(in Amhara, Oromia, SNNP,
and Tigray regions) are raising their demands (because
of) economic inequality, questions of identity, injustice, (and )bad
governance, and (they) are
pleading with the government to solve their problems peacefully
(August 4, 2016).
Given
the frantic uprisings in Ethiopia, a number of dignitaries in power are
confident that given the highly disciplined National Security system,
these types of dramatized demands by insignificant agitators could be
easily contained peacefully, or the demonstrators could be silenced by
bullets. On the other hand,
those with opposing political connections feel that the uprisings in the
country have created a crisis-ridden political atmosphere contributing to
destabilizing the already tenuous social-political equilibrium, and
tarnishing the country’s Federal governmental structure.
At
an individual level, some have portrayed the year 2015-2016 as a
monumental year, because the author is one of the well-known former
military leaders who, in 1991, toppled the military junta, Derg,
from power. In addition, the author was the former Chief of Staff of the
Ethiopian Armed Forces who played
a decisive role in reducing Eritrea’s military force to ashes in
1998-2000. They have
forcefully argued that the author has gone beyond the call of duty to
seriously challenge the regime in power for not implementing the 1994
codified Federal Constitution.
Until
he retired in 2001, the author
was in top leadership. Therefore, it seems
awkward and buzzer for the author to jump on the bandwagon against his own
older friends and boldly suggest that systemic transformation strategies
be designed to rekindle the country for the 21st
century. Before depicting the three scenarios posted by the author,
a few points on how scenarios need to be designed are briefly given below.
Briefly
stated, scenarios are expected to demonstrate what policy makers in
present-day Ethiopia need to address now, and map out an action plan to
address the future if the current regime’s complacency and
business-as-usual thinking is to be avoided. Therefore, the most important
scenarios developed by the author include: 1) a scenario that could result
in massive unrest throughout today’s Federal Ethiopia, possibly
contributing to the collapse of the state (Horn Affairs, p. 7); 2) a
scenario in which the incumbent in power may need to undergo holistic or
partial changes to extricate itself from the crisis (Horn Affairs, P.7);
and 3) a scenario for forecastingFederal Ethiopia’s vision for the
future.
Scenario
1: Mapping possible unrest in Contemporary Federal Ethiopia
Using
the principles of free speech enshrined in the 1994 Ethiopian Federal
Constitution, the author was bold enough to openly assert that beyond
unemployment and an increase in the cost of living, Ethiopians are facing
unbearable subjugation and oppression. The regime in power strongly
asserts that it achieved 100 percent in the 2015 electoral vote. Similar
to other opposition political parties that existed in Ethiopia, the author
highly doubts that if fair elections were conducted in 2015, the Ethiopian
People’s Democratic Front (EPRDF) could have ever achieved a 100 percent
vote to win all Ethiopian Peoples’ parliamentary sites.
In
addition, unlike the government, the author falls short by not considering
the role played by external forces in the 2005 election. Instead, the
author emphatically attributes some of the disturbances to mishaps in the
election process, contributing to the vagueness of the election results.
Actually, the author strongly argues that if these had been corrected
immediately and handled prudently, the so-called 100 percent election
results might not have caused more trouble in the country.
To
justify his argument, though it trickled to the Federal Government, the
author argues that the disturbance created last year in the Oromo region
was precipitated by the Oromo Regional Administration. Based on his
limited observation, the author now argues that if the existing
disruptions are not wisely contained, eventually the Federal Government,
which has nothing to do with the conflict, is likely to be involved in the
future.
Scenario
2:
Multiparty
Elections in Democratic Ethiopia
The
author states that from 1995 to 2015, parliamentary elections in Ethiopia
have been tightly controlled by the incumbent party, the EPRDF.
In every election, the opposition political parties in Ethiopia
have complained of harassment and intimidation. As ascertained by the
African Development Bank (2009), opposition parties in Ethiopia complained
of the absence of a level playing field and a narrowing of the democratic
space in Ethiopia’s electoral process. Thus, the author argues that if
elections are not made more inclusive in the future to include other
political parties, and if other political parties are not equally
subsidized as is the incumbent political party, the EPRDF, the future
modus operandi in Ethiopia, if kept as it is now, would probably instigate
more unrest throughout the country.
Based
on this description, the author’s possible solution to this predicament
is that Ethiopia needs to follow the rules of law and also conduct fair
elections, supervised by well-trained, neutral, and disciplined
international election observers in order for democratic practices to
spread in Ethiopia. In short,
the author asserts that the existing mono-party (EPRDF) system has to give
way to multiparty systems and elections need to be held fairly without
restrictions that might impede the implementation of a constitutional
democracy. Instead of being led by the EPRDF that has been reluctant to
reconcile democracy and government, a multiparty electoral system needs to
be adhered to in order to offer political choices to guarantee the
democratic rights of all Ethiopians (Desta, Jan. 27, 2016).
Scenario
3: Embarking on a Peaceful, Systematic, and Conscientiously led Change
Process.
The
Role of the People of Tigray in the Maintenance of Democracy in Ethiopia
The
author rightly asserts that “the Tigray people always consider itself as
the foundation of the Ethiopian state and as the leading actor in both the
failures and achievements of the state (that) have (been) seen during its
long history” (Horn Affairs, p. 8). Though very questionable, the author
also states that the Tigrian freedom fighters were conscientiously
practicing democracy in the battle field while fighting the Derg, and have
been busy during the early 1990s to establish democratic rights throughout
Ethiopia. When asserting this position, the author claims that he had the
opportunity to know well the people of Tigrai while being a fighter and
leader. He then goes on to
maintain that since 1991, the people of Tigrai, in collaboration with
other peoples and nationalities of Ethiopia, have made enumerable
sacrifices and have played very important roles in order to establish
democracy in Ethiopia.
Based
on this premise, the author says that he could not understand why" signs
of resentment toward the Tigray people in the central parts of the
country” (Horn Affairs, p. 8) are emerging. Given this, the author
states since the Tigrian people have fought for seventeen years to
establish democracy throughout Ethiopia, he assures his readers to make no
mistake that the people of Tigray have no desire to stifle the democracy
that has emerged in Ethiopia. However, if the existing tendency to hate
the Tigrians continues in some parts of Ethiopia, as a concerned citizen,
the author alleges that democracy would nevertheless flare up in Ethiopia
provided that genuine and concerned Ethiopians have the desire to engage
in constructive dialogues until they resolve their misunderstandings.
B)
Restraining
Defense Forces from being involved in Civilian Projects:
Though
included only in the Amharic Reporter News Paper, the author
strongly contends that instead of improving Ethiopia’s
military capabilities, he was sad to see that the Ethiopian military
forces are competing against private organizations to be involved and
operate in civilian or private projects. Though his argument is vague as
stated in the Reporter’s
News Paper, I
assume that the author believes that Ethiopian military forces and
civilians need not operate in the same space. From a classical economics
point of view, the author’s argument rests on Adam Smith’s argument
that since the military is part of government, it should keep hands off of
the market place. However, when the author was a policy maker, was he not
an advocate of the command system? That is why Ethiopia’s economy has
been operating under the developmental state
paradigm. Stated differently, the Ethiopian economy is pursuing state-led
industrialization. As a result, the government and the private sectors are
supposed to be working together in the Ethiopian economic system.
Therefore, given this situation, the author seems to be in another world
when he argues that the Ethiopian military system should not intervene in
Ethiopia’s industrialization process or developmental state.
If
the author doesn’t have any personal grudges against the existing
military structure, I see no reason why he is advocating that the
Ethiopian military be restricted from being involved in any type of
private reconstruction projects. Actually,
if we could learn from history, that had the Derg been clever enough to
train the then existing military force to carry out civilian related
projects, a number of the disbanded military officers would have not ended
up as beggars in the street during the emergency of the EPRDF’s regime.
Instead, the disbanded military forces of the Derg would have ended up
working or being employed to carryout small-scale projects.
Assuming
that the Ethiopian military labor force are undertaking civilian projects
and are acting honestly and ethically, not being involved on Boards of
Directors, the author would agree with me that it would be better for
Ethiopia to hire the competent Ethiopian armed forces rather than depend on
Chinese and Indian expatriates. Actually, considering economies of scale,
the local armed forces have many advantages for Ethiopia. Not only are
they highly qualified but their salaries are already paid. Instead of
storing the logistics support systems they have for war time, they could
effectively utilize them now in a number of developmental projects.
As
a side point, if the author advocates for lean and efficient types of
operations, it would make sense for him to convince his friends in
government that it is costly and unproductive for the government
bureaucracy to continue relying on an unofficial ‘kitchen cabinet’ of
trusted comrades who serve as quasi-governmental officials, who give
advice and also set policies without consulting some of the portfolio
officials within the government bureaucracy.
Why
Now?
As
stated before, the author was the Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Armed
Forces and is well known as a meticulous designer and leader. Therefore,
it doesn’t make sense to disagree with him that the contemporary
Ethiopian state is in a political quagmire. Though the English and Amharic
versions of the author’s article are not documented, the articles are
very illuminating. As said before, the content of the Amharic and English
versions of the article seem to be different. The English version depicts
the author as neutral while analyzing the geo-politics of Ethiopia.
Be
that as it may, I would say that the articles appear to be written for
different readers.Though the article was written in his name, it is sad to
note that as indicated in Horn Affairs English version the author didn’t
verify the content of the article.Thus,
I feel that the Horn Affairs English version was written in the name of
the author to appeal to the emotional level of Ethiopian’s who have the
desire not to reform but dismantle the present bureaucratic structure at
any cost.
To
reiterate, the English version of the article attempts to reflect a 20-20
version of the author’s experience. Though not included in the Amharic
version, the English version states the modus operandi of the EPRDF was
fundamentally democratic in nature when it started but as time progressed
it became undemocratic. For instance, the author states that the
undemocratic elements of the EPRDF started when it took actions against
the Oromo Liberation Movement (OLF),
which was,
according to the author, “…an authentic reflection of the Oromo People’s interests
and aspiration” (Horn Affairs, P. 4). Similarly, according to the
author, the 2000/01 split that emerged within the TPLF after the
Ethio-Eritrean war almost left an episode unfading scar on the
democratization process of Ethiopia (Horn Affairs, p.5). Finally, as
discussed by the author, in 2005, the KINIJIT (CUD) Party was unwilling to
“accept the results that were accepted by the EPRDF.”In addition,
after the CUD Party started spreading its anti-Tigrean propaganda
campaign, then, EPRDF had no choice but solidify the use of undemocratic
forces to stay in power with the support and manipulation of the
country’s security apparatus, (Horn Affairs, P. 7).
Rightly
so, the author strongly believes that Ethiopia now is on a slippery slope,
or to use the author’s words, at a political crossroad. However, unlike
the opposition groups that demanded a new transitional government to be
formed for the reconciliation process to start in Ethiopia, the author suggests that
the currently existing Constitution needs to be used as a starting point
for fruitful discussions. In addition, to reconciling the differences
among parties in Ethiopia, the author proposed that, “A body consisting
of representatives of political parties must be created (assembled) to
manage the political process until the next general election (occurs)”
(Horn Affairs, p. 10). Given
the author’s talent, I feel that the author’s proposal was not written
to extend the life cycle of the EPRDF/TPLF. But, I feel that in the
article he was being gullible or writing arrogantly to show that he was
not aware of or willing to digest the underlying demands of the various
disturbances that have galvanized the entire country. Instead, the author
was concentrating on superficial symptoms.
For
example, the uprising in the Walkit and Tsegadi region cannot be
attributed to language differences, (i.e., whether the region opts to use
Tigrigna or Amharic language as their lingua franca) but should be
emphasized that the uprising in the region might have evolved because the
region had the burning desire to be autonomous. Instead of a local leader
chosen by the people, political cadres are chosen by the Killil
to administer the region. For
instance, Mekelle, the headquarters of Tigrai killil,
or region, is very far from Walkit and Tsegadi. Also, there should be
an investigation to see if the Walkit and Tsegadi regions want to be part
of the Amhara region. The local people might prefer the Amhara region
which is more endowed with natural resources and is better administered
than the Tigrai killil. Otherwise,
if the residents of Walkit and Tsegadi, who claim that originally they are
Amharas rather than being Tigrigans, it is worth asking why they fought
together with the Tigrians and why it has taken them more than two decades
to articulate the feelings they have now.
Be
that as it may, the Walkit and Tsegadi region needs to have an autonomous
status and be allowed to be administered by their own
genuinely elected officials. I am sure this is not too late to minimize
the existing unrest and challenges in the region. Actually,
as suggested somewhere else, to mitigate the currently existing unrest in
Ethiopia, the existing regions (Killilis)
in Ethiopia need to be subdivided into more manageable units. For
example, as it is implemented in Nigeria
or Switzerland, the existing nine regions in Ethiopia need
to be further divided, based on population, into
viable sub regions or woredas,
(Desta, 2016).
Otherwise,
as suggested by the author, even if the various parties had the guts and
were willing to have a dialogue, it should have crossed the author’s
mind that the genuinely elected members of parties would start their
discussion by scrapping, article 39 of the existing Federal Constitution.
In addition, the newly elected members of the different parties are more
likely to negate the existing Ethiopia’s demarcation process based on
ethnicity. Personally, I feel that if “…Article 39 of the Ethiopian
Constitution, as in China, is being deleted from the Ethiopian
Constitution, it will give respite to the Ethiopian people from the
intolerable headaches they endured for the last twenty five years”
(Desta, 2016). If Article 39
and the ethnic demarcation processes are scraped, as suggested by the
author, then and only then, can parts of the Federal Constitution serve as
a good starting point for the discussions of representatives of the
parties.
In
addition, as discussed in detail, see Desta, 2016, “The
era of globalization demands new ways of engaging citizens in the search
for solutions rather than being the prisoners of political cadres that
have been socialized to blow vague slogans,” that
have originated either from the Soviet Union or China, or Albania.
Furthermore, like Nigeria, Switzerland, etc, “…Ethiopia’s ethnic
federalism needs to be constantly altered into manageable democratic and
autonomous federal units so the country will be able to cope with the
challenges that are likely to arise in the 21st century.
As
stated above, it was instructive to see that the author’s article was
framed on worthwhile scenarios. But, the sad part is that the author
hardly attempted to adequately review existing studies. For instance, over
the years, a number of websites have been very busy posting articles on
contemporary Ethiopia. Other than stating that Ethiopia’s Federal
Constitution needs to be a spring board for further discussion, and the
unkind words the author used to describe his former compatriots, the
English and Amharic version of his article should have been carefully
verified by himself, if he has the desire to act as a mediator and help
the different Ethiopian groups to come to terms. Honestly speaking, if
they read the Amharic version published by the Reporter,
some of the readers who gave favorable commitments to author might have
changed their opinion.
Lastly,
like other readers, I would like to know, why, now, the author wrote this
type of apologetic and inflammatory article. Is
the author attempting to accommodate and get the attention of some of
disgruntled agitators? By the way, did the author have an idea how his
compatriots and other freedom fighters would feel when they read his
statement that: “The Derg lost, not because they were cowards and the Tigrians
distinctively brave, but because their leaders betrayed the cause for
which they were fighting…” In addition, the statement is contradictory
to what the author was saying when he was in power either by himself or
through his proxies. In short, has the author not been telling the
Ethiopian people that the most oppressive, the Derg regime was routed from
power because the liberation fighters had an effective strategy and a
highly disciplined army?
Reference:
Africa
Development Fund (March 2009). Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Country Governance Profile, Governance,
Economic & Financial Reforms Department (OSGE), Country Regional
Department East (OREB).
Araia,
G.(2013). Ethiopia: Democracy, Devolution of Power, & the Developmental state.
New York: Institute of Developmental & Education for Africa.
Desta,
A. (2016).“Beyond the Usual:
Re-thinking Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism for the 21st
Century”. Institute of Developmental & Education for Africa, Inc. June 7,
2016.
Desta,
A. (January 27, 2016). “Democratic Self-rule Federalism: The Legitmacy
of Self-Determination in Ethiopia.
Lt.
General TsadkanGebreTensae( Hamele 24, 2008).
“Ethiopia’s Political Conditions and Possible Solutions”.Reporter, Amharic
General
TsadkanGebreTensae (July 31, 2016).
“General TsadkanGebretensae’s Response to Prof. MessayKebede.Horn Affairs English.
Gen.
TsadkanGebreTensae(August 4, 2016).“A
Road Map to Resolving Ethiopia’s Political Crisis”.Horn Affairs English.
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