ZIMBABWE
: From Party-Mobilizing to Monopolistic-Hegemonial
Regime
Ghelawdewos
Araia
May
6, 2008
This
essay examines the current political crisis in
Zimbabwe and discusses why Robert Mugabe wants to
cling to power and perpetuate a monopolistic-hegemonial
regime even after staying in power for almost
three decades.
Modern
Zimbabwe (colonial Southern Rhodesia) got its name
from dzimba dzamabwe, meaning ‘great
stone buildings’ in the Shona language. Between
1200 and 1450 AD, an African civilization of stone
masonry coupled with unique cylindrical fine
architecture thrived in this part of the
continent. Modern Zimbabwe is the product of a
14-year armed struggle that began in 1966 and led
by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of
Robert Mugabe, a Shona and Zimbabwe African
Peoples Union (ZAPU) of Joshua Nkomo, an Endebele.
Following
the 1979 Lancaster House peace agreement in
London
between ZANU/ZAPU and the Ian Smith white minority
government,
Zimbabwe
became formally independent in April 1980 and
Robert Mugabe became its first Prime Minister and
later its president. In the formative period of
the newly constituted Zimbabwe, Mugabe sought
reconciliation rather than confrontation with his
old enemies and even included in his cabinet white
ministers who were part of the Ian Smith
government. Also in the 1980s, Mugabe presided
over a party-mobilizing regime, with a socialist
agenda, and in many ways similar to Julius
Nyerere’s Tanzania, Sekou Toure’s Guniea, and
Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana. This honeymoon of
reconciliation with the remnants of the former
white regime and the ZAPU partners (old
comrades-in-arms of ZANU), however, will soon be
eroded. In fact the party-mobilizing regime soon
gave way to Mugabe’s new monopolistic and
hegemonial regime, and this type of regimes are
characterized by centralization of power attendant
with powerful but corrupt bureaucracy. Moreover,
although monopolistic hegemonial regimes advocate
abstract notions such as ‘justice’ and employ
fuzzy concepts like ‘democratic-centralism,’
in reality they rule by an iron-fist and do not
tolerate opposition whatsoever. Ultimately, thus,
political operations are strictly guided by the
executive (the legislative is reduced to rubber
stamp approvals) whereby the prime minister and/or
the president monopolizes power by becoming the
head of state, head of government,
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and chair
of plethora of departments and government
agencies. Such was the fate of Zimbabwe under
Mugabe, but it is imperative to examine in some
detail the complex political landscape of Zimbabwe
in order to fully fathom the current crisis.
Mugabe’s
present behavior had already been manifested as
early as November 1980 when his cronies and ZANU
officials began portraying ZAPU’s Nkomo as the
enemy of the people of Zimbabwe and charged the
ZAPU members with ‘plot’ against the
government. As expected, in February 1981, with
ZANU provocation, bloody conflict ensued in an
armed clash in the Bulawayo of Entumbane
(stronghold of ZAPU) that killed about 300 people.
This unfortunate event led to Shona vs. Endebele
ethnic strife and the Mugabe group, with
government apparatus at its disposal, obviously
had the upper hand. On top of this, the Ndebele
are 16% of the population as opposed to 71% of the
Shona, and this demographic factor was additional
curse on the Nkomo group. Despite the public
knowledge of the false charges and unfounded
allegations directed against Nkomo by the Mugabe
government, ZAPU was undone with and politically
destroyed by pre-planned government actions.
Subsequently, Nkomo was thrown out from the
government and his property confiscated; a
significant number of ZAPU fighters who were
integrated into the national army now became easy
prey to the Mugabe army. Some of them, who managed
to escape the killings and beatings of the
marauding government gangs were turned into
roaming bandits and armed robbers; others flee to
neighboring Botswana, reorganized themselves and
started resistance afresh against Mugabe and the
operations of these armed combatants continued
till 1984 in the Matebeleland, the traditional
Ndebele kingdom area in the south western part of
Zimbabwe.
In
the wake of ZAPU disintegration, Mugabe
successfully reinforced his party ZANU – PF
(Patriotic Front) and installed strict curfew
measures against dissidents and his so-called Five
Brigade, a special government force, was assigned
to monitor the activities and movements of ZAPU
fighters. The ruthless Five Brigade, in
collaboration with Mugabe’s secret police
virtually turned Matebeleland into an army
occupied vast camp and rounded up and detained
close to 8,000 Ndebeles. By the end of 1987, Nkomo
was forced to sign the so-called Unity Accord, by
which his already maimed ZAPU was to be integrated
with ZANU – PF in lieu of amnesty.
ZANU
– PF, now, has not only become the sole dominant
party that monopolized political power in
Zimbabwe, but also became a convenient vehicle for
the party officials and loyal bureaucrats to loot
the public purse, to systematically amass wealth,
and own property. Under these circumstances, as
pointed out earlier, a new dominant party elite
and a protégé to Mugabe emerged; many new
millionaires also emerged at the expense of
millions of destitute of Zimbabweans. In fact, by
1990 cabinet ministers and high-ranking military
officials became extremely rich by owning new
lands formerly owned by rich white farmers. The
propaganda of ZANU – PF of resettling poor
African farmers in fertile lands increasingly
became clear to the people that it was a scheme to
manipulate the masses and rather benefit the new
elite.
In
the absence of ZAPU and the ascendance of a
one-party state, Mugabe thought that he would
remain unchallenged, and ignored the plight of the
poor farmers and the unemployed multitude.
However, Zimbabweans initiated a new struggle of
opposition under former ZANU member Edger Tekere,
the leader of a new party Zimbabwe Unity Movement
(ZUM) in 1990. ZUM participated in the 1990
elections despite intimidation from Mugabe’s
forces and managed to secure 20% of the votes
although many of ZUM members including the
secretary, Patrick Kombayi were murdered. In 1992,
Mugabe prohibited electoral financial support to
the opposition and without hesitation he made
funding eligible for ZANU only. The Zimbabweans
relentlessly continued their struggle and another
opposition, known as the Forum Party, under the
leadership of Enoch Dumbutshena was founded in
1992. In the forthcoming election of 1996,
however, the Forum Party has already undermined
itself with infighting and its inability to reach
out other opposition forces and hence was a
propitious moment for Mugabe to be re-elected
uncontested. Nevertheless, Mugabe did not win the
1996 election because of the weaknesses of the
opposition but because all anti-Mugabe forces
opted to boycott the election.
From
1992 to 1998, there were food shortages in
Zimbabwe as a result of the inability of the
corrupt officials to run and maintain the newly
acquired mechanized farms. Ironically, the once
breadbasket Zimbabwe turned into a typical third
world food handout country. Thus, in 1998, the
food riots in
Zimbabwe
became the real headache to the Mugabe government
and again the government blamed the whites for the
food shortages; it was meant to camouflage rotten
government policies that resulted in corruption,
massive unemployment, and the breakdown of the
social system, which, in turn, triggered
hyperinflation in the country’s economy.
By
September 1999, in the spirit of ZUM and Forum
Party, Zimbabwean professionals, civic groups and
trade unionists, determined to challenge the
monopolistic-hegemonial regime, formed the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Morgan
Tsvangirai, from the trade unionists, became the
leader. MDC leaders proposed constitutional reform
to restrict the president only to two terms in
office and Mugabe, apparently agreed to the
formation of a constitutional commission, but he
soon started campaigning against the MDC. The
government media, in an effort to cover up
Zimbabwe
’s economic and social ills and distract the
people of
Zimbabwe
began blaming the Bretton Woods institutions,
Britain
, and the Whites who are now portrayed as forces
behind the MDC. To the uninitiated Zimbabwean,
‘MDC is the making of the Whites,’ and
Tsvangirai is their ‘running dog.’ Thus,
during the 2000 elections, MDC members were
intimidated and attacked by government forces, but
despite the government terrorist attacks the MDC
won the majority of the ballots in the urban
areas, mainly Harare and Bulawayo (two major
cities of Zimbabwe) and ZANU – PF claimed to
have won the rural areas, which incidentally was
difficult to verify the results. At any rate, the
official reports indicated that ZANU – PF won 62
seats and MDC 57 seats in 48% to 47% of the votes
respectively.
The
neck-to-neck of ZANU – PF and MDC in the
election results made Mugabe increasingly uneasy
and paranoid, and true to his nature he again
unleashed terrorist squads to attack and murder
MDC officials, members and supporters. Thousands
of MDC members were forced to flee their homes and
the government charged Tsvangirai with treason.
With
the above background, we can now better fathom the
29 March 2008 election, which has spurred so much
controversy and attracted world public opinion.
This time, Mugabe was not completely successful in
destroying the MDC group; in fact, if at all
Mugabe survives the 2008 elections it would be
only because of the splinter factions within the
MDC. If the MDC high-ranking officials and leaders
managed to iron out their differences and unite
and mobilize their forces against Mugabe, they
will win the day in the forthcoming ‘run-off’
elections.
According to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC),
Tsvangirai got 47.8% of the votes and Mugabe
43.2%, and as far as I am concerned this ZEC
leakage to the international media and approved by
Mugabe is very suspicious. Intuitively, I believe
the MDC have won by a wide margin although Mugabe
may have come by a treachery of make believe
story. In any event, ZEC, in effect a government
agency, inadvertently declared Tsvangirai as the
winner. But, Mugabe, far from conceding defeat,
has now proposed the run-off elections, in which
case both men will compete again. Paradoxically,
run-off elections can be conducted only in an
event where the competing candidates are in a dead
end of complete tie.
We
shall see what will happen in the run-off
elections! It seems to me, however, that Mugabe
could prevail only if he deploys all his secret,
army, and police forces all over Zimbabwe. This
last political ditch may not work for Mugabe this
time for three reasons: 1) Mugabe and his cronies
are not as young and energetic as they were in the
early 1980s; the wear and tear has taken a toll;
2) the bulk of the Zimbabweans, who got the brunt
of the crisis, are sick and tired of the
monopolistic regime; 3) Zimbabwe has now virtually
became a desolate and isolated country in an
increasingly globalized and interacting world, and
the only hope for Zimbabwe’s resurrection is the
MDC and other progressive Zimbabweans.
Either
the post- run-off election can herald a new era
for
Zimbabwe
with Morgan Tsvangirai as its new president or it
could ignite a bloodletting arena where the MDC
could yet encounter the fate of its predecessor
opposition parties. Any setback in the MDC may
give a new opportunity for Mugabe to consolidate
but it is going to be temporary. But if Tsvangirai
wins, he should not employ retributive politics
against Mugabe and the ZANU – PF officials
although he may carry out justice in a non-violent
manner. Tsvangirai and the MDC should move on,
resurrect Zimbabwe from the abyss, and uplift
Zimbabweans materially and spiritually, and this
would be a return to African ethos of regeneration
and renewal.
All
Rights Reserved. Copyright © IDEA, Inc. 2008. Dr.
Ghelawdewos Araia can be contacted for educational
and constructive feedback via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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