Background
to the Emergence of Dictatorship in
Ethiopia
Kaleb
Gebremeskel
March
12, 2010
The murder of Aregawi
Gebreyohannes, a member of Medrek (Forum for
Democratic Dialogue), the main opposition in
Ethiopia, is an early sign of a preemptive strike
by the Meles regime before the May 2010 elections
take place. It is inevitable that the frightened
EPRDF government headed by a notorious dictator
would violently attack the opposition that is
seeking state power through the democratic
process. I say inevitable, in regards to the
brutal action of the Meles regime, for two
reasons: 1) it is not in the nature of Meles and
his coward associates like Seyoum Mesfin, Abay
Tsehaye, Addisu Legesse, Tefera Walawa, Bereket
Semon, and other opportunist cadres hiding behind
the bureaucracy, to govern democratically, let
alone observe rule of law and respect basic
constitutional rights. These are a gang of
riffraff who came to power by the gun and can be
dislodged only by the gun. That is the only
language they understand, but the opposition does
not want to pursue the armed struggle and instead
likes to embrace the peaceful and democratic
electoral process. 2) This is not the only time
the Meles regime has killed its opponents,
incarcerated opposition leaders, and violently
crashed peaceful demonstrations, a living example
being that of the 2005 Kinijit supporters
who were targeted by police bullets and in which
close to 200 people died.
The
killing of Aregawi and the imprisonment of
Birtukuan are not isolated incidents. On the
contrary, they are extensions and manifestations
of dictatorship and state terrorism that have been
prevalent in Ethiopia for the last two decades.
Why is it that Meles and his entourage were
successful in controlling the larger Ethiopian
society and the opposition is unable to succeed in
Ethiopia? In order to answer this fundamental
question, we need to address several inputs that
contributed to the rise of a dictatorial regime.
Some salient features are:
1.
The demise of the Ethiopian
progressive forces during the Derg era (1974-1991)
and the creation of a political void vis-ŕ-vis a
pan-Ethiopian leadership.
2.
In the absence of a political
leadership that could have led Ethiopia toward the
formation of a democratic system, the only
militarily organized force was the Tigray Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF) and its appendage, the
Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (EPDM, now
renamed the Amhara National Democratic Movement
[ANDM])
3.
The TPLF, by virtue of its political
program to liberate Tigray and its membership
(Tigrayan only) could have not marched into Addis
Ababa without the EPDM boy scouts and the backing
of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF)
4.
The brutal Mengistu-led government
had lost momentum especially in the late 1980s not
because the TPLF and EPLF were superior in
weaponry and military tactics but mainly because
the Ethiopian national army was sabotaged from
within and also the Derg had lost the trust of the
Ethiopian people. Thanks to the Red Terror that
claimed the lives of thousands upon thousands of
Ethiopians, the people were demoralized and they
were just waiting for the final outcome and the
end of the Derg curse, and that is why there were
no protestations against the TPLF when it marched
in the streets of Addis Ababa in 1991. The
Ethiopian people, then, only wished to get rid off
a Chiraq (monster) by the name Mengistu,
not knowing that another Chiraq by the name
Meles had already been installed.
The
coming of a new monster means, of course, the
sealing off a democracy and the triumph of a
dictatorship in Ethiopia. But this is a very
simple analysis of a rather profound and complex
Ethiopian scenario. In order to come up with a
relatively thorough examination of current
Ethiopian politics, it is important to dwell on
the background of the TPLF and its leaders.
When
the TPLF was first organized in the early 1970s
and began its guerrilla operations in 1975, it had
a secessionist program and no Ethiopia agenda
whatsoever, and it was determined to fight any
pan-Ethiopian organization, including the
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP).
Early on, when the TPLF was a tiny guerrilla band
in the Dedebit, Shire area, it was beset by series
of contradictions within itself. The initially
recruited peasant fighters (mostly of brigand
background) had conspired to kill the educated
leaders who came from the urban areas but failed.
One of its leaders known as Musie (Mehari Tecle)
was mysteriously killed; another leader by the
name Sihul (Gessesse Ayele), a former member of
the Ethiopian parliament, was also mysteriously
killed. Following the elimination of some leaders,
the TPLF invites another Tigrayan front by the
name Tigray Liberation Front (TLF) and lured its
leaders for a democratic dialogue and possible
formation of a united Tigrayan front. But this did
not happen. The innocent leaders of the TLF
honored the invitation of the TPLF and went to the
rendezvous point. After talks and negotiations
with the TPLF leaders, not knowing they were in a
trap zone, went for their sleep and all were
murdered in their sleep.
After
the elimination of the TLF, the TPLF solely
claimed the Tigrayan agenda and prepared major
campaigns against two pan-Ethiopian organizations,
namely the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and
the EPRP in western and eastern Tigray
respectively.
By
the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s,
the TPLF militarily defeated the contending
parties in Tigray, and luckily for the TPLF
renegade elements of the EPRP in the Gonder area,
some 37 of them, defected to the TPLF in Tigray
and formed the EPDM as mentioned above. At about
the same time, a clique led by Meles Zenawi and
Sebhat Nega established a core group and conspired
to oust some of the founding leaders like Ghidey
Zeratsion and Aregawi Berhe and the latter indeed
were expelled from the Party. And in order to
justify their actions and legitimize the newly
restructured TPLF, the Meles-Sebhat clique founded
the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT), a
perfect camouflage to mislead the left movements
and the so-called socialist countries of the
world. Neither the expelled leaders of the TPLF
nor the Ethiopian left at large detected that the
TPLF leaders were in fact organized to dismantle
any left orientation and/or any broad or
encompassing Ethiopian agenda.
What
most people did not know before and after the TPLF
assumed state power is the fact that the
Meles-Sebhat clique had established a special
covenant with the EPLF. Not even some TPLF
leaders, let alone the mass fighters, knew about
the hidden agenda of the Meles clique and the
Isayas-led Eritrean group. Long before they seized
state power in Addis Ababa and Asmara, the joint
clique had an agenda to establish governments of
their own making in Addis Ababa and assess the
Ethiopian political atmosphere. If the Ethiopian
people seem to accept the TPLF, the latter will
stay and govern from the center. But if the people
were to oppose them, they would then unleash their
diabolical plan of dismantling Ethiopia. They
would have done that by forming a Tigray-Eritrea
state. However, as stated above, although the
Ethiopian people did not welcome the TPLF with
open heart and greeting flowers, it nonetheless
did not show opposition. The ouster of the Derg
monster, then, satisfied the people.
The
TPLF and EPLF ruling over their respective domains
for seven years, i.e. from 1991-1997, continued
their mutual friendship but due to unforeseen
consequences triggered by the issuance of new
currencies in both Eritrea and Ethiopia (and not
Badme/border issue) and subsequent lack of money
exchange that rendered the millions of Ethiopian
Birr in the hands of the Eritrean government
useless, the relationship between the two
countries [governments] seemingly fell apart, and
all of a sudden they went to war for mutual
destruction. Undeniably the war took place and was
concluded by Ethiopia’s victory but soon after
schism hit the TPLF and its core leadership was
split into two. Again, the Meles-Sebhat clique
that had good relations with Isayas Afwerki and
that was in control of the government won and the
other group who rejected the Algiers Agreement and
defended Ethiopia’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity were thrown out of office. From this
group, Gebru, Aregash, and Tewolde became
unemployed and Siye was incarcerated for six
years.
As
far as I am concerned the war between Ethiopia and
Eritrea was probably instigated to oust the
“trouble makers” within the TPLF and
strengthen the shaken apparatus of Meles. It could
also have been a grand design to deliberately
disturb the relative peace and stability that had
been scored in the Horn of Africa. We may never
know of the extent of this war conspiracy but
history may one day reveal it. In any event, the
Meles-Isayas mission was accomplished! But these
two cliques have also underestimated the resolve
and determination of the Ethiopian people. During
the Badme and Zalambessa battles, for instance,
the two leaders were caught off guard when the
entire people of Ethiopia stood behind the
Ethiopian Defense Forces. If at all, Ethiopia was
spared by the unflinching determination of its
people and by the TPLF leaders who rejected the
Algiers Agreement.
Some
disgruntled Ethiopians in the Diaspora who claim
to be part of the opposition have sojourned to
Asmara in the hope they would advance their
political agenda but they too are misled by the
apparent quarrel between Meles and Isayas.
Moreover, they have a poor judgment of the Horn of
Africa politics and they were unable to anticipate
that any association with anti-Ethiopia forces is
in fact guilty by association and inevitably
treasonous and counter productive.
Incidentally,
the Ethiopian fate will be decided by the internal
dynamics in Ethiopia and when the opposition
gathers momentum, no external forces can save the
brutal Meles regime. The latter is now frightened
because Medrek, a coalition of eight parties, is a
formidable party that is not only challenging the
status quo but also it is expected to win in many
parts of Ethiopia. Men and women of integrity like
Bulcha Demeksa, Aregash Adane, Negasso Gidada,
Merara Guidina, Beyene Petros, Hailu Araya, and
many others lead Medrek. These leaders are bound
to liberate Ethiopia from the dictatorial regime
of Meles and the EPRDF and despite state terrorism
unleashed against them by the government they are
determined to fight through to the end.
Given
the brutality and intolerance of Meles and his
party, the 2010 election, like the 2005 election
before it, may end up in the bloody attack of the
opposition by police forces. But if things go well
and a relatively civil electoral process is
conducted, Medrek may not capture state power but
it would definitely secure sizable seats in the
parliament and could enjoy legitimacy as the main
opposition in the legislature.
Unless
the EPRDF resorts to a violent suppression of the
opposition, it will be defeated by its own
policies and political program. Notwithstanding
the claim of the EPRDF to have answered the
question of nationalities in Ethiopia by forming
the language-ethnic based administrative states (Kilil)
the objective was not to meet the peoples’
demand (and the people have not demanded for an
EPRDF style restructuring of Ethiopia) but to
divide and rule them. Now the very federal
structure engineered by the EPRDF has come to
haunt it because its cadres have to be fielded in
their respective Kilil and districts and
they may or may not get support from the people of
their localities. However, as a safety mechanism
the EPRDF had used its affiliated parties like the
TPLF, ANDM, and OPDO and dispatched candidates to
the regional states. For instance, representing
the TPLF, Meles and Seyoum would go to Tigray;
representing the ANDM, Addisu Legesse and Tefera
Walwa would be fielded in the Amhara regional
state; and similarly the OPDO candidates would run
in the Oromia region.
In
the last 18 years, with the exception of Andinet,
only the EPRDF could have fielded its candidates
all over Ethiopia. Now Medrek can field candidates
in most parts of Ethiopia, thanks to the eight
party coalitions and the mass support from the
Ethiopian people. In Tigray alone, Medrek has now
managed to field in 34 out of 38 electoral
districts, and it goes the same in the Amhara,
Oromia, and other regions. This hard fact has now
became a nightmare to the EPRDF and it is highly
probable that the latter may either steal the
ballot boxes as it has done in the past or affirm
its dictatorship by unleashing state terrorism.
Another disadvantage that the EPRDF would face in
the 2010 elections is the fact that it desperately
needs to replace its old guards who are either
retiring or are not seeking re-election. Sebhat
Nega has retired at least from the leading post of
the TPLF; Addisu Legesse, Deputy Prime Minister
and Deputy Chair of the EPRDF; Tefera Walwa,
Minister of Capacity Building; Bereket Semon,
Minister of Government Communications Affairs; and
Tsegay Berhe, President of the Regional State of
Tigray are not going to run for office. Abudulla
Gemeda, President of the Oromia regional state
will step down from his post and run for the
federal parliament. From the old guards only
Seyoum Mesfin and Abay Tsehaye would stay around
with the dictator but they are the weakest link of
the EPRDF and the Medrek group can easily outshine
them in the electoral contest. Despite so many
disadvantages in logistics and finance and access
to the media and despite severe obstacles imposed
upon Medrek by the Meles dictatorship, the main
opposition could become successful in the May 2010
elections and that would be the beginning of the
end of dictatorship and state terrorism in
Ethiopia. Given the light at the end of the
tunnel, thus, Medrek should not rethink its bid
for power following the murder of Aregawi. If at
all, the loss of Aregawi should embolden and
strengthen Medrek and I say to the Medrek leaders
keep on marching and never give up!
The
author can be reached at kalebgebre@yahoo.com
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