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Trends and
Patterns in Contemporary Ethiopian Politics
Ghelawdewos Araia, PhD
December 13, 2017
Time and again I
addressed and seriously underscored the
significance of Ethiopian unity, because from day
one since the ascendance of the EPRDF to power, I
sensed a political program that could possibly
undermine the unity of the Ethiopian people and
subsequently the fragmentation of the Ethiopian
nation-state. This concern of mine, shared by
multitude of Ethiopians, was expressly stated in
my debut book published twenty-two years ago, and
it goes as follows:
The TGE’s policy of Kilil and
self-determination is commendable, but the
consequence of fragmentation as a result of new
wave of ethnic political consciousness, and the
inability of some minority nationalities to become
economically and politically viable, would
ultimately preoccupy Ethiopians to otherwise
unforeseen problem.1
Now, I have lived
to witness my own prediction haunting me as a
nightmare when especially I encountered a
preponderant ethno-nationalism, coupled by ethnic
hatred that virtually encapsulated the overarching
and common Ethiopian identity. Sadly, in the last
two and half decades, Ethiopians have begun
identifying themselves as Oromo, Amhara, and/or
Tigray instead of calling themselves
‘Ethiopian’. Diaspora Ethiopians have
forgotten their common Ethiopian identity, and
willingly forged ethnic enclaves; the Oromo in
Minnesota, for instance, have founded not only a
miniature Oromo nation but they also have
practically divorced themselves from the larger
Ethiopian society. Similarly, Amhara and Tigray
Diaspora Ethiopians who belong to the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church have gone separate ways and found
their respective churches led by politically
oriented clergy.
As indicated
above, thus, contrary to the general trend of
history in which human societies evolve from a
lower to a higher socioeconomic and
socio-psychological gradations, it looks that
Ethiopians have reversed the historical route and
ended up in sectarian and narrow entities, and as
a result they became narrow minded. This
kind of degeneration engenders negative
consequences of ethno-nationalism and manifests
the worst type of bias and hate against people. It
is therefore not surprising that Ethiopians in the
Diaspora and to some extent Ethiopians in
Ethiopia, inoculated with the virus of hate,
employ toxic activities such as burning Ethiopian
flag, burning public properties2 and
attacking Tigrawot (Tigrayans) that have nothing
to do with the TPLF/EPRDF. Similar frenzy attacks
had been unleashed against the Amhara in the early
1990s when the EPRDF-led transitional government
of Ethiopia (TGE) was established; subsequently,
the Amhara that were residing in the “Oromo
territory” were told to leave and go back to
“their country”, when in fact all Ethiopia is
their country. Moreover, narrow-minded
ethno-nationalists, perceive Amharic as their
enemy and as a result they don’t want to
communicate in Amharic nor want to use the Geez
alphabets to express their ideas.
I have been
following and studying ethno-nationalist trends
and patterns in the context of contemporary
Ethiopian politics and have come to conclude that
the present generation of Ethiopians have become
less enlightened and more myopic compared to the
generation of the 1960s and 1970s. I recall the
golden age of Ethiopian politics when Ethiopian
students, under the banner of USUAA (University
Students Union of Addis Ababa) promoted an
all-encompassing Ethiopian politics and ideology
against the regime in power; they were mainly
interested in the liberation of oppressed
nationalities; the equality of women; land to the
tiller; and the end of poverty in Ethiopia. These
were the major mottos and agendas that were
marshaled by the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM)
and that were mainly intended to overhaul Ethiopia
in general and uplift Ethiopians from poverty in
particular. In more general terms, the ESM is the
epitome of an advanced detachment and politically
highly conscious student body dedicated to the
welfare of the Ethiopian people and the
advancement of Ethiopia in the economic sphere.
To the enlightened
students mentioned above, ethnic divide and ethnic
politics were out of question; on the contrary,
beyond Ethiopian nationalism, the militant
students upheld the universal concept of
internationalism. They were advocates not only for
Ethiopia but also for other African countries like
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau
that were not independent yet; they also stood for
the people of Vietnam who were struggling for
freedom against American intervention, and for all
other oppressed peoples around the world. I still
have a vivid memory of USUAA-sponsored rallies,
such as the anti US-conducted war in Vietnam at
Arat Kilo; in that rally, in due course of burning
the effigy of President Nixon, one student by the
name Tsegaye Gebremedhin (Debteraw) almost burned
himself; and in the same rally, one student from
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) by the name Elias
read a memo in solidarity and support of the
Zimbabwe guerrilla fighters.
With the above
student legacy, the golden age of politics were
carried on after the 1974 revolution broke out. At
least in the formative period of the revolution,
EPRP and MEISONE exchanged debates on major
political issues via their respective
publications, Goh and Tsedey, and Ethiopians as a
whole assumed the emergence of a new democratic
Ethiopia. Tragically, contrary to the wishes and
ambitions of Ethiopians, when the Derg military
regime consolidated power it effectively
terminated the political culture of the golden age
by prioritizing the gun to suppress the people and
by declaring the so-called Red Terror against the
EPRP, the youth, and other progressive forces;
adding fuel to fire, the EPRP and MEISONE began
killing each other and the political trends and
patterns of the 1960s and 1970s were gone forever.
Although these two prominent political parties
made major tactical and strategic mistakes in
conducting fratricidal and pitched battles in
urban Ethiopia, there is no doubt that they were
infiltrated by foreign agents who wanted Ethiopia
to fail.
Ethiopia was ruled
by the most sadistic and brutal regime in its
history from 1974 to 1991, that is, until the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) ended the Mengistu Hailemariam-led
government and captured state power. Ethiopians,
once again, hoped for a new democratic Ethiopia
after the monstrous regime was avoided. At any
rate, with the coming of the EPRDF there were some
semblance of peace and gradually but surely the
new government began to implement development
programs but it never allowed democracy to
flourish. As far as I am concerned the absence of
democracy for the last twenty six years in
Ethiopia is viscerally disturbing, and it is for
this apparent reason that I have dedicated seven
chapters on democracy in my book Ethiopia: Democracy, Devolution of Power, and the Developmental State
(2013).
Some people argue
that democracy is not necessarily a precondition
to development, and they further reason that there
are countries that were transformed under
tyrannical regimes. However, although this line of
argument is logically sound, it does inadvertently
conceal not only the significance of democracy but
also justifies dictatorships and tyrannical
political systems. On top of this, the argument,
more or less, dismisses the possibility of the
synergetic connection of democracy and development
and that both can also in fact operate in tandem.
Once the EPRDF
firmly saddled on the state power machine, it was
determined to govern Ethiopia all by itself
without the participation of contending other
parties, let alone share power with
representatives of the legally registered
opposition parties. There is no doubt that the
EPRDF permitted well-meaning pre-election debates,
but soon after the election is over it becomes
fait accompli that the EPRDF is the winner; in
fact, the ruling party systematically alienated
the opposition several times. In the 2010
election, for instance, there was only one
opposition representative in the parliament with
547 seats, and in the 2015 election, the EPRDF
stunned the world by its ridiculous declaration
that it had won all seats in the parliament. This
action of the EPRDF, of course, was a national
disgrace for Ethiopia and a major hurdle for the
establishment of democratic institutions in the
country.
In the past
quarter of a century, thus, given the pattern of
governance EPRDF-style, the regime in power forged
a huge bureaucracy at the center (the federal
government) and the periphery (the nine regional
states) and infused it with patronage politics;
only loyal EPRDF members and supporters were to
benefit from the stakes and spoils of the
political system; and professionals and
intellectuals who were independent in their
thinking and were critical of the regime were
deliberately avoided; and although the EPRDF
condemned so-called Kiray
Sebsabinet, a confusing and wrong Amharic term
to mean ‘privilege seeking’, and attributed it
to corrupt officials within its ranks and the
larger Ethiopian society, it is the ruling party
itself that actually employed spoils as mentioned
above and openly gave offices and privileges to
its supporters.
However, despite
undemocratic governance and patron-client politics
of the EPRDF, the ruling party achieved major
development implementations in infrastructure such
as the construction of roads, railways, and dams;
the expansion of schools all over Ethiopia and the
founding of 35 universities; the expansion of
primary health care in the rural areas; the
construction of public housing
and establishment of factories and
industrial parks; and last but not least the
strengthening and upgrading of the Ethiopian
defense by an up-to-date and state-of-the-art
technology.
While the trends
and patterns in Ethiopian politics can be
summarized by the main features of this essay
discussed above, it would however be incomplete
without critically examining the most recent party
meetings of the EPRDF, particularly that of the
TPLF, to which I now turn.
The four parties
that make up the EPRDF, namely the Tigray People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo People’s
Democratic Organization (OPDO), Amhara National
Democratic Movement (ANDM), and Southern Ethiopian
People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM), have
conducted an overall organizational evaluation,
criticism and self-criticism, and assessment of
the present Ethiopian situation.
The OPDO, ANDM, and SEPDM conferences, in a
similar vein to that of the TPLF Mekelle
conference were aimed at launching, at least
theoretically, structural change within their
respective parties, but it looks that this wishful
agenda, if seen from prior repeated EPRDF promises
(pattern of behavior), is an Achilles Heel that
could not be healed. I think the EPRDF is stuck in
an intractable modus operandi and consequently
unable to manage its own internal crisis, let
alone bring fundamental and/or structural changes.
And short of complete overhaul of the EPRDF and
the political system it presides over, Ethiopia
could encounter a major setback and the
development programs scored thus far could be
derailed, retarded or stalled.
One good thing
that came out from the conferences, particularly
from the OPDO conference, is the emergence of new
and young leadership like Lemma Megerssa, who have
embraced Ethiopian patriotic nationalism. Lemma,
the current president of the Oromia Regional
State, told Ethiopians in no uncertain terms at
the Oromo-Amhara peoples meeting in Bahir Dar,
“Ethiopiawinet is addictive” although he used
the inappropriate and wrong word of ‘hashish’
in lieu of ‘addiction’. I was delighted to
hear those words and I said to myself,
“Ethiopian nationalism, after all, is a powerful
and unique ethos and will not easily succumb to
the present vogue of ethno-nationalism and
sectarian politics.” Nevertheless, whether
Ethiopian nationalism will eventually triumph over
ethnic enclave entrapments or is going to be
emasculated by the latter remains to be seen.
In the manifesto
of the TPLF fighters (Tegadelti)
that was made available for public consumption
after their August 2017 meeting, the emphasis and
leitmotif was Ethiopian nationalism; in fact, the
memo clearly states that “anti-Ethiopia elements
must be combated”, and this newly reconstituted
Ethiopian agenda gives some solace vis-à-vis an
Ethiopia that is beset by ethnic politics that
could possibly drive the great Ethiopian nation
toward fragmentation, unless it is dealt with
properly now; I mean now, without delay!
If the EPRDF
indeed is going to redeem pan-Ethiopian
nationalism and identity, it must seriously
consider the present mono-ethnic regional states
and put instead as an option multiethnic
administrative units without completely altering
the federal system. Federalism as such is not a
problem; in fact, federalism is a good system but
what matters is how the federal system is
arranged. In substantiating the above idea, in one
of my articles published in 2016, I reasoned as
follows:
I strongly believe that my recommendation of a
transition from a mono-ethnic regional states to
multi-ethnic and multicultural regional states
without disturbing the idea and practice of the
federal system is not only viable and a guarantee
to Ethiopian unity, but it could also forge a
higher form of national consciousness that would
altogether transcend the current sectarian
clannish and/or ethnocentric ideology. The
paradigm shift will also serve as a vehicle to
emancipate the Ethiopian psychology from the
shackles of ethnic politics in general and
liberate (or systematically emasculate) the
relatively obdurate, immutable, and invidious
Ethiopian elements from their toxic activity,
inherent bias and subjectivity, as well as
existential absurdity.3
In brief what the
above two paragraphs entail is the significance
and seriousness of what Ethiopia represents as a
nation and what it means to the collective psyche
of Ethiopians; in other words, it means all
Ethiopians, irrespective of their ethnic origins,
should be entitled to live, work, worship,
sojourn, and own property in all regional states.
In this regard, Ethiopia can learn from the
Nigerian federal experiment in which multiethnic
linguistic groups reside in all thirty six states
that makes up Nigeria. On top of this, the EPRDF
should altogether eliminate the word
‘secession’ from its lexicon and rewrite
article 39 of the Ethiopian constitution.
Finally, I like to
discuss the content and essence of the TPLF/EPRDF
Central Committee (CC) memorandum put out by the
organization following its 35-day closed meeting
in Mekelle. Although the TPLF’s newly formed CC
leadership does not in any way manifest change,
and on the contrary it signals to Ethiopians that
it is business as usual and same people
representing same old class interests are still in
place, credit must be given to the TPLF for
admitting its mistakes and for dissecting its
drawbacks. The CC of the TPLF, for instance,
states that “recently the party has entered into
a whirlpool and has shown weakness in not
providing sufficient answers to people’s
demands…and because the party’s strategic
leadership was incapacitated, the organization
became part of the problem, instead of becoming
part of the solution.”
Furthermore, the
following extract from the CC memo is the most
powerful and compelling self-criticism the TPLF
has ever made in its entire history: “The
leadership lacks theoretical and practical unity;
it is immersed in anti-democratic practices and
ideas; a leadership that does not furnish
leadership surrounding mission and principle;
instead of prioritizing the people and principles,
it promoted instead its own honor and interests;
at a time when its advocacy for the people was
being eroded, the party moved from being servant
to the people to servicing itself; instead of
sticking with people oriented successful
structural changes, it began quenching with
summary changes, and started rewarding itself by
false reports; as a result, the leadership was
transferred to a dependent ruling class.”
“This strategic
leadership weakness”, the TPLF additionally
states, “had huge impact on the implementation
of our economic goals. ‘We reached a point where
we could not continue what we had begun to achieve
numerous changes surrounding people’; the party
has seen in depth that sometimes these
achievements regressed; the party has also seen
that there was a wide gap in organized leadership
with respect to development forces. The party has
clearly understood that it has sterilized the
potential change championship of the youth,
intellectuals, women, and other professional
associations. It has made big contribution to the
erosion of the trust people had on the
organization. Moreover, the party also very well
understood that ‘we ensnared ourselves into the
trap made by the enemies of the federal system’,
and as a result the TPLF exhibited weakness in
jeopardizing the very existence of our country
Ethiopia.”4
More than
self-criticism and internal party evaluation, the
TPLF and the other three EPRDF organizations have
made confessions to the Ethiopian people, and they
also have promised changes, but the latter remains
to be seen and the Ethiopian people could still be
suspicious of the ruling party given the patterns
of inconsistency in its policies and style of
governance. However, Ethiopians could have some
confidence vis-à-vis the successes in the
foundational economy by the EPRDF. Furthermore,
Ethiopians could have confidence and hope due to
the fact that at long last the ruling party began
to expressly state Ethiopian nationalism that was
de-emphasized and undermined for the last twenty
six years.
By way of
concluding and offering some advice to the EPRDF,
I like to recommend the following: 1) The EPRDF
must carefully diagnose the trends and patterns
shown by African leaders who were self-proclaimed
permanent rulers and who brought so much damage to
their respective countries. The ruling party
should not follow their example and should rather
prepare itself an exit strategy; 2) given the
complex Ethiopian political landscape, the
weakness of the opposition, and the predominance
of ethnocentric politics and values, it would be
advisable that the EPRDF stay in power but with
the sole purpose of giving a chance to a new
leadership (“young blood”) via peaceful
transition; 3) at long last, the pan-Ethiopian
agenda and Ethiopian nationalism must be
revitalized in such a way not only to galvanize
country-wide sentiments, but also to purposely
mobilize the Ethiopian people against the enemies
of Ethiopia and transcending all narrow
ethno-nationalist proclivities and political
programs; 4) the EPRDF must be transparent not
only in its routine government operations but also
with respect to some suspicious incidents that
have afflicted the Ethiopian larger society for
relatively long time. To this day, the Ethiopian
people don’t know who conducted the bombardment
of Tigray Hotel and Lalibela Hotel in Addis Ababa
in the 1990s; they also don’t know who shot
Minister and Ambassador Abdul Majid Hussien or
murdered the Ethiopian priests in Arsi; conducted
the massacre in Gambella; murdered Hajji Yusuf in
Wollo; burned public property in Ambo (several
times); attacked Tigrayans in Gondar; and the
recent incidents of Woldia confrontation in which
one person died and another incident in Adigrat in
which also one student was killed. The government
must be accountable for all these disreputable,
dubious, and cynical activities and it should
explain (not just announce on TV) the causes for
the incidents; 5) the EPRDF should not revisit the
Algiers Agreement and surrender Ethiopian
territory and commit an egregious second historic
mistake. If it does, it may very well hasten its
downfall; 6) the EPRDF leadership and its officers
down the hierarchy of the party must understand
that development is not only material but it also
includes intellectual and psychological, and for
this apparent reason they must also give priority
to freedom of the press, open debates, and
evolution of democratic political culture without
preconditions; 7) the EPRDF must give priority to
youth preparedness and leadership; the youth are
the future of Ethiopia, and as such they must be
educated and oriented in a leadership academy so
that Ethiopia enjoys smooth transference of power
and political change.
However, the seven
recommendations mentioned above cannot be met
unless and until the EPRDF is willing to allow a
non-discriminatory platform in which all
opposition (except some treasonous organizations)
forces in Ethiopia and other organizations outside
Ethiopia like the EPRP and MEISONE (if it is still
existence) and other civic organizations
participate in the making of new Ethiopia. This,
in effect, is going to be the new national
reconciliation that could nourish peaceful
coexistence amongst various political parties and
nationalities of Ethiopia and guarantee Ethiopians
to continue endeavoring and realizing the
transformation of their country for the better.
That will be the day when Ethiopia rise as a
strong leader nation in the African continent and
herald the emergence of African Lions to the
world!
Notes
1.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopia:
The Political Economy of Transition,
University Press of America, 1995, p. 166
2.
Ghelawdewos Araia, “Foreign
Intervention, the Politics of Burning Public
Property, and State Emergency Declaration in
Ethiopia,” www.africanidea.org/Ethiopia_Foreign_Intervention.html
3.
Ghelawdewos Araia, “Beyond
Ethnocentric Ideology and Paradigm Shift for a
Greater Ethiopian Unity,” April 20, 2016
www.africanidea.org/Beyond_Ethnocentric_Ethiopian_unity.html
4.
TPLF/EPRDF, “TPLF/EPRDF Central
Committee Position Stand” Hidar 21, 2010
(Ethiopian Calendar), December 1, 2017
All Rights Reserved Copyright © Institute of
Development and Education for Africa (IDEA), 2017.
For educational and constructive feedback, please
contact Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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