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The
objective of this article is to critically examine
the overall thesis of Meles Zenawi’s paradigm
shift with respect to African development. It is,
in effect, an overview of the theme under
discussion and the tenets and points of view
incorporated in the preliminary draft presented by
Meles Zenawi (henceforth MZ), the Prime Minister
of Ethiopia.
From
the outset, however, I like to warn readers not to
impregnate a misconception of the oneness of
political proclivity (or ideological faith) and
personal theoretical observation. As far as I am
concerned I like to delineate (and cautiously
de-link) what Meles has stood for so far –
irrespective of his future commitment – and what
he presented to the public now. I am interested in
the latter, and it is in this spirit that I like
to critique African Development: Dead Ends and
New Beginnings. It is difficult to try to
dissociate ones political devotion (especially for
a head of a state) and his relatively scholarly
thesis or presentation of an historical account.
But if one can read and critique My Life and
the Progress of Ethiopia without bias to
Emperor Haile Slassie (the author of the title),
one can definitely read MZ’s ‘Dead Ends and
New Beginnings.’ Reinforcing my argument
further, I like to simply state, if we want to
learn anything, we must pay attention to the
information to be learned irrespective of who
provides it.
I
have no doubt that most Ethiopians have burning
curiosity why MZ came up with a comprehensive
development analysis at this point in time. I too
share this curiosity. However, I like to step a
little ahead and catalytically catapult the
‘forbidden knowledge’ into a permissible
curiosity. Whatever is produced and whoever
delivers it must be evaluated in the context of a
permissible knowledge. Let me, therefore, dissect
and thematically highlight MZ’s thesis.
The
leitmotif of MZ’s thesis is paradigm shift from
neo-liberal to a ‘democratic developmental
state.’ His work, by and large, favors
government intervention in the economy and the
prioritization of rural development. In the first
part of Chapter I, thus, he argues, “government
created rent does not necessarily have to be
socially wasteful. It becomes wasteful only if
solely self-interested maximizing individuals use
it to create wealth at the expense of society and
only if the state is incapable of improving on the
market – i.e. there are no market failures.”
Well said, but there is a problem in terms of what
currently plagues the African state.
Out
of the 53 African countries, it is believed that
only 15 are relatively democratic and less
corrupt. Actually, the “self-interest maximizing
individuals” have virtually strangled the public
purse and, thus, the preponderance of the
predatory state in Africa is not surprising. It
has to be clear, however, that the
“self-interested individual” that catapulted
the capitalist development in Europe is markedly
different from the self-interested corrupt African
officials. The former was essentially progressive
(in light of overall historical development) while
the latter is inherently regressive and
anti-development.
It
does not really matter whether the wealth makers,
the early harbingers of capitalist development, or
the kleptomania of the African state are few in
number. After all, in most instances, history has
been influenced and shaped by few individuals.
Hence the Pareto Principle, aka the 80-20 rule or
the law of the vital few or the principle of
factor sparsity, is whereby 80% of the
consequences are fashioned by 20% of the causes.
Therefore, the rule-of-thumb application
determines the fate of a given political economy
in spite of the laudatory proclamation of
democracy (government by the people).
MZ
has attempted to reconcile the dual nature of
self-interested individuals by stating, “only
individuals with a blend of self-interested and
non self-interested behavior can create a night
watch man state, and such people are equally
capable of creating a state which intervenes in
the economy in the larger interest of society.”
I
don’t see any problem with the above utilitarian
sounding argument. In a nutshell, a watchman state
can be forged in Africa, but the question remains
how and when? Is there any fertile ground for the
formation of such state, especially if examined in
light of domestic fragility and global cynicism?
In
Chapter 2.5, the author stipulates
“technological capability accumulation as
central to developing countries as it is to
developed countries.” But he also acknowledges
that “the neo-liberal assumption of efficient
competitive markets has no basis in fact or in
theory” vis-à-vis accelerated economic growth.
Again, this is a correct argument. However, beyond
the limitations of the neo-liberal paradigm, we
must also seriously consider the impact of
incidents such as terrorism on technological
transfer towards Africa. The incidence engendered
as a result of terrorism could be debatable, but
corroborating this grim scenario, Sidney Morse
indicates, “most experts believe the drop of
capital flows like FDI are tied to the bust in
technology sector world wide.”1
Additionally, the use of information
technology must be complemented by a sustained
flow of big data. That is a plus but not adequate
by itself. The political leadership must have a
quality of doggedness, endurance, and perseverance
in the effective implementation of appropriate
technology.
In
Chapter 4, the author argues that ‘agriculture
is the engine of growth’ and taken in a
historical context, this line of reasoning is
indisputable. He further extrapolates that
“equity accelerates the adoption and diffusion
of agricultural technology. Equity plays a vital
role in the establishment and strengthening of
market support and other rural organizations and
institutions. Equity enhances the linkage between
agriculture and non-agriculture and increases the
multiplier effect of agricultural growth on the
growth of non-agricultural and structural
transformation. Equity facilitates the
accumulation of social capital which in turn plays
a critical role in accelerating development.” I
cannot agree more! Distributive justice is indeed
vital to development if the latter is perceived as
social welfare and not simply as economic growth.
But, how is equity applied, implemented and
sustained? Where will the huge finance come from
to garner (subsidize) the effective utilization of
equity? The government policy-planning spectrum
should seriously consider such grand agenda as
equity! Otherwise, the talk on equity and other
justice-related concepts will only prove a
watered-down version of our engagement or remain
spectacularly implausible as to lack of their
credibility.
Before
the discussion on equity, however, the author
clearly puts the failure of the neo-liberal
paradigm as is egregiously felt in agriculture,
and countries that followed such a paradigm are
“mired in poverty traps.”
We
have known all along that development-oriented
institutions have fostered glib definitions or
superficial techniques in relation to poverty
reduction. If Ethiopia indeed is going to overcome
poverty once and for all and eliminate famine for
good, it should meet the challenges of
agricultural globalization whereby new
agricultural countries (NAC) have been made to
specialize only in exporting “labor-intensive
and off-season exotic fruits (bananas, pineapples)
vegetables (tomatoes, cucumbers) and fresh cut
flowers (roses, lilies)”2
for the industrialized world market.
In
Chapter 6 and under 6.3, in regards to the
developmental state, MZ argues “…behavior does
not depend on the size of the state on the degree
of its activism in economic matters but on the
nature of the state…” There is no doubt that
the nature of the state is of prime significance,
but size also is equally important. For instance,
country x endowed with natural resources and
visionary leadership is better off than country y
with strategic minerals and bad leadership. Lets
assume that x and y are of the same size. Another
hypothetical country z that enjoys the same
blessings as country x happens to be tiny and thus
plays a secondary, if not insignificant role in
regional and world history. Georgia will not
exhibit significant clout in international affairs
as Russia would; same logic applies to
Vietnam/China and/or Togo/Nigeria. Ethiopia is a
big country in the Horn of Africa and it could
play a significant role in regional and
continental politics. It must reckon with its
potential!
In
the same chapter, MZ argues, “development is a
political process first and economic and social
process later.” This is a clear departure from
the neo-Marxian thesis of economic determinism,
and by design or by default it happens to be
plausible. I myself have entertained the primacy
of politics in development in many of my previous
writings. The Italian political scientist Gaetano
Mosca is credited with developing the primacy of
politics in society, or more specifically with
developing the theory of elitism or the political
class. Mosca
actually anticipated a universal theory of
political society. For Mosca, elites are not
hereditary and with this reality in mind, he
foresaw a ‘circulation of elites’ in a given
political party or a governing entity. He further
argued that the circulation is manifested in a
dialectical theory of constant competition between
elites, with one elite group replacing repeatedly
over time.
The
Mosca phenomenon is clearly lacking in Ethiopia as
is conspicuously absent in most African nations.
How is it possible, thus, MZ’s developmental
state would meaningfully realize its agenda in the
absence of a democratically circulating elite?
Unless MZ and his close associates are ready to
revamp and overhaul the Ethiopian state, there is
no way a developmental state could be realized.
MZ
argues that ‘historical practice have shown that
state intervention has been critical in the
development process. Economic theory has shown
that developing countries are riddled with vicious
circles and poverty traps that can only be removed
by state action.’
In Africa in the Global Economy, I
have thoroughly examined the role of the state in
African development and indicated that even world
institutions like the World Bank have acknowledged
the positive role states can play in development.3
In
Chapter 7, the author discusses the importance of
democracy with reference to the experience of
Northern Italy and he makes the following factual
and interesting remarks: “In the North there is
a very dense network of civic organizations of all
types and an individual is usually a member of a
number of them at the same time. Such networks are
horizontal and based on mutuality. People actively
participate in public affairs. There is a large
measure of trust. People assume and expect that
the law will be obeyed by everyone.
People including politicians are relatively
honest. Politicians and the people value equity
and tend to seek mutually beneficial solutions,
they do not take politics as a zero-sum game.”
How
is Mr. Zenawi going to reconcile the virtual
absence of democracy in Africa with the rich
democratic culture in northern Italy? Moreover,
the Ethiopian political landscape of the last
fifteen years have not witnessed a climate of
democracy and tolerance, and unless MZ is
anticipating a democratic Ethiopia of the future
and his associates and himself are ready to lay
the cornerstone for such a future, zero-sum
politics will continue unabated in Ethiopian
political culture.
In
fact, MZ himself argues, “it is therefore the
developmental state that will have to prepare the
ground and accelerate development at the same
time.” But, again, do we have the requisite
elements in Ethiopia for such groundwork? As far
as I am concerned and as I have indicated in one
of my works entitled Humanizing the Ethiopian
Political Culture4, the Ethiopian
phenomenon clearly demonstrates that our
rationality is bounded and our adaptability
limited. Put otherwise, there is no fertile or
conducive groundwork for launching the
developmental state. Although I may welcome the
rationality of MZ and similar thoughts must be
encouraged as standard operating procedure, we
must recognize that we need to decidedly engage
ourselves practically to foster democracy in
Ethiopia. This may sound abstract and impractical
but I have attempted to clarify the notions,
elements and characteristics of democracy in many
related articles that I wrote in the past.5
As
I have indicated earlier, the main thrust of
MZ’s work is rural development. He says, “we
have argued that widespread and relatively
equitable ownership of assets is a requirement for
accelerated development. It is clear [that]
accelerated agricultural development will have to
include commercialization, it cannot be based on
sustaining subsistence farming.” That is a fair
and just statement, but more specifically what
will happen to poor farmers in due course? Will
the developmental state salvage the poor peasant
from poverty through subsidy of provisions or
wittingly let them disappear gradually? It is
quite apparent that commercialization of
agriculture entails relatively robust mechanized
agriculture that would effectively brush aside
poor farmers that are bound in their primordial
small plots of land. The poor farmers could be the
‘unfortunate class in history’ unless the
developmental state seriously considers their
fate. On the other hand, unless the peasants are
made partners to commerce agriculture (graduating
from their abject poverty to a new hybrid of
wealth creating middle class farmers!), the entire
edifice of the developmental state could be a
romantic enterprise.
At
the end of Chapter 7.4, MZ again entertains the
justification for the formation of the
developmental state. Very much like Gaetano Mosca,
he argues that ‘policy stability and continuity
could be achieved even when parties regularly
replace each other in governing the country,’
but he also tells us that ‘such a situation is
very unlikely to emerge in a developing country.
He further argues, “The most likely scenario for
a state that is both democratic and developmental
to emerge is in the form of dominant party or
dominant coalition democracy.”
I
personally am opposed to a ‘dominant party’
theory and am in favor of a ‘dominant
(preferably, ‘strong’) coalition democracy.’
‘Dominant’ insinuates dictatorship;
‘strong’ implies a solid foundation for a
coalition that is inclusive and ready to launch a
broader democracy. Moreover, as I have discussed
in Political Culture in the Context of
Contemporary Ethiopian Politics, “the best
solution…does not lie with extremes; it lies in
the middle of the continuum where political rivals
enter a covenant for a greater good of the nation.
In effect, they compromise a deal in order to
fashion a comprehensive, yet accommodating
national agenda that, in turn, secures
cooperation, transformation, and stability.”6
The
Asian Tigers as effective interventionist states,
and of course their success stories, are discussed
in Chapter 9 through Chapter 13. Their
‘miracle’ success especially in agriculture is
emphasized. Whether Ethiopia and other African
nations can emulate the Tigers remains to be seen,
but we must also underscore the unique historical
circumstances that enabled the Tigers to succeed.
In
Chapter 14 MZ discusses ‘the genesis and crisis
of the predatory state in Africa,’ and this is a
fine expose of the marginality and disadvantaged
status of Africa. Due to European hegemony,
African marginality and subsequent distortion of
African history by the colonialists, the world got
the impression that Africa was a recipient and not
a giver of civilization. That this was not the
case was thoroughly discussed in my article
entitled Modernism, Post Modernism and
Afrocentrism: Meanings forEthiopia.7
In
17.1, agriculture under economic reform is
discussed and more so the necessity of
agricultural technology is emphasized and the
failure of the neo-liberal paradigm is
re-emphasized in this respect. When it comes to
financing the agricultural projects of the
developmental state, we are confronted by African
marginality and conundrum of globalization. Unless
adequate finance is secured for rural/agricultural
development, it is impossible to even witness the
initial stage or kick-start in agriculture.
In
17.3, not to my chagrin but to my pleasant
surprise, MZ said the following: “Unless a
country has sufficient infrastructure, an educated
and healthy work force, world-class managers and
professionals and well functioning support
institutions, it is unlikely to attract much FDI.”
In
the last fifteen years, I have argued all along
that the EPRDF government needs to attract
Ethiopian intellectuals and professionals and
utilize their expertise and talent. So far, I have
not witnessed the use of Ethiopian professionals en
masse for nation building, notwithstanding the
few and far in between favored officials that hold
ministerial positions and other portfolios. If the
Meles regime is indeed in favor of ‘educated and
healthy workforce, world-class managers and
professionals,’ it should openly extend its
hands to all Ethiopians, especially those who are
scattered all over in the Diaspora. Irrespective
of our differences and political inclinations, I
personally like the government of Ethiopia to
reach out fellow Ethiopians who are willing to
contribute for the transformation of their country
and the welfare of their people. I am making this
kind of clarion call not for my own selfish
interest, but for the sake of my beloved
motherland.
To
be sure, the unexploited experience of Ethiopian
intellectuals and professionals potential is
tremendous, and if the Meles developmental state
is going to bear fruit and meaningfully uplift
Ethiopia, its agenda should be grasped not only
conceptually but also at a gut level emotionally.
In
21.2, the author expounds ‘the possibilities for
the success of the democratic developmentalist
paradigm.’ In this Chapter, one argument that
made uncomfortable, but sounds logical
nonetheless, is the following: “if developmental
states are to emerge in Africa they will emerge
and succeed not only because the neo-liberal
paradigm has visibly failed but also because the
global environment and the domestic environment
are permissive of such a development, if not
conducive to it.”
Firstly,
MZ does not substantiate the permissiveness of the
global and domestic environment; secondly, I am of
the opinion that neither the Ethiopian domestic
environment nor the global climate is favorable
yet for the take-off of the developmental state.
My argument is based on two factual realities: 1)
as I have indicated in many of my writings,
Ethiopians as a whole were unable to liberate
themselves from quid pro quo politics; they were
unable to make a transition from feudal bravado to
a bold democratic platform (such as dialogue,
peaceful coexistence, and negotiated settlements
of disputes). For this cultural predicament, the
government, civic leaders, opposition parties, and
Ethiopian intellectuals are responsible; 2)
globalization has yet to prove that it is indeed
meant to benefit African economies. It may have
created some economic opportunities and new vistas
in development agendas, but it has also served as
a remote control for somewhat invisible
corporations (without accountability) against
African interests. There is no doubt that Africa
was better off during the Cold War era than during
the colonial period; it could have been better off
now compared to the Cold War times. But the
“permissive attitude of the major powers” is
untenable and unpalatable to me insofar the
lingering cynicism and bias against Africa
continues.
Interestingly,
although MZ sounds optimist in his argument of
permissive environment he seems to share my own
stance when he states, “the external environment
is, however, not rosy from the point of view of
democratic develpmentalism.”
Another
interesting argument that MZ brought forth and
that reflects the current Ethiopian reality is the
following: “there are vested interests who
benefit from the current dysfunctional system that
are likely to vigorously oppose the new paradigm.
The rent-seeking business, the “ethnic
entrepreneurs” who have used ethnicity as a
means of accessing state power and accumulating
personal wealth, many of the domestic “NGO and
VO entrepreneurs” who have used domestic NGOs
and voluntary organizations as instruments of
patronage and personal welfare, if not wealth
accumulation, are likely to at least initially
vigorously oppose the democratic develeopmentalist
paradigm.”
If
MZ is thinking about his own Ethiopia and its
problems and is ready to use the broom at his
disposal to clean the mess, that would be a step
in the right direction. If the concept of the
‘vested interest’ is conjured metaphorically,
however, the realization of a developmental state
could be remotely conceptualized and not
implemented practically.
Chapter
21.3 is about ‘steps in the direction of the
African Renaissance.’ The author states that
‘developmental states come in all shapes and
sizes and therefore there cannot be a single blue
print for all democratic developmentalist states
in Africa.” This is absolutely right. To begin
with, Africa is highly diverse in terms of size,
culture and historical experience. This reality
apparently presupposes that Africa as a whole
should not be compared to the Asian Tigers.
Moreover, the blue print of the developmentalist
state should first be experimented at individual
countries level or at regional level (like ECOWAS
or SADC).
Under
the same sub-chapter, the author tells us, “in
the end leadership is bound to play a critical
role…” to realize the developmental state
agenda in Africa. In relation to leadership, we
must reckon with the hard fact that quality
leadership seriously matters. By quality
leadership, I don’t mean that all leaders in the
government be erudite and intellectual, but I
strongly believe that a visionary, committed, and
patriotic leadership is prerequisite to the
effective implementation of the developmentalist
state. Incidentally, MZ has been emphatic on the
problem of ethnic-based political patronage
through much of the body of the text of his work.
However, like most African nations Ethiopia
suffers from political patronage and unmistakably
from ethnic-based politics. It is for this
apparent reason, therefore, that I suggested
earlier the PM of Ethiopia need to clean up his
mess before he ventures on the grand agenda of the
developmental state.
In
this sub-chapter, the author explicitly tells us
that ‘the rural areas are crucial to the success
of democratic developmentalism…rapid and
sustained development in African countries will
crucially depend on agriculture.’ While this
reasoning reflects the realities for most African
countries, it does not necessarily apply for some.
As pointed out above, Africa is diverse and
priorities for countries are most certainly
variegated. For instance, Egypt, a country that
depends solely on the Nile, could not possibly
adopt same rural development agenda as Ethiopia
does. Similarly, Botswana’s priority in
development has been mining industry instead of
agriculture.
As
far as I am concerned, Botswana is one of the
earlier developmental states in Africa and I like
to share with the PM, my Ethiopian readers, and
the general African audience what I wrote about
Botswana in “Africa in the Global Economy:”
“Botswana’s
success lies in its implementation of a
diversified economy and its commitment both to
democratic governance and to a strong private
sector through its Financial Assistance Policy (FAP)
that made the country a major exporter of goods,
which, in turn, guaranteed independent linkage
with the global economy. Botswana’s commitment
to the corporate sector is, of course, directly
linked to the country’s political commitment to
ensuring democratic governance that includes an
effective partnership between the state, the
private sector, and civil society. In fact,
Botswana has consistently committed itself to
alleviating poverty and to expanding public
education and primary health care. As a result of
its on going success, Botswana is now depicted as
‘the brightest spot’ and/or ‘the jewel that
shines brighter’ on the African continent.”8
Finally,
MZ emphasizes the strengthening of the state, the
establishment of new institutions, and the
effective state intervention in addressing market
failures. “A fundamental transformation and
building up of the state,” says MZ “is thus
bound to be a central tenet of the paradigm.”
Furthermore, he states, “the state will have to
be strengthened primarily by transforming it from
the locus of personal wealth accumulation to an
effective instrument of restructuring the playing
field and enforcing the new rules of productive
investment.”
It
is in light of the above statement that I have
made recommendations time and again so that
Ethiopia adopt a policy of non-partisan inclusion
of Ethiopian intellectuals and professionals.
Whatever
the merit of the developmental Ethiopian state of
tomorrow, it seems to me that the regional states
and local governments should be the bulwark for
the implementation of the policy and development
agenda of the central government. Lets assume the
central government is like an octopus with an
overlooking head and strong tentacles. The rural
areas in Ethiopia, thus, should serve as strong
(empowered) tentacles and not as weak detachments.
Otherwise, the entire edifice of the developmental
state will collapse ignominiously.
The
developmental state should not only be an
interventionist, monitoring, gargantuan apparatus.
On the contrary, it should serve as a platform for
citizen involvement in the political process and
nation building. It should relentlessly seek
feedback from the masses if indeed the latter are
going to be the massive backbone and bulwark for
state policy and actions.
Finally
and most importantly, the developmental state
should purposely foster tolerance and encourage an
ambience where a myriad of ideas can be propagated
and flourished. As I have stated in many of my
previous writings, state policy, like science and
other enterprises, is a gregarious business and it
is by interacting with other people and by
clashing ideas that one could get a satisfactory
result for a sound development agenda. After all,
the developmental state is a system and not an
individual phenomenon.
Some
people may perceive the MZ thesis as some form of
re-emergence from obscurity; others could surmise
that the author’s insight may have appeared
slowly, in separate disconnected flashes that may
have taken years to coalesce into a coherent idea.
The above conjectures could be true, but in spite
of the various assumptions I like to reason that
any initiative must be evaluated at face value and
given the benefit of the doubt. My only fear is
that the MZ agenda, like plethora of AU, ECA, UN,
WTO etc. proposals and rounds before it, could
encounter the fate of a crashing tree in a forest
when there is no one to hear its sound. Unless
there is a committed leadership and a reservoir of
audience ready to cooperate in the making of the
developmental state, all policy recommendations
pertinent to development will evaporate in thin
air. Lets wait and see for the implementation and
fruition of the developmental state in Ethiopia.
Notes
- Sidney Morse, “How Will
Sub-Sahara Africa Technology Transfer and
Investment Fare in a Post September 11 ‘New
World Order,’” African Link, Vol.
10, No. 3, 2001
- Korbla P. Puplampu,
“Globalization of Agriculture: Lesson From
Ghana,” in Malinda Smith (editor) Globalizing
Africa, African World Press, 2003, page
386
- Ghelawdewos Araia,
“Africa in the Global Economy: Aid, Debt,
and Development,” Globalizing Africa,
Ibid, pages 190-95; see also Ghelawdewos
Araia, “Africa’s Place in the Global
Economy,” www.africanidea.org/critcal.html
- Ghelawdewos Araia,
“Humanizing the Ethiopian Political
Culture,” www.africanidea.org/humanizing.html
- Ghelawdewos Araia,
“Designing Continuum to Enrich Ethiopian
Educational Discourse and Debate Culture,” www.africanidea.org/designing.html
and “Education for Tolerance: Sustainable
Dialogue for Human Dignity,” www.africanbidea.org/tolerance.html
- Ghelawdewos Araia,
“Political Culture in the Context of
Contemporary Ethiopian Politics,” www.africanidea.org/political_culture.html
- Ghelawdewos Araia,
“Modernism, Post-Modernism and Afrocentrism:
Meanings for Ethiopia,” www.ethiomedia.com/newspress/modernism_040705.html
Dr.
Ghelawdewos Araia can be contacted at ga51@columbia.edu
for educational and constructive feedback.
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