To the
exaggerated horror of many western powers, in
the 1920s, a series of Japanese visitors sought
to expand trade between Japan and Ethiopia.
Japanese representatives attended Hayle
Sellase�s Coronation in 1930, and soon
afterward signed a Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce with Ethiopia.
The next year, the Ethiopians promulgated
a constitution closely modeled on Japan�s
Meiji Constitution of 1889.
Capping this rapprochement, Foreign
Minister Heruy Welde Sellase, one of
Ethiopia�s most influential �Japanizers,�
visited Japan in late 1931.
Heruy sought commercial and political
ties as well as military aid.
Widely f�ted, Heruy and his party
examined many of Japan�s most important
industrial and military facilities.
Many of Japan�s most influential
nationalist leaders eagerly greeted him hoping
to find in Ethiopia an important ally in the
struggle of �colored peoples� against white
colonialism and imperialism.
Heruy�s visit, however, signaled the
high-water mark of cooperation.
Japan�s government proved less willing
to risk the wrath of the world�s great powers
than were Japan�s nationalists.
Based on English, French, Italian, and
Japanese primary and secondary sources, this
paper describes the motives and consequences of
the well-publicized visit.
It also places this example of
globalization and westernization through a
non-western agent in its larger diplomatic
context.
HERUY
AND ETHIOPIA�S JAPANIZERS
To
the exaggerated horror of many western powers,
in the 1920s, a series of Japanese visitors
sought to expand trade between Japan and
Ethiopia. Japanese
representatives attended Hayle Sellase�s
Coronation in 1930, and soon afterward signed a
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Ethiopia.
The next year, the Ethiopians promulgated
a constitution closely modeled on Japan�s
Meiji Constitution of 1889.
This rapprochement encouraged
Ethiopia�s �Japanizers,� a group of young
educated Ethiopians who sought modernization for
their country by modeling Japanese successes.
Seemingly fulfilling their dreams,
Foreign Minister Heruy Welde Sellase, one of
Ethiopia�s most influential Japanizers,
visited Japan in late 1931.
An
accomplished and progressive thinker, Heruy
wrote in Amharic some twenty-eight works,
including stories, histories, and social
philosophy.
A linguist and, after 1930, foreign
minister, he also had served in diplomatic
missions to Paris, Geneva, Japan, and the United
States. Additionally,
Heruy had edited Ethiopia�s civil and
ecclesiastical codes.
Both he and Emperor Hayle Sellase sought
the Japanese developmental model, and both
understood that Europeans acting as Japan�s
educators had prodded Japan�s rapid evolution.
Speaking with the French charg�
d�affaires in Ethiopia, Heruy praised
Japan�s transformation and asserted, �You
will see even more extraordinary things here
than in Japan.�
Approaches
to Japan held practical diplomatic advantages.
By the early 1930s, Ethiopia�s policy
was to confide important business concessions to
those countries not having immediate interests
in Ethiopia, for example, the United States,
Germany, a few small European countries, and
Japan. In
the international political game, Heruy
understood that Japan�s geographical position
meant the Japanese could not threaten
Ethiopia�s sovereignty.
Further, Japan�s economic interests in
Ethiopia might induce Tokyo to back Ethiopia if
a European power should threaten.
Finally, a Japanese presence, including
immigration, in Ethiopia could weaken the rights
of England, France, and Italy, which held
neighboring colonies.
French
diplomats had thought well of Heruy, at least
early in his career.
In 1919, when he went to Europe, they saw
him as leading Ethiopia�s intellectual party.
At the request of the Quai d�Orsay, he
received an insignia as an officer of public
instruction.
When named in 1922 as president of the
Special Court in Addis Ababa, a special court
designed to deal with non-natives, foreign
diplomats expressed satisfaction.
The French minister in Ethiopia from 1917
to 1923, reported that Heruy was honest,
intelligent, educated, and that all Europeans in
Ethiopia were counting on him to guarantee the
smooth functioning of the Special Court.
In 1924, Heruy joined Teferi Mekonnen�the
future emperor Hayla Sellase�on another trip
to Europe.
On that occasion, another French minister
declared him to be:
a
man of great worth, completely devoted to Ras
Teferi for whom he will probably become one of
the principal ministers if the prince arrives to
the throne.
Full of common sense and open-minded.
Understands well modern ideas and
understands the necessity that his country come
to know them.
One of the government�s best heads. . .
. .
Little-by-little,
however, this positive opinion changed.
In a letter of July 25, 1931 to his
foreign minister, the French charg�
d�affaires wrote that Heruy lacked
intelligence and took only superficial care of
his job. The
government in Addis Ababa, nonetheless, took no
decision without consulting him.
His influence on the sovereign remained
so important that one French representative
called him the �Rasputin� of Ethiopia, and
another editorialized, �Heruy was consecrated
emperor under the name of Hayle Sellase.�
One wag called him �the wizard.�
Why
had Heruy�s reputation among French diplomats
slipped so badly?
Not a Francophile, he did not trust
Europeans in general, although he did want to
draw closer to the English and the Swedes.
The French also criticized Heruy�s
aggressive policies that had isolated Ethiopia.
Specifically, many Europeans�including
the French�blamed Heruy for Japan�s advances
in Ethiopia.
HERUY�S
VISIT
Heruy
was more �diplomatic� than he allowed.
He had also requested arms and munitions
from the Japanese government.
Tokyo, however, was then dealing with the
Manchurian Incident and had worries other than
those of supplying arms and munitions to
Ethiopia.
Over
the next several years as Italy prepared to
attack Ethiopia, Foreign Minister Heruy was
unable to muster either allies or arms
sufficient to protect Ethiopia�s independence.
After defeat and always Hayle Sellase�s
trusted adviser, he went into exile with the
emperor in 1936 and died in England.
TWO
POSTSCRIPTS: A MARRIAGE PROPOSAL AND DABA
BIRROU�S DESPERATE SEARCH FOR ARMS
To
statesmen in London, Paris, Moscow, and
elsewhere, the threat of Japanese political,
commercial, and military intrusions into
Ethiopia seemed sufficient to justify Italy�s
military preparations against Ethiopia from 1934
on. In
1933 and 1934, Araya�s proposed marriage
vexingly personified these intrusions.
One hyperventilated account argued that,
[P]lans
have been made for effecting mixed marriages
between the eligible Japanese settlers
(estimated at about 2000 in number) and native
Abyssinian women.
This declared policy which is intended to
produce a new race of leaders in the united
revolt of the coloured peoples against the white
races, was to have been inaugurated by the
marriage of Princess Masako, a daughter of the
Japanese prince Kurado [Kuroda], to the
Ethiopian prince Lij Ayal� [Araya].
Mistakenly
believing that this was to be a royal wedding,
Europeans saw the genesis of the proposed
marriage as lying in Ethiopia�s wish to model
its modernization after Japan and in Japan�s
romantic vision of Ethiopia.
While
this explains the motives of Araya and Kuroda
for joining in an arranged marriage, other
individuals were also involved.
Most important were several Pan-Asian,
nationalist Japanese who were promoting the
marriage to leverage a prominent role for
themselves in commercial exchanges between Japan
and Ethiopia.
One was Yamauchi.
Interestingly, neither government in
Tokyo or Addis Ababa promoted the marriage idea;
neither lamented when the proposal died sometime
in 1934; and both suffered international
complications because of it.
The
proposed union continued to rankle Italians long
after the quasi-betrothal had been broken off.
Enemies of Ethiopia or Japan continued to
write about it long after they had every cause
to know that it had never carried the policy
implications feared and had not come to pass
anyway. One
Communist book published in 1936, for example,
echoed the thoughts and fears of many, when it
thundered against Japanese imperialism:
�Through the marriage of an Abyssinian prince
to the daughter of a Japanese noble, the
Japanese were enabled to equip airdromes in
Ethiopian and to receive a cotton concession
there.�
Clearly, for Moscow as for many others,
the falseness of such statements was less
important than was the need to draw on any
potential anti-Japanese and anti-Ethiopian
arguments.
The
second diplomatic postscript involved Heruy�s
translator, Daba Birrou.
In
the first half of the 1930s as Italy geared up
for war in East Africa, Ethiopia sought outside
political, military, and economic support to
balance Italy�s greater power.
No one�to the great upset of the
Italians and many in Japan�s
government�responded more favorably than did
Japan�s pan-Asian nationalists.
As war approached in the summer of 1935,
Ethiopia�s lack of supplies was becoming ever
more obvious as outlying troops were daily
pouring into Addis Ababa to get equipment only
to find none available.
Desperate for arms and munitions, Emperor
Hayle Sellase decided to take advantage of
popular Japanese sentiments to send Daba to
Japan. Ostensibly,
he was to be the first secretary to Ethiopia�s
honorary consul in Osaka.
Shoji Yunosuke, a Pan-Asian nationalist
and correspondent for the Osaka
Mainichi accompanied him.
His newspaper sponsored the trip.
Shoji had actively promoted Araya�s
proposed marriage to Kuroda.
Daba
and Shoji arrived in Japan on September 13, and
Italy attacked Ethiopia three weeks later.
Despite the enthusiastic welcome for Daba
from many nationalist Japanese, the government
in Tokyo proved unwilling to oppose Italy either
directly or indirectly.
Its interests in Ethiopia were too few to
risk a confrontation in a theater so far away.
In short, Japan put international
relations first and had few resources anyway to
offer East Africa.
Japan�s foreign ministry and army
agreed that public passions would not affect
policy. The
government announced that it would strictly
observe neutrality, calmly watch the East
African crisis, and completely ignore League of
Nations policy.
The Japanese told the Italians but not
Daba that they would not send loans, arms,
munitions, volunteers, or a military mission to
an Ethiopia unable to pay anyway.
Tokyo rejected Daba�s requests only
through its instructions of December 4 preparing
for appointing a minister ad
interim, who would open Japan�s new
legation in Addis Ababa in January 1936.
On January 23, 1936, Heruy visited the
newly opened Japanese legation at Addis Ababa to
order small quantities of light arms from Japan,
but did no better than was Daba.
One
of the Japanese nationalists actively involved
in Heruy�s visit in 1931, Araya�s marriage
proposal, and now Daba�s visit was Sumioka
Tomoyoshi.
At the end of March, in a letter to
Ethiopia�s emperor, he predicted that
Ethiopia�s brave army commanded by �its
courageous King of Kings� would defeat his
enemies. The
letter went on to commend Daba�s activities:
During
his six months� sojourn in Japan . . . Daba
has at all times conducted himself with credit,
and at no time has the prestige of Abyssinia
suffered at his hands. . . . [Foreign Minister]
Hirota . . . has received him twice in private
conference and has seen him to the door in
person when
. . . [he] took leave. . . .
Despite
the difficulties . . . Daba has been able to
push negotiations with the Japanese authorities
to a point where agreement on principles has
been reached, although on particulars there
still seems room for further discussion.
The
goodwill of the Japanese people toward Abyssinia
has been evinced in the warm welcome which . . .
Daba received when he landed at Kobe and when he
arrived at Tokyo station and in the intense
activities of . . . organizations and
individuals in sending medical supplies, money
and other articles for the aid of the Abyssinian
people.[50]
Sumioka�s
statement clearly�even if
inadvertently�emphasized the quasi-official
nature of Daba�s visit.
And Sumioka�s list of
accomplishments�Daba had seen Hirota twice and
been escorted to the door; he had negotiated
�agreement in principles� even if without
particulars; he had been enthusiastically
welcomed by many Japanese; some few groups had
sent some few medical supplies; and Daba had not
embarrassed himself�merely highlights how
little his visit had achieved or even could have
achieved.
Italy�s
ambassador in Tokyo agreed.
He had only casually followed Daba�s
exploits. In
his report to Rome describing Daba�s departure
from Tokyo at the end of March, he mentioned the
couple of hundred members of �reactionary
nationalistic associations,� who had seen him
off at the station.
He received assurances from the war
ministry that the supplies given Daba had been
but a few samples of poor quality, and did not
include �even one of the rifles that he had
been insistently requesting.�[51]
After
seven months in Japan, Daba sailed for his
homeland on April 2.
Although he had declined to attend a
farewell party held by right-wing organizations,
Daba did put on a brave face in interviews with
the Osaka
Mainichi just before his departure.[52]
At a press conference on April 17, a
Japanese foreign ministry spokesman stated that
if Italy subjugated Ethiopia, Japan would act
independently to protect its rights and
interests in that region.
He pointed out that Japan had a
friendship and commercial agreement with
Ethiopia and that commerce between the two
countries had been increasing.[53]
Meanwhile,
Ethiopia�s army was neither sufficiently
armed, trained, nor led to effectively resist
for long Italy�s invasion.
Italian troops entered Addis Ababa in May
1936.
By
mid-October, Daba had settled himself in Cairo,
and on December 12, he subjected himself to
Italian authority and received a passport.[54]
Tokyo
also adjusted itself to Italy�s conquest of
the Ethiopian Empire.
The exchange of recognitions on December
2, 1936�Japan�s conquest of Manchukuo for
Italy�s conquest of Ethiopia�paved the way
for the reconciliation between Tokyo and Rome
and their eventual alliance during World War II.[55]
Surely,
Rome and Tokyo could not have this volte-face
so quickly if the Italians had not come to
believe Tokyo�s many declarations of innocence
about the arms transfers and training that
Ethiopia had so desperately sought through
Daba�s mission.
Perhaps they never had.
But whether they had or not, throughout
1935 and much of 1936, they had effectively used
rumors of significant Japanese inroads into
Ethiopia to successfully disarm potential
international opposition to Italy�s coming
adventure, especially in London, Paris, and
Moscow. In
truth, Daba�s visit never had any real chance
to succeed other than as a publicity stunt
orchestrated by Shoji and the Osaka
Mainichi.
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