Global Political Theater and The Peripheral States of Africa
Ghelawdewos Araia
June 16, 2008

This essay will discuss and systematically extrapolate wide-ranging issues with respect to sovereignty, territorial integrity, ethnic politics, food crisis and famine as currently encountered by many African nations. Political and economic crisis in Africa cannot be thoroughly understood without carefully dissecting the Continent’s inextricable linkage with the global political order.

With the exception of Ethiopia, all other nation-states in Africa are the product of European colonial artificial insemination. Even Ethiopia, the jewel in the crown of African independence had to share the brunt of imperialist hegemony. Africa’s political and economic pitfalls, of course, are not entirely and solely attributable to the global political theater that we shall presently examine. It is also engendered by dictatorial and acquiescent domestic regimes, although intriguingly the petty African leaders are in a way, directly or indirectly, the making of the global hegemonic order. I shall substantiate my argument later. By way of introduction, however, I like to recite what I wrote in Africa in the Global Economy: Aid, Debt, and Development:

“Despite over four centuries of exchange relations initially with the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, including the intercontinental European slave trade and subsequent colonization, Africa was never fully integrated into the global economy. On the one hand, if we see it in the context of European imperialism and colonial hegemony, Africa was probably the most globally penetrated continent. No other continent was brought under global capital or imperialism, as Africa was. And, yet, on the other hand, Africa remains the world’s least developed continent. It was, and remains, on the periphery of the global economy. Despite enormous cultural coalescence – with more Anglophone and Francophone countries in Africa than any other continent – the former colonial powers developed negligible educational institutions, healthcare systems and infrastructure to facilitate their interests on the continent. Moreover, they took pains to destroy Africa’s indigenous institutions and traditions, leaving post-independence leaders ill-equipped to address the enormous challenges of governing modern national states.”1 

In order to understand with some depth why Africa was relegated to the periphery by colonial and neocolonial forces and later by international institutions, it is very important to dwell, at least briefly, on European ideological framework. In this context, three important philosophers that come to mind are Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Immanuel Kant. The Grotian, Hobbesian, and Kantian philosophical parameters have been discussed in relation to global political order by plethora of scholars, and chief among the latter is Hedley Bull’s essay, The Idea of International Society. “The Hobbesian tradition,” says Bull, “describes international relations as a state of war…the Hobbesian prescription for international conduct is that the state is free to pursue its goals in relation to other states without moral or legal restrictions of any kind.”2

Diametrically opposite to the Hobbesain prescription is the Kantian view, otherwise known as the ‘universalist tradition’ and goes beyond state-state relations and rather underscores the significance of citizens of various states; it is in effect, people-people relations in an effort to forge a universal community of mankind. The Kantian theory of universal brotherhood was never tried, but it could perhaps materialize in the long haul when the Hobbesian and Machiavellian curse ends and is replaced by a more humane global society.

The Grotian prescription lies between the Hobbesian and Kantian traditions, and views global politics not as conflict-ridden (Hobbesian) or simply as universal brotherhood (Kantian), but as political theater of states best connected by trade. Unlike the naked, brute, and immoral Hobbesian states, however, the Grotian states are expected to exhibit (at least in principle) moral imperatives and rule of law. In the long run, the Grotian tradition, thus, may serve as stepping stone and building blocs for the Kantian futuristic international relations. Realistically, however, it looks we are stuck in the Hobbesian world politics and with no end in sight. It is in this context that I like to examine the crisis that has bewitched the African peripheral states.

Long before the advent of European hegemony on African respective societies, Africans indeed enjoyed relatively stable and tranquil communities. The fact that Africa witnessed varied political systems ranging from acephalic to hunting and gathering, to village democracies, and to sophisticated and centralized kingdoms, is not surprising. The continent, after all, is cradle of humanity and civilization. 

Nevertheless, beginning the middle of the 15th century while Europe emerged from its long dark ages, the West African kingdoms began to decline; Ethiopia entered into medieval isolation; the Egyptian and Nubian (Kush) civilizations have become memories of the distant past; and the Swahili city-states were threatened by new Portuguese explorers-cum-colonizers. The Vasco da Gama venture of 1498 was followed by other European explorers such as David Livingston, Henry Stanley, James Bruce, Richard Burton, and Mungo Park, who were in the business of mapping out Africa. Indeed, they furnished valuable information about the Continent to the mercantile class of European powers. The explorers were soon followed by Christian missionaries, and the latter, i.e. the “gospel preachers,” effectively paved the way for the would-be commercial investors and colonizers. 

However, Africans vehemently resisted European encroachment and incursion on African territories. Some examples of resistance are the Khoisan-Dutch conflict in South Africa and later the English-Zulu wars in the south eastern part of South Africa; the Ovambo-Herero resistance against German colonial occupiers in Namibia; the Hehe and Maji Maji rebellion in Tanganyika; the Abd al Qadir –led Algerian resistance against the French in 1830; the Ashanti-English wars from 1805 to 1895; the Futa Toro and Futa Jallon resistance against the French in the Senegal river valley; the Al Hajj Omar and Samori Toure-led Jihad wars against the French in the Niger River bent and present-day Guinea area; the Al Mahdi-led Eastern Sudan State resistance against the British; the Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes and Ras Alula-led wars against the Italians in present-day Eritrea; and the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik-led battle of Adwa against the Italians in 1896.

So, before Europeans subdued Africans and make them their colonial subjects, hundreds of resistances were conducted virtually all over the continent. By the time Africa was partitioned among European powers following the Berlin Conference of 1884, Africa had already lost at least 20 million of its human resources to the Americas. The development and transformation of the Americas (the Caribbean, Central America, South America, and North America) cannot be contemplated without African slaves. European industry could not have been a reality without African slaves either. The nexus between African labor, American plantation, and European industry is known as the Triangular Trade in history.

The curse of Africa, the underdevelopment of the continent, ecological disaster, and widespread famines are in fact retrospectively attributable to the Triangular Trade, and the strings of curses continue unabated in the modern peripheral states of Africa, as we shall see later. 

The colonial period that lasted from the middle of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century had a devastating impact on the continent, both materially and psychologically although, to be sure, there were some pluses to it. Infrastructures such as railway and roads were built, public works and health systems introduced, and a modicum of educational institutions opened up. But the negative impact of colonialism weighs more. The colonial concessionary companies recklessly exploited Africa’s natural resources and strategic minerals without paying in return to the local people. The 
Colonial regimes deliberately ignored the necessity of manufacturing industries on site in Africa. They rather shipped the raw materials and minerals to Europe, process it in European industries, and sale the finished products in Africa and elsewhere. Africa, thus, became the source of raw materials and the market for European products, and yet remained a peripheral continent due to its unequal partnership with Europe. 

On top of exploiting raw materials for free, the European colonial regimes left a vast wasteland in Africa by cutting trees and clearing savannah and forest areas for cash crop plantation. A good example of this scenario is the Francophone West Africa peanut farms that resulted in the catastrophic famine of 1973. These vast areas of peanut, cocoa, cotton and other cash crop plantations replaced the conventional food crops like maize, sorghum, and rice and brought about widespread famine that killed millions of Africans.

The worst of all colonial legacies, however, is mental slavery. The heavy Eurocentric dosage prescribed to brainwash Africans had an indelible impact on the psychological makeup of Africans, and indeed engendered ‘black skin white masks’ as Frantz Fanon amply puts it in one of his works with the same title. An educated Senegalese, Blaise Diagne, who was elected to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1914, best exemplifies the hybrid of mental colonization and inferiority complex. Blaise is believed to have said, “I am first of all a Frenchman, and secondly an African.”3 Diametrically opposite to the Blaise type ‘black skin white masks’, of course, were the pan-African nationalist leaders who were circumvented by a combination of self-inflicted weaknesses and curios external machinations. Whatever the circumstances encountered by these leaders, it is abundantly clear that they have entered into oblivion and the current generation of Africans doesn’t even seem to know the pan-African tradition. 

With the above backdrop, we can now discuss and critically examine the important issues that I have alluded to at the beginning of this essay.

Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity: in 1957 when Ghana achieved independence, there were only 8 independent African countries; by 1963, there were 32 sovereign African nations that became signatories to the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At present, we have 53 (the total number of countries in Africa) nations that are independent. Are these countries really independent or can they be characterized as recipients of ‘false decolonization’ as Fanon once argued in his famous book Wretched of the Earth? It is indeed important to recognize the lack of complete independence due to influences of former colonial powers that, in one form or another, controlled the destiny of African nations. The bulk of the former colonies of France belong to the Francophone zone and former British colonies are still attached to the Commonwealth. The currencies of most Francophone African nations is subsidized by the French Franc, which clearly makes these African nations dependent on France. The currency, in turn, has strings attached to it especially in bilateral relations, policy formulations, and trade exchanges; in some instance, these dependent African nations have even allowed the French to have military bases and/or militarily intervene in their internal affairs. 

The degree of dependence, however, varies from country to country and across the board in Africa. A significant number of Africans in the early 1960s were vociferously and avowedly independent, and fiercely independent regimes like Sekou Toure of Guinea were penalized by economic embargo and diplomatic ostracism. At the other extreme of the continuum, there were some leaders who either wanted to postpone independence or simply continue the patronization of their ‘mother country’ France. 

After the early 1960s leaders, Africa encountered the soldier politicians and tyrants, some of whom were semi-independent and others completely servile to global interests. In a span of time of four and half decades, Africa has witnessed all sorts of regimes, the majority of whom prioritize their selfish interests above the interest of the people and the nation. And finally arrived leaders on a mysterious leash, supple and submissive to the point of obsequiousness. With these latter varieties of regimes, the respective governments have a shadowy existence and sovereignty and independence are trampled over.

As pointed out earlier, some of the signatories of the OAU charter in 1963 presided over relatively sovereign and independent nations. They understood the sensitivity and fragility of the African boundaries drawn by the former colonizers, and yet they agreed to respect and abide by those boundaries instead of reclaiming lands on contiguous zones based on cultural, linguistic, and/or ethnic affiliations. They very well understood that irredentism could undermine the very gains of independence and create havoc to the stability of African nations. This wisdom of the early 1960s, it seems to me, is lost in the last quarter of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. A good example of this debacle is the Ethiopian-Eritrean war followed by the Algiers Agreement and the most recent controversy of the Ethiopia-Sudan borders. Unlike the Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute, in the latter case the Ethiopian people were completely out of the loop, although in all cases secret machinations were involved. It is still unfathomable to me why parts of the Ethiopian territories of Armacheho and Gambella should be handed over to Sudan, the largest country in Africa. The current Ethiopian-Sudan territorial controversy has already created unnecessary tension on the borders; the Sudanese military forcibly evacuated Ethiopians from their land and incarcerated them, and on both Armacheho and Gambella blood has been spilled and we may witness more bloodshed in the future. In the long run, as has been attempted by a vigilante group in Tach Armacheho, the Ethiopian people will demand the return of their lost land and I gather a major conflict could erupt between Sudan and Ethiopia.

I am of the opinion that other Africans should continue to uphold the OAU charter with respect to territorial integrity, opt for a peaceful resolution of any conflict, and should never emulate the Horn of Africa destabilizing political scenario. And if at all the likelihood of a border conflict is on the horizon, there should be at least a modicum of transparency and accountability on the part of any given government, and most importantly the people must be involved especially in the affairs that directly affects them. In the latter spirit, IDEA press release has, in part, wrote the following in 2004: 

“The Ethiopian people have a stake in defending the territorial integrity of their nation and the government of Meles Zenawi should permit a national referendum for the final determination of the peaceful resolution to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict. In any peace initiative of paramount historical significance, the Ethiopian people should matter and should have a say, and the territorial integrity of Ethiopia matters at all times.”4 

It logically follows that a government that does not respect the will of the people could not have the mandate to act on behalf of the people, let alone make decisions or enter covenants without the knowledge and consent of the people.

Ethnic Politics: is perhaps the alter ego or second personality of African societies and this is chiefly due to historical circumstances and partly due to manipulation by corrupt leaders whose agenda is to stay in power indefinitely. The historical dimension of ethnic politics manifests the inability of African countries to embark on the threshold of development that could in turn have catapulted them beyond ethnic particularities. Only a comprehensive development agenda coupled by transformative politics could overcome the current debilitating ethnic animosities. 

Ethnic politics in Africa is not entirely endogenous. In fact, it was also deliberately concocted and introduced by the former colonizers as part of their divide and rule policy. For instance, by employing the so-called ‘indirect rule’, the British enticed ethnic animosity in Ghana and Nigeria as they have done in Sudan as well. The long drawn civil war in Sudan, between North and South actually is attributed to the British agenda of ethnic politics, although later the local African leaders exacerbated it. The French employed the same policy in Morocco, Senegal, Guinea, and other Francophones. “It was in towns that ethnic consciousness and tribal rivalry grew apace,” says Martin Meredith and “the notion of a single Igbo people was formed in Lagos among the local ‘Descendants Union.’ The Yoruba, for their part, founded the Egbe Omo Oduduwa – a ‘Society of Descendants of Oduduwa…”5 Likewise the Hausa-Fulani of the North formed their own association, and the only organization that transcended the ethnic associations was the National Association of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) founded by Nnamdi Azikiwi Pili. The Nigerian parties later changed their names to avoid their respective ethnic badges but their overall structure, composition, and mobilization strategies were characterized by tribal affiliations. For instance, the Action Group (AG) founded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo was essentially a Yoruba party, and once ethnic politics became program guideline of a given party, it is highly likely that the party degenerates into clan and even sub-clan politics. And once local and narrow nationalistic fervor sets in, it can easily precipitate political fragmentation, cultural disarray, and the breakdown of the social fabric. In brief, death of a nation becomes inevitable, and sadly this is what exactly happened to Somalia. Liberia and Sierra Leone shared the fate of Somalia although somehow they managed to resuscitate from their political morbidity.

The Rwanda genocide of 1994 is the ultimate manifestation of ethnic politics that degenerated into ethnic cleansing. Ironically, the Hutu and Tutsi share the same culture and speak the same language. The original sin for ethnic animosity was first sown by the Germans and later flourished under the Belgians. “German officials in the early 1900s identified Hutu and Tutsi as distinct and separate ethnic groups. With few staff of their own on the ground, they relied on the Tutsi as the ruling aristocracy to enforce control, enabling them to extend their hegemony over the Hutu…The Belgians went further. In the 1920s they introduced a system of identity cards specifying the tribe to which a holder belonged.”6 The Hutu-Tutsi mutual destruction was virtually ignored by helpless and ineffective African nations and also by Western countries, including the United States. The genocide did not take place in Rwanda only as popularized in Hotel Rwanda; it had taken place in neighboring Burundi in 1965, 1972, 1988, and in 1996 although the world was almost unaware of these massacres except for the Gitega Province massacre on July 25, 1996 that was covered by the Western media.

The Apartheid regime imposition of ‘passes’ on the African indigenous population in South Africa was reminiscent of the Belgian ID cards in Rwanda and Burundi. Similar Ids known as Mehlefi (literally ‘pass’) were also implemented in Eritrea to distinguish Ethiopian residents from Eritreans. These yellow passes designated to Ethiopians, however, were not only meant to identify Ethiopians, but also to serve vigilantes to terrorize, harass, and physically attack innocent Ethiopians. What happened to Ethiopians in Eritrea is a manifestation of the excesses of ethno-nationalism, and as I have indicated in my article, ‘Ethnocentric Politics and Reinforcing Psychology in the Ethiopian Context,’ “the emotional dynamics of ethno-nationalism…could breed particular mode of self-orientation that, in turn, sustains generic psychological predisposition, and it could be dangerous if it is permitted to evolve from insipid and innocuous manifestations to the most venomous practices.”7 

Since the ascendance of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to power in 1991, the government came up with the idea of ethnic demographics that would divide Ethiopia along linguistic lines. Thus, we have now nine major regional states (recognized in the constitution as ‘nations’) demarcated on the basis of languages. One of the newly formed regions is the Afar State for the people who speak Óphir or Afarigna. By the same token Oromia for the Oromo; Tigray State for Tigrayans and Amhara State for the Amharas etc. I personally supported the self-determination of nationalities or ethnic groups in enabling them to flourish their culture and autonomously run their local governments. The present Ethiopian constitution, however, goes beyond self-determination and recognizes the right of the artificially forged ‘nations’ to secede from the Ethiopian body politic. This is a dangerous premise and proposal and it entails a ticking bomb that could go off anytime and dismember Ethiopia. To be sure, the majority of the Ethiopian people do not embrace the formation of ethnic states, but ironically Diaspora Ethiopians have wittingly organized themselves along ethnic affiliations. So, one cannot always blame the government as if it is the sole actor in ethnic politics.

The new ethnic politics in Ethiopia, nevertheless, have had a wide-ranging impact on the psychology of Ethiopians at home and abroad. In the Oromia region, for instance, the local administrators, professionals, and businessmen don’t welcome other ethnic groups from other regions and they are reluctant to speak Amharic (the official language which is now viewed as language of the oppressors). In the Diaspora, we have now associations of Amharas, Tigrayans, and Oromos etc. although these groups sometimes find themselves in all-Ethiopian gatherings or conferences. Incidentally, as pointed earlier, the degeneration into sub-regions was inevitable. Thus, we have now Gonder Development Association instead of Amhara Development Association. Likewise, in lieu of Union of Tigrayans in North America (UTNA) or Tigray Solidarity, we now witness the proliferation of minuscule associations of Shire, Irob etc. and alumni associations such as Atse Yohannes, Queen Sheba, and Agazi. These associations, I gather, are not ill motivated and don’t have sinister agendas but their very structure and composition impede inclusiveness and diversity and thus are condemned to serve local and narrow interests only.

The most serious and worrisome aspect of Ethiopian ethnic politics has been reflected in various ethnic clashes, and in the long run I believe localism would have a far-reaching negative consequence on the Ethiopian nation. It is not exactly known who the culprits or perpetrators are behind the ethnic clashes, but antagonistic skirmishes were tried time and again since 1991. The Oromo-Amhara clash in the Harar area and later two times in Wellega; the ‘terrorist’ bombings of Tigray Hotel, Lalibela Hotel and other series of bombings; the murder of Ethiopian priests by unknown “Islamic” groups; and the recent Oromo-Konso clashes are but some examples of dress rehearsal for a major conflict that can plunge Ethiopia into a blood letting civil war.

Global Political Economy, Food Crisis and Famine: The global political economy is clearly characterized by unequal partnership between Northern industrialized nations and the bulk of the poor Third World countries. To be sure, in between the two extremes, we have now the so-called newly industrialized countries (NICs) and relatively speaking they are doing very well, but given the current global political economy structure, they are not guaranteed either. In 1997, for instance, the world witnessed the Asian Tiger collapse and as I have observed in my essay, Africa and the New World Order, in the same year the IMF came to the rescue by providing 36,893,000,000 to the Asian countries of South Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.8 

Neither the NICs nor poor African countries can be salvaged by the myth of comparative advantage that is so often taken for granted in economics journals and academic lectures. Comparative advantage incidentally is contradiction in terms in an unequal partnership of trade. When I say ‘unequal trade relations’, I am not thinking only in terms of Africa and the West (including Japan), which is obvious. What is not so obvious is the prevalence of inequality among the European Union (EU) itself. This reality is well substantiated by Egbert Wever’s cogent observation in his article entitled ‘Globalization and the Changes in Europe’s Landscape’: “The main European corridor in manufacturing and related services still runs from northern Italy, through the southern and western part of Germany, the eastern and northern part of France, Flanders and the western part of the Netherlands, to England.”9 

Therefore, in the context of Wever’s observations Africa’s negative encounter in the global economy is not at all surprising. In fact, at the Uruguay Round of agricultural negotiations, African countries and other Third World nations were deliberately excluded by a EU-US partnership. Moreover, the World Trade Organization (WTO) many times acted as a countervailing force against African countries’ trade interests, especially in agricultural products. In effect, the WTO promoted a neo-colonial type of unprotected African agricultural produce vis-à-vis unfettered subsidies of the industrial North. In other words, the market price of African products were left to the whims of Northern corporations while at the same time, Africa as in the olden colonial period became the dumping place for American, European, and Japanese products, and as of recent to Chinese products. 

Does this mean, however, Africa is at the periphery and hence at a disadvantage solely because of Western cynical policies? Not quite! As has been discussed earlier, Africa’s problems are also the result of wrong development strategies and wrong priorities drafted and implemented by corrupt and myopic leaders. With the exception of very few countries like Botswana, Mauritius, and Tunisia, and to some extent South Africa, the majority of African nations are at the very bottom when evaluated in terms of GDP and human development index (HDI). At the very outset when Africans gained independence, even the relatively progressive leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana were poised at enriching themselves and their cohorts at the expense of the poor people. At the other end of the continuum were kleptomania leaders like Mobutu Sese Seko who stole the public purse without shame. In fact, they considered stealing from the national budget as virtue and bragged about it! In between the two extremes were leaders who were engaged in lavish expenditures and good examples of this latter type of leaders are the former president of Gabon Omar Bango who spent $500 million for his palace and the former president of Cote d’ Ivoire, Houphouet Boigny who squandered millions and millions of dollars for his mausoleum. 

The other major problem African leaders could never overcome is their inability to design and implement diversified economic policies. A significant number of African leaders, for instance, emphasize on agriculture –led development, which is fine if viewed superficially. But they ought to recognize first that development entails a whole package (agriculture, health, infrastructure, industry etc.) as opposed to monoculture. Moreover, African leaders must realize that agriculture is an integral part of industry. Of course, there is nothing wrong in prioritizing agriculture in Africa, for at least 80% of the people live in the rural areas. But the question remains, what kind of agriculture? With respect to agriculture, again African leaders seem to have embraced a distorted notion of agriculture-led rural development, and wittingly or unwittingly they wanted to promote commodity and cash crop production at the expense of food crop production and here lies the crux of the matter and the causes for recurring famines. 

Lack of diversification, and on the contrary fixation on commodity and cash crop production is best exemplified by Tanganyika’s (later Tanzania) considerable plummeting of sisal market due to demand of synthetic fabrics; West Africa’s dependence on peanuts; Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire’s dependence on cocoa; Senegal’s heavy dependence on groundnuts; and the contagion of commodity (especially flowers) production that has now afflicted African countries like Ethiopia and Uganda. Ethiopia has gone further in its emphasis of cash crop production at the expense of food crop production and the 2008 famine should not be surprising. However, until this tragedy is countered by sound development agenda that can defeat famine once and for all, relief aid should be extended to the famine victims in Ethiopia.

In its formative years, the EPRDF government of Ethiopia had adopted agriculture-led industrial development with priority given to rural development, and that was a sound development strategy. In recent years, however, the initiative has been undermined by a cash crop mania. One famous and traditional Ethiopian cash crop that could play a pivotal role in foreign exchange or fair trade balance is coffee. But Ethiopia cannot depend on coffee alone for its development. The other distorted priorities in cash crop at the expense of food crop are the recent proliferation of strawberry, eggplant, and silkworm plant farms that have already created havoc to the livelihood of Ethiopian farmers and peasants. 

The current global food crisis is precipitated by a number of factors, including the slippery slope of the dollar, and it could have a far-reaching impact on poor countries and more so on famine-ravaged countries like Ethiopia. But the food crisis should not preoccupy African policy makers and it should not be a stumbling bloc in the overall development agenda and in overcoming famine once and for all. One reliable solution in defeating famine is a comprehensive development program as I have suggested in one of my works in 2001:

“African economic policy makers must seriously consider the following fundamental notions in macroeconomics: 1) identification and exploitation of Africa’s natural resources; 2) develop and expand the domestic technology; 3) enhance production efficiency; 4) promote the development of human power. Number 1 is a precondition to number 2 and Africa is blessed with natural resources, specifically with strategic minerals; and number 2 will necessarily lead to the expansion of manufacturing industry, which the Continent lacks at present, and needs it to empower itself in the global economy. And it goes without saying that one cannot imagine a successful manufacturing industry without production efficiency (number 3) to which the World Bank proposal boils down. 
The development of human power, an offshoot of human resources development should entail modern scientific and technological knowledge, training and education pertaining to infrastructure which ultimately facilitates a diversified commodity production. 
Unless Africa designs a comprehensive and highly diversified mode of production, it will not make a breakthrough in its development agenda, and finally the Continent must come to terms with its ubiquitous lack of accountability and transparency on the part of respective governments. This is the political dimension of development and without which macroeconomic agenda cannot materialize.”10 

Interestingly and to my pleasure, a year after I suggested ‘development policy shift for Africa,’ a meeting of African ministers of agriculture took place at the FAO headquarters in Rome, Italy to consider the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) initiated by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The latter “gives high priority to agriculture and food security,” recognizes the importance of “vigorous large-scale community-based programmes to improve the performance of small farms throughout the continent,” and “it looks to the example of the Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) launched by FAO as one approach to achieving sustainable food security.” At the same time, however, NEPAD critically examines “the role of small farmers in achieving higher levels of food household and national food security [and] is not intended to imply that there is not a role also for large-scale farms in Africa’s future agricultural development. While such development, usually led by the private sector, can contribute importantly to economic growth, it tends to have fewer linkages within the rural economy and hence less of a multiplier effect than development driven by small-scale farmers.”

The most relevant part of NEPAD’s program to our present discussion is ‘Strategies to Reduce Food Insecurity’ that is doable but was not effectively implemented by famine-prone countries like Ethiopia and a significant number of other African countries that have been distracted by commodity and cash crop production. In order to reduce poverty and eliminate famine, the poor African countries are best advised to seriously consider or re-consider NEPAD’s program succinctly put as in the following:

“There is an emerging consensus that a) economic growth is essential for sustainable poverty reduction, provided that socially acceptable resource distribution mechanisms are put in place to combat poverty, b) as long as large numbers of people remain hungry, the quest for economic growth will remain illusory, and c) in most developing economies, agriculture growth has a stronger positive impact on poverty and hunger reduction in both rural and urban areas than growth in other sectors, because of its potentially strong multiplier effects due to numerous backward and forward linkages. In a continent where significant development resources from both local and external resources are often diverted to emergency needs for food, one element of the strategy must be addressing the emergencies. Simultaneously, interventions should promote higher productivity.”11 

All the developments programs and strategies that we have discussed above would, of course, become meaningless if they are not meaningfully designed to empower the poor farmers throughout Africa. At the outset NEPAD’s CAADP should be producer-driven and labor-driven. The African farmers could enjoy real empowerment if they are organized in the form of cooperative consumers and decide the fate of their own produce and neither governments nor opportunist merchants should play the role of middlemen to take advantage of farmers’ toil. In its ‘world development report 2008’, the World Bank underscores the enhancement of the performance of producer organizations: “Collective action by producer organizations can reduce transaction costs in markets, achieve some market power, and increase representation in national and international policy forums. For smallholders, producer organizations are essential to achieve competitiveness. They have expanded remarkably rapidly in number and membership, often in an attempt to fill the void left by the state’s withdrawal from marketing, input provision, and credit, and to take advantage of democratic openings allowing greater civil society participation in governance. Between 1982 and 2002 the percentage of villages with producer organizations rose from 8 to 65 percent in Senegal and from 21 to 91 percent in Burkina Faso. The Indian Dairy Cooperative Network has 12.3 million members, many of them landless and women, and they produce 22 percent of India’s total milk supply.”12 

Notes

1. Ghelawdewos Araia, ‘Africa in the Global Economy: Aid, Debt, and Development’ in Globalizing Africa, Malinda S. Smith (ed), Africa World Press, 2003, p. 199
2. Hedley Bull, ‘The Idea of International Society’ in Phil Williams et al, Classic Readings of International Relations, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California, 1994, pp. 2021
3. Joseph Harris, Africans and their History, Meridian, 1998, p. 248
4. Institute of Development and Education for Africa (IDEA), ‘Ethiopian Territorial Integrity Should be Guaranteed at All Times’, IDEA Press Release, November 25, 2004
5. Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 2005, pp. 155-56 
6. Martin Meredith, Ibid, p. 158
7. Ghelawdewos Araia, ‘Ethnocentric Politics and Reinforcing Psychology in the Ethiopian Context’, www.ethiomedia.com/release/ethnocentric_politics.html
8. Ghelawdewos Araia, ‘Africa and the New World Order’, African Link, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1998
9. Egbert Wever, ‘Globalization and the Changes in Europe’s Economic Landscape’ in The Dialectics of Globalization, Menno Vellinga (ed), Westview Press, 2000, p. 227
10. Ghelawdewos Araia, ‘Development Policy Shift for Africa’, African Link, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2001
11. NEPAD, ‘Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme’, November 2002, chapter 4, p. 1 and p. 3
12. World Bank, World Development Report 2008, p. 14

All Rights Reserved. Copyright © IDEA, Inc. 2008. Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia can be contacted for constructive and educational feedback at dr.garaia@africanidea.org