National
Reconciliation and National Development in
Ethiopia
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD.
October
22, 2010
This essay intends to reach
out the Ethiopian government and the opposition by
way of suggesting to both parties so that they can
and should make efforts to iron out their
differences and create a political climate,
conducive enough, to enable the two blocs to sit
in a round table for dialogue and for the peaceful
and smooth development and transformation of
Ethiopia. Sometimes, we have to have the courage
to say a spade a spade and realistically approach
reality and accordingly foster interests that can
benefit the larger society and not the political
groupings only. We must recognize that reality and
perception do not always correspond, and as a
matter of fact objective conditions do not
necessarily manifest subjective wishes and
entertainments. Above all, reconciliation,
negotiation, and dialogue are designed to bring
together opposing or opposite forces and not birds
of the same feather that flock together. It is in
this spirit, thus, that I like to write this essay
and invite Ethiopians to seriously consider the
agenda of national reconciliation if indeed they
are genuinely concerned about the national
development of their country.
For the sake of convenience
and simplification, I will classify the Ethiopian
political forces into four categories: 1) Diaspora
Enclave Opposition; 2) Diaspora and Home Patriotic
Opposition; 3) Non-Committed Diaspora Ethiopia;
and 4) The EPRDF-led Ethiopian Government.
Diaspora Enclave
Opposition: these opposition groupings are
scattered throughout the Diaspora and they are
haphazardly organized under ethnic affiliations
and not under national Ethiopian agenda, although
a significant number of them uphold the name
‘Ethiopian’ as their banner. Most of these
groups are organized in enclave-cum-neighborhood
type organizations that claim to be political but
in effect they are civic or social organizations
that have degenerated into sub-regions in the
making of their associations and even their
membership in the churches. Ethiopians who come
from the same nationality, speak the same
language, and profess same religion have chosen to
congregate in separate churches on Sundays. This
group has extreme hatred to the EPRDF government,
and more specifically to the ‘Woyane’ regime
as per their routine cajoling, to the extent of
absurdity, if not outright insanity. This group is
imbued with narrow ethnic agenda that is inimical
to national development, and quite obviously it
could not make a positive input in the unity of
Ethiopia and/or the progress Ethiopia ought to
make in the 21st century. This group is
led and mobilized by flag waving upscale
charlatans, as I have defined them in my previous
writings, and its own organization and
constitution has already undermined the unity of
Ethiopians abroad.
It stands to reason that a
national unity of Ethiopia can be attained only
when Diaspora Ethiopians, irrespective of their
ethnic differences, work together as Ethiopians.
What we have now are artificially superimposed
ethnic enclaves of Diaspora Ethiopians that have
seriously jeopardized and undermined their unity.
As indicated above, if Diaspora Ethiopians who
belong to the same Ethiopian Orthodox Tewhado
Church pray in separate churches, how is it
possible that these congregations revitalize
Ethiopian unity and contribute for the development
of their country? It is insanity par excellence to
have two St Mary’s and two St. Gabriel’s
churches of Diaspora Ethiopians in the same
district and same city, as is now the case in
North America. Apparently these churches are meant
to accommodate same ethnic groups, and the
proliferation of ethnic associations, civic
organizations, radio networks, and churches are
reminiscent of a primordial primate culture that
clings together and despise others that are
perceived as different from them.
And unless these Diaspora Ethiopians
transcend their present state of mind and liberate
themselves from their comfort zones (enclaves),
they have no hope whatsoever to make a difference
in Ethiopia’s progress.
The Diaspora Enclave
Opposition lacks uniformity in outlook although it
is rallied around the anti-Woyane front. Within
this group, there are innocent Ethiopians (mostly
youth) who do not really understand the complexity
of the politics in Ethiopia; there are elderly men
and women who could careless of who governs what,
but by virtue of their ethnic identity they stick
with their artificially fashioned community; there
are sensible professionals and intellectuals
(insignificant in number) who advocate an
inclusive Ethiopian agenda but would not want to
be ostracized by their extreme enclave comrades;
and finally, there are elements who are morally
retarded and psychically equipped with appalling
ignorance and arrogance.
Some elements in this group
are slick and have played double standards in
their dealings with the seating government in
Ethiopia. On the one hand, they have
ostentatiously exhibited themselves in public
squares, along with the innocent multitude of
their brethren, in the condemnation of the
‘Woyane’; on the other, they go to Ethiopia
“for a visit” and buy land, houses, and also
open up businesses. Yet, some of this group has
surprised their own comrades for being renegades
and for joining the rank and file of the EPRDF.
These hypocrites are loud enough in drumming their
comrades-in-arms in the Diaspora that ‘Ethiopian
wealth has been and continue to be transferred to
Tigray at the expense of Ethiopians’ although
deep down in their hearts they know that Bahir
Dar, Awassa, and Nazreth equally, if not more,
have flourished and have shown economic
transformation in recent years. Even if we believe
their perception to be true, what these
blindfolded politicians seem to have forgotten is
that Tigray is also a quintessentially Ethiopian
state that must, as a matter of course, share the
dividends of the Ethiopian wealth.
Diaspora and Home
Patriotic Opposition: A significant number of
Ethiopians who organized themselves in the form of
civic organizations in the Diaspora and political
parties at home in Ethiopia, and who relentlessly
and without flinching defended the unity and
sovereignty of Ethiopia; struggled for the
establishment of broader democracy in their
country; and who made sacrifices of the Ethiopian
people belong to the Diaspora and Home Patriotic
Opposition. This Ethiopians are the torchbearers
of freedom and heirs to the fallen heroes whose
bones have littered the four corners of Ethiopia.
This group includes
well-meaning Ethiopians including scholars and
professionals, civic organization leaders,
Ethiopian community leaders, advocacy groups and
activists, political parties and coalition
organizations that are not allowed to operate in
Ethiopia. Of these groups, however, the
oppositions that played a crucial role in
Ethiopian politics are the Coalition for Unity and
Democracy (CUD) during the 2005 election and the
Federal Ethiopian Democratic Forum, popularly
known as Medrek (forum in Amharic), in the 2010
election. Both organizations have enjoyed
substantial support from Ethiopians at Home and
the Diaspora, and although following the 2005
election CUD leaders were arrested, released, and
then encountered fragmentation, they still had a
good following. One solid group that carried the
banner of CUD is Andinet, a formidable group that
ultimately joined Medrek.
Following the 2010 election,
the eight-party coalition Medrek has merged into a
single party and vis-à-vis the current politics
of Ethiopia, this was a very important move but it
could have been more effective had the Coalition
done it before the election. In any event, the
current merger would still enable Medrek to garner
more support from the Ethiopian people in the
future because it would mobilize its forces as one
party and not as eight splinter groupings.
The Patriotic opposition,
both at home and the Diaspora, is relatively
strong compared to the enclave group, but the Home
opposition has countenanced major shortcomings due
to lack of funding, lack of media access, and its
inability to organize conferences and/or rallies
due to government contravention of rules that
permitted Ethiopians to organize and assemble
freely. The shortcomings of the Diaspora Patriotic
that belong to this group, on the other hand, are
manifested in many ways. Unlike the Home front,
this group enjoys broad democratic rights
including staging demonstrations, freedom of
speech, access to media, access to
congressmen/women in the US and member of
parliaments in Europe, and also its ability to
raise funds easily. Despite these distinct
advantages, however, this group was not able to
forge a united Ethiopian organization. It is
splintered into plethora of political entities,
and despite repeated efforts made by some elements
within this group to bring about its many
organizations under one overarching organization
or under one coalition party, some of the
coalition in fact suffered faction degeneration
and amoeba-like fission politics. On top of this
debilitating problem, the intellectuals, scholars,
and professionals who belong to this group were
reactive for the most part and not proactive with
respect to Ethiopian politics. They are unable to
fashion an organic political program for Ethiopia,
as other parties have done during the heyday of
the Ethiopian revolution in the 1970s and 1980s.
Moreover, the Diaspora and
Home Patriotic Opposition did not exhibit acumen
in politics especially in its dealings with the
ruling party. Instead of employing the art of
politics in promoting its interests, its overall
performance was tainted by principle at best and
ideology at worst. Ideology indeed is a guide to
action and principles cement the infrastructure of
a patriotic movement, but if the opposition
depends on programmatic principles only and does
not include some Machiavellian astuteness in its
operations and is confronted by a cunning
countervailing force(s), it can crumble like a
house of cards. It is because of this
ideology-cum-principle yardstick that the
patriotic group was unable to employ politics in
all its dimensions and broad range attributes,
including initiating dialogue with the ruling
party, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF).
Given the reality of
Ethiopian politics of the last two decades and the
propensity of the foreseeable future, the
Patriotic group must consider the possibility of
negotiating with the EPRDF. It must shed its
cocoon of principles and liberate itself from the
ideological tenet and resume talks with the ruling
party. The fear of “if we do so, we will entrust
legitimacy to the EPRDF and confuse our members
and supporters” is lame rationale compared to
what the opposition could favorably garner great
strides in Ethiopian politics.
The Patriotic opposition, in
fact, should learn from the CUD debacle in the
post-2005 election. In 2005, the CUD managed to
win sizable urban votes and virtually took over
Addis Ababa in its entirety, but instead of
advancing its interests by entering the
parliament, it refused to do so. The CUD forgot
that Ethiopian politics was Third World politics
(and not Western liberal democratic politics) and
created unnecessary gridlock in most obsidian
rigid fashion, and demanded rather an outright
takeover of the government. Then, I personally
wrote an article in which I argued that the CUD
must enter parliament and then negotiate from
strength with the incumbent party. It did not do
it and the result was obvious to all of us: It
lost everything and its leaders ended up in jail.
The current Patriotic
opposition, thus, must not see negotiation and
dialogue with the government as a sign of weakness
or as gesture of legitimacy to the ruling party.
Quite on the contrary, talking to the government
could mean strength on the part of the opposition,
and it could also, by default, promote the
interest of the opposition and the Ethiopian
people in the long haul.
In negotiating with the
Ethiopian government, Forum should respect and
acknowledge the achievements of the EPRDF while
criticizing the white papers and overall political
performances of the latter. It should not accept
preconditions set forth by the government.
However, acknowledging the achievements of the
government is a sign of strength and not weakness,
and to be sure I myself (a foremost critic of the
current regime) have, for instance, written in
admiration of the pre-election debates in my
article entitled Pointers of Justice and the
Ongoing Debates in Ethiopia on April 10, 2010
(please view this link, www.africanidea.org/pointers.html).
Similarly, I have written another article in
support of the completion of the Gilgel Gibe III
Dam (see Ethiopia Must Complete the
Construction of the Gilgel Gibe III Dam in www.africanidea.org/Gilgel_Gibe_111.html)
because I strongly believe that, beyond
politics and above everything else, the national
development of Ethiopia must come first.
Non-Committed Diaspora
Ethiopia: This group represents the many
silent Ethiopians in the Diaspora who do not
involve themselves in Ethiopian politics in any
way, shape or form. They are the quiet multitudes
that seemingly enjoy the sanctuaries of college
and university campuses, the offices of
international development agencies, research and
development institutions, and private businesses.
This group is not organized under civic or
political organizations, but it can broadly be
divided into three groups: 1) elements, like the
Enclave group, who frequent churches and
traditional festivals in spite of its aloofness;
2) apathetic elements who could careless of
politics in general and the current affairs of
contemporary Ethiopia; 3) elements who gave up on
politics completely as a result of prior adverse
negative encounter, but from time to time they
nonetheless entertain politics in local cafes and
Ethiopian restaurants. They are like a tree that
falls in the middle of the jungle and no body can
hear the noise it makes. However, I do not have
any quarrel with or reservation on the
Non-Committed Diaspora Ethiopia. After all,
politics sometimes is cruel, nasty, and
disgusting, and above all Diaspora Ethiopians must
earn their living in fiercely competitive
environments. After depicting and recognizing the
harsh reality of the Ethiopian Diaspora ecology, I
am in favor of leaving the non-committed
Ethiopians alone, but I am still hoping that at
one point in time they too join hands with
patriotic Ethiopians in the historic uplifting of
their motherland.
The EPRDF-led Ethiopian
Government: the EPRDF has assumed state power
either by pure historical accident or by dint of
political fiat; or even by carefully crafted
design, or by a combination of all of the above.
Logically, thus, whether we like it or not, the
current seating government of Ethiopia is the
EPRDF-led government. This rationale, however,
does not automatically suggest that Ethiopians in
the opposition must yield everything and initiate
dialogue with the government and in the latter’s
favor. On the contrary, it means that the
government does not dictate the nature and outcome
of the negotiation process; it also entails
that the government must not have the upper hand
in the talking arena.
First and foremost, the
principle of negotiation demands and requires
equal footing of the negotiating parties, if at
all it is going to have a genuine fruitful result.
It is in this spirit that I like to suggest to the
Ethiopian government to initiate dialogue with the
opposition, especially with the Diaspora and Home
Patriotic Opposition. .
The recent dialogue and
negotiation of the EPRDF-led Ethiopian government
with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
is not only the right track in politics; it is
also a promising endeavor in fostering peace in
Ethiopia. By the same token, the release of
Birtukuan Medeksa from prison and the
accommodation of Eritrean students at Addis Ababa
University (as my good friend Professor Tecola
Hagos has observed) are good gestures for
reconciliation. And as my other good friend,
Professor Teodros Kiros, noted in his new book, Philosophical
Essays, and to which I had the honor to write
a blurb, a good constitution can be mobilized
“in service of humanity and produce a good moral
condition of citizens.” The ultimate objective
of national reconciliation and national
development must be to produce good Ethiopian
citizens, and not simply to foster technical
development devoid of morality and justice.
If the EPRDF-led government
can enter dialogue with the ONLF, it can do so
with Forum or Medrek especially if it transcends
selective and preferential politics. The politics
of both parties could be at variance or situated
at extreme sides of the continuum, but both must
understand that divergent perspectives enriches a
society in transition and brings meaningful and
enduring transformation.
On the other hand,
mono-directionality of flow of ideas, or in its
worse form, “my way or the highway” attitude
could be bad politics. This kind of politics could
be detrimental to the very existence of a nation
because the two sides could go to great lengths in
destroying each other. The 2005 election, for
instance, despite its manifest democratic process,
exhibited mutual exclusion (if not destruction) of
the EPRDF and the CUD. And it is not surprising,
thus, that the ruling party and regime were
haunted by paranoia long after the 2010 election
ended. So, ultimately reconciliation would not
only heal wounds and aggravations on both sides,
but it will also preserve the sanity of the
contending parties, and by default contributes to
Ethiopia’s positive national development.
If the EPRDF-led government
is ready to initiate dialogue and negotiation with
the opposition, it must first recognize the
potential input to development that the opposition
could make. Secondly, the Meles government must
tolerate and engage strong rivals rather than
systematically avoid or isolate them. Thirdly, the
government of Ethiopia must seriously rethink its
ethnic politics in the administration of Ethiopia
if the developmental state indeed is going to be
successful. Political fragmentation in
contradistinction to national development
emasculates the latter’s objectives, and the
EPRDF ought to transcend the current kilil (regional)
politics and foster a pan-Ethiopian development
without undermining the relative autonomy of the
regional states. There is nothing wrong for the
latter to ran their own affairs and flourish their
respective cultures and languages, but it would be
counterproductive for the people of one regional
state (e.g. Tigrayans) not to invest in other
regional states (e.g. Oromia). The EPRDF
government could not bring about meaningful
transformation in Ethiopia unless it first
corrects the technically narrow kilil agenda.
On the other hand, if the
EPRDF initiates a more inclusive politics, iron
out its differences with the opposition,
especially with the opposition that is eager to
contribute to Ethiopia’s development, the newly
restructured Ethiopian politics will dialectically
reveal new opportunities and it may even deliver
unexpected but promising vistas for future
generations of Ethiopians.
The government, more than the
opposition, has the wherewithal to change the
political environment in Ethiopia, and if it is
willing to do so it must invite the well-meaning
patriotic Ethiopians who are willing to join hands
for a better Ethiopia and for the welfare of the
Ethiopian people. This kind of gesture on the part
of the government, in turn, will create a positive
political ambience that would have a great density
of interaction, great effervescence of ideas, and
a favorable atmosphere that can altogether bolster
Cultural Revolution as precondition to economic
development. The government must preside over a
national reconciliation forum not simply with the
intention of permitting democratic rights, or
sharing power, but also in enabling the opposition
to participate in national development at all
levels. Politics and development are gregarious,
and that is the bottom line that I am implying to
when I call upon the opposition and the government
to make a historic national reconciliation.
Without the participation of the Ethiopian people,
development would become ideal chimera of economic
salvation, and without reconciling differences of
all groups, the Ethiopian nation could not move
forward. Both the opposition and the government
must carefully gauge the present globalization
where regional cooperation has now become a
necessary ingredient to respective national
developments; the recent revival of East African
Common Market is one good example of paving the
road to development beyond national politics. The
opposition and the government also must have the
decency to treat each other as opposites of the
same coin in politics and as partners in the
development of Ethiopia, and not as enemies.
Good luck to Ethiopia and
Ethiopians!
All Rights Reserved.
Copyright © IDEA Inc. 2010. Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia
can be contacted for constructive and educational
feedback via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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