Coalition Government and Comparative Politics: Meanings for Ethiopia

                                       Ghelawdewos Araia

Following the May 15, 2005 Ethiopian elections, the majority of Ethiopians found themselves caught in the crossfire between contesting parties--the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)& United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) vs. Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)--. Both, the ruling and opposition parties, declared that they were winners, and both declared that they would form the next government long before the ballots were counted. At the beginning, the EPRDF conceded that the CUD/UEDF coalition won in Addis Ababa and other major cities; the CUD was also confident that it managed to throw out from office key and top EPRDF officials including Addisu Legesse (deputy prime minister and former president of the Amhara regional state), Genet Zewdie (Minister of education), Tefera Walewa (Minister of capacity building), Dawit Yohannes (speaker of the parliament), Arkebe Okbay (mayor of Addis Ababa) etc.

Although the CUD/UEDF may not have scored a landslide victory as per their declaration, they, without doubt, have unleashed a tremor (political earthquake) of great magnitude that effectively undermined the EPRDF regime. And to be sure, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his close associates, as a matter of course, had to strategize and make sure that the political equation (status quo) should remain in their favor. Therefore, once again, they declared that the EPRDF is the actual winner in the countryside while at the same time, in anticipation of CUD/UEDF protestation, Addisu Legesse, in no uncertain terms, indicated that his government would take necessary action and crack down mass protests. It is not, therefore, surprising that we witnessed a blood bath in Addis where 40 young men and women were killed and a hundred more were injured.

The CUD too made a mistake in contemplating to [hurriedly] form the new government after it claimed that it had won more than 300 seats. Had it seriously considered IDEA�s editorial (www.africanidea.org/mirage.html) it would have reconsidered a different route to power and restrained itself from frightening the EPRDF that had already eroded its TPLF base and now faced with a major challenge in 14 years. It should have pursued a more prudent, sober and seasoned political measure.

In the final analysis, however, it is not EPRDF�s determination to stay in power or CUD�s intention of having a coalition government (government of national unity) that decides the outcome of the elections and future politics of Ethiopia. Whether the EPRDF desperately clings to power or the CUD/UEDF ruminate with disappointment, or whether the centrifugal and centripetal forces prevail in current Ethiopian politics is not so relevant for our present discussion.

I like to discuss in this paper the significance of coalition government in Ethiopian politics, and given the lack of democratic culture and egregious intolerance in modern Ethiopian society, the central theme of this paper, at best, is going to be conceptual, theoretical, and futuristic. The theoretical analysis and policy formulation that we shall discuss based on other countries experiences, however, will at least enable us to appreciate the diversity of interaction (divergent participation by citizens) in the political process and ultimately witness the evolution of tolerant social and political systems. Once we secure a relatively permanent democratic system, then we can easily ward off political fragmentation and instability.

It is good to have a relatively tolerant atmosphere as in the pre-election debates in Ethiopia and we cannot deny that there was effervescence of ideas during the electoral process, but it was transient and brief indeed. A lot of Ethiopian observers who were impressed by the pre-election political culture forgot to realize that flowers can bloom but weeds can also take over if the foundation of the electoral democracy is on a shaky ground. Nevertheless, I too do appreciate the historic significance of the 26 million registered voters who went to the ballots to decide the future of Ethiopia.

If we want to ward off instability and political fragmentation, however, it seems to me that the formation of coalition government is a wise move. Coalition governments are formed during crisis or when election results are disputed and remain unresolved. A coalition government is a government of national unity, an alliance or clustering of various parties for peaceful transition and transformation. Coalition governments are also ideal in proportionally represented parliamentary systems like the Nordic (Scandinavian) countries, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Israel, India, as opposed to France, USA, and Russia where the cabinet is chosen by the president. But, what the above democracies have in common is the fact that the executive derives its mandate from the legislature and is accountable to it.

In countries where there is no democratic governance or where there is a semblance of democracy and/or fragile political structure, the executive dominates politics and operates above the law; the legislature becomes a rubber stamp entity and in effect does not legislate. In such political systems, it is unlikely that peaceful coexistence and coalition governments can take place. As stated above, however, we are trying to provide a foundation for developing paradigms and conceptual tools whereby future leaders of Ethiopia can draw a lesson from other political cultures.

However, if the EPRDF, on second thought, accepts the CUD proposal of government of national unity, then a coalition government in which several parties cooperate and a cabinet (regime) that is proportionally represented and which would be accountable to the parliament will be established. Central to coalition government is consensual politics in which several parties (in this case the EPRDF, CUD, UEDF etc) would have to concur with respect to governmental policy, because under this system there is no majority party in parliament to impose its will on other parties. In terms of advancing macro policies such as Ethiopian sovereignty and national interest, coalition governments are effective, but when it comes to micro policies of individual parties such as land reform, privatization etc. coalition governments are marred with disagreements and at times are prone to disintegration. Member parties don�t always come to terms on policies and they often countenance irreconcilable differences. In this sense coalition governments are unstable.

If on the other hand there is an atmosphere of toleration, democratic principles and practice, and overall political maturity that transcend trivial and personal political quarrels, a smooth coalition bargaining becomes the rule rather than the exception; a rich continuum of debate develops, and an equilibrium phenomenon accommodates the member parties.

The equilibrium phenomena in coalition government cannot take place if one of the parties views other parties as enemies and adversaries as opposed to �opponents� that share same national policy for the nation. Here, the analogy, almost always, drawn vis-�-vis coalition governments characterized by equilibrium is the metaphorical pie or cake that I have discussed in Strategies for A Democratic Culture (East African Forum, January 2000) under the �Principle of Negotiation�:

            The analogy that we can use here is, a group of people ready to eat a pie. They will negotiate on how to divide up the pie equally among themselves. Underscore the word �equally.� They have already established a form of mutual respect and confidence, and above all a collective consciousness toward forming a permanent society based on equality. But the negotiation will not be limited to sharing the pie only; the group will in fact creatively come up with the idea of baking the pie. They have now formed a higher unity that no enemy can easily dismember.�

Are Ethiopians ready to eat the cake together? A coalition government with equilibrium presupposes stability, because no single party or individual can undermine the structure and policy-related directives of the coalition. Once equilibrium is established single parties and individuals become less and less prominent although some individuals can still have enormous clout and could even become national figures. With equal footing, coalition members can equally share the cake and if they demonstrate sophisticated politics, they can even manufacture the cake as I have suggested five years ago.

The formation of a coalition government is good for the nation in terms of national unity, implementing policies, and circumventing dictatorial (monopoly of power) proclivities. However, in the short run, it could be politically a curse and blessing for the respective parties. The EPRDF, for instance, can lose substantial power but it can enjoy legitimacy in the political system as a whole. CUD/UEDF, on the other hand, can proportionally share power and influence public policy, but they can lose the faith and support of their constituency (those who voted for the opposition) that came out en masse during the election with the sole purpose of ousting the EPRDF.

In the long term, however, the people at large will understand why coalitions are formed, compromises are made, and why peaceful transition and transformation are preferable in light of the three decades bloody history of Ethiopia. Ethiopians should make sense, regenerate their traditional wisdom, and employ political acumen to further garner politics associated with national interest of Ethiopia. When it comes to democratic governance, there is no doubt that Ethiopians, despite thousands of years of statecraft, are toddlers, if not infants. But toddlers do grow and become men and women.

There are some countries that have had similar political experience like Ethiopia but that were bold enough to try coalition government. In point of fact, Thailand in many ways similar to Ethiopia � monarchy and independence � have tried coalition government where foes and friends alike operated together. If the Thais can do it, Ethiopians can at least put coalition government to test. Thailand�s coalition government was fragile but it created a sense of hope to the people in their democratic experiment after seven decades of monarchic rule.

The best of all coalition governments is to be found in Switzerland or the Swiss Confederation. Switzerland, of course, has a long history of democratic tradition where the Cantons have an upper hand in Swiss politics. The Cantons (at least 700 years old) are perhaps the oldest republics in the world and they serve as the foundation for coalition and referenda in Swiss politics. The Swiss Confederation has been ruled by a coalition of four strong parties for the last 46 years, i.e. since 1959. Because Switzerland is the envy of the world in its coalition governance, its political system is popularly known as the �Magic Formula.�

We have seen in the above a relatively fragile (Thai) and one formidable coalition (Swiss) and in between the two extremes we have touched upon the Western democracies. We do not expect Ethiopia to emulate Switzerland, nor do we have the illusion that the country all of a sudden will look like the Nordic countries, but we can hope for a trial period like that of Thailand, and if all goes well an experiment like that of India or Israel.