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Reflections
on Strategy for Sweden’s Development Cooperation
with Ethiopia
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
June 1, 2016
This paper intends to systematically analyze Sweden’s
development cooperation with Ethiopia (2016-2020)
in the context of the multivariate facets or
component parts of the Strategy and in conjunction
with Ethiopia’s role in the transformation
process and overall development agenda. First,
however, I like to present a brief synopsis of the
distinctive history of Sweden that ultimately led
to the Swedish Model.
Sweden is one of the most fascinating, prosperous, and
peaceful country in our planet earth; and this is
not a mere historical accident or coincidence.
What makes Sweden one of the most successful and
best countries in the world has to do with its
long tradition of peaceful resolution to conflicts
and its rich political culture in social
democracy; admittedly, however, Sweden was engaged
in wars with Denmark, Russia, and Poland in the 17th
century and it even became a regional power in the
Baltic zone in the same century. Nevertheless,
after Sweden lost war with Russia in 1709 and its
subsequent last war in 1814, the country pursued a
peaceful non-aligned foreign policy. The country
was not involved in WWI and/or WWII and it did not
join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Also admittedly, Sweden was involved in
acquiring overseas sphere of influence or colony
by purchasing tiny St. Barthélemy in the
Caribbean from France in 1784 but sold it back in
1878, and to its credit Sweden set free the
African slaves before it abandoned the island.
With the above historical background of Sweden, thus, it is
not surprising that Sweden became a peace
advocating progressive nation and a
quintessentially strong bulwark in the
development-aid package, mostly manifested in the
mission and objectives of Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA). The latter agency, by
and large, follows the overall social democratic
culture of Sweden and the country’s advocacy for
human and civil rights; and now, before I delve
into the Strategy for Sweden’s Development
Cooperation with Ethiopia, it is imperative that I
dwell on the Swedish Model.
When I was a graduate student at Columbia University, I read
Kurt Samuelson’s “The Swedish Model and
Western Europe 1945-1988”, in which the author
argues that “Sweden’s economy was modern and
efficient enough to withstand the increased
competition from…West Germany.”1 Most
importantly, however, it is Samuelson’s
characterization of the Swedish Model that is
relevant to our present discussion. “The model
is not merely this or that policy,” argues
Samuelson, “The model is not the Swedish welfare
system, even if that is an important part.
Historically, and foremost, the model is defined
not by the material content of specific policies
but by Swedish political behavior itself, in the
interrelations between government, industry and
unions. Relations between different political
opinions and parties are also important; you may
call it the political climate or the political
culture. During the 1930s, and even more so during
the 1940s and the end of the 1960s, these
relations were characterized more and more by
cooperation, consensus and an ability to have
reasonable checks and balances.”2
Justice and equality are the kernel and/or embodiments of the
Swedish Model and it is no wonder that the
Strategy memorandum underscores ‘democracy’,
‘human rights’, ‘gender equality’ etc. The
Strategy has three component parts: 1) A better
environment, limited climate impact and greater
resilience to environmental impact, climate change
and natural disasters; 2) strengthened democracy,
gender equality, and greater respect for human
rights; 3) better opportunities and tools to
enable poor people to improve their living
conditions.
The Strategy for Sweden’s development cooperation with
Ethiopia memo, of course, critically examines the
country context and evaluates Ethiopia “as one
the world’s poorest countries” but it
acknowledges that Ethiopia’s economy is growing
rapidly. The Strategy also candidly argues that
“the scope for political participation is
limited and women have a subordinate position in
society. …Respect for human rights in the
country is neglected, in particular with regard to
democracy and women’s rights.”
However, the beauty of the Strategy memo is that it is well
balanced in its critical examination of the
Ethiopian country profile. It is neither
condescending nor mere critical appraisal; on the
contrary, it gives credit to the positive
development progress Ethiopia is making. This is
how it puts it:
“However, in other respects, Ethiopia is moving in the right
direction. Poverty is steadily decreasing and
several social indicators are moving in a positive
direction. The country has presented an economic
growth of around ten percent annually for several
years. The manufacturing industry is developing
steadily and is attracting more and more foreign
companies, several of which are Swedish.
Considerable investments are being made to improve
the infrastructure including access to
electricity. However, workers rights remained
neglected.”
“There is a strong driving force in the Government regarding
the implementation of the second national
development plan (Growth and Transformation Plan,
GTP II) that runs between 2016 and 2020. The plan
focuses on economic growth through increased
productivity in agriculture and the manufacturing
industry, continued investment in infrastructure
and the promotion of environmentally-friendly
industry and energy sector through the strategy
‘Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE, adopted
in 2011)”.
GTP II, like its predecessor GTP I may score some achievements
in the development of the foundational economy but
it could meet major challenges beyond the policy
matrix. The main reason for the challenge is the
level of economic development of Ethiopia itself;
despite promising economic growth trends, the
country is unable to make a transition from
agriculture to export-led manufacturing industry.
Moreover, the country is far from creating
environmentally-friendly industry. The many
tanneries throughout the country have now become
the major cause for the pollution of hitherto
pristine streams in their respective
neighborhoods. A good example of these polluted
waters is the Qebena River in Addis Ababa, which
was clean and fresh but has now became very toxic
due to unfettered pollutants poured unto the
river.
Pollution, of course, is not a uniquely Ethiopian phenomenon;
all major industrial countries, in one form or
another, have polluted water and air in spite of
the plethora environment protection protocols.
However, if diligent policies are pursued and
governments exhibit some commitment, pollution
could be minimized or even controlled, and it is
in the latter spirit that I have proposed the
following with some caveat:
“The Ethiopian government in general and the MOA [Ministry
of Agriculture], in particular have a mammoth
responsibility to reverse the imbalance of the
ecosystem in Ethiopia, not by simply enhancing
agricultural production but also by maintaining
the ecosystem at the same time. For instance,
clearing trees and shrubs for rice agriculture in
Gambella (south western region) could exacerbate
the imbalance of the ecosystem, and flower farm
near Lake Zuwai could disturb and kill marine life
because the chemical fertilizers and insecticide
sprays, that apparently enhance fresh cut flower
industry, could find their way into the Lake.”3
The Swedish Strategy ought to make an in-depth investigative
field work research on Ethiopia’s agriculture,
industry, and the environment in order to meet its
goals and by default place Ethiopia on the right
track, especially with respect to modern
agriculture, the new industries and their impact
on the environment.
The Strategy also credits Ethiopia for implementing “major
initiatives in health and medical care” and
acknowledges that “good results have been
achieved.” On top of this, the Strategy
recognizes that “Ethiopia serves as a
stabilizing factor in the Horn of Africa, where,
in various parts of the region the political
situation is tense with several ongoing conflicts,
resulting in considerable refugee flows. Ethiopia
pursues a relatively open and generous refugee
policy, which has contributed to the country
hosting one of the world’s largest refugee
population totaling 720,000 individuals from
mainly South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea.”
The last part of the Strategy reiterates the question of
democracy and human rights that we have already
discussed above, but it is not clear whether
Sweden will make it a precondition to its
aid-development in Ethiopia, or simply engage in
the implementation of the Strategy while at the
same time Swedish personnel on the ground lead by
example and monitor the various projects and make
sure they are implemented in the context of the
Swedish Model and Ethiopian reality.
The concluding part of the Strategy clearly stipulates that
“the forms to be used for follow-up are
described in the Government’s guidelines for
strategies. Evaluation is to be seen as integral
part of continual follow-up and is to be conducted
when necessary. Various methods for results
monitoring are to be applied, using both
qualitative and quantitative results information.
A balance between short-term and long-term results
in the contribution portfolio should be sought to
ensure that aid contributes to fair and
sustainable development.”
In the final analysis, however, qualitative and quantitative
data; evaluations, guidelines etc could be fine
tools in the policy spectrum, but they could face
daunting negative encounters given the lack
thereof of good governance and wide-spread
corruption in Ethiopia, although the country is on
the right track as mentioned above and its overall
development progress is promising.
Notes:
1.
Kurt
Samuelson, “ The Swedish Model and Western
Europe, 1945 – 1988,” Journal
of International Affairs, School
of International and Public Affairs, Columbia
University, Vol. 41/No. 2, Summer 1988, p. 364
2.
Kurt
Samuelson, Ibid, p. 368
3.
Ghelawdewos
Araia, ETHIOPIA:
Democracy, Devolution of Power, and The
Developmental State, Institute of Development
and Education for Africa (IDEA), 2013, p. 179
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