There are Some Historical Destinies that We Could not Avoid

                                      Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia
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            Although people are essentially the makers of history, a major portion of history is forged independent of our will. In some instances, history is pleasant; in another it is full of surprises, and yet sometimes it has no mercy. In this context, circumstances, which are the component parts of history, govern us.

            One tragic historical destiny that we encountered in the last three decades is the unfortunate decimation of Ethiopian progressive forces by successive regimes. The Derg unleashed the Red Terror without ever detecting that heinous criminals that have effectively hijacked the revolutionary momentum and deliberately destroyed the future leaders of Ethiopia infiltrated it. Adding insult to injury, the EPRDF, the illegitimate orphan of the Yekatit Abiot, have also succumbed into an anti-Ethiopian frenzy although it attempted to masquerade with some revolutionary slogans including some sedate plagiarism such as Abyiotawi Democracy, a forgery from EPRP’s official papers, namely Abyot and Democracy. The EPRDF, ironically now embraces the same Derg criminals who perpetrated genocide against their own people (e.g. Red Terror campaigns in all major Ethiopian cities, air bombardment and massacre of Hawzien, and wanton destruction of Eritrean villages).

            Ethiopia have had many bright and positive destinies in the past: it is home to Denknesh or Lucy, the first mother of all humanity; it is the locus of one of the spectacular ancient civilizations; it is the home of the gallant patriots who preserved Ethiopian independence; it is the headquarters of the OAU & ECA. But Ethiopia’s independence was at stake with the rise of Mussolini in Italy and subsequent brief occupation of the country by Fascist forces. Then, the dignified emperor Haile Selassie had to face humility and was compelled to appeal to the League of Nations, and beg for his survival and the survival of Ethiopian independence. This destiny, in turn, was followed by the revival of Ethiopia’s sovereignty. Given the overall scramble for Africa, the brunt of European hegemony Ethiopia shared with other Africans was an inescapable historical destiny.

            The current Ethio-Eritrean conflict, therefore, must be examined in light of colonial impact on the African continent even long after the latter gained independence. In fact, because most African nations are presided over by beggar regimes, they could hardly entertain and formulate independent policies. This historical phenomenon is testimonial to the fact that a subservient regime is directly or indirectly controlled by shadowy elements although the façade is official authority that is inadvertently recognized by the relatively uninitiated people. This rational behind the historical inevitability of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict is not merely incidental or spontaneous conflagration of the two regimes, but essential component part of the overall destiny that I have alluded to above.

            The permutations that can result from destinies (understood as ‘historical inevitability’ and not ‘fate’) are extremely complex and varied and it requires sophisticated political elegance to understand, harness, and control them. It seems to me that the present Ethiopian opposition, despite its current weakness, is destined to marshal forces against anti-Ethiopian elements and once again meaningfully assert Ethiopian national interest. It is a major historical task, but it should be done and it could be done. I will propose ideas on how to safeguard Ethiopia’s national interest and initiate renewal and transformation later. But first, I like to critically examine the situation and category of the Ethiopian opposition. The following categories are arbitrary classifications of the Ethiopian opposition. Nonetheless, they do reflect the nature and conditions of the various Ethiopian political groupings:

1. Well-meaning Ethiopians of high political stature and caliber whose main advocacy is the promotion of Ethiopian national interest and the assurance of Ethiopian sovereignty. These are mostly spokesmen and spokeswomen without affiliation to any political party.
2. Myriads of opposition parties ranging from astute and sophisticated groups to elements whose political agenda is obscure but for the most part conflated with progressive political program. This group is, in turn, divided into a) genuine patriotic elements and b) gendarme servile elements.
3. Charlatans, flag-waving demagogues and upscale hucksters. These groups are vehemently opposed to the regime in Addis Ababa, but they foster a narrow political agenda and ethnic phobia directed against traditionally minority nationalities in Ethiopia. They use vitriolic language and they are trapped in a dead end of frivolous political chat in Ethiopian restaurants and Starbucks cafes.
4. Emotion-ridden “patriots” whose agenda is limited to cursing and insulting. This are nemesis of Group 3 and both, unwittingly, but mostly due to their shortsightedness have created a fertile ground and longevity to the regime in power. These groups are “dynamic” groups who could not envisage beyond their nose.
5. Scattered and relatively miniscule civic organizations and associations bearing ethnic and/or Ethiopian names whose program are undermined by infighting, quarrel and discord. These groups do have well-meaning individuals among the rank and file and they are not dangerous, but they indirectly reinforce the agendas of Groups 3 and 4.
6. Groups in hibernation. These are scholars and enlightened individuals who chose to remain silent. At this juncture we may attribute complicity to the silence of these groups but the onslaught and counter offensive that is directed against them by pretentious “nationalist” elements terrify some of them. Their fear is understandable but not justifiable.

Ultimately, Ethiopia will be rescued by groups in category 1 and 2(a) and the well meaning Ethiopians in category 5 will gravitate toward them, but the struggle is not going to be easy. These Ethiopian hopefuls must consider a series of interconnected political phenomena including the following:

1. The current Ethiopian regime and the entire political apparatus: the opposition must not lose sight in the analysis of the entire political system and must not indulge in egregious mistakes of singling out Meles and his close-knit circle. Although it is important to focus on the hard core of a political regime, it is very crucial to consider the system in its entirety. Holistic approach or methodological inquiry has several advantages: A) it will enable the opposition to better understand the nature and operations of the political system, study the psychology and interests of officials, and expose the shadowy sycophants who are for the most part incompetent and servile. These opportunist elements are like the apes that think with their stomach but they should not be underestimated. They are the artery and life of the regime and as such they sustain it. B) Holistic approach will enable the opposition to formulate its own policies and reject all other policies, political programs, bilateral and multilateral agreements (including international treaties) signed and agreed upon by the present regime. For instance, the current Ethiopian constitution is a flashy bright document, but it is a paper work and not a working paper. In the absence of a non-working constitution, one cannot demand the recall of Ethiopian officials nor demand the arrest of some of them simply because there are no enforcing agencies that can translate the constitution into action. In point of fact, what we have is the proverbial heavenly cow that does not deliver milk (lam Alechin Besemai Wetetwanim Alay). On the contrary, it is the officials in power who are arresting and imprisoning Ethiopians without due process of law. The arrest of the individuals in power can come only if there is an organized revolt within the Ethiopian military and if the opposition effectively rallies the people around its orbit.

2. Global politics, trends and transformations: The Ethiopian opposition must seriously study global politics with its attendant globalization, underpinning trends and subsequent transformations. It is of paramount importance that the opposition reckons with the hard fact of a unipolar world dominated by the United States and as such must deal with it. Real politic dictates that America is the only superpower at least for now, and the Ethiopian opposition must utilize political craft to circumvent the support the anti-Ethiopian elements are getting from the United States. In the long run or in the not distant future, Russia and China are going to be contending powers, but that is all up in the air. Dealing with the United States, however, does not mean that the opposition must not enter accord with other powers. It should definitely seek support from the European Union and also from the African Union although the latter could entail inherently paradoxical political relations. The Ethiopian opposition must understand, gone are the days of “anti-imperialist” slogans and that the current trends and transformations in world politics are part and parcel of destiny package discussed above. It is demeaning to trash one’s principles and become a sell out, but it is crucially significant to be able to adapt in a complex (in fact complicated) global scenario. The Egyptian writer Naguib Mahfouz dedicated his entire adult life writing on colonialism and its impact on social transformation without flinching from his principles, but being an independent individual writer and leading a nation collectively are altogether different matters.

3.     Transcending Ideology and Reactive Politics: Hanna Arendt, the philosopher once said, ‘our discipline runs the risk of degenerating into a “debunking enterprise” based more on ideology than evidence.’ It is time for the Ethiopian opposition to move on from ideological sloganeering to praxis, a refined plan to ensure congruence between thought and practice. In all probability, the opposition cannot escape the attributes and vicissitudes of ontology (the nature of reality), cosmology (the larger world), and axiology (human interaction), which are all-interdependent and respectively reflect real politic, globalization, and domestic politics. The synthesis of all three, of course, is epistemology with its attendant result, concrete evidence. This kind of theoretical analysis can help the opposition interact its political activities on the right track, and theory, as I have argued elsewhere, predicts the outcome, but it should always resonate practical engagement. It is for this apparent reason that I suggest the opposition transcend the current reactive politics (less talk and more of organizational operation) and embrace proactive politics (system level and multiple interlocking interventions).

A reactive political program will not solicit or stimulate the intended political goal, while a proactive program will. Put otherwise, if the opposition reacts to every move of the government, it will stagnate and lose momentum, creativity, and credibility. If, on the other hand, the opposition goes beyond the miniscule government policies and actions and outshines it in politics, it has indeed played a proactive role. The opposition, therefore, must not indulge in student movement type demonstrations and rather come up with a solid political agenda that can shake the foundations of the government.

The Ethiopian opposition cannot afford to become conceptually incarcerated in narrow framework of world outlook that distracts us from the main discourse or governing circumstances. Ultimately, the reason why the opposition must be proactive corresponds to the fact that, however cathartic ones testimony may be it may not change the historical and contemporary disadvantages Ethiopia presently encounters, unless a genuine and patriotic political leadership assumes political power in Addis Ababa.

4.     The Question of Eritrea: The question of Eritrea, like any other politics that directly affects Ethiopian affairs, is a complex one. Its complexity, as has been discussed above, has to do with European hegemony, current global politics, and a domestic anti-Ethiopian politics. In this kind of bizarre political scenario, the opposition at the home front faces a major dilemma and the opposition in the Diaspora finds it difficult to promote Ethiopian interest vis-à-vis Eritrea. When it comes to the Eritrean question, the Ethiopian opposition has two options: a) directly confront the question; b) employ ostrich-style approach to the question. In the second option, the approach entails denying the existence of Eritrea as an independent entity, let alone as a problem to reckon with. It could also mean to eschew reality and fail to acknowledge even if the problem makes a direct impact.

I am of the opinion that the Ethiopian opposition must uphold the first option when it comes to Eritrea. Direct confrontation, however could mean 1) peacefully reconcile and iron out the differences between the two countries and engage in constructive dialogue, or 2) apply force and renegotiate Eritrean independence. In either case, we cannot escape messy politics, but again reality (local and global) will dictate the nature and outcome of the negotiations and/or conflict. If the first option is sought, the two countries may sit on a negotiating table and trade bargaining chips via give and take. Both could enjoy equal footing, but because Ethiopia is giant in terms of size and population (15 times the size of Eritrea and with 70 million strong) and Eritrea is only 1/3 of New York City population, the latter could have a colossal disadvantage. Ethiopia by comparison is very resourceful (artificially made poor) and Eritrea seems destined to depend on Ethiopia for goods and services, especially agricultural products. On top of this, Ethiopia has enormous clout in the African Union and the Black Diaspora. Given all these political attributes that Ethiopia enjoys, the “equal footing” in the negotiating table actually becomes symbolic rather than actual. In light of this reality, thus, Ethiopia can give less and take more, although whatever is extended from Ethiopia could be beneficial to Eritrea. Ethiopia, for instance, can demand to have Assab as its port although it could sound spectacularly implausible.

      It is in light of the above analysis and the current tension between the two countries, and most importantly my concern of a second round cycle of violence, that I suggested Ethiopia should have an outlet to the sea by paying taxes in the recent VOA interview. This remark is perhaps my Achilles heel compared to my previous positions and may have created confusion among some Ethiopian audience, but it was expressed in light of the present regime that does not at all advocate a sea outlet to Ethiopia. It should also be known that I have also said in the same interview the possibility of having a corridor in the Assab Bay and the complete rejection of the Boundary Commission decision. Otherwise, the outlet to the sea that I suggested in 2000 in the Solidarity sponsored conference in DC is that Ethiopia invokes the 1923 agreement between Italy and Ethiopia in which Ethiopia could have 6000 or more acres of land in Assab and administer the port itself. This actually is my position and I see it as the most viable of all other options. Other Ethiopians like to invoke the Assab autonomous region of the Derg although they don’t substantiate its legitimacy; still others contend that Ethiopia could claim Assab through the self-determination of the Afar people who like to re-join Ethiopia, but this option cannot be a guarantee in the event the Afars of Eritrea decide not to re-join Ethiopia.

      If the opposition assumes power and the second option is sought, however, it will be the end of politics and the resumption of military offensive in an effort to control the Red Sea waters, but we may stumble into a wholly unpredictable situation. For Ethiopia, this could be a risky venture and for Eritrea it could be more risky. If Eritrea cannot negotiate when at least some of its darlings are in Addis, I don’t think it will ever have an opportunity to resolve conflicts peacefully with a nationalist and patriotic Ethiopian regime that could be on the horizon anytime in the near future.

      In any event, whichever options are embraced and however solutions are sought for the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, Ethiopians must come to terms with the fact that Eritrea is now an independent state. It is easy to say, “Eritrea was part of Ethiopia and we must reclaim it,” forgetting the sixty year existence of Eritrea under Italian colonialism and British administration, and also the Eritrean nationalism and psychological make-up forged in due course.

      There is no doubt that Eritrea was not only part of ancient Ethiopia but also as its hub. There were times also when the entire northern Ethiopia from Alwaha Milash to the Dahlak Islands was known as Tigray (see Rediscovering Ethiopian History and African Wisdom in www.africanidea.org/rediscovering.html ), but in the latter half of the 19^th century European hegemony was superimposed on us that our great patriotic emperors Tewodros, Yohannes and Menelik could not stop. This is what I mean by historical destinies that we could not avoid. For further discussion on the Red Sea as Ethiopia’s historical frontier, see my article Ethiopia’s Territorial Integrity Is Inextricably Linked to the Red Sea (11/2001) in www.ethiopiafirst.com/news2001/Nov/ethiopia-s_Territorial_Integrity.html

      There is also no doubt that the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples are in many ways the same. In fact, on the border area or contiguous zones the Tigray, Kunama, Saho, and Afar nationalities are on either side on either side. The Bilen of Keren are the direct cousins of the Agow in Abergile (Tigray), Lasta (Wello), and Agowmidir (Gojjam). But Eriteans now do have a different (sometimes antagonistic) national sentiment that we cannot simply dismiss. What is authenticated as truth in one culture may not be perceived as truth in another. In the final analysis, therefore, any future government in Ethiopia must recognize the complexity of the Eritrean question and anticipate the conflict’s long-term deleterious effects on the Ethiopian and Eritrean peoples.

      Finally, I like to reassure my readers and my Ethiopian audience in particular that I will never flinch an inch in defending the national interest of Ethiopia and the welfare of the Ethiopian people. My commitment stretches back to three decades and my writings are living testimonies. I very well understand I am in a public spot and I am ready to accept a certain amount of rejection from those who don’t find my political stances palatable. Luckily for me, I am a simple scholar and I am neither running for public office nor for popularity contest. When I argue that there should be constructive dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it is not meant to valorize criminals but to consider the impending catastrophe, and as some of us felt it the very size and intractability of the problem Ethiopia faces at present prevents us from being coherent in some of our presentations.

      One final message I like to convey to my readers is that they try to read between lines and in context and consider in all their reactions and deliberations a whole package. They should also understand that what is subjectively desirable may not always be compatible with what is objectively available. I have no doubt that our mental operations expedite novel solutions to problems, but in almost all cases weakness in others is relatively easy to condone. As the proverb goes, the monkey does not see its hind parts, it sees others. One needs to undergo self-examination before rushing to judgment and dismissing ones indisputable principled stand.