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Misreading
History and Political Science and the Exigency of
Smooth Power Transition in Ethiopia
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
February 18, 2018
In
the last three to four years, Ethiopia has been in
constant political turmoil, ranging from Gondar
and Oromia incidents to the Oromo-Somali
confrontations in South East Ethiopia, to the
Woldia-Kobo-Mersa protestations and subsequent
deaths of innocent Ethiopians. All these
protestations, euphemistically called mass
upheavals by some disgruntled Diaspora Ethiopian
groupings, were actually ethnic-based and
ethnic-hatred disturbances; I label them as
disturbances because in any historical context,
revolutionary and peoples’ uprisings do not
destroy and/or burn public property. Moreover, the
only mass upheaval that moved toward revolutionary
insurrection in Ethiopia is that of 1974 (Yekatit
1966 Ethiopian Calendar) broad-based people’s
uprising.
The
1974 revolution, as opposed to the present
ethno-nationalist disturbances, involved all
classes – from urban dwellers to rural peasants
– and their demand was class-based equality,
freedom and justice, and no iota of ethnic
politics were manifested in the mass
insurrections, but unfortunately the revolution
was hijacked by the military and Mengistu and his
henchmen presided over a Red Terror regime,
slaughtered the people (especially the youth), and
governed the country by tyrannical rule for
seventeen years.
Any
given society, including our own Ethiopian
society, must be examined in the context and
methodological framework of history and political
science, because the two social science
disciplines can effectively dissect and analyze
the nature and characteristics of systems and
phenomena. As Charles Tilly and Robert E. Goodwin
aptly put it, “the ultimate aim of political
science is to identify general laws of political
process that cut across the details of time,
place, circumstances and previous history.”
Furthermore, these scholars tell us that
“knowledge of historical context provides a
means of producing more systematic knowledge of
political processes.”1 It is this
kind of methodological rigor that is clearly
missing in the Ethiopian Diaspora charlatan
groups. They have heavily depended on the ethnic
factor to explain present Ethiopian politics, and
as a result they have completely misread history
and political science. Consequently, they have
made wrong diagnosis of the Ethiopian reality and
singled out Tigrayans from other Ethiopians in an
attempt to isolate and target Tigrigna-speaking
Ethiopians. The Diaspora opposition attempted to
construct a rational analysis of the Ethiopian
political scenario by attributing ethnicity to
regime change in the country; some of them even
argued that the TPLF managed to capture state
power by campaigning hate against the Amhara;
there is some truth in this reasoning because the
TPLF mobilized its fighting forces by exaggerating
the national question (nationalities
self-determination and secession) and mobilizing
its fighting forces by emphasizing on Amhara
dominance and Shewan hegemony. However, the TPLF
actually defeated the Derg militarily and took
over state power. In significant measure with
respect to Ethiopian history, State power in
Ethiopia was earned or acquired via the barrel of
the gun, and leaving out this determining factor
could lead to misreading history and political
science.
On
top of misreading history and political science,
the Ethiopian Diaspora has also a completely
mistaken analysis of the Ethiopian political
landscape, especially when it comes to dealing
with the ruling party and/or the Government; and
because it has wrongly perceived Ethiopian
politics, it has squared on the people of Tigray;
interestingly, the Diaspora opposition groups have
made a quick transition from being anti-Woyane to
anti-Tigrayan. They falsely assumed that the
present socioeconomic formation of Ethiopia is
dominated solely by Tigrayans. A good
misconception (or perhaps deliberate deception) of
this view is Shaleka Dawit’s article entitled
“Ethiopia and the United States: Can the crisis
be prevented?”
In
Shaleka Dawit’s article, there is no mention of
EPRDF as a ruling party or government, or any
ethnicity that make up the Party. It is a
well-known fact that the EPRDF main driving force
(until now) was the TPLF, but other parties of the
Amhara, Oromo, and Debub also have been playing a
pivotal role in the policy and decision making
processes. In contradistinction to the four-party
coalition of the EPRDF, Shaleka Dawit states, “a
minority government representing in theory 6% of
the population that is in complete control of the
state machinery, including the economic,
political, and state apparatus…current Ethiopia
is gripped with the Rwandan syndrome before the
1994 genocide. It is Tigray people versus the rest
of the population. It is a situation the elites
from the 6% own major private enterprises directly
or indirectly. It is a situation where the entire
6% is portrayed as a superior race than others. It
is the case where the disproportionate amount of
resources is being directed to the province where
the 6% live. It is the case where the majority of
the 6% are led to believe that they will be
exterminated unless they have full control of the
economic, political, and security apparatus. It is
the case where through fear, intimidation, and
blackmail the 6% is being brainwashed to hate the
rest of the population and prepare itself against
a possible genocide. Hence the hate becomes
mutual.”2
For
those of us in the academia and for others who are
engaged in modest scholarly works, Dawit’s
description of the Ethiopian political reality
(which is largely a mirage), not only lacks
substantive theoretical framework but it also
evaporates in thin air as a meaningless verbose
that contradicts the overall situation in
Ethiopia.
First
and foremost, there had never been genocidal
ethnic confrontations in the history of Ethiopia
because the country have had a long history of
durable civilization and advanced political
economy that enabled it to forge a centralized
political system, in which the low-level ethnic
communities are woven into the fabric of a united
and overarching nation-state. Moreover, the
Ethiopian people have been interacting,
intermingling, and intermarrying for thousands of
years, and there is no Ethiopian history where one
tribe was mobilized to exterminate or commit
genocide against another tribe; even during the
Era of Princes (1769-1855), when Ethiopia was
divided into mini-states for seven decades, it was
the regional lords and not the people that fought
against each other. Interestingly but ironically,
even the regional lords believed in the oneness of
Ethiopia and in recognizing the king (now
subservient to the lords) as symbol of Ethiopian
unity.
So,
given the history of Ethiopia in the context of
political economy, can we then safely conclude
that large scale and persistent ethnic
confrontations and genocide will never happen in
Ethiopia? The answer, of course, is no. Although
the background history of Ethiopia could possibly
keep such blood-letting civil wars at bay, and
could manage and control ethnic wars, given the
new psychology of the Ethiopian youth, that is, a
psychology devoid of pan-Ethiopian ideology, the
new ethno-national tendencies, coupled by the
relentless efforts of Ethiopian enemies to drag
the country into ethnic warfare, it is highly
probable that Ethiopia could encounter civil wars
among nationalities, especially if the Government
continue to exhibit silence, inaction, and a
non-intervention attitude.
The
current ethno-nationalist politics in Ethiopia was
engineered and fabricated by the EPRDF government
when it demarcated the regional states based on
language and ethnicity, although it did not
intentionally install the new federal structure to
divide up Ethiopians. However, we could surmise
that the EPRDF misread history and political
science when it devised the devolution of power
unto ethnic enclaves without calculating the
risks. At any rate, 23 years ago, I was very much
concerned that Ethiopia could face a major setback
due to its nascent geopolitical configurations,
and here is what I scribbled then:
The TGE policy of Kilil and
self-determination is commendable, but the
consequence of fragmentation as a result of new
wave of ethnic political consciousness, and the
inability of some minority nationalities to become
economically and politically viable would
ultimately preoccupy Ethiopians to otherwise
unforeseen problem.3
Now,
beyond the concern I discussed 23 years ago, the
enemies of Ethiopia have managed to create a
target audience of youngsters imbued with ethnic
hatred and as agents, could easily perform the
agenda of anti-Ethiopia grand actors who are the
impetus behind the political fragmentation of
Ethiopia. The grand actors are Ethiopians whose
allegiance is to foreign powers; and in many
instances, they have been coordinating their
activities and their political language (or
‘political program’ as they call it) with
non-Ethiopians including Europeans, Americans, and
Arabs.
In
2010, I was compelled to respond to a
non-Ethiopian by the name Gregory Stanton, who
also took it for granted that Tigrayans could
become victims of genocide. Here below is a
summary of Stanton’s speech and my critique:
Stanton’s opening speech was quite palatable to my
political opinion and I want to extend credit to
him for attempting to foster “trans-ethnic
politics” and for saying “you are Ethiopians,
not Amharas or Tigrayans” to his audience. And
to be sure, it is this kind of thinking that
Ethiopians should entertain at this juncture of
their history.
Based on
the above opening remarks of Dr. Stanton, I had a
cursory understanding of the tenet of his speech
as an advocacy for Ethiopian unity. But, all of a
sudden, the speaker began making annoying quirks
with respect to Tigrayans and their role in
current Ethiopian politics. His speech was
inundated with disconnected flashes of themes
including the “massive massacre” in Gambella:
“the best land of Gambella that is being sold to
foreign investors”, and what he calls the
“internal colonization” of Ethiopia by
Tigrayans.
Dr. Stanton attempted to substantiate
his thesis of “Tigrayan regime trying to
colonize the best of Ethiopia” by his argument
stated as “effectively a Tigrayan takeover of
the whole country”. Furthermore, in an omen
anticipating sign, the speaker said, “Who do you
think is going to pay for all these?” and he
answers it himself by saying, “the Tigrayans”,
“I am worried for the Tigrayans”, says
Stanton, “who could become victims [of genocide]
themselves.”4
The
leitmotif or running themes in the Dawit essay and
Stanton’s speech are “genocide” and
“extermination” of Tigrayans, a stunningly
awful and coveted demand and call against innocent
people. I am not surprised that Gregory Stanton
used portentous or forewarning words without due
regard to the people of Tigray; after all, people
of European descent have committed genocide and
massacres against indigenous and colonized
peoples, but I am saddened when my own flesh,
Dawit W. Giorgis, entertained same ideas.
As
I have discussed above, there has never been
ethnic warfare in Ethiopia, and due to this hard
fact, one could assume that there wasn’t ethnic
hatred amongst the diverse linguistic groups of
Ethiopia, except a tinge of bias and stereotype
fomented toward some groups. But it is important
to discuss the psychology of hatred so that the
present generation of Ethiopia understands the
gravity and consequence of it, and embrace rather
the psychology of love in order to safeguard the
unity and brotherhood of Ethiopians.
Navarro,
Marchena, and Menacho discuss the psychology of
hatred in detail, and they state, “…Hatred is
built on a complex mix of cognitions and emotions.
The cognitive components are related to the
devaluation of the other, the perception of them
as a threat. The emotional part includes a set of
feelings like anger, fear, distress and hostility.
Finally, another element related to hatred is a
certain, sometimes crazy, sense that we are
justified in acting against – or even
eliminating – the object of our hate. When
hatred intensifies, a certain fanatical obligation
to get rid of the person or group that is the
object of the hatred can easily arise (Opotow,
1990).”5
The
word “eliminating” in the above quote
corresponds to the Dawit-Stanton words of
extermination and genocide, and this catastrophic
sentiment is the one directed against Tigrayans
that I have discussed above. It is manifested in
the gangsters’ actions of burning and destroying
public property, assets owned by Tigrayans in
particular. However, as per media outlets such as
ethiomedia.com, “Scores of businesses owned by
individuals suspected as TPLF collaborators were
burned down or destroyed…Homes of alleged
government collaborators were also burned down.”6
According
to the Institute of Development and Education for
Africa (IDEA) investigative findings, there is no
truth to the ethomedia.com report; on the
contrary, it is the homes and businesses of the
non-political and non-TPLF affiliated merchants
that was destroyed and burned down by the fanatic
elements. IDEA’s findings, in fact, was
corroborated by the VOA interview of the Tigrayan
businessman who lived for thirty years in the
Woldia-Kobo area; he said, he managed to escape
while at the same time confirming to the
interviewer that he and his children have
no affiliation to the TPLF whatsoever.
Fanaticism
is dangerous, because it “dilutes empathy,
awareness of other suffering, and feelings of
guilt toward the object of own hatred…Fanaticism
is incompatible with critical judgment. The
fanatic lives in a “niche” without being
touched by logical reasoning.”7Because
the fanatics lack reason and political
consciousness they are easily driven by their
emotions to accomplish the mission of the
anti-Ethiopia forces who desire ‘a Rwandan
syndrome’ for Ethiopians.
It
should be understood, however, that the
ethno-nationalist fanatics are not the making of
the anti-Ethiopia movements only; they are also
the products of a political systems that
underscores differences rather than commonalities
among the various Ethiopian nationalities. As
Courtney Jung correctly puts it, “race,
ethnicity, and religion (and also class, gender,
and sexuality) do not have any essential core that
determines their fundamental character. Race does
not arise from biology; ethnicity does not arise
from material conditions. Instead, these
categories are constituted by politics and by the
particular historical process that have organized
access to power, in ways that forge boundaries
of exclusion and selective inclusion”8 (emphasis mine).
The
‘particular historical process’ in the
Ethiopian context is the demarcation of
nationality boundaries solely based on language
and ethnicity that I have already discussed above;
and the ‘boundaries of exclusion and selective
inclusion’ very much reflects the nature and
characteristics of the EPRDF and its style of
patron-client governance for the last 27 years.
Unfortunately, even today and after the EPRDF
concluded its evaluation meetings, the ruling
party does not seem to recognize that ethnic
politics is the main culprit for the cause of
present crisis.
As
far as I am concerned, Ethiopia should come first
at all times and the only way out from the present
political morass is to promote and embrace the
overarching Ethiopian (not Tigryan, Amhara, Oromo,
etc) nationalism. Emperor Tewodros and Emperor
Yohannes became sacrificial lambs for Ethiopia and
not for this or that nationality; Ethiopians
converged at Adwa in 1896 and at Badme in
1998-2000 for the independence, defense, and
territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and not for
this or that nationality. We must follow their
footsteps and that is the only way out from the
present crisis.
In
the past, I have advocated on behalf of Tigrayans
only because they were singled out and targeted by
the fanatic ethno-nationalists. In point of fact,
this is what I argued in 2013: “This is not the
first time I have defended the people of Tigray. I
have done it back in 2003, and every time the
negative campaign is sharpened, I have attempted
to provide countervailing ideas in the defense of
Tigrayans. However, it should also be known that I
have accorded same defense to the Oromos, Amharas,
and other Ethiopian nationalities. I do not
prescribe to ethno-nationalist politics as a prime
agenda in any setting. ; I am a pan-Africanist and
pan-Ethiopianist and for more than three decades I
have embraced an overarching ideology that unifies
rather than separates respective ethnic groups in
Ethiopia, although I also support the
self-determination of cultural and ethnic groups
within a unified and indivisible Ethiopia.”9
Irrespective
of the current crisis, however, I believe Ethiopia
will remain united and Tigray will not go anywhere
because the concept and material force of
‘Ethiopia’ was conceived and born in Tigray.
Certain groups may invoke Article 39 of the
Constitution to separate Tigray from the rest of
Ethiopia but they will not be successful because
the majority of the people of Tigray would like to
jealously guard the unity of Ethiopia and maintain
Ethiopian national identity. In this context,
thus, back in 2003 I tried to portray Tigray as an
indivisible core of the Ethiopian nation-state, as
shown below:
It all began in Tigray. Tigray is the
cradle and hub of Ethiopia’s ancient
civilization. In Tigray, Ethiopia’s future seems
to contend its past while the present testifies
cyclical historical events as constant reminders
of the distant and near past. In Tigray, the
modern period seems to lend the requisite touch of
antiquity, as if to deliberately endure
uninterrupted Ethiopian political state. After
all, this quintessentially Ethiopian northern
regional state is the plain field of ancient
civilization and unparalleled conventional wisdom,
and as the custodian to that epic African
ingenuity.10
What is to
be done now? Now
that PM Hailemariam Desalegn submitted his letter
of resignation in the midst of the crisis and the
Council of Ministers declared state of emergency
for the second time, what should Ethiopians in
general and the government in particular do to
ensure smooth transition of power and also
guarantee stability and peace in the country? Let
me begin with what different groups but
well-meaning Ethiopians have proposed in an
attempt to overcome the crisis and pave a peaceful
path for Ethiopia.
Back
in 2016, Professor Awol Allo of Keele University,
in an interview with Kassahun Yilma of ESAT, made
a very constructive statement with respect to
making distinction between the people of Tigray
and the TPLF, at a time when a significant number
of the Diaspora Ethiopians were unable to see the
differences between a given party and a people;
hence their overgeneralization and blind
condemnation of one people. Emancipating the mind
of the zealot from the shackles of sectarian
politics is not going to be easy but the
contribution of Professor Awol Allo and others
like Baysa Wakwoya, who also argues in favor of
making distinction between a political party and
the masses, could be major assets in this regard.
One
other way and most effective strategy to mitigate
the crisis in Ethiopia and resolve the
contradiction between the people and the
government is to conduct series of public and open
forums in which the people could freely express
their views and the government exhibits
transparency and accountability. A good example of
such forums is the ENN (Odaa) program of February
12, 2018, where national security, unity, and
Ethiopian nationalism (Ethiopiawinet) were
discussed in depth by four learned men. They all
have underscored the significance of the
overarching Ethiopian national identity while at
the same time respecting the cultures and identity
of the various nationalities that make up
Ethiopia.
In
a similar vein to the ENN panel discussion, Goitom
Gebreleul and William Bedasso also have produced a
timely article entitled “Managing Ethiopia’s
political crisis”. The authors argue,
“Managing Ethiopia’s current political crisis
requires going beyond democratic reform and
instead thinking about the political economy and
institutions that shape elite competition along
ethnic lines. The two most important reform
measures that should be embarked upon immediately
in this regard are devolving more power to the
regional states in accordance to the Constitution
and de-ethnicising elite competition at the
federal level.”11 I
have accepted the authors argument with some
reservation; while lessening and gradually
eliminating ethnic competition is crucial in
Ethiopian politics in order to overcome the
governance crisis, ‘devolving more power’ to
the regional states may not be feasible and
achieveable because there is a huge gap between
the states in terms of capital (resources),
knowhow (educated and professional personnel), and
mode of production. Some states like Afar, Somali,
Beni-Shangul, and Gambella have a pastoral/transhumant
life style and a portion of them have just made a
transition to sedentary agriculture. Therefore,
even if you devolve theoretical or constitutional
power to these states, they are still going to
need massive material aid and administrative
support from the federal government in order to
catch up with the relatively “advanced” states
like Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and to some extent
Debub.
On
top of public forums and contributions of
scholarly works by intellectuals in the academia
from the major Ethiopian universities, the
Government should initiate a drastic measure in
order to realize the long overdue national
reconciliation, and the latter, at long last,
could get some space in Ethiopian politics and
could be implemented in different forms. Some
recommendations are the following:
1.
The
Government and the legally operating opposition
parties in Ethiopia should enter dialogue with the
sole purpose of fostering national unity and
retooling Ethiopian nationalism while at the same
time deemphasizing ethnic politics. If this kind
of national reconciliation is tried, it should be
done in public in which the Ethiopian people also
become participant-observers. This would also be a
momentous historic event at unleashing a political
culture of toleration and inclusiveness and a
reflection of the ideals and sentiments of the
Ethiopian nationhood.
2.
As
L/G Tsadkan suggested in his interview with The
Reporter, a commission must be established under
the Office of the President to oversee the crisis
and come up with solutions, but the EPRDF should
continue to govern the country for the coming two
years; that is, until the next election is
conducted in 2020 and followed by the installment
of a transitional government.
3.
A
coalition government of the EPRDF, the legally
registered opposition parties, scholars and
academe with excellent resume and public record,
and civic as well as religious leaders. The
purpose of the coalition government is to lead
Ethiopia peacefully by establishing a transitional
government, until elections are conducted in 2020.
Of
the three options mentioned above, my preference
is the formation of a coalition government, but
since Ethiopian politics at this juncture is
complicated and fluid, a task force of the
coalition should undertake a thorough and in depth
study of the Ethiopian reality and come up with
some recommendations. I personally would recommend
the continuation of the current federal structure
with some amendments of the Constitution in
regards to Article 39 and its clause of secession;
the latter should be discarded and only the
‘self-determination’ clause should be
preserved. The regional states must continue as
autonomous states but their mono-ethnic
composition should change to multi-ethnic diverse
and yet inclusive polities. In other words, while,
for instance, Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Debub, Afar,
Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella maintain
their present status, they should simultaneously
accommodate other Ethiopian ethnic groups in their
respective turfs, and gradually graduate to
multi-ethnic states, very much like the Debub
Kilil or Southern Nations, Nationalities, and
Peoples (SNNP).
Going
back to the coalition government, it is important
to define its purpose and delineate its formation
process. The purpose of the coalition is not only
to include multiple parties to participate in the
making of the government but also to
systematically curb the monopoly or dominance of
one party. Coalition government, almost always,
are formed in parliamentary systems like we have
in Ethiopia today, and it is, in brief, an
alliance or bloc within the parliament with a
special mission to thwart absolute majority of
legislators by one party. Its composition features
the many stakeholders that I mentioned above, but
a core group or a task force is necessary in order
1) to enhance communication within members of the
coalition; 2) to make sure that members of the
coalition have common interest and common goal
with respect to safeguarding the unity of the
Ethiopian people and ensuring the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the country; 3) to
ascertain that urgent situations such as the
crisis in general and the public interest in
particular are addressed; 4) to form an effective
and efficient government.
Finally,
all Ethiopians without exception and irrespective
of their ethnicity, religion, creed, and
affiliation to political parties, must bear in
mind that they have one and only one country and
as a result one common identity. They must also
further understand that Ethiopia is a great nation
with civilization of antiquity and the medieval
period; home to Denknesh, the mother of all
humanity; symbol of independence to Africans and
people of African descent in the Diaspora; and
it is the seat and headquarters of the African
Union. This greatness must be preserved at all
costs and Ethiopians endowed with a modicum of
wisdom must seriously consider the continuation of
the foundation economy that will ultimately
catapult the country to a middle income status, if
not one of the highly industrialized countries in
Africa. This agenda, however, can be realized only
if peace is maintained, and Ethiopians who care
for the welfare of Ethiopians and security and
stability of the nation should welcome the state
of emergency that was just declared. On the other
hand, the present EPRDF government or the
coalition that is yet to be formed must understand
that a country cannot be governed by state of
emergency alone; the alternative is democratic
governance in all its dimensions. Democracy alone
is also not going to solve the bread and butter
issue of Ethiopians unless it is reinforced by a
transformative and viable economic agenda. The
vision and policy implementation, therefore,
should be to install a twin system of democracy
and development and maintain the delicate balance
with extra care.
Notes
1.
Charles
Tilly and Robert E. Goodwin (editors), The
Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis,
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 20
2.
Dawit
W. Giorgis, “Ethiopia and the United States: Can
the crisis be prevented?” Satenaw,
October 24, 2017 14:32
3.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, Ethiopia:
The Political Economy of Transition,
University Press of America, 1995, p. 166
4.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “The Fate of Ethiopia must be decided by
Ethiopians: A commentary on Gregory Stanton’s
speech”, November 15, 2010 www.africanidea.org/commentary_IDEA.org
5.
Joĕl
I Navarro, Esperanza Marchena, and Immaculada
Menacho, The
Open Criminology Journal, 2013, Vol. 6, 13,
Department of Psychology, University of Cadez,
Spain
6.
“Attack
Helicopters Over Defiant Kobo: Security forces
again kill unarmed civilians,” www.ethiomedia.com
January 26, 2018
7.
Op
cit, Navarro et al
8.
Courtney
Jung, “Race, Ethnicity, Religion”, in Charles
Tilly and Robert E. Goodwin, The
Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis,
op cit p. 366
9.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “Ethiopian Diaspora Politics and the
People of Tigray”,
www.africanidea.org/Ethiopian_diaspora_polotics.html
February 2,
2013
10.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, “Hail the People of Tigray, Defenders of
Ethiopian Sovereignty and Custodians of its
Civilization” July 1, 2003 www.ethiomedia.com/hail_the_people_of_tigray.html
11.
Goitom
Gebreluel and Biniam Bedasso, “Managing
Ethiopia’s political crisis”, Opinion/Africa,
7 February 2018. Nemera Mamo is a co-author of
this article
All
Rights Reserved © IDEA, 2018. Dr. Ghelawdewos
Araia can be contacted via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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