Priorities
in Ethiopian Politics: Expediting the Exigencies
and Postponing the Inessential Ones
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
March 1, 2019
This
Article is dedicated to the 123rd
anniversary of the victory of the Ethiopian people
at the Battle of Adwa on March 1, 1896
Today we no
longer view our mutual destruction but solemnly
acknowledge our interdependence as free and equal
citizens of our common motherhood.
Nelson Mandela, Reconciliation Day, 1995
Almost always
the men who achieve these fundamental inventions
of new paradigm have either been very young or
very new to the field whose paradigm they change.
Thomas Khun, ‘The Structure of Scientific
Revolution’.1
Ethiopia
is at crossroads again, undertaking, this time,
not a scientific revolution but a scientific
reform; incremental at times and transformational
at other times. It is in the latter sense and in
the context of the two quotations above that this
article is written. For the above reason, thus,
the purpose of this article is three fold: 1) to
make a quick glance at some relevant ideas of the
past; 2) to thoroughly examine the priorities in
Ethiopian politics; and 3) to furnish redeeming
ideas to current Ethiopian malaise, sort of
proposal in order to bit the odds and come up with
a sound policy spectrum that could in turn
catapult Ethiopia in the right direction and
subsequently achieve a more comprehensive and
viable socioeconomic strategies for change and
development. Before I delve into the central
thesis of this paper, however, I like to make a
synoptic birds-eye-view of the above quotations.
Mandela’s maxim is abundantly clear in terms of
its literal meaning. Mandela gave more weight and
significance to reconciliation than to the
seemingly irreconcilable differences between the
apartheid regime and the black indigenous
Africans; in the end, he along with Bishop Tutu
and the African National Congress (ANC) managed to
dismantle apartheid and also launch a new
democratic system. With the advent of Mandela and
the ANC to power, South Africa witnessed open
political debates, a robust constitution, and an
independent judiciary. However, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) did not herald any
bright future for socioeconomic equality of Black
Africans, the majority of whom are still poor, and
it is not surprising that South Africa was
bedeviled by the vent of the frustrated and
xenophobic young South Africans.
Thomas
Khun’s ‘young and new men’ who achieve
inventions and bring about change is relevant to
the current movers and shakers in Ethiopian
politics, and it is best exemplified by PM Abiy
Ahmed, who is only 42. Most Ethiopians and the
world at large perceived Abiy as the youngest
Ethiopian leader ever, but this perception is
wrong if examined in light of other leaders of
modern Ethiopia, who, in fact, were at their prime
age when they assumed state power: Emperor
Tewodros was 37, Emperor Yohannes was 34, Emperor
Menelik 45 (he was only 22 when he became king of
Shewa), Emperor Haile Selassie 39, Mengistu
Hailemariam 40 (he was 33 when the Derg took power
in 1974), and Meles Zenawi was 36. All of them
were young blood who came to power with incredibly
diverse avenues and political policies and
programs, but all of them (ranging from the good
and the bad to the ugly) have attempted to build
institutions of change, some reformist and
transient and others radical and durable in
nature. So, age won’t matter sometimes although
life experience is a plus in leadership. What
really matters is a combination of vision and
commitment, as well as empathetic consideration
for the welfare of the masses and integrity of the
nation-state; it is in the latter sense that I
will set the priorities in Ethiopia as follows:
1.
Rule
of law, peace, and stability (very urgent)
2.
National
reconciliation (immediate and urgent)
3.
Continuing
the development agenda (urgent)
4.
Democracy
(important in the long haul but not very urgent)
5.
Elections
(the forthcoming election should be postponed)
6.
Border
and Identity Commission (should be postponed)
7.
Issues
pertaining to federalism vs. the unitary state
(should be postponed)
8.
Witch
hunting former officials for whatever reason
(should be postponed)
9.
Human
rights (urgent)
10.
Political
education: a) in schools and universities
(important but not urgent); b) mass informal
education (very urgent)
Despite
the above exigencies and inessential ones,
however, the Ethiopian Government should seize the
moment and take matters into its own hands in
building formidable institutions. Ethiopia should
indeed build institutions, but in order for the
latter to be realizable and efficacious, the
Ethiopian people must undertake an historic
national reconciliation that I have been
advocating for many years. On October 2010, I
contributed an article entitled “National
Reconciliation and National Development in
Ethiopia”, in which I argued the following:
“Given the reality of Ethiopian politics of the
last two decades and the propensity of the
foreseeable future, the patriotic group must
consider the possibility of negotiating with the
EPRDF. It must shed its cocoon of principles and
liberate itself from the ideological tenet and
resume talks with the ruling party. The fear of
‘if we do so, we will entrust legitimacy to the
EPRDF and confuse our members and supporters’ is
a lame rationale compared to what the opposition
could favorably garner great strides in Ethiopian
politics.”2
The
essence of national reconciliation, of course, is
compromise and ironing out differences via
dialogue and peaceful means, and by sitting on a
round table and looking at each other’s eyes.
Moreover, the metaphors embedded in national
reconciliations, as Fanie du Toit aptly put it, is
“the pragmatism of enemies surviving together in
a lifeboat on the open ocean.”3 Toit
furthermore argues, “Yet the promise of
reconciliation to deliver transitions ‘that
work’ lies precisely in its ability to turn this
imposition of interdependence into an aspiration, into hope, and into a set of possibilities with concrete
benefits for those on both sides of the
conflict.”4
On
top of negotiations, ironing out differences,
compromises that characterizes national
reconciliations and subsequent results of hopes
and aspirations by the people - a peace dividend
that is maintained -, other important outcome of
the project is the three criteria of inclusivity
in relation to who participates, fairness in terms
of all participants having equal opportunities to
be heard, and a commitment to concrete outcomes
that advance the promise of justice for all.”5
It
should be known that the national reconciliation
agenda, though entrusted with forgiveness and
“Live and Let Live” motto of toleration and
mutual strategy, it is not entirely guided with
religious overtones that completely overrides the
sins of some crimes committed by some members of
the ruling elite. In fact, wittingly or
unwittingly, this project could expose corrupt and
criminal officials which could be viewed as losers
in the transition period. However, in the spirit
of criterion number 8 above, it would be prudent
to postpone the case of corrupt and criminal
elements at least for now.
If
Ethiopia successfully sets its priorities as
suggested above, it should then put in right order
the exigencies of peace and stability and national
reconciliation while at the same time continue the
national agenda of development, and also enforce
the rule of law which is intimately related to the
three criteria mentioned above. With respect to
development policy, I have repeatedly argued on
behalf of the developmental state (DS) and the
continuation of the Ethiopian foundational economy
projects in many of my research papers, including
“Transposing Ethiopia While Concurrently
Preserving its Institutional Heritage and its
Political Economy Achievements”, and also in my
most recent book, Ethiopia:
Democracy, Devolution of Power, and the
Developmental State”.
It
seems to me it is much easier to continue the DS
development policy than to build a robust
democratic system in Ethiopia, but it is not
impossible to lay the ground work for the
political cultures of democracy, especially if we
begin installing institutions for the sole purpose
of establishing a democratic system. For this
apparent reason, I have extrapolated
‘institutionalizing democracy in Ethiopia’ as
follows: “Institutionalizing democracy in
Ethiopia could simply mean laying the foundation
for the edifice of a democratic system, i.e.
forging democratic institutions as prelude to
preconditions for the consolidation of democracy
in the country. …Ethiopia could emulate other
countries’ experiences and some of their vision
(theoretical constructs) and paradigms, but it
should also depend on its own historical
experience, which could be amalgamated with what
the country can best emulate from others.
Incidentally, no country can develop on its own
without external input but a nation that
excessively depends on foreign prescriptions alone
cannot effectively and meaningfully realize a
genuine transformation in democracy and/or
economic development.”5
Part
I of my book is entirely dedicated to democracy
and what Ethiopia can learn from American and
European democracies, from some African countries,
and from its own historical experience. In all the
learning experiences that can serve as models for
Ethiopia and as paradigms for Ethiopian scholars
and policymakers, institutions take center stage.
Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufmann argue that
“the answers are to be found in the nature of
political institutions. We focus particular
attention on two variables: the constitution of
executive authority and the nature of the
representative institutions that mediate between
contending political and social groups and the
government.”6
Haggard
and Kaufmann’s argument is very relevant to the
current Ethiopian politics, especially to the
initiatives taken by Dr. Abiy Ahmed in engaging
diverse groups such as teachers, leaders of
contending parties, and the leaders of the
so-called EPRDF-affiliated groups from various
regional states, and also in effectively utilizing
his executive powers. While these debates and
exchange of ideas are important in and of
themselves, it is equally important that the
government of Dr. Abiy realize that it would be to
its advantage to preserve the constitutional order
and attendant institutions that could facilitate
the ongoing discussions, negotiations, debates
etc. above all, when the current government (and
succeeding governments) initiate reforms and
changes by first delineating priorities, they must
understand that “Institutions create elements of
transparency and imperfect order and historical
continuity. They [institutions] give rule
communicable meaning so they can be diffused and
passed on to new generations. Indeed, institutions
are unusually associated with routinization and
repetition, persistence and predictability, rather
than with political change and flexibility,
agency, creativity, and discretion. Surviving
institutions seem to stabilize their reforms,
rules, and meanings so that procedures and forms
adopted at birth have surprising durability”7
Once
Ethiopia sets its priorities, it should seriously
consider the building of institutions that, in
turn, can greatly contribute to state and nation
building in general, and accountability and
transparency in particular. The state and nation
building is not novice to Ethiopia; the country
indeed is one of the sites of early states and
nation-states with spectacular civilizations in
Africa. The Ethiopian civilization of late
antiquity witnessed formidable states that were
competing and collaborating with contemporary
states such as the Roman and Persian. Functional
laws and constitutional orders were Ethiopia’s
main features since the Aksumite period, to the
medieval period, and the modern times. But,
Ethiopia had major shortcomings in transparency
and accountability from modern governments of
Emperor Haile Selassie to present.
At
this juncture, what Ethiopia should do is cleanse
its bureaucracies with professional detergent that
could possibly enable the country to install
vertical and horizontal accountabilities. However
the fundamental question is, “how is Ethiopia
going to make these accountabilities effective? As
Guillermo O’Donnell convincingly argues, “This
hasty tour
d’horizon of several important and
complicated issues, each of which merits a huge
bibliography, provides a necessary context for my
discussion of horizontal accountability. This kind
of accountability depends on the existence of
state agencies that are legally empowered – and
factually willing and able – to take actions
ranging from routine oversight to criminal
sanctions or impeachment in relation to possibly
unlawful actions and omissions by other agents or
agencies of the state.”8
To
recuperate the sick and badly damaged Ethiopian
bureaucracies and other government agencies is a
daunting task, involving major challenges; and it
will also require a reasonably long time to
realize both vertical and horizontal
accountabilities in Ethiopia, and for this
apparent time-sensitive undertaking and other
important tasks that must be given priority, I
like to propose that the May 2020 Ethiopian
election be postponed. As O’Donnell puts it,
“Elections, however, occur only periodically,
and their effectiveness at securing vertical
accountability is unclear, especially given the
inchoate party systems, high voter and party
volatility, poorly defined issues, and sudden
policy reversals that prevail in most new
polyarchies.”9
In
his recent meeting with the so-called
EPRDF-affiliated parties of Afar, Somali,
Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella, the Prime
Minister announced that a new one party of all
Ethiopia, not of Amhara, Oromo, Somali, etc. will
be formed. Although I was perplexed to hear that
relatively bizarre announcement, I first had the
impression that the new party is meant to replace
the EPRDF and thereby get ready for the
forthcoming election. If this is the case, it will
be counterproductive and the election will be
messy, to say the least. On second thought,
however, I have perceived and interpreted the new
forthcoming party, as a party that includes Dr.
Abiy and his close associates and the various
opposition groupings that were invited to come to
Ethiopia from the Diaspora. The new party may not
include the majority of the legally registered
home-grown parties, although it may include some
as token for the sake of positive image and
legitimacy; at the other end of the spectrum, the
new party may alienate other parties like the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Tigray
People’s Liberation Party (TPLF). But, most
importantly, my view of the new future party that
it is going to be essentially an elitist party and
a superimposition from above and not a grassroots
political party that could duly respect the rights
of the average Ethiopian in the electoral process.
If this is going to be the nature and
characteristics of the new party, it will grossly
violate the criteria of inclusivity that we have
discussed above and may find itself in
contradistinction with the nationalities that make
up the majority of the regional states.
Sometimes,
Dr. Abiy unwittingly falters when he utters words
that are not of his own measure. For instance,
when he addressed the teachers, frustrated by the
recalcitrant OLF, said, “I am on the verge of
becoming a dictator”. Ethiopia have had enough
dictators and autocrats, some firm and other soft,
but irrespective of the variety of autocrats, what
we need now is a broader democracy that would take
root via institutional capacity building, and, in
turn, that serves as vehicle in building
institutions. However, Ethiopia is not going to
overhaul everything from scratch; it has already a
robust constitution and a federal structure that,
in my opinion, should be preserved, and if
necessary reformed and/or renovated, but not
disturbed by unnecessary injection from seemingly
“research and investigative” bodies such as
the Border and Identity Commission. Additionally,
some of the appointed people in the Commission
have already made up their minds and they are
biased against some Ethiopian regional states and
could be a liability instead of an asset. It is
for these reasons that I am suggesting the
postponement of criteria 5, 6, 7, and 8 as shown
above.
On
the other hand, criterion # 9 on human rights is
urgent and the government has an obligation to
ensure the human rights of Ethiopians. In the last
ten months, due to lack of peace and instability,
millions of Ethiopians were displaced from their
homestead; some were attacked and killed by
unknown forces and obviously we have now a
humanitarian crisis. The enigma vis-à-vis the
disturbances is the fact that the Federal Police
and the Defense Forces remained silent, but at
long last they officially embarked on quelling the
disorder and infighting in western and central
Gondar of the Amhara Regional State, but even this
initiative was circumvented. The eerie silence of
the Government is also quite disturbing at a time
when the Ethiopian people are desperately seeking
help in the redress for the violation of their
human rights. As an extension of Criteria # 1, I
appeal to the Ethiopian Government to ameliorate
the condition of the internally displaced
Ethiopians by taking action not only at
rehabilitating the affected population but also by
apprehending the dark forces that are disturbing
the whole of Ethiopia.
Like
the criteria that I labeled ‘urgent’,
Criterion # 10 is also very crucial and it could
galvanize (in the sense of inspire, stimulate, or
arouse) the political consciousness of Ethiopians.
All higher institutions in Ethiopia must include
‘political education’ in their respective
curricula, and it must be reinforced and/or
supplemented by workshops and mini-conferences.
Political education in schools is long term
objective in laying the kernel of political
culture, the commonalities of historical heritage,
and the significance of unity in diversity. This
kind of political education, by its very nature is
slow and steady but not urgent. On the other hand,
mass informal education is very urgent and can be
conducted effectively via the official Ethiopian
Television (ETV) and other media outlets, and to
make it more successful, it should be supported by
series of town meetings for the sole purpose of
educating the Ethiopian people.
With
respect to mass political education in the context
of democratic tolerance, Ethiopians missed a
golden opportunity when the 1974 Revolution
erupted and when the Derg military junta hijacked
the initiative and direction of the social
upheaval. The second golden opportunity was missed
when the EPRDF assumed state power in 1991; there
was high hope when the EPRDF organized the Addis
Ababa Charter, but for all intents and purposes,
the post-military regime also did not establish
and launched democratic institutions, although the
EPRDF has scored great achievement in the
foundational economy.
Now
again, under Abiy and his associates, Ethiopians
must not miss an historic opportunity at
installing the political culture of democracy. As
the English maxim goes, ‘it is now or never’
for the establishment of democracy in Ethiopia,
but if Ethiopia is indeed going to meet the
priorities suggested above by delaying the
inessential ones, it should begin by acknowledging
the positive contributions of the EPRDF and by
either restricting or discouraging negative
attitudes and ethnic hatred as well as
ethnocentric politics. A good panacea for
overcoming narrow ethnic proclivities and
practices is to uphold a pan-Ethiopian agenda that
I have recommended numerous times by contributing
articles on the subject. One good and encouraging
initiative is the Lucy sojourn for peace and love
and whose objective is the revival of the
overarching Ethiopian brotherhood. The Lucy factor
and the young Ethiopians who walked from all
corners of Ethiopia to the site of the Battle of
Adwa are fantastic gestures for the unification of
the Ethiopian people and the revival of the
Ethiopian etiquette attributed to mutual respect
which is currently tarnished and disgraced by
ethnic hatred.
One
other important task the Abiy Government must
seriously consider is the general consensus of the
majority of Ethiopians on the continuation of the
current federal structure. The eight regional
states of Tigray, Afar, Harar, Somali, Debub,
Oromia, Gambella, and Benishagul Gumuz have
affirmatively endorsed the federal system. Instead
of promoting a countervailing idea/policy of a
unitary state, the best bet for Abiy and his
government is to strengthen and further solidify
the Ethiopian state that, in turn, best serves the
interests of the Ethiopian people within the
framework of the present federal structure. After
all, the Ethiopian state, like other successful
and effective states, must realize its potential
and its “capacities to create and strengthen
state organizations, to employ personnel to co-opt
political support, to subsidize economic
enterprises, and to fund social programs.”10
That is the way to go and that is how
Ethiopia must set its priorities by discriminating
the essential and inessential ones and
meaningfully executing the day-to-day political
and administrative affairs of Ethiopia.
In
addition to the priority agendas that I have
discussed above, there are some important
sentiments and concerns expressed by many
Ethiopians from the regional states that the
present regime must discuss on an open public
forum. A significant number of Ethiopians from the
said regional states have condemned the betrayal
committed against the people of Tigray, who
apparently have made huge sacrifices in dislodging
the Derg government and contributing to the newly
forged identity of the respective Ethiopian
nationalities. Many Oromo, Afar, Somali, Gambella,
Benishangul-Gumuz, and other sub-nationalities
from Debub have exhibited their sympathy to the
people of Tigray. The Government of Dr. Abiy,
thus, is best advised to respect the wish and
demand of the Ethiopian people and rethink the
ongoing drama of attempting to isolate Tigray from
the rest of Ethiopia, which by the way could
result in disaster due to miscalculation and
unnecessary provocation. Abiy and his associates
are best advised to giving priority to the unity
of the Ethiopian people and also to recapturing
the glory of the Ethiopian nation-state that
evolved thousands of years ago in Tigray.
Notes
1.
Thomas
Khun, “The Structure of Scientific
Revolution”, quoted in Martin Bernal, Black
Athena,
2.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “National Reconciliation and National
Development in Ethiopia”, www.africanidea.org/national_reconcillation.html
October 22,
2010
3.
Fanie
du Toit, When
Political Transitions Work: Reconciliations as
Interdependence
4.
Toit,
Ibid
5.
Toit,
Ibid
6.
Stephan
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The
Political Economy of Democratic Transitions,
Princeton University Press, 2018
7.
James
March and Johan Olsen, “Institutional
Perspectives” in Bernard E. Brown, Comparative
Politics, Tenth Edition, Thompson and
Wadsworth, 2006, p. 361
8.
Guillermo
O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New
Democracies”, in Bernard E. Brown, p. 206
9.
Guillermo
O’Donnell, Ibid, p.203
10.
Theda
Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In”, in
Bernard E. Brown, Ibid, p. 88
All Rights
Reserved Copyright © Institute of Development and
Education for Africa (IDEA), 2019. For educational
and constructive feedback, please contact Dr.
Ghelawdewos Araia via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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