This paper intends to systematically analyze the significance of democracy, the politics of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and the role of the opposition political parties in Ethiopia. The aim of the study, above all, is to engage Ethiopian intellectual circles and the opposition in an effort to meaningfully address the current Ethiopian politics and challenge the EPRDF, the ruling party, without resorting to eschatological epithets. Whether one likes it or not, the EPRDF is the current government in Ethiopia and while it is perfectly legitimate to oppose the policies of the ruling party, it would be imperative for the opposition to come up with an alternative political program beyond criticizing and cursing the status quo. The opposition also must consider the ballot as a viable mechanism to challenge the EPRDF and secure legitimacy without tempting itself to employing other options that could result in bloodshed.

I am a strong believer in the promotion of dialogue and constructive engagement, and even if the regime in Addis Ababa exhibits reluctance in accommodating the opposition, the latter must continue to uphold a broader framework of strategies to peacefully engage the government in power. After all, confrontational politics is messy and bloody for the most part and destroys the spirit of civilized discourse. The opposition, in the long haul, will gain momentum if it manages to cultivate and nurture proactive politics that is guided by the principles of tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflicts. This is not to suggest, however, a Gandhian mantra of nonviolence but to propose that dialogue is strength. In brief, I am not recommending the opposition to turn the other cheek, but to carefully maintain the delicate balance between the peaceful method and the coercive alternative.

The path to democracy and the transformation of the Ethiopian society for the better is not going to be easy. There are two broad sets of problems that characterize the hindrance of democratic transformation in Ethiopia: 1) the pugnacious nature of most Ethiopians, a legacy of a long and deeply entrenched feudal values that shape the Ethiopian psyche of confrontation and bravado. This kind of psychological makeup greatly impedes the blossoming of culture of dialogue, tolerance, and accommodation in the political landscape; 2) the opposition mobilization is confronted by dual negative inputs: a) overall organizational weakness engendered by the devastation of the Ethiopian intelligentsia by the former regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam between 1974 and 1991; b) the cut-throat competition in power politics by the opposition within itself and against the EPRDF that has been controlling power relations at all levels since 1991.

On the other hand, the majority of Ethiopians have tremendous love for their country, and most of them vigorously entertain, at least conceptually, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their homeland. A common external enemy, thus, had met fierce resistance and ultimate defeat in the distant and most recent past by the collective struggle of Ethiopians, irrespective of their ethnic background and religious affiliations. On top of this patriotic zealotry, one common denominator Ethiopians have is the sentiment and fervent wish of a transformed and prosperous Ethiopia. Another additional quality of Ethiopians is that they are unwilling to settle short of fundamental change in both the political and economic realms.

For those Ethiopians who see half-full-glass, change is inevitable, and as Tom Bottomore aptly puts it “political change of some kind goes on continuously in every society, in response to a variety of changing internal and external conditions, which include the relation to nature and to other societies, the interaction of groups within each society, and the unceasing circulation of personnel through the disappearance of older generations and the rise of new ones. Depending upon the type of society concerned, more or less significant political changes may result from the introduction of a new technology; from trade or warfare; from a palace coup, a change of dynasty, the accession of competent or incompetent monarch, or the emergence of an exceptionally talented political leader; from cultural and intellectual movements; from the rise and fall of particular social groups, among them classes, religious and cultural groups, and elites which represent distinct social interests.”¹

Of all the elements mentioned above that play a catalytic role, the most salient, especially in the context of regime change in Ethiopia, are the cultural and intellectual movements. Ethiopian learned men and women, therefore, must shoulder an exceptional historical task in refashioning political ideologies and paving the road to fundamental change. The first task of Ethiopian intellectuals (politically active scholars) should be to clarify the ambiguities and difficulties associated with the political system, the rule of law, and the democratic process etc. The other major task should be involving oneself in mitigating the stark polarization among the opposition and elicit sustained and effective support to opposition political parties that embrace a pan-Ethiopia agenda.

Ethiopian intellectuals and professionals must also seriously consider the introduction of democracy in their country by way of creating discussion forums and platforms, and for the sake of provoking discussion, substantiating the central theme of this paper, and so that all of us learn by example, I will examine selected democratic experiments around the world.

In Africa itself, there are some promising spots with respect to the introduction and practice of democracy. Democratic elections, smooth transition to power, and coalition formation were the rule rather than the exception in Botswana. The three parties in this country, namely the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP), the Botswana National Front (BNF), and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) have contested power and have cooperated on many fronts to make their country stable and prosperous. The Botswana leadership seems to understand the portfolio allocation model that worked so well in most parliamentary democracies.

South Africa is another promise of a democratic experiment in the Continent despite the proliferation of corruption and widespread crime in the urban areas. Since the coming to power of Nelson Mandela in 1994, smooth transition to power has become the norm in South Africa. The former president, Thabo Mbeki, and the current president (since April 22, 2009), Jacob Zuma, may not successfully implement the legacy of Mandela, but South Africa has a splendid constitution, robust institutions, and an independent judiciary. Most importantly, South Africa has encouraged the mushrooming of political debate unleashed first by the Truce and Reconciliation Commission.

Ghana has made a major departure from its coup-prone political atmosphere and successive dictatorial regimes to viable democratic governance, thanks in large measure to the former president John Agyekum Kufour. The democratic election process is now functional in that country. There are multitudes of contesting parties operating in Ghana as political vehicles for the mobilization of the people, and the last election of December 2008 is a very good example of smooth transition. The Inter-Party Advisory Committee instructed the Electoral Commission (EC) to use biometric mechanism to carefully monitor the elections and minimize the problems of election duplication and other technical problems. In so doing, successful elections were conducted between the two candidates, Nana Akufo Addo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and Atta Mills of the National Democratic Party (NDP), and the latter won the day.

Ethiopia was not fortunate enough to embrace the norms and values of the above-mentioned African countries. Although there is a penchant for political participation on the part of the Ethiopian people, there is a tremendous deficit in political engagement on the part of the political leadership; and the majority of career politicians serving the EPRDF are insulated from the concerns of ordinary Ethiopians. Following the fall of the brutal military government of Mengistu Haile-Mariam in 1991, the EPRDF was expected to introduce at least a modicum of democratic culture. On the contrary, it became increasingly intolerant of the opposition and even resorted to crushing opponents by force.

Ato Meles Zenawi, the current prime minister, understands the aspirations of the Ethiopian people since he witnessed the student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and with that background he could have led Ethiopia toward a democratic society. I do not see any reason why a person who is relatively erudite cannot play a positive role in the introduction of democracy, unless there are inexplicable factors (such as cultural background and psychological makeup) that inhibit someone from carrying important and positive steps to bring about change when s/he has the opportunity to do so. More specifically, however, it seems to me that the power nexus is complex and intriguing, and individuals at the power helm undergo considerable change in their personality. “When people experience power,” says Deborah Gruenfeld, “they stop to control themselves; they forget that there are social consequences.” Professor Gruenfeld further discusses the psychology of power and leadership as follows: “Disinhibition involves acting on your own desires in a social context without considering the effects of your actions. It implies a heightened sensitivity to your own internal state and also a reduced sensitivity to others interests and experiences. It implies action orientation in pursuit of a goal and also the possibility that might use others as a means to an end.”²

Disinhibition or not, the EPRDF knows that the Ethiopian society is dynamic and change is inevitable, and I believe the ruling party has still a chance to initiate national reconciliation and conduct dialogue with the opposition in the making of a new democratic Ethiopia. It can at least talk to the main opposition parties such as Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ), All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP), the Medrek (Forum) group etc. The EPRDF came to power through the barrel of the gun, but after wielding power for the last eighteen years it should bear in mind that the gun or stick do not always serve political ends even in dictatorial and/or totalitarian states. To be sure, realists of extreme variety recognize and understand that carrots enhance stability and smooth transition to power.

There is no doubt that the EPRDF, a coalition of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), and the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), is dominated by the TPLF (popularly known as Woyane), and, in turn, by the inner circle of the Meles group. The latter, however, is not composed just of Woyane elements. It also includes powerful people from the other parties, including the Southern Ethiopian Peoples Organization, that have major stake in the state and overall governance. The learned men and women in the Ethiopian Diaspora, especially those who belong to groups who claim to be part of the opposition, need to undertake a sociological study on the nature and characteristics of the EPRDF and reexamine the composition of the ruling party in light of class stratification and analysis and not limit itself to the ethnic variable only.

The ruling party should also seize the historical moment before it slips from its hand forever, to reconcile [its differences] not only with the opposition but also with the larger Ethiopian society. It must allow broad democratic and civil rights; permit fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and peaceful demonstration. It is neither important nor necessary for the Ethiopian government to arrest and incarcerate members of the opposition and political figures whenever they voice the concern of the people or raise major political issues. Incarceration and detention of hundreds, and in some instances thousands of people is not the solution for the political regime that claims to embrace the developmental state, to which I will return later. Taking away the best and the brightest and putting them behind bars, in fact, directly conflicts with the underpinnings of development initiatives. According to www.Haber.com, “Ethiopia’s Tigray regional government officially releases 2167 prisoners in a full amnesty grant to mark the nation and nationalities day…”³ If more than 2000 people were pardoned from the prisons of one regional state, one could ponder how many of them were [are] behind bars in all Ethiopia?

The main opposition parties in Ethiopia too should take measures beyond confrontation and invite the ruling party in dialogue and peaceful negotiations. The opposition should transcend the Ethiopian psyche of grudge politics and seriously consider the most vexing problems of leadership succession that has bewitched Ethiopia for the last three and half decades. On top of engagement in national reconciliation, however, the main opposition groups in Ethiopia should initiate a massive opposition mobilization by organizing and recruiting sectors of the Ethiopian society, not only to challenge the EPRDF but also to bring about comprehensive change in current Ethiopian politics. But, first it must consolidate itself beyond loose federation of political groups and forge unity at least on the basis of minimum program. The opposition and Ethiopian intellectuals must also educate themselves by emulating other societies if at all they are going to realize a meaningful change in Ethiopia. Lessons in democracy, as discussed below, are prerequisites to the new and prosperous Ethiopia.

What is democracy and how relevant is it to Ethiopian politics? Without going to the ubiquitous etymology of the word ‘democracy’, I like to delve into the essentials of a democratic system as political scientist Robert Dahl puts it:

Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power through regular, free, and fair elections that exclude the use of force.

A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is prevented from exercising the rights of citizenship.

A level of civil and political liberties – freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and demonstration, freedom to form and join organizations, freedom from terror and unjustified imprisonment – secured through political equality under a rule of law, sufficient to ensure that citizens (acting individually and through various associations) can develop and advocate their views and interests and contest policies and offices vigorously and autonomously.⁴

However, Dahl’s paradigmatic analysis of a democratic system of government, which he labels polyarchy, is not limited to the component parts of the system. “Also implicit in [his] definition are the notions that rulers will be held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens and their representatives beyond the formal political framework of parties, parliaments, and elections.”⁵

Ethiopia, of course, is not going to be democratic overnight nor can it simply emulate the major democracies of the West, but it can learn from other Third World countries including African nations mentioned above. One interesting and very old democratic experiment, but which did not get global attention and scholarly recognition, is that of Chile. According to Arturo Valenzuela, “Chile would have been classified… a high success, a stable and uninterrupted case of a democratic rule. For most of the preceding one hundred years, Chilean politics had been characterized by a high level of party competition and popular participation, open and fair elections, and strong respect for democratic freedoms. …In the 19^th century, Chile developed democratic institutions and procedures, setting the country apart from many of its European counterparts as well as Latin American neighbors.”⁶

As is well known, the Chilean experiment was interrupted in 1971 by the ascendance of the Pinochet regime “which led the largest and most brutal authoritarian interlude in the nations history,” as Valenzuela puts it.

In western countries with a long history of liberal tradition, the development of democracy could entail fundamental rights, civil rights, and popular sovereignty. In countries like India, however, democracy could incorporate social mobilization and economic development as well. India has an established record of 52 years of democratic culture, and the elections of May 2009 that has drawn 700 million voters is a testimony to the country’s commitment to governance by consent.

Iyotirinda Das Gupta discusses the constitutional democratic system in India vis-à-vis the immense challenges of poverty, developmental problems, and ethnic diversity of the country. Gupta contends that “political reconstruction in India since 1947 has been remarkable for its consistent and continuous use of constitutional methods for generating national coherence, political stability, and the development of economic resources and political freedom.” Further more, Gupta argues, “unlike the historically established democracies, which benefited from a sequence of social mobilization and economic development preceding political democratization, democratic systems in developing countries have the inevitable task of simultaneously and rapidly developing the polity, economy, and society.”⁷

The Indian experiment is an amalgam of Western liberalism and domestic know-how, and the educated Indian elite was at the forefront in the configuration of India’s two-pronged development agenda. As Gupta noted, “an idealized blending of Western notions of liberal justice and indigenous knowledge of self-realization and social welfare had already become a part of nationalist culture that was widely shared by the educated classes. Constitutional encoding of these ideas satisfied their collective pride and reminded them of the social task ahead.”⁸

Interestingly, the Indian constitution clearly spells out the importance of liberal democracy and development, and I personally envision India’s example as an ideal model to Ethiopia’s nation building, if the latter is genuinely committed and manages to layout the infrastructure necessary to build a solid democratic system and a comprehensive development agenda that, in turn, can meaningfully overhaul the Ethiopian economy and enable the country to once and for all overcome widespread famine and catapult this ancient land into the threshold of middle-income status.

Is it possible for Ethiopia to emerge from its present status? I would like to think in the affirmative, but only if the prerequisites for the establishment of democracy and development are fulfilled. In light of the questions I posed above and the preconditions I have alluded to, I know return to the current vogue of the developmental state and discuss it in the context of the democracy-development nexus. There is no direct correlation between democracy and development, and successful developmental states, best exemplified by the Asian Tigers, are abound. However, the Tigers style of governance should not be a justification for the negation of democracy and liberalism, and it is in light of this rationale that I critiqued Meles Zenawi’s work ‘African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings’ in 2007. In that essay I argued, “the developmental state should not only be an interventionist, monitoring, gargantuan apparatus. On the contrary, it should serve as a platform for citizen involvement in the political process and nation building. It should relentlessly seek feedback from the masses if indeed the latter are going to be the massive backbone and bulwark for the state policy and actions…and most importantly, the developmental state should purposely foster tolerance and encourage an ambience where a myriad of ideas can be propagated and flourished.”⁹

Unless Ethiopia chooses the Indian model of developmental state and participatory democracy, the Ethiopian people will become mere spectators in their own affairs, let alone enjoy a relative degree of control over the actions of government officials. Once Ethiopia successfully establishes participatory democracy or government by consent, however, the most important corollaries of democracy, including freedom of expression, will evolve in tandem and immensely contribute to the positive conduct of the government in terms of transparency and accountability. Both the ruling party and the opposition parties in Ethiopia, thus, must learn from the common elements prevalent in most democratic systems:

Political parties to contest elections, mobilize public support for or opposition to the government’s policies, and handle the succession of power

An elected legislature to serve as the agent and advocate of the representatives’ constituents, to symbolize consultation with the governed, and to act as a conduit for communication of approval of and dissent from official policy

Electoral procedures to express mass approval or disapproval of government policy, to set limits on the course of government policy, and to renew leaders’ terms of office or dismiss them

Nonparty associations and groups (interest groups) to supplement the formal system of representation in the legislature, to communicate their members’ views to government officials, and to act as a means of consultation between the governed and the governors

Additional linkages between the government and its citizens to provide supplementary means of communication through guarantees of freedom of the press, the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, and protection against official reprisals for dissent against government actions.¹⁰

At the heart of the common elements enumerated above, of course, lies citizen participation in the electoral process and the overall government decision-making process at local, regional, and national levels. Benjamin Barber and Patrick Watson convincingly argue, “The true citizen is an active participant in politics, someone engaged in self-government. …Democracy means citizens governing themselves. But citizens are not simply private persons wearing political coats. One elementary measure of democracy is whether a people have a lively sense of themselves as citizens: as members of a body politic rather than just as self-interested individuals – as men and women capable of expressing public judgment rather than just voicing private needs and wants.”¹¹

With the exception of few and far between African nations mentioned above, the majority of the states in the Continent have turned into political machines that promote the ‘private needs and wants’ of the corrupt dictators. The challenge to the ruling party in Ethiopia once again is going to be the forthcoming elections of 2010. Part two; Article 38 of the Ethiopian constitution stipulates the right to vote and to be elected. Will this paperwork be translated into action in 2010?

If the ruling party and the opposition parties contest for state power and get broad-based electoral support, the state apparatus will not be reduced to serving private needs; instead it will serve the interest of the people. If on the other hand free and fair elections are not allowed, the likelihood of a state vanishing in the midst of autocracy is highly probable. What can then Ethiopians do to save the nation and the state from breaking down and crumbling? One viable option is to follow the examples of democratic orders around the world and install at least a modicum of democratic institutions. The advantage of having democratic institutions and periodic elections is, first and foremost, to guarantee smooth transition to power without resorting to coup d’état and mass revolt. Elections also entail not only putting people into public office, but also influencing policies and determining the overall operations of government at all levels.

Ethiopians can learn from American electoral process conducted every election season. “By casting their votes in elections, Americans make their most important collective decisions. They determine who will lead their government – who will decide when and where to use military force, what taxes to impose, what services to provide, and how to regulate the economy and social relations. With their election day choices, voters can demonstrate their displeasure as well as their satisfaction with the state of the Union, with the performance of public officials, and with how their own lives are going. By either terminating or renewing leaders’ leases to government offices, voters can hold public officials accountable for their actions and indirectly affect government policy.”¹²

Long before voters cast their ballot and preparations are underway (if all goes well) for the 2010 Ethiopian election, however, preliminary tasks for opposition mobilization such as propaganda (e.g. alternative policy agenda) for the consumption of the people should effectively take place so that the potential voters can gravitate toward the opposition parties. The opposition parties in Ethiopia must undertake massive mobilization tasks not only to oust and outshine the EPRDF, but also primarily to organize voters to exercise their constitutional rights and decide the future of Ethiopia in the 21^st century. “By embodying meaningful ideological alternatives,” say Gregory M. Scott and Loren Gatch, “parties provide the voting public with a basic guide for articulating otherwise-inchoate preferences. Parties also aggregate these preferences, thus improving a necessary structure to the process of representative democracy.”¹³

Can the Ethiopian political parties mobilize the opposition and enable it to articulate its aggregate preferences? Is there a political climate conducive enough to permit the opposition to meet its goals and objectives? Is the Ethiopian opposition equipped enough in organizational capability (party structure, membership drive, departmental task forces, finances etc.) and theoretical constructs (vision and political clarity)? These are some of the questions pertaining to the realities on the ground in Ethiopia that the opposition must address and answer before it ventures into the 2010 elections.

During the 2010 elections, the incumbent ruling party will enjoy a distinct advantage of controlling the government apparatus and the media, and also with finances at its disposal and favored diplomatic relations with the major nations of Europe and North America. The opposition, on the other hand, lacks virtually all of the above attributes that the ruling party can easily garner. While the opposition can potentially achieve mass support from the Ethiopian people, the ruling party’s mass base (already on shaky ground) can be eroded considerably. While the opposition has nothing to fear of power related countervailing forces such as coup d’état, the ruling party may have grave concerns of unforeseen subversion and an imploding political scenario. While the ethnic enclave mentality of Ethiopians, ironically exaggerated following the formation of the ethnic-based regional states, is unforeseen bonus for the EPRDF, it is a major challenge especially for pan-Ethiopian opposition parties. The paradox of history is clearly reflected in many Ethiopian circles and communities organized on ethnic lines as if to intentionally implement the program of the EPRDF. This political reality especially promoted by Diaspora Ethiopians will have a far-reaching negative impact on the mobilization efforts of the opposition in Ethiopia.

Opposition mobilization must begin with the analysis and firm grasp of the above-mentioned complex and intractable issues. Diagnostic approach to the complicated Ethiopian politics is one way to go. The prognosis/prescription will take its own course!

1.Tom Bottomore, Political Sociology, Harper & Row Publication, 1979, p. 79

2.Deborah Gruenfeld, Stanford Graduate School of Business, May 2006

www.harber.com, November 16, 2008

4.Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press, 1971

5.Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset (editors), Politics in Developing Countries, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p. 7

6.Arturo Valenzuela, “Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy,” in Larry Diamond et al., p. 67

7.Iyotirinda Das Gupta, “India: Democratic Becoming and Developmental Transition,” in Larry Diamond et al., p. 274

8.Gupta, Ibid, p. 276

9.Ghelawdewos Araia, “Reflections on African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, May 2007 www.africanidea.org/reflections_mz.html

10.John F. Bibby, Government by Consent, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1992, p. 13

11.Benjamin Barber and Patrick Watson, The Struggle for Democracy, Little, Brown, and Company, 1988, pp. 141-142

12.John F. Bibby, Ibid, p. 219

13.Gregory M. Scott and Loren Gatch, 21 Debated Issues in American Politics, Second Edition, Upper Saddle River, 2004, p. 103

All Rights Reserved. Copyright © IDEA, Inc. 2009. Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia can be contacted via dr.garaia@africanidea.org for educational and constructive feedback.